Tucumseh,
Points accepted and my apologies as the suggestion of a generic MOD thread was not intended to remove your views from the thread. However, threw my inarticulateness you may have misunderstood the thrust of my original comments. Your example and the the point I tried to make was that the SFS and the 760(in your case) were raised by the responsible front line engineering unit. Had the leak in the fuel system been 'well known' at the time there would be corporate knowledge of the leak either documented in the F700 or in the ADS( for instance if the leak was accceptable an entry in the LAD or a leaflet in the 2(R)1. The idea that numerous individuals ignored it through a general acceptance is just too shocking to believe.
The suggestion that DV appeared to be making was that it was 'well known' and ignored by all and sundry (including the crews!) and not for the first time on this thread where the insinuation has been made about engineers on the aircraft not being responsible. This is patently wrong in my opinion, irrespective of the decisions made by Range Managers that they do not understand or even attempt too, the robustness of the airworthiness system is only as good as the diligence of those personnel who daily perform the maintenance on the aircraft. To suggest, however inadvertently, that they would ignore fuel leaks anywhere does not do the purpose of this thread any good whatsoever.
Tapper's Dad,
sir, be careful of the trust you show in the statistics, as pointed out above they are often raised for all manner of reasons and not all are for the reasons included in the DASC answer. Also and I am nitpicking here but didn't the MR2 fleet only reach 16 aircraft late in 94 and for a long period of the time mentioned the actual size of the fleet was 25 aircraft. This will no doubt change the number of incidents, but that is neither here nor there. Here are 2 potential scenarios:
Example 1. Crew lands and Cptain reports that he has had an incident and wishes to incident report the RADAR. Responsible Engineers reply that this will have a Knock on effect on the turnround of the aircraft for the next Sortie. Captain replies, no no it's not a hazard and I'll aircrew accept the fault for the next trip. This means that this potential hazard to life, loss of aircraft may now not be investigated for upto 72 hrs.
Example 2 An aircraft has an aging, if not obsolete, Nav Aid but as the aircraft has only a short period until the end of life there is no money in the pot to replace it. At a user meeting it becomes apparent that all the stakeholders want to replace it and there is money available if a flight safety case can be made to replace it. The peice of kit then becomes subject to incident reports over many months if not years and eventually the case is made and the new kit is provisioned and fitted.
As you can see the raw data does not give info you require, the data needs to be crunched and the information extracted from there, sorry if this appears to be teaching you to suck eggs but the bald assertion of information does not make it a fact without understanding the context.