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Tucumseh,
Points accepted and my apologies as the suggestion of a generic MOD thread was not intended to remove your views from the thread. However, threw my inarticulateness you may have misunderstood the thrust of my original comments. Your example and the the point I tried to make was that the SFS and the 760(in your case) were raised by the responsible front line engineering unit. Had the leak in the fuel system been 'well known' at the time there would be corporate knowledge of the leak either documented in the F700 or in the ADS( for instance if the leak was accceptable an entry in the LAD or a leaflet in the 2(R)1. The idea that numerous individuals ignored it through a general acceptance is just too shocking to believe.
The suggestion that DV appeared to be making was that it was 'well known' and ignored by all and sundry (including the crews!) and not for the first time on this thread where the insinuation has been made about engineers on the aircraft not being responsible. This is patently wrong in my opinion, irrespective of the decisions made by Range Managers that they do not understand or even attempt too, the robustness of the airworthiness system is only as good as the diligence of those personnel who daily perform the maintenance on the aircraft. To suggest, however inadvertently, that they would ignore fuel leaks anywhere does not do the purpose of this thread any good whatsoever.
Tapper's Dad,
sir, be careful of the trust you show in the statistics, as pointed out above they are often raised for all manner of reasons and not all are for the reasons included in the DASC answer. Also and I am nitpicking here but didn't the MR2 fleet only reach 16 aircraft late in 94 and for a long period of the time mentioned the actual size of the fleet was 25 aircraft. This will no doubt change the number of incidents, but that is neither here nor there. Here are 2 potential scenarios:
Example 1. Crew lands and Cptain reports that he has had an incident and wishes to incident report the RADAR. Responsible Engineers reply that this will have a Knock on effect on the turnround of the aircraft for the next Sortie. Captain replies, no no it's not a hazard and I'll aircrew accept the fault for the next trip. This means that this potential hazard to life, loss of aircraft may now not be investigated for upto 72 hrs.
Example 2 An aircraft has an aging, if not obsolete, Nav Aid but as the aircraft has only a short period until the end of life there is no money in the pot to replace it. At a user meeting it becomes apparent that all the stakeholders want to replace it and there is money available if a flight safety case can be made to replace it. The peice of kit then becomes subject to incident reports over many months if not years and eventually the case is made and the new kit is provisioned and fitted.
As you can see the raw data does not give info you require, the data needs to be crunched and the information extracted from there, sorry if this appears to be teaching you to suck eggs but the bald assertion of information does not make it a fact without understanding the context.
Points accepted and my apologies as the suggestion of a generic MOD thread was not intended to remove your views from the thread. However, threw my inarticulateness you may have misunderstood the thrust of my original comments. Your example and the the point I tried to make was that the SFS and the 760(in your case) were raised by the responsible front line engineering unit. Had the leak in the fuel system been 'well known' at the time there would be corporate knowledge of the leak either documented in the F700 or in the ADS( for instance if the leak was accceptable an entry in the LAD or a leaflet in the 2(R)1. The idea that numerous individuals ignored it through a general acceptance is just too shocking to believe.
The suggestion that DV appeared to be making was that it was 'well known' and ignored by all and sundry (including the crews!) and not for the first time on this thread where the insinuation has been made about engineers on the aircraft not being responsible. This is patently wrong in my opinion, irrespective of the decisions made by Range Managers that they do not understand or even attempt too, the robustness of the airworthiness system is only as good as the diligence of those personnel who daily perform the maintenance on the aircraft. To suggest, however inadvertently, that they would ignore fuel leaks anywhere does not do the purpose of this thread any good whatsoever.
Tapper's Dad,
sir, be careful of the trust you show in the statistics, as pointed out above they are often raised for all manner of reasons and not all are for the reasons included in the DASC answer. Also and I am nitpicking here but didn't the MR2 fleet only reach 16 aircraft late in 94 and for a long period of the time mentioned the actual size of the fleet was 25 aircraft. This will no doubt change the number of incidents, but that is neither here nor there. Here are 2 potential scenarios:
Example 1. Crew lands and Cptain reports that he has had an incident and wishes to incident report the RADAR. Responsible Engineers reply that this will have a Knock on effect on the turnround of the aircraft for the next Sortie. Captain replies, no no it's not a hazard and I'll aircrew accept the fault for the next trip. This means that this potential hazard to life, loss of aircraft may now not be investigated for upto 72 hrs.
Example 2 An aircraft has an aging, if not obsolete, Nav Aid but as the aircraft has only a short period until the end of life there is no money in the pot to replace it. At a user meeting it becomes apparent that all the stakeholders want to replace it and there is money available if a flight safety case can be made to replace it. The peice of kit then becomes subject to incident reports over many months if not years and eventually the case is made and the new kit is provisioned and fitted.
As you can see the raw data does not give info you require, the data needs to be crunched and the information extracted from there, sorry if this appears to be teaching you to suck eggs but the bald assertion of information does not make it a fact without understanding the context.
Bingo
Thank you.
“The idea that numerous individuals ignored it through a general acceptance is just too shocking to believe”.
While I know nothing (there I go again) of the “well known” Nimrod fuel problem, I have offered an example (involving 2 fatalities) where numerous individuals DID ignore prior warnings. Not generalised warnings, but very specific advice down to which LRUs and functionality to check. I found their refusal to act shocking. Unfortunately, I didn’t find it unbelievable, as it is all too common. As we have discussed, the processes and procedures are robust, but the human input is variable to say the least. The actions of the higher grades/ranks (or rather lack of action) set the tone. Junior staff, in what is a high turnover area given MoD personnel rules, learn what is “acceptable” and follow their “leader”. That is, they don’t rock the boat, can screw up big time, and advance. It is left to fewer and fewer experienced boat rockers to fight the good fight.
What has this got to do with Nimrod? (And Chinook and…….). Same people at the top. Same working practices, edicts and precedents. An example? You can trade out Performance (which includes safety/airworthiness, spares, training………) to meet Time and Cost. The procurement equivalent of a political soundbite. The common denominators I speak of.
In part, as Chug says, it is pressure caused by lack of funding, coupled with reluctance to challenge MoD policy. However, one can look at it the other way, given the same individuals have also ruled that challenging waste is a disciplinary offence, despite it being a legal obligation to PUS. (Again, conflicting and confusing rules and precedents). PM Brown has, apparently, called MoD a “metropolis of waste”. Absolutely right. Now he has the power to do something about it. If I were him, I wouldn’t give them a red cent more until what (and who) I speak of has been eradicated for good. Want £100M to make an aircraft safer (ESF, fuel leaks….)? It would take me 5 minutes to write as robust a case as you would ever see, identify the funding source, yet still maintain time, cost and performance on that source programme. In fact, I’ve done it and been ignored. (Same people again). £200M? 10 minutes I’m afraid as I’d have to check with someone. I’m only one person – MoD has around 10,000 doing this stuff day in, day out but are scared to act. Yes, shocking.
Thank you.
“The idea that numerous individuals ignored it through a general acceptance is just too shocking to believe”.
While I know nothing (there I go again) of the “well known” Nimrod fuel problem, I have offered an example (involving 2 fatalities) where numerous individuals DID ignore prior warnings. Not generalised warnings, but very specific advice down to which LRUs and functionality to check. I found their refusal to act shocking. Unfortunately, I didn’t find it unbelievable, as it is all too common. As we have discussed, the processes and procedures are robust, but the human input is variable to say the least. The actions of the higher grades/ranks (or rather lack of action) set the tone. Junior staff, in what is a high turnover area given MoD personnel rules, learn what is “acceptable” and follow their “leader”. That is, they don’t rock the boat, can screw up big time, and advance. It is left to fewer and fewer experienced boat rockers to fight the good fight.
What has this got to do with Nimrod? (And Chinook and…….). Same people at the top. Same working practices, edicts and precedents. An example? You can trade out Performance (which includes safety/airworthiness, spares, training………) to meet Time and Cost. The procurement equivalent of a political soundbite. The common denominators I speak of.
In part, as Chug says, it is pressure caused by lack of funding, coupled with reluctance to challenge MoD policy. However, one can look at it the other way, given the same individuals have also ruled that challenging waste is a disciplinary offence, despite it being a legal obligation to PUS. (Again, conflicting and confusing rules and precedents). PM Brown has, apparently, called MoD a “metropolis of waste”. Absolutely right. Now he has the power to do something about it. If I were him, I wouldn’t give them a red cent more until what (and who) I speak of has been eradicated for good. Want £100M to make an aircraft safer (ESF, fuel leaks….)? It would take me 5 minutes to write as robust a case as you would ever see, identify the funding source, yet still maintain time, cost and performance on that source programme. In fact, I’ve done it and been ignored. (Same people again). £200M? 10 minutes I’m afraid as I’d have to check with someone. I’m only one person – MoD has around 10,000 doing this stuff day in, day out but are scared to act. Yes, shocking.
Junior staff, in what is a high turnover area given MoD personnel rules, learn what is “acceptable” and follow their “leader”. That is, they don’t rock the boat, can screw up big time, and advance. It is left to fewer and fewer experienced boat rockers to fight the good fight.
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Look Bingo, I did not say "well known", it was the IPTL (Gp Capt) who made that statement. What I quoted in my earlier posting is as stated in the report on an SFS raised on 3rd Sept (one day after the crash) for XV255 follow AAR. If something is "well known" on 3rd, then it is reasonable, for any normal person, to think that it was known about before that date.
And, I am not saying that aircrew go off flying into the blue with fuel dripping from the airframe, but they will go if IPT says that certain defects are within newly defined limits. Ground ground crews will serice to the same limits. Operation Medusa started on 2nd Sept and it was important that Nimrods were available at that time. Using MoD's own definitions, unacceptable risks are tolerable under exceptional circumstances.
DV
And, I am not saying that aircrew go off flying into the blue with fuel dripping from the airframe, but they will go if IPT says that certain defects are within newly defined limits. Ground ground crews will serice to the same limits. Operation Medusa started on 2nd Sept and it was important that Nimrods were available at that time. Using MoD's own definitions, unacceptable risks are tolerable under exceptional circumstances.
DV
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DV. The incident you refer to on the 3rd of sept (cracked fuel pipe) did result in a SFS, however, the leak was discovered whilst the aircraft (XV255) was being ground refuelled, NOT following AAR. This was NOT a "well known" problem I can assure you. The SFS was raised literally within 1 hour of the leak being discovered which resulted in issue of a UTI to be carried out before "next flight" on the whole of the Nimrod fleet. The timing of the leak being found will always "spook" me, because if it had been found the previous day, IMHO, we would not be reading this thread because it wouldnt exist.
As for operation "Medusa" starting on the 2nd sept and the importance of the Nimrod being there, I can again assure you that the Groundcrew would not allow an unsafe aircraft to fly ( Even if "newly defined limits" where introduced). Flight Safety is Flight Safety no matter what the IPT say. Period.
RIP CXX/3
As for operation "Medusa" starting on the 2nd sept and the importance of the Nimrod being there, I can again assure you that the Groundcrew would not allow an unsafe aircraft to fly ( Even if "newly defined limits" where introduced). Flight Safety is Flight Safety no matter what the IPT say. Period.
RIP CXX/3
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Tuc
Once again you misunderstand me, I was suggesting that the guys who maintain the aircraft day to day would not ignore the problem over a period of time and then raise a serious fault signal. what happens after that is out of their control but it would be interesting to see what the reaction to the serious fault signal was rather than dealing in hypotheticals or other instances where the system failed, which we are all agreed is unacceptable.
Chugalug 2
I am not defending the indefensible, if the MOD has nothing to hide then independent regulation should prove no problem to them. However, if as you think there is a problem then they of course will resist it. Bear in mind the current concerns regarding the HSe and the lack of funding preventing their regulatory action and the fact that there are regular incidents in the civilian sector as well.
DV
You used the phrase 'well known' without contextualising it. To then claim that somehow there was a new limit in place (not the case) or that because of the op being carried out that there were blind eyes being turned or that faults outside the usual limits being carried is dangerous and without any foundation. Knowing the guys involved in the ground and having participated in many Ops and a number of conflicts in my personal experience, I have never seen or never heard about the military exemption being used and I would lay bets that no-one on the engineering side would sign of on such a fault. they are in the business of ensuring that people return as they are not just colleagues but friends. Indeed, many people have been described as obstructive for preventing commanders from carrying out their wishes because it compromises safety, is against procedures or is not allowed because of the release to service. I am sorry that the phrasing of the IPTL has allowed you to believe that their is more to this than serious fault found, repair underway, you might like to look at the other ac in light of the previous tragic event.
Once again you misunderstand me, I was suggesting that the guys who maintain the aircraft day to day would not ignore the problem over a period of time and then raise a serious fault signal. what happens after that is out of their control but it would be interesting to see what the reaction to the serious fault signal was rather than dealing in hypotheticals or other instances where the system failed, which we are all agreed is unacceptable.
Chugalug 2
I am not defending the indefensible, if the MOD has nothing to hide then independent regulation should prove no problem to them. However, if as you think there is a problem then they of course will resist it. Bear in mind the current concerns regarding the HSe and the lack of funding preventing their regulatory action and the fact that there are regular incidents in the civilian sector as well.
DV
You used the phrase 'well known' without contextualising it. To then claim that somehow there was a new limit in place (not the case) or that because of the op being carried out that there were blind eyes being turned or that faults outside the usual limits being carried is dangerous and without any foundation. Knowing the guys involved in the ground and having participated in many Ops and a number of conflicts in my personal experience, I have never seen or never heard about the military exemption being used and I would lay bets that no-one on the engineering side would sign of on such a fault. they are in the business of ensuring that people return as they are not just colleagues but friends. Indeed, many people have been described as obstructive for preventing commanders from carrying out their wishes because it compromises safety, is against procedures or is not allowed because of the release to service. I am sorry that the phrasing of the IPTL has allowed you to believe that their is more to this than serious fault found, repair underway, you might like to look at the other ac in light of the previous tragic event.
WCBH, thank you for your response to my call for Independent Regulation. Of course the MOD will resist it, so it would have to be irresistible would it not? The CAA airworthiness standards and regulation have not AFAIK been compromised by lack of funding, but others may know otherwise. There are always incidents, the trick is to stop them becoming accidents, or if not to prevent them from becoming repetitive accidents. The Civil track record in that regard is, I would avow, superior to the Military one. HSE are the ones, are they not, who have been funding the assessment of the incremental safety case for placing a towel on the bathroom floor to step onto when leaving the bath? A case there perhaps for subsuming them into the MOD, the synergies of waste are obvious!
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Dodgie sootie: Many thanks for that information. The SFS that I am reading confirms what you have stated; whilst refueling No5 tank. However, it does say that this was found "post AAR" sorties. It is understood that a sortie was flown on 3rd (day after the crash) and is assumed this was undertaken by XV255.
DV
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DV
There was no MR2 flight at all on 3 Sep. I was on on the first trip subsequent to the disaster which took place on the 4th. After the wake you definately wouldnt have found anyone sober enough on the 3rd!!
There was no MR2 flight at all on 3 Sep. I was on on the first trip subsequent to the disaster which took place on the 4th. After the wake you definately wouldnt have found anyone sober enough on the 3rd!!
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I'm not party to much of the FOI Act document that are being referred to although I have seen some very distburbing documents.
I am however an investigator by profession and have 10 years experience working to a high level within the civil service and I can assure you that when something stinks as much as this my experience tells me there is usually something rotten at the source.
Take the example of the cock-pit video from the UK jet that followed 230 down. I have been told by more than one Senior member of the RAF that it does not exist and indeed the MOD state that it does not exist. Yet, I have it on very good authority that it does exist, indeed even that it has been seen to exist. Now even if I step back as Tappers brother, as an investigator I want answers. I start to think ok so why would the MOD and RAF deny the existence of this recording yet reliable sources contradict them.
Ultimately the BOI may provide some answers but a veracious coronor, the FOI Act and people like my dad, DV, Tuc and Chug will ultimately get the answers that the authorities seem so keen to hold on to.
I am however an investigator by profession and have 10 years experience working to a high level within the civil service and I can assure you that when something stinks as much as this my experience tells me there is usually something rotten at the source.
Take the example of the cock-pit video from the UK jet that followed 230 down. I have been told by more than one Senior member of the RAF that it does not exist and indeed the MOD state that it does not exist. Yet, I have it on very good authority that it does exist, indeed even that it has been seen to exist. Now even if I step back as Tappers brother, as an investigator I want answers. I start to think ok so why would the MOD and RAF deny the existence of this recording yet reliable sources contradict them.
Ultimately the BOI may provide some answers but a veracious coronor, the FOI Act and people like my dad, DV, Tuc and Chug will ultimately get the answers that the authorities seem so keen to hold on to.
when something stinks as much as this my experience tells me there is usually something rotten at the source.....
Ultimately the BOI may provide some answers but a veracious coronor, the FOI Act and people like my dad, DV, Tuc and Chug will ultimately get the answers that the authorities seem so keen to hold on to.
Ultimately the BOI may provide some answers but a veracious coronor, the FOI Act and people like my dad, DV, Tuc and Chug will ultimately get the answers that the authorities seem so keen to hold on to.
For my own part, and more importantly for the purposes of this thread, there has surely been enough revealed here and on other threads to damn the MOD's custodianship of Miltary Airworthiness and Flight Safety Standards. It is sad to read about the rightful pride and professionalism in those who operate, maintain, and manage our military aircraft, including the MR2, who scrupulously maintain the standards of reporting and implementation placed upon them, when the higher command and their apparatchiks so contemptuously and arbitrarily renege on their own professional duty to them in return. My case, as said before, is to strip the MOD of this responsibility and place it with or alongside the CAA. Obviously there would be many problems, but they could be overcome and confidence in a reformed and reinvigorated Military Airworthiness process restored. Those who have served this system before will be best placed to comment here, whether they be ex BD, Main Building or wherever. Do not think because it worked in your day then it must work now. The shock of discovering that very very little of the RAF that I knew still survives, other than in the skill and bravery of its young men and women, has been profound. There is a chance here for all we BOFs to once again serve our country, I put it at no less than that!
Last edited by Chugalug2; 11th Aug 2007 at 16:21. Reason: words
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Just back from an important meeting in Scotland so I have beeen catching up with the postings .
dodgysootie
You said in your last posting that "I can again assure you that the Groundcrew would not allow an unsafe aircraft to fly"
I will let you into a secret and I quote
"Immediate actions taken post the crash of XV230 isolated potential sources of ignition in the Bomb Bay area pending the results of the ongoing BOI investigation. AAR was also withdrawn but in conjuction with RTSA, a sevice Deviation was released to give the Force Commander the operational flexibility to specifically authorize AAR sorties where overriding operational requirements exist."
Question. Why was AAR withdrawn
Answer . It is not deemed to be safe
Question . As AAR is considered not safe can the Groundcrew stop the ac from flying
Answer . NO the Force Commander has the operational flexibility to specifically authorize AAR sorties where overriding operational requirements exist.
dodgysootie
You said in your last posting that "I can again assure you that the Groundcrew would not allow an unsafe aircraft to fly"
I will let you into a secret and I quote
"Immediate actions taken post the crash of XV230 isolated potential sources of ignition in the Bomb Bay area pending the results of the ongoing BOI investigation. AAR was also withdrawn but in conjuction with RTSA, a sevice Deviation was released to give the Force Commander the operational flexibility to specifically authorize AAR sorties where overriding operational requirements exist."
Question. Why was AAR withdrawn
Answer . It is not deemed to be safe
Question . As AAR is considered not safe can the Groundcrew stop the ac from flying
Answer . NO the Force Commander has the operational flexibility to specifically authorize AAR sorties where overriding operational requirements exist.
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Question. Why was AAR withdrawn
Answer . It is not deemed to be safe
Answer . It is not deemed to be safe
My take on this is that AAR was withdrawn as a standard day to day practice as that was the activity that the crew had been doing just prior to the tragic accident. At that time all they knew was that until the BOI returned even an intermediate report (and maybe not even then) then no-one knew whether or not the AAR was linked in any way to the event or not. Other possibly linked actions were also stopped after the loss. AAR was not deemed to be unsafe simply deemed to be POSSIBLY linked, and hence stopped as a standard practice - just in case.
Why could AAR be carried out with certain authority? Because the guys have a real job to do and what they do directly effects the lives of guys on the ground! There are some cases where an aircraft is needed to stay on task longer than a non-AAR sortie will permit. Unfortunately with all the cuts in airframes, manpower (aircrew and ground-crew) and money for spares the fleet is simply unable to send aircraft after aircraft up, thus avoiding AAR. When one crew can be relieved by another then that happens, but it is not always possible.
Certain jobs will see the need to have someone on high take the serious decision as to whether AAR was linked to the accident or not and whether the need is greater than the possible risk. I am certain that decision is not taken lightly and have seen the request for AAR authorisation refused on several occasions. Imagine how the guy would feel if he decides that the task needs outweigh the individual needs, sends a crew flying on an AAR mission and a tragic event occurs due to them carrying out AAR!
Until there is a definite proven link between AAR and the loss of CXX/3 then it is a sad fact that sometimes risks have to be taken. The whole business of military aviating, especially during times of conflict, is risky and the crews are fully aware of that.
Several times I have seen your posts twist the information you have received because you are either too close to the whole thing, don't fully understand the information/terminology you read or both. I lost several good friends on CXX/3 but can't begin to imagine how you and other families must be feeling - but please try and look at the information you receive with an open mind and keep a balanced view.
MadMark!!!
TD: to answer the same questions a slightly different way from the text you quoted and what Dodgysooty wrote re ground crew:
Q: Why was AAR withdrawn
A: Standard procedure while we ascertain a source of ignition in the areas of possible fuel leaks and the possible reason for the fuel leaks and try to remedy as quickly and safely as possible.
Which was found and isolated pending the result of the BOI, according to what you wrote and a solution is/has possibly been ascertained.
Q: As AAR is considered not safe can the Groundcrew stop the ac from flying
A: Yes, they raise a 707B and state that the aircraft has a fuel leak and this needs to be rectified before flying, additionally, because of a what they found above, they can say we have found a source of ignition in a wiring harness and it will be fixed before we can safely sign the aircraft off, it would take a brave man as an engineering officer to say sign the card up and authorise the aircraft to go flying against the experience and advice from the groundcrew and results from the Immediate actions taken post the crash of XV230.
Again don't stop asking questions, but as has been said before there is a lot of Nimrod experienced aircrew/groundcrew, and ex of the same, who also want to help you with a resolution, but are trying to stop you going of in the wrong direction.
Q: Why was AAR withdrawn
A: Standard procedure while we ascertain a source of ignition in the areas of possible fuel leaks and the possible reason for the fuel leaks and try to remedy as quickly and safely as possible.
Which was found and isolated pending the result of the BOI, according to what you wrote and a solution is/has possibly been ascertained.
Q: As AAR is considered not safe can the Groundcrew stop the ac from flying
A: Yes, they raise a 707B and state that the aircraft has a fuel leak and this needs to be rectified before flying, additionally, because of a what they found above, they can say we have found a source of ignition in a wiring harness and it will be fixed before we can safely sign the aircraft off, it would take a brave man as an engineering officer to say sign the card up and authorise the aircraft to go flying against the experience and advice from the groundcrew and results from the Immediate actions taken post the crash of XV230.
Again don't stop asking questions, but as has been said before there is a lot of Nimrod experienced aircrew/groundcrew, and ex of the same, who also want to help you with a resolution, but are trying to stop you going of in the wrong direction.
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Exrigger & Mad_Mark
The information I posted was dated 29th October 2006 and not straight after the crash to the best of my knowledge using the information I have via the FOI, AAR can still only take place at the Force Commander's discretion and why are No 7 tanks not being used and why is the SCP not being used.
Perhaps you could give me an answer on those questions.
The information I posted was dated 29th October 2006 and not straight after the crash to the best of my knowledge using the information I have via the FOI, AAR can still only take place at the Force Commander's discretion and why are No 7 tanks not being used and why is the SCP not being used.
Perhaps you could give me an answer on those questions.
Last edited by Tappers Dad; 12th Aug 2007 at 11:04.
Key extract from above…………….
“Unfortunately with all the cuts in airframes, manpower (aircrew and ground-crew) and money for spares the fleet is simply unable to send aircraft after aircraft up, thus avoiding AAR”.
That is, front line is forced to change the risk assessment criteria that underpinned the MAR, RTS and associated SDs. TD, it’s called politics, and people who were previously perfectly sane are subtly given a “career brief on their brief career” if they don’t roll over. I think there are others here who would agree that if the role and/or use of the aircraft is changed for these reasons then an updated whole aircraft safety case is required. (I’d say mandated, but the procedural Def Stans don’t make allowance for such political interference. They were written in the days before airworthiness became optional). I’d almost guarantee a weakness the audit trail. The fallout is borne by operators and maintainers while those responsible advance and retire disgracefully.
“Unfortunately with all the cuts in airframes, manpower (aircrew and ground-crew) and money for spares the fleet is simply unable to send aircraft after aircraft up, thus avoiding AAR”.
That is, front line is forced to change the risk assessment criteria that underpinned the MAR, RTS and associated SDs. TD, it’s called politics, and people who were previously perfectly sane are subtly given a “career brief on their brief career” if they don’t roll over. I think there are others here who would agree that if the role and/or use of the aircraft is changed for these reasons then an updated whole aircraft safety case is required. (I’d say mandated, but the procedural Def Stans don’t make allowance for such political interference. They were written in the days before airworthiness became optional). I’d almost guarantee a weakness the audit trail. The fallout is borne by operators and maintainers while those responsible advance and retire disgracefully.
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Is AAR Safe on Nimrod?
In order to answer this question we need to define "Safe". Safe, according to MoD is a condition where risk has been demonstrated to have been reduced to a level that is broadly acceptable. Let us now examine the following chain of events:
22-11-04 XV227 returns with fractured hot air pie in SPC and a "cooked" No.7 tank (port)
03-08-05 Report issued, but some recommendations not carried out. Preventative maintenance/lifing policy yet to be announced.
02-09-06 XV230 crashes after AAR and bimb bay fire. Explosion in wing root.
03-09-06 Fuel leak from cracked fuel pipe dicovered on XV255. Serious Fault Signal (SFS) raised for incident.
04-09-06 Forward deployed aircraft cleared to fly after "visual inspection"
??-10-06 XV250 fuel leak, post AAR. Aircraft returned to Kinloss.
13-10-06 XV231 fuel leak, post AAR.
20-09-06 XV231 fuel leak. Aicraft returned to Kinloss.
21-10-06 RTI/NIM/173 issued. Calls for SPC to be isolated and draining of No. 7 tank (Pt and Stb) before flight.
29-10-06 SFS raised for XV250 and XV231
02-11-06 Initail report for SFS issued. Claims that XV255 problem was "well known" to IPT.
08-11-06 Air Incident Report raised by aircrew of XV260 for fuel leaks after AAR.
08-12-06 Air Incident Report raised by aircrew of XV232 for fuel leaks after AAR.
N.B. Would by useful to know what the make up off the 52 fuel faults were prior to the accident.
Now that chain of events, by any stretch of the normal imagination, does not demonstrates a level of risk that is broadly acceptable. Therefore, I must agree with Tapper's Dad; the AAR system, No.7 tank and the SCP are "unsafe" until proven otherwise, and isolation is not the answer. Safety has to be proven by evidence, not by the lack of it.
Finally, on the question of whether or not ground crews will sign off defective systems, and aircrews accept them, of course they will not. That, as I read it, is not the issue. If IPT carry out "risk management", which is influenced by the opertional environment, and state that the aircraft are acceptable to fly with tanks and SPC isolated, then the aircraft goes. Regardless of what aircrews and ground crews believe.
DV
22-11-04 XV227 returns with fractured hot air pie in SPC and a "cooked" No.7 tank (port)
03-08-05 Report issued, but some recommendations not carried out. Preventative maintenance/lifing policy yet to be announced.
02-09-06 XV230 crashes after AAR and bimb bay fire. Explosion in wing root.
03-09-06 Fuel leak from cracked fuel pipe dicovered on XV255. Serious Fault Signal (SFS) raised for incident.
04-09-06 Forward deployed aircraft cleared to fly after "visual inspection"
??-10-06 XV250 fuel leak, post AAR. Aircraft returned to Kinloss.
13-10-06 XV231 fuel leak, post AAR.
20-09-06 XV231 fuel leak. Aicraft returned to Kinloss.
21-10-06 RTI/NIM/173 issued. Calls for SPC to be isolated and draining of No. 7 tank (Pt and Stb) before flight.
29-10-06 SFS raised for XV250 and XV231
02-11-06 Initail report for SFS issued. Claims that XV255 problem was "well known" to IPT.
08-11-06 Air Incident Report raised by aircrew of XV260 for fuel leaks after AAR.
08-12-06 Air Incident Report raised by aircrew of XV232 for fuel leaks after AAR.
N.B. Would by useful to know what the make up off the 52 fuel faults were prior to the accident.
Now that chain of events, by any stretch of the normal imagination, does not demonstrates a level of risk that is broadly acceptable. Therefore, I must agree with Tapper's Dad; the AAR system, No.7 tank and the SCP are "unsafe" until proven otherwise, and isolation is not the answer. Safety has to be proven by evidence, not by the lack of it.
Finally, on the question of whether or not ground crews will sign off defective systems, and aircrews accept them, of course they will not. That, as I read it, is not the issue. If IPT carry out "risk management", which is influenced by the opertional environment, and state that the aircraft are acceptable to fly with tanks and SPC isolated, then the aircraft goes. Regardless of what aircrews and ground crews believe.
DV
Some EngOs can be rather too keen to sign things off...
Back when Wattisham was still a fine RAF fighter station, one of our F4s was due to go to St Athan for a major. Unfortunately the beast had some problem with its flaps which was proving a bugger to fix.
One Met Brief, OC Eng announced that he'd come up with a solution...
"We'll lock the flaps fully up and isolate the system", he grandly announced. At this, there was much muttering amongst the assembled aircrew, who all knew that the prospect of a flapless landing on a 6000ft RW was somewhat disturbing...
"It's OK - I'll volunteer to go in the back, if you like", he then announced.
"You can go in the bloody front as far as I'm concerned!" came a response from the floor. At this even the Stn Cdr, the excellent T**y P**k, laughed aloud. "I think we'll have another look at getting the flaps fixed, won't you", he said....
A bit of thread drift, but don't assume that all EngOs have as much safety sense as others!
Back when Wattisham was still a fine RAF fighter station, one of our F4s was due to go to St Athan for a major. Unfortunately the beast had some problem with its flaps which was proving a bugger to fix.
One Met Brief, OC Eng announced that he'd come up with a solution...
"We'll lock the flaps fully up and isolate the system", he grandly announced. At this, there was much muttering amongst the assembled aircrew, who all knew that the prospect of a flapless landing on a 6000ft RW was somewhat disturbing...
"It's OK - I'll volunteer to go in the back, if you like", he then announced.
"You can go in the bloody front as far as I'm concerned!" came a response from the floor. At this even the Stn Cdr, the excellent T**y P**k, laughed aloud. "I think we'll have another look at getting the flaps fixed, won't you", he said....
A bit of thread drift, but don't assume that all EngOs have as much safety sense as others!
Come now BEags, I think we're rather wandering into the realms of the fanciful, wouldn't you say? You'll be telling us next that an SEngO managed to get airborne in a Lightning on a taxy check, having accidentally gone through the reheat gate and found he couldn't get out of it. No doubt you would add, for dramatic effect, that he had the canopy open and the pins in, which would have been just as well seeing as he wasn't strapped in! Time to come down to earth wouldn't you say? Which I guess is what the SEngO had to do, though not on the same short runway from which he had got airborne. Case of the proverbial black eye and feather in the cap syndrome I guess. Now see what you've started! Thread retrieval, Thread retrieval, Go!