Is Ukraine about to have a war?
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I don't know enough about CGI\Photoshops\editing etc to make a call . But I do remember seeing pics from sevastopol last week (
) or so showing the rus ships had painted their hull numbers out with grey, and the video seems to show a hull number ( well blurred white area in the right place) ... so I am not optimistic especially.
Also the view angle is changing very rapidly , I am sure a Bayraktar pic would be much clearer at the necessary range for that degrees\sec rate.
Also the view angle is changing very rapidly , I am sure a Bayraktar pic would be much clearer at the necessary range for that degrees\sec rate.
Last edited by Usertim; 6th May 2022 at 16:28.
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Those poor folks in Mariupol… BEWARE GRAPHIC injuries, one just hopes they get them out and treated, none of them seems to be complaining at their lot though. 
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Yes
An excellent read on the modernisation of the Ukrainian military to the quality they are today and the failings of the Russian one.
https://www.thebulwark.com/i-command...ainian-armies/
An excellent read on the modernisation of the Ukrainian military to the quality they are today and the failings of the Russian one.
https://www.thebulwark.com/i-command...ainian-armies/
Yes
An excellent read on the modernisation of the Ukrainian military to the quality they are today and the failings of the Russian one.
https://www.thebulwark.com/i-command...ainian-armies/
An excellent read on the modernisation of the Ukrainian military to the quality they are today and the failings of the Russian one.
https://www.thebulwark.com/i-command...ainian-armies/
I came across some footage of the inside of a captured Russian vehicle earlier, full of detritus and badly maintained. The real eye opener was a car battery on the floor powering who knows what with wires wrapped around its terminals that were also crudely joined without insulation.
Not in the slightest, theres one there pretty much every day, only unusual thing thing is it got replaced by another one for the night shift. Normally they dont have 24 hour coverage (or at least the night shift doesn't broadcast ADSB)
Apart from the IR images, I expect the Admiral Makarov will glow in the dark.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Leaked Captain’s status report from Moskba before she was sunk. HMS Sheffield redux reference Satcom….
twitter images of the frigate are questionable. The aspect rate of change would relate to a short slant range that is inconsistent with video quality by any means. The vertical offset also makes a sudden jump that is not consistent with a drone. Why would a drone fly within .51 cal range to get such a poor image? compared to a recent video at apparently 4 times the range that had very high clarity?
The smoke on the horizon is consistent with a possible strike on something, or another bad wiring day.
The smoke on the horizon is consistent with a possible strike on something, or another bad wiring day.
The Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) sensor on NOAA-20 recorded fire in the middle of the Black Sea, some distance south of Snake Island, at N44E030. That may have been someone having a bad day.
Please where did these 2 : 1 or `1 :1 figures come from?
The historical combat [or civil disaster] ratio gets near to 3:1 does it not? Both World Wars throw up similar figures for many scenarios.
British army, all arms of service, Great War:
[The teeth arms in actual combat were nearer 4:1]
1914 : 1 killed to 2.39 wounded ( officers, 1 to 1.24 ; men, 1 to 2.47 )
1915 : 1 killed to 2.83 wounded ( officers, 1 to 1.77; men, 1 to 2.89 )
1916 : 1 killed to 2.69 wounded ( officers, 1 to 2.22; men , 1 to 2.72 )
1917 : 1 killed to 2.43 wounded ( officers, 1 to 1.78 ; men, 1 to 2.46 )
1918 : 1 killed to 3.04 wounded ( officers, 1 to 2.72 ; men, 1 to 3.06 )
The historical combat [or civil disaster] ratio gets near to 3:1 does it not? Both World Wars throw up similar figures for many scenarios.
British army, all arms of service, Great War:
[The teeth arms in actual combat were nearer 4:1]
1914 : 1 killed to 2.39 wounded ( officers, 1 to 1.24 ; men, 1 to 2.47 )
1915 : 1 killed to 2.83 wounded ( officers, 1 to 1.77; men, 1 to 2.89 )
1916 : 1 killed to 2.69 wounded ( officers, 1 to 2.22; men , 1 to 2.72 )
1917 : 1 killed to 2.43 wounded ( officers, 1 to 1.78 ; men, 1 to 2.46 )
1918 : 1 killed to 3.04 wounded ( officers, 1 to 2.72 ; men, 1 to 3.06 )
The ratio of KIA-DOW v WIA varies from case to case, on the types of arms employed, location, and capability of the combatants, i.e., Russia's experience in Afghanistan was different from 10 years later in Chechnya, and is different to that experienced today, and is quite different to 1917.
The Russians today employ their doctrine of using combined arms based around battle groups, which are heavily weighted towards armored warfare, AW. Against civilians and soft targets, AW can be effective assuming that there is food and gas for the AW units. Confronted by PGM and P/G-ATW's the AW becomes problematic, and the current crop of self-immolating MBT/IFV's. The Russians actually had a big part in developing casualty clearing protocols historically, which is a bit of a surprise, there is more evidence in recent times of soldiers dumping their fallen associates beside the road and replacing them with washing machines than taking buddy care to heart. (there is one video of a squad looking after each other, but there is a lot more of the guys running around the wounded to get away...) The analysis of Russian casualty handling in Grozny seems markedly different to today, and the fact that accurate ATWs are being faced in the field as well as the historical low point in manpower quality and quantity suggest that Russia is having a hard time of it. It is also true that the Russians are suppressing media about casualties and little is being reported, except for the info leaks from field hospitals in Belarus that indicate that a considerable number of casualties are occurring and ending up in field hospitals.
As far as historical rates go for KIA-DOW/WIA, the figures that are available from studies indicate variability from unity to 5:1.... the current studies indicate that it is problematic to be able to predict the actual case rates, even where there is no qualitative change in the type of conflict occurring. Some long term assumptions still hold true however, mainly that artillery is devastating, tankers have a high loss rate if hit, and urban warfare is deadly. The recent studies include Korea, Vietnam, 73 war, Chechnya, Afghanistan (russia, USA) Iran-Iraq, Gulf 1, Gulf 2, amongst others.
The following are related to US souces.
The Russians took heed of Chechnya in part...
"The paper reports that combat in the city produced different sets of casualty rates and patterns than those normally experienced by the Russians. It supports this statement by quoting “Red Cross statistics for limited conflict” as usually reflecting 23% wounded by mines, 26% from bullets, 46% from shrapnel, 2% from burns and 3% from miscellaneous. In the fighting for Grozny, there was a higher incidence of burns and the majority of wounds were caused by mortar fire. (This appears to reflect the Red Cross figures of 46% shrapnel.) The majority of those killed were wounded in the head and upper body by snipers and shrapnel. It would appear that this number also includes those unprotected by helmets and ballistic vests, including civilians. The paper also notes a figure of three killed for every one wounded. . Medical evacuation was often made difficult and dangerous by snipers". (Leitch, 1997, referring to Grau et al, 1997)
MEDICAL LESSONS LEARNED BY RUSSIANS [then forgotten]
Russian military personnel emphasized the following points regarding combat in Chechnya: ·
- As the enemy became better armed, the proportion of shrapnel wounds to gunshot wounds increased. ·
- Mine injuries became a major threat ·
- Mine injuries presented multiple and complex injuries which were very difficult to manage. ·
- In urban operations, evacuation particularly by helicopter was always difficult and dangerous. ·
- Armored ambulances were required for protection. ·
- Ambushes made even armored vehicle evacuation risky and slow. ·
- Despite the risks, air evacuation is still the preferred means of evacuation away from an operational area. ·
- Preparation for air medical evacuation needs to start in peacetime. ·
- More and better evacuation helicopters were needed during the war. ·
- A STOL medevac aircraft of the AN 72 type was sorely needed to operate forward, but from secure airfields out of range of direct urban combat. ·
- The need for a treatment capability at Echelon 2 of the traditional medical company configuration, i.e. capable of triage, resuscitation and stabilization for evacuation was questionable in the type of operations conducted around Grozny in particular. ·
- Evacuation in this type of operation is from Battalion Aid Stations direct to hospital by air. ·
- The need for “life and limb saving” surgical intervention far-forward was considered urgent enough to deploy forward surgical teams at the Regimental Medical. ·
- Well trained and equipped medical personnel need to be located as far-forward as possible. ·
- Medical resources in far-forward units and sub-units need re-enforcement ·
- Ground evacuation utilizing armored vehicles but not lightly armored ambulances appears the best option from far-forward combat areas. ·
- Burns, sniper wounds, and shrapnel wounds appeared to be the major injury patterns in Grozny. ·
- Medical units deployed far forward need extra physical protection and should be dug in or put in basements.
How many of the above-recommended practices are compromised by the Russian situation in Ukraine today?
Why consider a lower rate of KIA-DOW/WIA for Russia in Ukraine at present than the 1914-1918 rates?
The data of confirmed vehicle losses gives a total fatality case number that even using optimistic survival rates matches closely the Ukrainian estimates (the Russian numbers bear no relation to the vehicle losses, and are discounted as propaganda for home consumption). The numbers that remain are so low that high rates of injuries to fatalities would have more combat troops out of action from the total of KIA, DOW, & WIA than exist in the 170 odd BTG's that are fielded, so can be considered to be unlikely. There is a rate of return to theatre of operations that can occur, but given that the conscripts have an apparent lack of enthusiasm for the adventure, that would be a fairly low rate in a "Special Military Operation" which is not subject to martial law at present.
Takeaway:
The current battlespace is devastating for troops in AW units, the current mix of ATW/P/G-ATW/Drone spotted artillery is causing high loss rates of AW units, and the fatalities in each loss is a high percentage from the type of systems employed.
References:
Blood, C.G., Anderson, M.E., The Battle for Hue: Casualty and Disease Rates During Urban Warfare, 159(9): 590-595,1994.
Blood, C.G., Jolly, R., Comparisons of Disease and Nonbattle Injury Incidence Across Various Military Operations, Military Medicine, 160 (5): 258-263, 1995.
Blood, C. G., Zouris, J. M., & Rotblatt, D. (1997). Incorporating adversary-specific adjustments into the Ground Forces Casualty Forecasting System (FORECAS) to project casualty sustainment (Report No. 97-39). San Diego, CA: Naval Health Research Center.
Bruce-Briggs, B., Suburban Warfare, Military Review, 54:3-10, 1974.
Carey, M.E., Learning From Traditional Combat Mortality and Morbidity Data Used in the Evaluation of Combat Medical Care, 152 (1): 6-13, 1987.
Chuykov, V.I., Street Fighting-The Lessons of Stalingrad, Military Review, July: 95-99, 1944.
Dupuy, T.N. (1990). Attrition: Forecasting battle casualties and equipment losses in modern war. Fairfax, VA: Hero Books.
Gofrit, O.N., Leibovici, D., Shapira, S.C., The Trimodal Death Distribution of Trauma Victims: Military Experience from the Lebanon War, Military Medicine, 162(1):24-26, 1997.
LTC (Ret) Lester W. Grau and Dr William A. Jorgensen D.O. Handling the Wounded in a Counter-Guerrilla War: The Soviet/Russian Experience in Afghanistan and Chechnya. Foreign Military Studies Aug 97
Hardaway, R.M., Vietnam Wound Analysis, Journal of Trauma, 18(9):635-643, 1978.
George W.S. Kuhn, Ground Force Battle Casualty Rate Patterns, Logistic Management Institute, 1991
Colonel (Retd) RA Leitch MBE RGN Dr. HR Champion F.R.C.S (Edin) F.A.C.S. Dr. JF Navein MB ChB M.RC.G.P. Analysis of Casualty Rates & Patterns Likely to Result from Military Operations in Urban Environments, CWL/TechMed/11/97
Mabry, E.W., Munson, R.A., Richardson, L.A., The Wartime Need for Aeromedical Evacuation Physicians: The U.S. Air Force Experience During Operation Desert Storm, Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, October : 941-946, 1993.
Rogov, M., Pathological Evaluation of Trauma in Fatal Casualties of the Lebanon War, 1982, Israel Journal of Medical Sciences, 20:369-371, 1984.
Yheskel, B., Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)—Medical Aspects— Lebanon War 1982—A Case Study
Last edited by fdr; 7th May 2022 at 08:33.
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I suppose that is what you get when you declare war without telling your military, so they have no time to bring their vessels up to combat readiness.
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twitter images of the frigate are questionable. The aspect rate of change would relate to a short slant range that is inconsistent with video quality by any means. The vertical offset also makes a sudden jump that is not consistent with a drone. Why would a drone fly within .51 cal range to get such a poor image? compared to a recent video at apparently 4 times the range that had very high clarity?
The smoke on the horizon is consistent with a possible strike on something, or another bad wiring day.
The smoke on the horizon is consistent with a possible strike on something, or another bad wiring day.
The Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) sensor on NOAA-20 recorded fire in the middle of the Black Sea, some distance south of Snake Island, at N44E030. That may have been someone having a bad day.
Apparently not only the landing craft, but the SAM system it was carrying...
IG
Last edited by Imagegear; 7th May 2022 at 09:43.
So it looks, sadly, as though the story about Admiral Maskarov wasn't true. There's nothing about it on the mainstream media (CNN, BBC, Guardian) - the BBC had an item but it seems to have disappeared. And the +1 ship probably applies to this landing craft.
Rob Lee highlights a post from the Wagner Group on their views of declaration of war by Putin. They say that only masses of infantry win wars.
Moscow Times report that russian state enterprises are recruiting mobilisation and wartime experts,
"Vacancies seeking experts in "wartime mobilisation readiness and training" began appearing on the popular jobs platform Headhunter over the past week"
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/...reports-a77605
Like the russian blood banks arriving at the frontline a week or two before the invasion, this is a sign that mobilisation and declaration of war by Russia is coming in the near future. Probably preceded by a false flag attack to galvanise the russian demos
World War III, here we come.
Moscow Times report that russian state enterprises are recruiting mobilisation and wartime experts,
"Vacancies seeking experts in "wartime mobilisation readiness and training" began appearing on the popular jobs platform Headhunter over the past week"
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/...reports-a77605
Like the russian blood banks arriving at the frontline a week or two before the invasion, this is a sign that mobilisation and declaration of war by Russia is coming in the near future. Probably preceded by a false flag attack to galvanise the russian demos
World War III, here we come.
How many more thousands will have to die to save Putin’s face?
It took some 11 years for the US to lose some 60,000 (including MIA) in Vietnam, say 500 / month or 120 / week.
The Russians have now lost some 24,000 in the last 10 weeks - 2,400 / week, some 20 times the US loss rate in Vietnam.
That the Russian public is still not in full hue and cry over these losses testifies to Russian news suppression
The Russians have now lost some 24,000 in the last 10 weeks - 2,400 / week, some 20 times the US loss rate in Vietnam.
That the Russian public is still not in full hue and cry over these losses testifies to Russian news suppression
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Film of the, not so mighty T90, the one they took out earlier.