Nimrod Information
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Thanks to those who sent me an answer to the above.
As I have said before "In the end, we will remember not the words of our enemies, but the silence of our friends."
As I have said before "In the end, we will remember not the words of our enemies, but the silence of our friends."
TD
RTI = routine technical instruction. Try a google search with something like "routine technical instruction RAF" and you will get some useful hits.
I'm not an engineer, but I would surmise RTI/173/Nim is the 173rd RTI for the Nimrod fleet. As to what that RTI says I haven't a clue, I haven't seen it .......................
RTI = routine technical instruction. Try a google search with something like "routine technical instruction RAF" and you will get some useful hits.
I'm not an engineer, but I would surmise RTI/173/Nim is the 173rd RTI for the Nimrod fleet. As to what that RTI says I haven't a clue, I haven't seen it .......................
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Biggus
I have found out now basically it means:
RTI/NIM/173, ensures that potential sources of fuel ignition within and around the bomb bay (and panniers for the R Mark 1), including engine crossfeed and Secondary Cooling Ducts have been isolated.
Thanks anyway
I have found out now basically it means:
RTI/NIM/173, ensures that potential sources of fuel ignition within and around the bomb bay (and panniers for the R Mark 1), including engine crossfeed and Secondary Cooling Ducts have been isolated.
Thanks anyway
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Fractured Fuel Line
In early Sept 2006, a SFS (Serious Fault Signal) was raised citing a fuel fault on XV250, post AAR. The problem was a "well know" fuel line rupture at an attached bracket. Does anyone know when this problem first appeared?
DV
DV
Last edited by Distant Voice; 8th Aug 2007 at 14:50.
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Distant Voice,
SFS for a 'well known' problem, unlikely. SFS raised for an unusual occurence or failure that the organisation that discovers it feels they should highlight to the EA. The subsequent actions are then decided upon by the IPT. The occurrence of this was probably on the date of the leak and henceforth the leak would have occured within the previous 24 hours, hardly time for it to become 'well known' even if it had a particularly busy social life!
SFS for a 'well known' problem, unlikely. SFS raised for an unusual occurence or failure that the organisation that discovers it feels they should highlight to the EA. The subsequent actions are then decided upon by the IPT. The occurrence of this was probably on the date of the leak and henceforth the leak would have occured within the previous 24 hours, hardly time for it to become 'well known' even if it had a particularly busy social life!
Bingo Handjob
“SFS for a 'well known' problem, unlikely. SFS raised for an unusual occurence or failure that the organisation that discovers it feels they should highlight to the EA. The subsequent actions are then decided upon by the IPT. The occurrence of this was probably on the date of the leak and henceforth the leak would have occured within the previous 24 hours, hardly time for it to become 'well known' even if it had a particularly busy social life!”
What you describe is the “ideal”. Consider this real occurrence, one of many……
RAF station raises MF760 (Narrative Fault Report) - cracked gearbox housing.
EA completes MF760A (Fault Investigation Request).
MoD Technical Agency (named individual responsible for airworthiness / type approval of item, usually a Civil Servant engineer) approves 760A.
RAF Supply Manager (age 18.5) refuses to release money. Supported by her boss, RAF Wg Cdr. Grounds? The kit is very old. Reliability improves with age. At this stage there should be no failures. Therefore, no funding. NOTE – Non-engineers making engineering decisions.
Next cracked gearbox, Lyneham (for it was they) try again. Same result.
After many cracked gearboxes, an omnibus 760 is raised (request for investigation into multiple instances – 23 if I recall). Same result.
SFS raised against “well known” problem.
TA completely ignores financiers/suppliers, transfers money from another budget and “cracks” problem.
RAF (suppliers) demand disciplinary action against CS.
Aircraft safe.
“SFS for a 'well known' problem, unlikely. SFS raised for an unusual occurence or failure that the organisation that discovers it feels they should highlight to the EA. The subsequent actions are then decided upon by the IPT. The occurrence of this was probably on the date of the leak and henceforth the leak would have occured within the previous 24 hours, hardly time for it to become 'well known' even if it had a particularly busy social life!”
What you describe is the “ideal”. Consider this real occurrence, one of many……
RAF station raises MF760 (Narrative Fault Report) - cracked gearbox housing.
EA completes MF760A (Fault Investigation Request).
MoD Technical Agency (named individual responsible for airworthiness / type approval of item, usually a Civil Servant engineer) approves 760A.
RAF Supply Manager (age 18.5) refuses to release money. Supported by her boss, RAF Wg Cdr. Grounds? The kit is very old. Reliability improves with age. At this stage there should be no failures. Therefore, no funding. NOTE – Non-engineers making engineering decisions.
Next cracked gearbox, Lyneham (for it was they) try again. Same result.
After many cracked gearboxes, an omnibus 760 is raised (request for investigation into multiple instances – 23 if I recall). Same result.
SFS raised against “well known” problem.
TA completely ignores financiers/suppliers, transfers money from another budget and “cracks” problem.
RAF (suppliers) demand disciplinary action against CS.
Aircraft safe.
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Tucumseh
As ever you are proved correct by your example but for every horror story (completely unacceptable and having worked in that environment the frustration and sometimes, the despair at the operation of the system can be soul destroying) there are the many occasions where the system works as advertised and action is taken and follows the correct path. Highlighting the failures, and one is one too many, doesn't hide the fact that the system works everyday. As you constantly say your knowledge of the Nimrod is not complete and the suggestion from your example could easily give the impression that this instance may have followed that path but without any evidence that this was the case.
I appreciate that this is a rumour forum but many of the comments on it regarding the maintenance and safety of the Nimrod contain hugely loaded statements such as 'well known' - having worked on the Nimrod for a significant portion of the last 25 years this fault is not 'well known'.
You also post on other forums where you, correctly, highlight problems within the airworthiness chain on other platforms. However, if you have no evidence of the same events happening on this platform all it does is darken already murky waters. A generic what's wrong with the MOD thread may be more suited to your comments.
As ever you are proved correct by your example but for every horror story (completely unacceptable and having worked in that environment the frustration and sometimes, the despair at the operation of the system can be soul destroying) there are the many occasions where the system works as advertised and action is taken and follows the correct path. Highlighting the failures, and one is one too many, doesn't hide the fact that the system works everyday. As you constantly say your knowledge of the Nimrod is not complete and the suggestion from your example could easily give the impression that this instance may have followed that path but without any evidence that this was the case.
I appreciate that this is a rumour forum but many of the comments on it regarding the maintenance and safety of the Nimrod contain hugely loaded statements such as 'well known' - having worked on the Nimrod for a significant portion of the last 25 years this fault is not 'well known'.
You also post on other forums where you, correctly, highlight problems within the airworthiness chain on other platforms. However, if you have no evidence of the same events happening on this platform all it does is darken already murky waters. A generic what's wrong with the MOD thread may be more suited to your comments.
Nice try WCBH, you are the second one on this page to suggest that this Nimrod thread should only
"Concentrate on the facts that pertain to MR2, include those that have a DIRECT correlation, do away with rumour, conspiracy theories and speculation and we will hopefully get an answer and stop it happening again", to quote Headstone.
Strange that the Chinook and Hercules threads have concerned themselves with the RAF higher command and the MOD, ie the state of the woods, in order to make sense of the condition of their particular trees. Never mind a generic thread, IMHO there is already a generic link with those other threads and that is the airworthiness of their eponymous airframes, and the generic link with that is the airworthiness authority for RAF aircraft, and the generic link with that is the MOD. If your house gets broken into every night, only concerning yourself with repairing broken windows and locks is rather missing the point, you have to start getting tough on crime (oh, and with the causes, etc etc!). It's the same here it seems to me. Airworthiness is too important to be left to the whim of Tucumseh's 18.5 year old Supply Manager, or any other individual in the food chain for that matter. We already have a respected and proven Airworthiness Authority in this country. Time to call on them to fix this problem, generic or otherwise!
"Concentrate on the facts that pertain to MR2, include those that have a DIRECT correlation, do away with rumour, conspiracy theories and speculation and we will hopefully get an answer and stop it happening again", to quote Headstone.
Strange that the Chinook and Hercules threads have concerned themselves with the RAF higher command and the MOD, ie the state of the woods, in order to make sense of the condition of their particular trees. Never mind a generic thread, IMHO there is already a generic link with those other threads and that is the airworthiness of their eponymous airframes, and the generic link with that is the airworthiness authority for RAF aircraft, and the generic link with that is the MOD. If your house gets broken into every night, only concerning yourself with repairing broken windows and locks is rather missing the point, you have to start getting tough on crime (oh, and with the causes, etc etc!). It's the same here it seems to me. Airworthiness is too important to be left to the whim of Tucumseh's 18.5 year old Supply Manager, or any other individual in the food chain for that matter. We already have a respected and proven Airworthiness Authority in this country. Time to call on them to fix this problem, generic or otherwise!
Bingo
Thank you. I accept what you say, in part. I was going to say I didn’t claim this example happened on Nimrod (clearly I was referring to Hercules) but then I remembered the equipment was common across a number of types and, yes, it was fitted to MR1. That is, a Nimrod (or Andover, VC10, Dominie or Jetstream at the time) could have had the same problem. It just so happens Lyneham workshops spotted the problem first.
My point, and Chug makes the same one very well, is that if you ask a given IPT “How many problems have you had on such and such”, they may answer “one” and the MoD immediately says “isolated case”. But if you ask the question (mandated for 760s) “What about affected aircraft, equipment or contractors” the answer may be more than one. That is, not isolated, but a potentially critical trend. Stovepiped IPTs, and the demise of centralised support for maintaining the build standard of equipment (coupled with no money to do it anyway) conveniently hide these trends and make the MoD’s argument seem plausible to those who do not understand the “system”. And such a system means each IPT must contribute financially to the solution, and invariably don’t have the funding.
No, I may not know a lot about the Nimrod airframe but please don’t use that as a reason for dismissing what I say. Here’s another example, which I’ve mentioned before, but nobody likes discussing. Aircraft type A is fitted with a system which the equipment project office has (knowingly, and with 2* support) failed to integrate properly, rendering it unfit for purpose (unsafe). Given this project office is responsible for all such equipment, fitted to the vast majority of aircraft, the “affected aircraft, equipment and contractors” question is asked (by Aircraft A IPT, which is a failure of process and duty of care, as the equipment office shouldn’t need to be told). Specifically, two 2*s are separately advised to order all such systems checked for proper integration and safe function. They ignore this. As does 4*. Some time later Aircraft type B is shot down (2 dead) and the BOI recommends said system “should be integrated”, as if they’ve just worked it out.
To get to the truth you must ask the right question. There is no point asking about Aircraft A. The IPT will say “Isolated case, it was fixed”. Clearly, the BOI for Aircraft B did not dig deeper, as their recommendation only applied to that type. Again, this is a process failure; either the BOI should have looked wider and deeper, or if that wasn’t in their remit they should have recommended such action to the appropriate authority (who’d already refused). They didn’t. Notably, the BOI must have been complicit in burying the fact that this was not an isolated failure of process, but a clear trend which had been identified years previously. And I haven’t mentioned the Coroner’s role. Based on the verdict, he clearly didn’t know the truth.
The point I’m making is that if you study supposedly isolated cases on, say, Chinook, Tornado, Hercules, Nimrod etc you will find trends. (It doesn’t have to apply to all cases, just two or more). I do understand that, quite naturally, people have their own agendas on these aircraft. My advice is, if you find an area of concern, do not jump in and ask a singular question of MoD; rather, seek advice from those looking at the other cases to see if there is commonality. That is, ask the affected aircraft, equipment or contractors question. This restricts the MoD’s room for manoeuvre.
Thank you. I accept what you say, in part. I was going to say I didn’t claim this example happened on Nimrod (clearly I was referring to Hercules) but then I remembered the equipment was common across a number of types and, yes, it was fitted to MR1. That is, a Nimrod (or Andover, VC10, Dominie or Jetstream at the time) could have had the same problem. It just so happens Lyneham workshops spotted the problem first.
My point, and Chug makes the same one very well, is that if you ask a given IPT “How many problems have you had on such and such”, they may answer “one” and the MoD immediately says “isolated case”. But if you ask the question (mandated for 760s) “What about affected aircraft, equipment or contractors” the answer may be more than one. That is, not isolated, but a potentially critical trend. Stovepiped IPTs, and the demise of centralised support for maintaining the build standard of equipment (coupled with no money to do it anyway) conveniently hide these trends and make the MoD’s argument seem plausible to those who do not understand the “system”. And such a system means each IPT must contribute financially to the solution, and invariably don’t have the funding.
No, I may not know a lot about the Nimrod airframe but please don’t use that as a reason for dismissing what I say. Here’s another example, which I’ve mentioned before, but nobody likes discussing. Aircraft type A is fitted with a system which the equipment project office has (knowingly, and with 2* support) failed to integrate properly, rendering it unfit for purpose (unsafe). Given this project office is responsible for all such equipment, fitted to the vast majority of aircraft, the “affected aircraft, equipment and contractors” question is asked (by Aircraft A IPT, which is a failure of process and duty of care, as the equipment office shouldn’t need to be told). Specifically, two 2*s are separately advised to order all such systems checked for proper integration and safe function. They ignore this. As does 4*. Some time later Aircraft type B is shot down (2 dead) and the BOI recommends said system “should be integrated”, as if they’ve just worked it out.
To get to the truth you must ask the right question. There is no point asking about Aircraft A. The IPT will say “Isolated case, it was fixed”. Clearly, the BOI for Aircraft B did not dig deeper, as their recommendation only applied to that type. Again, this is a process failure; either the BOI should have looked wider and deeper, or if that wasn’t in their remit they should have recommended such action to the appropriate authority (who’d already refused). They didn’t. Notably, the BOI must have been complicit in burying the fact that this was not an isolated failure of process, but a clear trend which had been identified years previously. And I haven’t mentioned the Coroner’s role. Based on the verdict, he clearly didn’t know the truth.
The point I’m making is that if you study supposedly isolated cases on, say, Chinook, Tornado, Hercules, Nimrod etc you will find trends. (It doesn’t have to apply to all cases, just two or more). I do understand that, quite naturally, people have their own agendas on these aircraft. My advice is, if you find an area of concern, do not jump in and ask a singular question of MoD; rather, seek advice from those looking at the other cases to see if there is commonality. That is, ask the affected aircraft, equipment or contractors question. This restricts the MoD’s room for manoeuvre.
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Well WCBH, how about this for fact.
"The detection of a cracked fuel pipe on a 3rd aircraft (XV255) on 4th Sept 2006 (incident happened on 3rd, according to SFS) is well know to the ITP and this matter was addressed by UTI, RTI and F760 action as part of the initial reaction to the aircraft crash. Signed Nim ITPL"
Implication is that it was known about before the crash.
DV
"The detection of a cracked fuel pipe on a 3rd aircraft (XV255) on 4th Sept 2006 (incident happened on 3rd, according to SFS) is well know to the ITP and this matter was addressed by UTI, RTI and F760 action as part of the initial reaction to the aircraft crash. Signed Nim ITPL"
Implication is that it was known about before the crash.
DV
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Guys
Dunno if this helps....but I is serving out "here" again (thanks politicians & Islamist fascist c**ts) and have done loads of tankin'...no probs.
It maybe that AAR is a "red herring" and that the entire fuel system(!) maybe "fragile" BUT again - we have had no probs.
It could also be that there was a "typical" Flight Safety chain of events that led to this appalling accident.
And yes, I know what it is like to lose someone in the family due to an accident. In my case legally proved to have been avoidable.
Dunno if this helps....but I is serving out "here" again (thanks politicians & Islamist fascist c**ts) and have done loads of tankin'...no probs.
It maybe that AAR is a "red herring" and that the entire fuel system(!) maybe "fragile" BUT again - we have had no probs.
It could also be that there was a "typical" Flight Safety chain of events that led to this appalling accident.
And yes, I know what it is like to lose someone in the family due to an accident. In my case legally proved to have been avoidable.
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DV
The point you make about the fault being well known about by the IPT is void.
This WAS a well known fault only by the implementation of the UTI and inspections being carried out to find other faults, that is what a UTI is there for.
If it had of been known about beforehand then there would have been structured maintenance in place to rectify such a problem before any aircraft was released for flight.
The fact the IPT are saying (if your information is correct) that it was well know could very well have been from the inspections carried out all in one day, once they are found of course they know about it because we report any faults straight to the IPT.
The point you make about the fault being well known about by the IPT is void.
This WAS a well known fault only by the implementation of the UTI and inspections being carried out to find other faults, that is what a UTI is there for.
If it had of been known about beforehand then there would have been structured maintenance in place to rectify such a problem before any aircraft was released for flight.
The fact the IPT are saying (if your information is correct) that it was well know could very well have been from the inspections carried out all in one day, once they are found of course they know about it because we report any faults straight to the IPT.
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MightyHunter AGE
I recieved this under the FOI
"Using the DASC database we have compiled a list of recorded incident reports on the Nimrod aircraft from 1987 to 2007, which consists of 2496 individual records".
"Aircraft incidents, are categorised as an occurrence involving an aircraft which results in the aircraft sustaining damage or a person receiving an injury or which discloses a flight safety hazard or potential hazard and these are recorded by the Defence Aviation Safety Centre (DASC)".
"Faults identified while the aircraft is on the ground would normally be reported and rectified in accordance with laid-down maintenance and repair procedures, and therefore these faults would not form part of the aircraft incident records held by DASC".
Lets see thats 2496 divided by 20yrs=124.8 incidents a year that resulted in the aircraft sustaining damage or a person receiving an injury or which discloses a flight safety hazard or potential hazard.Thats 2 a week.
I am being generous there as well because we all know there have not been 20 ac in the fleet for some time. Makes you think eh !!
I recieved this under the FOI
"Using the DASC database we have compiled a list of recorded incident reports on the Nimrod aircraft from 1987 to 2007, which consists of 2496 individual records".
"Aircraft incidents, are categorised as an occurrence involving an aircraft which results in the aircraft sustaining damage or a person receiving an injury or which discloses a flight safety hazard or potential hazard and these are recorded by the Defence Aviation Safety Centre (DASC)".
"Faults identified while the aircraft is on the ground would normally be reported and rectified in accordance with laid-down maintenance and repair procedures, and therefore these faults would not form part of the aircraft incident records held by DASC".
Lets see thats 2496 divided by 20yrs=124.8 incidents a year that resulted in the aircraft sustaining damage or a person receiving an injury or which discloses a flight safety hazard or potential hazard.Thats 2 a week.
I am being generous there as well because we all know there have not been 20 ac in the fleet for some time. Makes you think eh !!
“recorded incident reports”
Remember that, in the early 90s, funding to investigate equipment faults was largely withdrawn and instructions issued to Engineering Authorities to limit the number of MF760s raised. That set off a chain reaction. Fewer 760s, less spent on investigations, “surplus” money at end of FY, funding cut for next year - so when EA raised a 760 there was less money to spend on maintaining the build standard, which includes safety. (See my previous posts – related to that. Same people made the decision). I wonder if an omnibus report counts as 1? Or if the DASC database contains only a sample?
Remember that, in the early 90s, funding to investigate equipment faults was largely withdrawn and instructions issued to Engineering Authorities to limit the number of MF760s raised. That set off a chain reaction. Fewer 760s, less spent on investigations, “surplus” money at end of FY, funding cut for next year - so when EA raised a 760 there was less money to spend on maintaining the build standard, which includes safety. (See my previous posts – related to that. Same people made the decision). I wonder if an omnibus report counts as 1? Or if the DASC database contains only a sample?
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Okay tucsemeh you win – I withdraw from this thread and will make no more comment or even read it. I, along with many others, thought that this thread was all about finding answers about the Nimrod crash and help TD and the others in some way. However many of the recent posts have been from people who by their OWN admission know nothing about the causes of the crash, know nothing about the MR2, know nothing about the Training System for the MRA4 but are quite happy to attempt to broaden the thread and post questions and theories. They do nothing to help find out what went wrong and you have no proof whatsoever that they have anything to do with this specific incident.. A lot of people have a thing about both procurement and British Waste of Space and without any proof that in any way those allegations had anything to do with this terrible event will quite happily post their unsupported theories. I will join the likes of SFO who evidently is an experienced pilot of both the MR2 and MRA4 and did post information but after a totally unwarranted and foolish rant posted by TSM he indicated in his final post that he wasn’t bothering to read this any more.
To TD I most sincerely hope that the true cause is found and that at some stage you can have some form of peace. I have lost friends in crashes, my wife and I lost a daughter at a very young age and so in some form I know what you are going through and the long road you still have to
To TD I most sincerely hope that the true cause is found and that at some stage you can have some form of peace. I have lost friends in crashes, my wife and I lost a daughter at a very young age and so in some form I know what you are going through and the long road you still have to
Well Headstone, you start off talking about me, but then list subjects which I have not commented or opined about. I have offered advice and, for the benefit of those who have not experienced the MoD’s deceit at close range, I have offered relevant examples. And they are relevant, as they illustrate parallels with other incidents which, clearly, few are interested in. I’m afraid I don’t offer rumour, just simple, verifiable fact based on my collating open source information. You are free to ignore these facts – much higher people than I have. Some here take great delight in reminding me of my admission I know little about the Nimrod airframe and extrapolate this to assume universal ignorance. Yet you don’t comment on my assertion that unqualified staffs routinely make engineering decisions on aircraft and equipment support. What do you prefer; someone who is honest about their background or someone who acts under false pretences?
Tapper’s Dad has sought answers from various sources, including MoD. He has expressed concern about the veracity and relevance of some of those he has received. I seek to help. I read the other similar threads and always think the same thing – dig deeper, look wider.
I’m afraid some of the comments here have a familiar ring. The MoD is fond of saying they have nothing further to add when an awkward question is asked. Or hiding behind the notion that, because incidents/accidents are relatively rare, that must mean they do everything right. Well, they don’t. Their processes and procedures are robust, but implementation is not. God knows it is difficult enough to change this without criticism from the very people we seek to equip, support and keep safe.
If we spoke I think you would find we have more common ground than you think.
Tapper’s Dad has sought answers from various sources, including MoD. He has expressed concern about the veracity and relevance of some of those he has received. I seek to help. I read the other similar threads and always think the same thing – dig deeper, look wider.
I’m afraid some of the comments here have a familiar ring. The MoD is fond of saying they have nothing further to add when an awkward question is asked. Or hiding behind the notion that, because incidents/accidents are relatively rare, that must mean they do everything right. Well, they don’t. Their processes and procedures are robust, but implementation is not. God knows it is difficult enough to change this without criticism from the very people we seek to equip, support and keep safe.
If we spoke I think you would find we have more common ground than you think.
Incident Reports
TD, I see what you're trying to imply about the incident reports. You need to find out how many IRs there have been for fuel related incidents if you're trying to prove something. IRs are raised for all sorts of things and they may not be as severe as the DASC quote for the reasons raised. I raised an IR recently for the thrust reverse not deploying on one of my 2 engines. The other one worked fine, I have wheel brakes, a hook and a barrier to stop so hardly serious but raises the trail to investigate why and take steps to correct it on that jet. I also raised one for the reheat not working on take-off. Yes, they're raised for serious events - one I had for an engine failing in-flight. Things like that happen more often than you'd imagine (even on big jets incl 747s etc!) but doesn't mean the aircraft is unsafe.
I was serving out in theatre and was very closely involved on 2 Sep, so my deepest condolences and if I can put your mind to rest about certain aspects then do PM me.
Regards
I was serving out in theatre and was very closely involved on 2 Sep, so my deepest condolences and if I can put your mind to rest about certain aspects then do PM me.
Regards
a totally unwarranted and foolish rant
Well quite, Headstone. Of course you could have just not posted, but that would have prevented you from characterising others with whom you disagree as total ignoramuses, who know nothing at all about all the things that presumably you do know about. What do you think motivates the likes of Tucumseh, and others including myself, to post here, self aggrandisement? Hardly, for we are all conscious of the human tragedy that underlines this thread. For the most part we are serving or retired professionals in the operation, maintenance or management of military aviation. The primary concern that unites us, or should do, is Flight Safety, ie accident prevention. The RAF has an excellent track record in the development and execution of its Flight Safety system. It seems from posts here that it continues to utilise that system to the full. It is clear though that such a system is only as good as its weakest link, which would seem to be lack of money. So the system continues to scrupulously flag up deficiencies, only to have the identified shortcomings left unresolved because someone, usually in the MOD, be it 18.5 year old girl or 60 year old 4*, stops things dead in their tracks as there is no money to pay for it. That is totally unacceptable. No doubt BA would have been tempted to go for that solution after their tragic B737 fire at Manchester. They had no choice, the CAA said fit smoke hoods and floor track lighting to aid evacuation in a smoke filled cabin. BA and every other UK airline were obliged to obey. We need the same degree of obligation on the MOD to ensure that all UK military aircraft are airworthy. By definition that obligation must come from outside as it does for Civil Aviation. Oh, if some are minded to tell me that military flying is potentially dangerous anyway, of course it is. All the more reason for not making it needlessly dangerous!
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Headstone
Thank you for your kind words and I am sorrry for your loss.As someone told me if you shut your eyes they are there on the back of your eye lids.
I hope I do find out the truth, I am very close to doing so through a lot of writing and FOI requests.However the new information I do have needs a wider audience than on here.
Thank you for your kind words and I am sorrry for your loss.As someone told me if you shut your eyes they are there on the back of your eye lids.
I hope I do find out the truth, I am very close to doing so through a lot of writing and FOI requests.However the new information I do have needs a wider audience than on here.