Nimrod Information
Join Date: Sep 2006
Location: Bridgwater Somerset
Posts: 459
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
DV
You said "Therefore, I must agree with Tapper's Dad; the AAR system, No.7 tank and the SCP are "unsafe" until proven otherwise, and isolation is not the answer. Safety has to be proven by evidence, not by the lack of it".
I find it interesting that after the incident on 22-11-04 when XV227 returned with fractured hot air pipe in SPC and a "cooked" No.7 tank were there was proof of the fault they continued to use No7 tanks and the SPC.
And yet after the crash of XV230 they stopped using No 7 tanks and the SCP and stopped AAR yet there is no proof as yet that any of these caused the fire or explosion. Why did they not do this things after the XV227 incident.
You said "Therefore, I must agree with Tapper's Dad; the AAR system, No.7 tank and the SCP are "unsafe" until proven otherwise, and isolation is not the answer. Safety has to be proven by evidence, not by the lack of it".
I find it interesting that after the incident on 22-11-04 when XV227 returned with fractured hot air pipe in SPC and a "cooked" No.7 tank were there was proof of the fault they continued to use No7 tanks and the SPC.
And yet after the crash of XV230 they stopped using No 7 tanks and the SCP and stopped AAR yet there is no proof as yet that any of these caused the fire or explosion. Why did they not do this things after the XV227 incident.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Mar 2007
Location: Bristol Temple Meads
Posts: 869
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
TD.
Only God (and MoD) know.
As you know, all these events are regarded as "isolated incidents", until they happen again. Then brave people pay for the lack of action.
DV
Only God (and MoD) know.
As you know, all these events are regarded as "isolated incidents", until they happen again. Then brave people pay for the lack of action.
DV
Thread Starter
Join Date: Mar 2007
Location: Bristol Temple Meads
Posts: 869
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
TD, on second thoughts, perhaps there has been other incidents between the XV227 event and the crash of XV230 that as yet have got to come out in the wash. Lets face it, to be able to give the go ahead to fly, within 48 hrs after a visual inspection, tends to suggset the "authorities" knew what to look for. As one "current" operator reported to me "Within hours of the accident, most of the possible factors (fuel pipes, tanks, and various hot pipes), were identified and taken out of service, pending the BOI report". Even Exriggers posting suports this point of view by stating that the area of the possible fuel leak and ignition were ascertained and isolated, pending BOI report.
Now you can not take that sort of action unless you have kown indicators.
DV
Now you can not take that sort of action unless you have kown indicators.
DV
Last edited by Distant Voice; 13th Aug 2007 at 08:52.
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Scotland
Age: 49
Posts: 134
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Does anyone know which squadron provided the British fast jet commitment for Operation Herrick prior to 800 Naval Air Squadron being deployed on October 1, 2006?
Can anyone confirm that it was 1(F) Squadron (RAF)
Please PM myself or TappersDad.
Can anyone confirm that it was 1(F) Squadron (RAF)
Please PM myself or TappersDad.
Last edited by Da4orce; 13th Aug 2007 at 16:16. Reason: New information
Da4orce try this link:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operati...rder_of_battle
I know some say that Wikipedia do not always have the proper gen, if this is not want you want let me know.
Added gen, still not found a definitive answer but it does look likely that you are correct
Kandahar
The Royal Air Force (RAF) has deployed a Joint Force Harrier detachment from RAF Cottesmore. Based in Kandahar, it provides close air support and reconnaissance to coalition and NATO forces operating in southern Afghanistan. In October 2006, however, the Royal Air Force turned over the task to 800 Naval Air Squadron, in the first operational deployment of the Fleet Air Arm's Harrier GR7 squadrons. These are the deployed Royal Air Force, Royal Navy and Army Air Corps units:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operati...rder_of_battle
I know some say that Wikipedia do not always have the proper gen, if this is not want you want let me know.
Added gen, still not found a definitive answer but it does look likely that you are correct
Kandahar
The Royal Air Force (RAF) has deployed a Joint Force Harrier detachment from RAF Cottesmore. Based in Kandahar, it provides close air support and reconnaissance to coalition and NATO forces operating in southern Afghanistan. In October 2006, however, the Royal Air Force turned over the task to 800 Naval Air Squadron, in the first operational deployment of the Fleet Air Arm's Harrier GR7 squadrons. These are the deployed Royal Air Force, Royal Navy and Army Air Corps units:
- 846 Naval Air Squadron
- 3 Regiment Army Air Corps
- 9 Regiment Army Air Corps
- 1 (Fighter) Squadron RAF, operating the GR7 Harriers
- 4 (Army Co-operation) Squadron RAF, operating the GR7 Harriers
Last edited by Exrigger; 13th Aug 2007 at 16:44. Reason: Additional info
Thread Starter
Join Date: Mar 2007
Location: Bristol Temple Meads
Posts: 869
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I understand that the weld that caused the fuel pipe to fracture on XV255 (3rd Sept) has been replaced by another form of attachment on the MRA4. Anyone got first-hand experience on this one?
DV
DV
Join Date: Sep 2006
Location: Bridgwater Somerset
Posts: 459
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I understand that No 7 tanks now have to be drained before flight, How empty is it when it is drained? Has no fuel? Has some fuel? Has some fuel vapurs? or no fuel and no vapours . Anyone know please
TD:
You asked:
I will answer this by saying depends on the instructions, but here goes:
1. If a normal defuel is carried out there is fuel that remains in the tank and there will be vapours.
2. During normal usage when the tank contents have been used, like your car, there will still be fuel that remains in the tank and there will be vapours.
3. When a tank is drained through the normal drain points, there will be a considerably smaller amount of fuel left in the tank and vapours.
4. If the tank is drained, depuddled and vented, there will be no fuel or vapours.
If the instructions where to carry out 1, 2 or 3 then in degrees there will be fuel and vapours, if the intruction was to do 4 then there will not. To quantify this you have to consider how this information might be relevant, i.e. having fuel and vapours in any fuel tank is not a problem, it only becomes a problem if there is a source of ignition within the tank as it is effectively isolated from the system by all the valves, or there is a big hole in the tank/supply pipe to the tank (allthough if the tank shut off valves are shut then again the tank would normally be deemed safe) this also has to have a nearby source of ignition. As aircraft fuel tanks on a lot of aircraft are in the vicinity of an engine then it is normally assumed that heat alone on the outside of a fuel tank wall would not cause an explosion regardless of the amount of fuel/vapours within that tank.
I hope this is ok, but as with all these things I will no doubt be corrected on any technical errors/assumptions in the above from those who are current on type or more knowledgable on fuel systems than my memory is.
You asked:
How empty is it when it is drained?
1. If a normal defuel is carried out there is fuel that remains in the tank and there will be vapours.
2. During normal usage when the tank contents have been used, like your car, there will still be fuel that remains in the tank and there will be vapours.
3. When a tank is drained through the normal drain points, there will be a considerably smaller amount of fuel left in the tank and vapours.
4. If the tank is drained, depuddled and vented, there will be no fuel or vapours.
If the instructions where to carry out 1, 2 or 3 then in degrees there will be fuel and vapours, if the intruction was to do 4 then there will not. To quantify this you have to consider how this information might be relevant, i.e. having fuel and vapours in any fuel tank is not a problem, it only becomes a problem if there is a source of ignition within the tank as it is effectively isolated from the system by all the valves, or there is a big hole in the tank/supply pipe to the tank (allthough if the tank shut off valves are shut then again the tank would normally be deemed safe) this also has to have a nearby source of ignition. As aircraft fuel tanks on a lot of aircraft are in the vicinity of an engine then it is normally assumed that heat alone on the outside of a fuel tank wall would not cause an explosion regardless of the amount of fuel/vapours within that tank.
I hope this is ok, but as with all these things I will no doubt be corrected on any technical errors/assumptions in the above from those who are current on type or more knowledgable on fuel systems than my memory is.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Mar 2007
Location: Bristol Temple Meads
Posts: 869
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
That's right COVEC, XV230 was a procedural proplem as well --- SCP and No. 7 tank not isolated.
You should re-read the incident report. Rear hinged fairing doors to MAD boom covered in fuel. Flares covered in fuel. Fuel drips of 25 per min. Just a simple procedural problem.
Sorry, Pamorama got it right. As they did about XV227, or was that just another procedural problem?
DV
You should re-read the incident report. Rear hinged fairing doors to MAD boom covered in fuel. Flares covered in fuel. Fuel drips of 25 per min. Just a simple procedural problem.
Sorry, Pamorama got it right. As they did about XV227, or was that just another procedural problem?
DV
Last edited by Distant Voice; 17th Aug 2007 at 10:20.
With all due respect guys, if you not connected to the Nimrod, working within the current environment, or anythign similar, you are in no way qualified to say whether or not "Panorama got it right". I could spend pages going over just how many errors there were in that program.
Join Date: Sep 2006
Location: Bridgwater Somerset
Posts: 459
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
RECOMMENDATIONS made after the XV227 incident in 22 Nov 04
were that
The SCP duct is with replaced with new manufacture items on a fleet-wide basis as soon as possible.
A hot air leak warning system is introduced for the ruptured duct and cross-air bleed ducts.
Does anyone know if this lifing / maintenance/ replacement policy has been implemented.And if so when was it implemented.
were that
The SCP duct is with replaced with new manufacture items on a fleet-wide basis as soon as possible.
A hot air leak warning system is introduced for the ruptured duct and cross-air bleed ducts.
Does anyone know if this lifing / maintenance/ replacement policy has been implemented.And if so when was it implemented.
TD: Da4orce on the 28th June on post #663 posted the answer to those questions which where:
Recommendation
The ruptured duct is replaced with new manufactured items on a fleet-wide basis as soon as possible.
Action Taken
Recommendation closed. All such ducts fitted to in-service aircraft have been replaced with newly manufactured items.
Recommendation
The extent of the hot air leak warning system is reviewed to ensure that all possible duct failures are covered.
Action Taken
Recommendation closed. A review of the aircraft warning systems revealed that the affected Supplementary Cooling Pack Duct was the only duct whose failure would not have been detected.
Recommendation
A hot air leak warning system is introduced for the ruptured duct and cross-air bleed ducts.
Action Taken
Recommendation rejected. The duct failure was an isolated incident and was in the only part of the system where a leak would not have been detected. All of these ducts have been replaced with newly manufactured items that, based upon the previous 25 fault-free years that the original duct had been fitted, are expected to last well beyond the planned MR2 Out of Service Date (early part of the next decade). Moreover, fitting a discrete hot air leak warning system would be a complex modification that would have to be embodied across the fleet during its maintenance cycle and therefore take several years to embody. Considering the Out of Service Date of the Nimrod MR2, the fitting of such a system was not considered to be practicable. Action closed.
Recommendation
A maintenance policy should be instigated for the ruptured duct and all similar ducts.
Action Taken
A study into the need for a preventative maintenance/lifing policy for this and similar ducts has been concluded by the Designer (BAE Systems). Their report, which is due to be issued imminently, is based on the results of a detailed analysis of a sample of ducts taken from a number of MR2 aircraft. This analysis has taken time to complete, but the report is expected to recommend that a lifing policy be introduced. Ducts due for replacement would be replaced during scheduled maintenance activities and it is anticipated that such a duct replacement programme would be in place by December 2007. Action ongoing.
And before we get into discussions like last time, the lifing policy for the specific duct that ruptured, and has been replaced across the fleet already, see first recommendation/Action Taken, will be from post fitment of this new duct. For all other ducts that did not require replacement immediately, as they did not fail, the lifing policy will be as appropriate from the stated analysis of these other ducts, subsequently these other ducts will get replaced before this analysis indicates the time-line likelyhood of failure and that these other ducts will start being replaced, as required, starting in Dec 07 during a scheduled maintenance task.
TD I hope this helps answer those questions.
Recommendation
The ruptured duct is replaced with new manufactured items on a fleet-wide basis as soon as possible.
Action Taken
Recommendation closed. All such ducts fitted to in-service aircraft have been replaced with newly manufactured items.
Recommendation
The extent of the hot air leak warning system is reviewed to ensure that all possible duct failures are covered.
Action Taken
Recommendation closed. A review of the aircraft warning systems revealed that the affected Supplementary Cooling Pack Duct was the only duct whose failure would not have been detected.
Recommendation
A hot air leak warning system is introduced for the ruptured duct and cross-air bleed ducts.
Action Taken
Recommendation rejected. The duct failure was an isolated incident and was in the only part of the system where a leak would not have been detected. All of these ducts have been replaced with newly manufactured items that, based upon the previous 25 fault-free years that the original duct had been fitted, are expected to last well beyond the planned MR2 Out of Service Date (early part of the next decade). Moreover, fitting a discrete hot air leak warning system would be a complex modification that would have to be embodied across the fleet during its maintenance cycle and therefore take several years to embody. Considering the Out of Service Date of the Nimrod MR2, the fitting of such a system was not considered to be practicable. Action closed.
Recommendation
A maintenance policy should be instigated for the ruptured duct and all similar ducts.
Action Taken
A study into the need for a preventative maintenance/lifing policy for this and similar ducts has been concluded by the Designer (BAE Systems). Their report, which is due to be issued imminently, is based on the results of a detailed analysis of a sample of ducts taken from a number of MR2 aircraft. This analysis has taken time to complete, but the report is expected to recommend that a lifing policy be introduced. Ducts due for replacement would be replaced during scheduled maintenance activities and it is anticipated that such a duct replacement programme would be in place by December 2007. Action ongoing.
And before we get into discussions like last time, the lifing policy for the specific duct that ruptured, and has been replaced across the fleet already, see first recommendation/Action Taken, will be from post fitment of this new duct. For all other ducts that did not require replacement immediately, as they did not fail, the lifing policy will be as appropriate from the stated analysis of these other ducts, subsequently these other ducts will get replaced before this analysis indicates the time-line likelyhood of failure and that these other ducts will start being replaced, as required, starting in Dec 07 during a scheduled maintenance task.
TD I hope this helps answer those questions.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Mar 2007
Location: Bristol Temple Meads
Posts: 869
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Exrigger: That's what TD is asking about. We all know that the defective duct was replaced across the fleet, he is asking about the recommendation for similar pipes. Come on guys, stop going around in circles you sound like MoD.
DV
DV
DV: you said
so what part of
does no one understand.
he (TD) is asking about the recommendation for similar pipes
A study into the need for a preventative maintenance/lifing policy for this and similar ducts has been concluded by the Designer (BAE Systems). Their report, which is due to be issued imminently, is based on the results of a detailed analysis of a sample of ducts taken from a number of MR2 aircraft. This analysis has taken time to complete, but the report is expected to recommend that a lifing policy be introduced. Ducts due for replacement would be replaced during scheduled maintenance activities and it is anticipated that such a duct replacement programme would be in place by December 2007. Action ongoing.
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Scotland
Age: 49
Posts: 134
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Tappers Dad wrote:
A study into the need for a preventative maintenance/lifing policy for this and similar ducts has been concluded by the Designer (BAE Systems). Their report, which is due to be issued imminently, is based on the results of a detailed analysis of a sample of ducts taken from a number of MR2 aircraft. This analysis has taken time to complete, but the report is expected to recommend that a lifing policy be introduced. Ducts due for replacement would be replaced during scheduled maintenance activities and it is anticipated that such a duct replacement programme would be in place by December 2007. Action ongoing.
Accepted Exrigger, I think for further clarity what he is getting at is has scheduled maintenance on any of the airframes involved the replacement of 'similar ducts' if so is this now complete fleet wide or not? Or as you imply, as we're are not yet in December, has no duct replacement programme been implemented yet? Presumably if the programme was ready for implementation earlier than December it could be implemented earlier, unless there os a particular reason to wait until December.
I would think that the longer they wait however the more likely the MOD are to say sorry guys the airframe is now so close to replacement we can't justify this duct replacement programme. (But then my cup is always half full !)
Does anyone know if this lifing / maintenance/ replacement policy has been implemented.And if so when was it implemented.
Accepted Exrigger, I think for further clarity what he is getting at is has scheduled maintenance on any of the airframes involved the replacement of 'similar ducts' if so is this now complete fleet wide or not? Or as you imply, as we're are not yet in December, has no duct replacement programme been implemented yet? Presumably if the programme was ready for implementation earlier than December it could be implemented earlier, unless there os a particular reason to wait until December.
I would think that the longer they wait however the more likely the MOD are to say sorry guys the airframe is now so close to replacement we can't justify this duct replacement programme. (But then my cup is always half full !)