Nimrod Information
The trouble is, imho, is that Jimmy Jones is treated as a credible source by the folk that read the papers, watch the news etc.
Maybe he would like to visit ISK in the near future, for an update on current practices!
Maybe he would like to visit ISK in the near future, for an update on current practices!
Firstly, the MOD is not obliged, under law, to promulgate Safety Cases
EdSet100, if an MAA is created to regulate UK Military Airworthiness then the MOD will be obliged, under law, to abide by its regulations. Anything less would make a mockery of the system and reduce us to the present situation. No doubt the many challenges of allowing operational commanders the tactical freedoms required by military aviation would be accommodated, but the freedom to skimp on Flight Safety funding in order to bung more money into schools and hospitals in Government marginals would be denied the SoS and his little helpers. Of course mistakes will still be made under an MAA, there will still be incidents and worse still, accidents, but with proper enforcement of Airworthiness Standards they should be fewer, with fewer casualties. The problem here is much greater than the tragedy of XV230, awful though that is, it is the destruction of the MOD based military airworthiness system. It is now just smoke and mirrors, it looks as though it is there, but it isn't, only a mirage. Everybody seems to be angry about this and for good reason, this tragedy and other recent ones were avoidable accidents. The anger of the families is palpable and justified. The anger of the guys and girls who operate and maintain the Nimrod, putting their heart and soul into its vital work, risking their lives on our behalf, only to feel overlooked by the external media hype about 'shortcomings' is natural. Both parties have been betrayed, not by the media, not by the ancient warriors (even those like me who were never on the fleet). They have been betrayed by a system that is rotten to the core. Purporting to be able to ensure the provision of Military Airworthiness it instead ensures the most dangerous commodity of all in aviation; false hope. All the titles, all the processes, all the meetings are in vain because it does not deliver the finished product, airworthy fleets. The cold cynicism with which this farrago has been perpetrated by the MOD is an indictment of the RAF's high command. Having, one hopes, fought and lost the battle to fund airworthiness, they did not do what men of honour should do, resign. Instead they clung to their jobs, their honours, their sinecure futures. Now they must leave under a shadow that they have cast themselves and good riddance, for theirs is the greatest betrayal of all, they have betrayed their own service and the loyal dedicated men and women who serve it!
DGE I admire your loyalty which is, I'm sure, shared by most who still serve. It is not pleasant to be calling for heads in a service that I had the honour and pleasure to serve in. The RAF is in a major crisis, all the cuts, amalgamations, reorganisations, and ever more and more cuts has brought it to crisis point. It now teeters on extinction as surely as it did in Trenchard's day. He managed to keep it independent and alive in the midst of massive cutbacks. The RAF desperately needs another Trenchard. The present incumbents have shown themselves weak and ineffective. Of course this scenario was laid before they took their present posts, but it has worsened immeasurably in their tenure. They really have to go. A massive challenge awaits their successors. Military airfleets must regain their airworthiness, cuts in units and squadrons must be reversed to ensure that operational capability is not lost forever. Civilianisation of man management must be reversed, and the powers of subordinate commanders reinstated. The RAF is a fighting force, designed to go to war, to fight, and sadly at times die. It is not the uniformed branch of M&S, and no matter how worthy that plc might be, never should be. What can be learned however from 'in your face company men' is that when bidden by an independent CAA, they operate airworthy aircraft, the MOD does not.
Slightly off the thread but a comment on world communication.
Sitting in a bar yesterday, at 19.00 hrs Beijing time, in Shekou, Peoples Repubic of China, a chap comes up and and says.
"You're ex RAF, you might be interested in this."
With that he gave me a 10cm thick wad of A4, a copy of the proceedings of the Board if Inquiry.
Sitting in a bar yesterday, at 19.00 hrs Beijing time, in Shekou, Peoples Repubic of China, a chap comes up and and says.
"You're ex RAF, you might be interested in this."
With that he gave me a 10cm thick wad of A4, a copy of the proceedings of the Board if Inquiry.
"It doesn't matter how you dress it up, but human error in any single organisation (CAA?) is still human error".
True. And "an error does not become a mistake unless you refuse to fix it". (JFK)
The MoD refused. That is what this thread is about. In the CERTAIN knowledge their actions would lead to the decline in safety and airworthiness standards, the MoD refused to implement its own mandated regulations. This was NOT an omission by error; it was a deliberate decision.
This corporate and individual failure has contributed significantly to four fatal accidents since 2003 (Tornado/Patriot, Sea King, Hercules and Nimrod). If you read the BoI reports, the clear, incontrovertible linkages are there for all to see. (And if you have to ask, no answer can suffice). PRECISELY the same failures to implement process and procedures. The same underlying themes and, at a certain level, the same individuals. Not least, instructions to ignore safety and airworthiness issues, followed by disciplinary action if you didn't.
I sincerely hope the Nimrod Review has a remit which requires study of these practices, policies and decisions; and the effects. It should do. The processes and procedures are not aircraft specific, they are mandated across the MoD. They affect everyone.
On Tuesday, the press also ran a story about a Doctor who was struck off because he failed in his Duty, resulting in a mother being wrongly imprisoned for killing her child. There have been many such cases over the years, and they inevitably lead to wide ranging reviews of past cases in which the subject has been involved - and very often retrospective action. If the same legal principle is established here, natural justice dictates the good names of the Chinook pilots will be restored.
True. And "an error does not become a mistake unless you refuse to fix it". (JFK)
The MoD refused. That is what this thread is about. In the CERTAIN knowledge their actions would lead to the decline in safety and airworthiness standards, the MoD refused to implement its own mandated regulations. This was NOT an omission by error; it was a deliberate decision.
This corporate and individual failure has contributed significantly to four fatal accidents since 2003 (Tornado/Patriot, Sea King, Hercules and Nimrod). If you read the BoI reports, the clear, incontrovertible linkages are there for all to see. (And if you have to ask, no answer can suffice). PRECISELY the same failures to implement process and procedures. The same underlying themes and, at a certain level, the same individuals. Not least, instructions to ignore safety and airworthiness issues, followed by disciplinary action if you didn't.
I sincerely hope the Nimrod Review has a remit which requires study of these practices, policies and decisions; and the effects. It should do. The processes and procedures are not aircraft specific, they are mandated across the MoD. They affect everyone.
On Tuesday, the press also ran a story about a Doctor who was struck off because he failed in his Duty, resulting in a mother being wrongly imprisoned for killing her child. There have been many such cases over the years, and they inevitably lead to wide ranging reviews of past cases in which the subject has been involved - and very often retrospective action. If the same legal principle is established here, natural justice dictates the good names of the Chinook pilots will be restored.
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So, the best brains in the RAF have poured over the Board's findings, but have been unable to recommend any more fire protection on Nimrod, any additional protection in the wings, or dual wall protection to AAR pipework.
Mightycrewseven worries about the wording in Q12 out of 15 well worked through questions from a worried local MP who is trying to do his best for his costituents. Crewseven, I wouldn't waste your concern about this ridiculous mistake, for starters the core of the question concerned the OSD of R1 of 2025, but more importantly, the very clever response by MoD lawyers of offering to further inquiries should mean that none of those questions get answered for a very long time. Sir Glenn Torpy will be well into his retirement by then. Still, galling to think that those lawyers are paid for out of the public purse.
Where does all this leave the MRA4 program?
Well, unsurprisingly the mantra of 'We cannot accept any further delays to MRA4 in service date' has continued, so don't expect any of the protection not provided on MR2 to be fitted to its replacement.
Of course, life in the wider aviation community continues apace Just yesterday, a call has been made for cargo bay fire protection US NTSB calls for cargo aircraft fire suppression systems,
John Croft, Washington DC (05Dec07, 13:33 GMT, )
"US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) officials today called for all Part 121 carriers to install fire suppression systems on cargo aircraft to contain onboard fires in the cargo hold.
The outcome follows the NTSB’s investigation of a post-flight fire that destroyed a UPS Douglas DC-8 cargo aircraft at the Philadelphia International airport on 7 February 2006.
Investigators were not been able to determine the cause of the fire, other than to say it most likely started in one of three suspected cargo containers.
Contributing to the aircraft hull loss, said the Board, were inadequate certification test requirements for smoke and fire detection systems and the lack of an on-board fire suppression system.
Along with the call to install the suppression systems, the Board issued the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) six additional recommendations, including a request for “clear guidance” to operators of airports, large passenger and cargo aircraft and fractional services as to how flight crew or first responders should respond to evidence of a fire when no onboard alerts are available.
According to the NTSB, the UPS pilots had the choice of four checklists for troubleshooting a smell the first officer described as “like burning wood” when the aircraft was descending through 9,375m (31,000ft) on the approach to the Philadelphia.
“None covered what the crew was seeing,” says an investigator, adding that one of the checklists they completed brought more air into the cargo hold to fuel the fire.
The aircraft’s smoke alarms ultimately sounded at 1,088m (3,600ft) and smoke entered the cockpit just as the aircraft touched down. The crew evacuated the aircraft with no injuries. "
Mightycrewseven worries about the wording in Q12 out of 15 well worked through questions from a worried local MP who is trying to do his best for his costituents. Crewseven, I wouldn't waste your concern about this ridiculous mistake, for starters the core of the question concerned the OSD of R1 of 2025, but more importantly, the very clever response by MoD lawyers of offering to further inquiries should mean that none of those questions get answered for a very long time. Sir Glenn Torpy will be well into his retirement by then. Still, galling to think that those lawyers are paid for out of the public purse.
Where does all this leave the MRA4 program?
Well, unsurprisingly the mantra of 'We cannot accept any further delays to MRA4 in service date' has continued, so don't expect any of the protection not provided on MR2 to be fitted to its replacement.
Of course, life in the wider aviation community continues apace Just yesterday, a call has been made for cargo bay fire protection US NTSB calls for cargo aircraft fire suppression systems,
John Croft, Washington DC (05Dec07, 13:33 GMT, )
"US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) officials today called for all Part 121 carriers to install fire suppression systems on cargo aircraft to contain onboard fires in the cargo hold.
The outcome follows the NTSB’s investigation of a post-flight fire that destroyed a UPS Douglas DC-8 cargo aircraft at the Philadelphia International airport on 7 February 2006.
Investigators were not been able to determine the cause of the fire, other than to say it most likely started in one of three suspected cargo containers.
Contributing to the aircraft hull loss, said the Board, were inadequate certification test requirements for smoke and fire detection systems and the lack of an on-board fire suppression system.
Along with the call to install the suppression systems, the Board issued the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) six additional recommendations, including a request for “clear guidance” to operators of airports, large passenger and cargo aircraft and fractional services as to how flight crew or first responders should respond to evidence of a fire when no onboard alerts are available.
According to the NTSB, the UPS pilots had the choice of four checklists for troubleshooting a smell the first officer described as “like burning wood” when the aircraft was descending through 9,375m (31,000ft) on the approach to the Philadelphia.
“None covered what the crew was seeing,” says an investigator, adding that one of the checklists they completed brought more air into the cargo hold to fuel the fire.
The aircraft’s smoke alarms ultimately sounded at 1,088m (3,600ft) and smoke entered the cockpit just as the aircraft touched down. The crew evacuated the aircraft with no injuries. "
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DeepGE
I can appreciate that people at Kinloss might have been feeling under siege over the past few months but your comments about Jimmy Jones are completely out of order.
No-one who has been involved in the attempts to bring attention to this issue has ever criticised the ground crews at Kinloss. When we obtained the QinetiQ report, the STimes article specifically went out of its way to report the team's conclusions that the RAF ground crews at Kinloss were "highly committed" and working to good standards. Even before the QinetiQ report, it was always Jimmy's stance that this would of course be the case and he has always stuck to that view.
As a current SME( Look it up if your not sure) on Nimrod MR2 I am sick to the back teeth of so called experts now appearing from the woodwork after 30 odd years of Nim Ops. If u didn't have the b"^^3 to stand-up when you where in the developement phase then shut the f%%k up now. And yes I direct this at Jimmy!!!!. Do not question how we maintain an AC you so proudly boast you put into service. No b"^^3 then no point having big b"^^3's now. Cheers Pet!!!
I may have been a bit OTT initially but I am sick of the speculation and down right falls hoods posted reference groundies on MR2. Having been an AGE and Rects controller I have seen the physical and mental effort these totally profesionall technicians apply to keeping the MR2 fleet the potent asset it is. Can somebody just reward this effort with the high level support it deserves.
I may have been a bit OTT initially but I am sick of the speculation and down right falls hoods posted reference groundies on MR2. Having been an AGE and Rects controller I have seen the physical and mental effort these totally profesionall technicians apply to keeping the MR2 fleet the potent asset it is. Can somebody just reward this effort with the high level support it deserves.
No-one who has been involved in the attempts to bring attention to this issue has ever criticised the ground crews at Kinloss. When we obtained the QinetiQ report, the STimes article specifically went out of its way to report the team's conclusions that the RAF ground crews at Kinloss were "highly committed" and working to good standards. Even before the QinetiQ report, it was always Jimmy's stance that this would of course be the case and he has always stuck to that view.
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Mick , emotions are running very high after the BoI publication. One thing is clear:
NO BLAME IS ATTACHED OR CAN BE ATTACHED TO ANY MAINTENANCE STAFF AT KINLOSS - PERIOD. CONFIDENCE IN THEIR SKILL AND WORK IS RECOGNISED FROM THE HIGHEST LEVELS DOWN.
I think the feelings expressed by DeepGE, and in fact by many people at ISK, go much, much deeper than any supposed criticism of groundcrew. I'm sure that more will be heard of this in the months to come.
Magnersdrinker
A few points mate:
a. Big Vern never flew Nimrods, it was his brother.
b. Big Vern's brother is not so big now
although even he would struggle with the new, overarching fitness regime!
c. There have been several Flight Deck Gods over the years, BV was certainly one - Kinloss is a less fun place without them and I wish they were they were back.
d. There are other, smoother, more sophisticated ciders available. Pop into the Drunken Duck (and Tescos) for one example.
e. If you're fixing my jet, please can you get to bed a bit earlier? Cheers.
NO BLAME IS ATTACHED OR CAN BE ATTACHED TO ANY MAINTENANCE STAFF AT KINLOSS - PERIOD. CONFIDENCE IN THEIR SKILL AND WORK IS RECOGNISED FROM THE HIGHEST LEVELS DOWN.
I think the feelings expressed by DeepGE, and in fact by many people at ISK, go much, much deeper than any supposed criticism of groundcrew. I'm sure that more will be heard of this in the months to come.
Magnersdrinker
To me there was only 1 Nimrod pilot god and that was Big Vern, wherever he may be now please come back
a. Big Vern never flew Nimrods, it was his brother.
b. Big Vern's brother is not so big now
although even he would struggle with the new, overarching fitness regime!c. There have been several Flight Deck Gods over the years, BV was certainly one - Kinloss is a less fun place without them and I wish they were they were back.
d. There are other, smoother, more sophisticated ciders available. Pop into the Drunken Duck (and Tescos) for one example.
e. If you're fixing my jet, please can you get to bed a bit earlier? Cheers.
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Smitter said
d. There are other, smoother, more sophisticated ciders available. Pop into the Drunken Duck (and Tescos) for one example.
e. If you're fixing my jet, please can you get to bed a bit earlier? Cheers.
answer to d, Magners I think is classed as sophisticated, its certainly better than Savvanah LOL ,saying that if you mix a savvanah and an elephant beer when in the DD it only results in removal of clothing. but its not classy one bit
and answer to e, if you would stop breaking it then maybe we could get to the bar early and enjoy
Thanks for the info though on BV, I think he led a double life when on det , great guy nevertheless and one who always no matter looked after his guys and his groundies when away. Im sure all would agree
d. There are other, smoother, more sophisticated ciders available. Pop into the Drunken Duck (and Tescos) for one example.
e. If you're fixing my jet, please can you get to bed a bit earlier? Cheers.
answer to d, Magners I think is classed as sophisticated, its certainly better than Savvanah LOL ,saying that if you mix a savvanah and an elephant beer when in the DD it only results in removal of clothing. but its not classy one bit
and answer to e, if you would stop breaking it then maybe we could get to the bar early and enjoy
Thanks for the info though on BV, I think he led a double life when on det , great guy nevertheless and one who always no matter looked after his guys and his groundies when away. Im sure all would agree
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DeepGE
Whilst you may have a point about those of us that left the fleet more than 3-4 years ago being a dinosaur, the thing is that the aircraft's fuel system has NOT changed since the eintroduction of the AAR probe for Op Corporate.
Nor too has the fact that the bomb bay has no fire suppression fitted.
Now as someone who has vigerously said that the CAS and ACAS and AOC 2Gp should go, I stick by that for one simple reason.....
This accident could and should have been prevented. If you read the BoI (as I have from front to back) then you will see that it was preventable IMHO.
Who on earth undertakes to let a contract that services an aircraft such as Nimrod, but does NOT expect or enforce the contractor to fix fuel leaks?
Who ignores reports from the likes of BAe and QQ about the (quite high) risk of a fire/explosion because of no fire retardent?
Who ignores all of the other fire/smoke related incidents over the past few years (when the fleet has drawn down to a handful of frames?
The answer is....CAS, ACAS, AOC and to a lesser degree Stn Cdr ISK
Might I also point out that, following your colourful post about the groundcrew, I can find not a single reference on this forum where the groundcrew have been blamed or where it is even suggested that they are to blame. They have constantly been praised on this forum for doing a great job, with very limited resouces and under difficult conditions, not to mention with limited manpower.
Please would you stop suggesting (along with MightyHunter AGE) that we are in some way holding you responsible for what happened. On the contrary. It would appear from the report that the blame lies in the maintenance policy, and NOT the maintainers Sir!
The Winco
Whilst you may have a point about those of us that left the fleet more than 3-4 years ago being a dinosaur, the thing is that the aircraft's fuel system has NOT changed since the eintroduction of the AAR probe for Op Corporate.
Nor too has the fact that the bomb bay has no fire suppression fitted.
Now as someone who has vigerously said that the CAS and ACAS and AOC 2Gp should go, I stick by that for one simple reason.....
This accident could and should have been prevented. If you read the BoI (as I have from front to back) then you will see that it was preventable IMHO.
Who on earth undertakes to let a contract that services an aircraft such as Nimrod, but does NOT expect or enforce the contractor to fix fuel leaks?
Who ignores reports from the likes of BAe and QQ about the (quite high) risk of a fire/explosion because of no fire retardent?
Who ignores all of the other fire/smoke related incidents over the past few years (when the fleet has drawn down to a handful of frames?
The answer is....CAS, ACAS, AOC and to a lesser degree Stn Cdr ISK
Might I also point out that, following your colourful post about the groundcrew, I can find not a single reference on this forum where the groundcrew have been blamed or where it is even suggested that they are to blame. They have constantly been praised on this forum for doing a great job, with very limited resouces and under difficult conditions, not to mention with limited manpower.
Please would you stop suggesting (along with MightyHunter AGE) that we are in some way holding you responsible for what happened. On the contrary. It would appear from the report that the blame lies in the maintenance policy, and NOT the maintainers Sir!
The Winco
the thing is that the aircraft's fuel system has NOT changed since the introduction of the AAR probe for Op Corporate.
To prove a point, your facts are wrong. The original UOR was introduced in 1982 as a quick fix. It was completely re-engineered around 1989 under Mod 715 and, except for the probe, the design and construction bears no resemblance to the original.
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I would suggest that as a direct result of over-stretch brought about by the likes of Torpy agreeing to fight on two fronts Nimrod engineers were breaching harmony requirements and forced to send people with less experience than desirable into theatre. The BoI report refers to this very thing. The recent incident report resulting in a Mayday Nimrod landing at Kandahar, referred to a new fuel coupling and the crew made a mental note of the fact that it was the first AAR flight since the new coupling. Problems with couplings increased four fold in recent years another fact in the report. Problems with procedures concerning the maintenance of these couplings are well known, And the RAF chief engineer is open minded about a coupling being responsible for the fuel leak that brought down XV230.
Lack of experience is nothing to be ashamed about. It is an inevitable result of excessive draw downs, poor morale and over-stretch.
As a direct result of the recent loss of a Herc in Afg many changes have taken place. Reflecting the lack of training opportunity and low levels of experience in the modern RAF. Take a look at a recent inquest into the Basra Puma crash. Lack of training and experience is starting to kill. It is a very big problem. If there is a shortage of manpower at ISK or a lack of experience in the engineering community, there ain't no use in denying it.
The forthcoming eng det to Akrotiri is only going to make matters worse.
Lack of experience is nothing to be ashamed about. It is an inevitable result of excessive draw downs, poor morale and over-stretch.
As a direct result of the recent loss of a Herc in Afg many changes have taken place. Reflecting the lack of training opportunity and low levels of experience in the modern RAF. Take a look at a recent inquest into the Basra Puma crash. Lack of training and experience is starting to kill. It is a very big problem. If there is a shortage of manpower at ISK or a lack of experience in the engineering community, there ain't no use in denying it.
The forthcoming eng det to Akrotiri is only going to make matters worse.
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Softie,
Thank you for that.
The UOR was indeed an 'quick fix' to get us south, but there were NO changes to the fuel gallery or system at that time (other than to allow the two AAR pipes to feed into each wing, as far as I can recall.
Didn't MOD 715 purely 'hide' the pipes that ran through the cabin? I don't recall it actually 'changing' the fuel system at all, merely 'tidying it up' a bit. However, if it did, then I will bow to your knowledge.
The Winco
Thank you for that.
The UOR was indeed an 'quick fix' to get us south, but there were NO changes to the fuel gallery or system at that time (other than to allow the two AAR pipes to feed into each wing, as far as I can recall.
Didn't MOD 715 purely 'hide' the pipes that ran through the cabin? I don't recall it actually 'changing' the fuel system at all, merely 'tidying it up' a bit. However, if it did, then I will bow to your knowledge.
The Winco
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Winco,
I agree that things are becoming too heated and understand that now we have answers regarding what happened last September, the next question will inevitably be "who do we blame?"
Nimrod engineers are understandably concerned about this, and unfortunate phases like "shoddy maintenance" do not help to allay their fears. I have no doubt that this statement was directed at policy rather than line engineers.
As far as comments from Jimmy Jones are concerned, I agree, in the main, with DeepGE. Although Jimmy's motives are entirely honourable, statements such as, the Nimrod, "...is being flown in conditions that are much harsher than it was designed for", even though the Nimrod has operated from the Middle East for more than 20 years, are clouding the perception of the public. In addition, his statement in the Times that, "If the MoD had acted on BAE Systems’ recommendations, those 14 crew members would still be alive today" cannot be substantiated and is conjecture. I do not remember any reports from BAe contesting the NSC.
As I have previously stated, credible technical comments can only come from those who routinely operate and service the aircraft. However, general Flight Safety issues, such as those tabled by Nige and Tuc are, in my opinion both valid and necessary for an objective argument.
I agree that things are becoming too heated and understand that now we have answers regarding what happened last September, the next question will inevitably be "who do we blame?"
Nimrod engineers are understandably concerned about this, and unfortunate phases like "shoddy maintenance" do not help to allay their fears. I have no doubt that this statement was directed at policy rather than line engineers.
As far as comments from Jimmy Jones are concerned, I agree, in the main, with DeepGE. Although Jimmy's motives are entirely honourable, statements such as, the Nimrod, "...is being flown in conditions that are much harsher than it was designed for", even though the Nimrod has operated from the Middle East for more than 20 years, are clouding the perception of the public. In addition, his statement in the Times that, "If the MoD had acted on BAE Systems’ recommendations, those 14 crew members would still be alive today" cannot be substantiated and is conjecture. I do not remember any reports from BAe contesting the NSC.
As I have previously stated, credible technical comments can only come from those who routinely operate and service the aircraft. However, general Flight Safety issues, such as those tabled by Nige and Tuc are, in my opinion both valid and necessary for an objective argument.
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Mr P
I do not know Jimmy Jones, although perhaps I should, as our time at ISK must have overlapped at some time.
I agree entirely with your sentiments, and again, I would in no way imply that the groundcrew are to blame at all for the loss. I do understand their concerns, but they must understand that they are not being blamed at all. It clearly statwes in the report that it is the POLICY that is (partly) to blame.
The thing about what JJ said, is that he might just be correct you know?
I'm not saying he is, but the 'facts' speak for themselves, and he may well be correct in his comments.
If the MOD had acted after the BAe report than maybe ......?
If they had acted after the QQ report then maybe ........?
If more attention had been given over the fuel leaks, then maybe .....?
I accept that we will never really factually know, but you have to say, that simply ignoring reports from so-called 'experts' is not the best way to conduct matters?
Regards
The Winco
I do not know Jimmy Jones, although perhaps I should, as our time at ISK must have overlapped at some time.
I agree entirely with your sentiments, and again, I would in no way imply that the groundcrew are to blame at all for the loss. I do understand their concerns, but they must understand that they are not being blamed at all. It clearly statwes in the report that it is the POLICY that is (partly) to blame.
The thing about what JJ said, is that he might just be correct you know?
I'm not saying he is, but the 'facts' speak for themselves, and he may well be correct in his comments.
If the MOD had acted after the BAe report than maybe ......?
If they had acted after the QQ report then maybe ........?
If more attention had been given over the fuel leaks, then maybe .....?
I accept that we will never really factually know, but you have to say, that simply ignoring reports from so-called 'experts' is not the best way to conduct matters?
Regards
The Winco
mileandahalf
I’m sure Mick Smith is big enough to look after himself, but I can’t let your totally ill-founded and ill-tempered attack on him pass without comment.
You say
I suggest that that is exactly what he is doing, with highly commendable results. Amongst the general dumbing down of the media, investigative journalists like Mick Smith are increasingly rare - and yet a free democracy like ours depends on people like Mick to keep the executive in check. He has consistently used his valuable platform at The Times to publicise and consider the often questionable behaviour of some of the senior people in the chain of command. Without his insights and revelations, I believe the Board might not have come to some of its conclusions, and it is arguable that we would not have had apologies from the Secretary of State and the Chief of the Air Staff, nor the unprecedented launching of a much broader inquiry, to say nothing of the mention of new consideration of compensation for the relatives.
You also say
I have not spoken to Mick Smith about this - but I would be very surprised if he does not proudly accept exactly that responsibility. What other, less reputable, parts of the media do with the fruits of Mick’s valuable research is obviously not his responsibility, however.
I really don’t think, either, that slagging off Mick Smith is going to help
.
I believe that work such as his is part of a big effort that might just help to save some of those lives in future.
airsound
I’m sure Mick Smith is big enough to look after himself, but I can’t let your totally ill-founded and ill-tempered attack on him pass without comment.
You say
I reckon you should stick to journalism
You also say
You need to accept some of the responsibility for the way that the whole issue has been portrayed throughout the media
I really don’t think, either, that slagging off Mick Smith is going to help
put something positive back into the lives of those at Kinloss
I believe that work such as his is part of a big effort that might just help to save some of those lives in future.
airsound
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Mr Softie, you gently chastise Winco for suggesting the AAR lash up is the same as the fag packet design in 82.
Would you care to comment on the admission the ACM was amended to REMOVE max refuelling pressure?
As a Nimrod SME, maybe deep GE would also care to comment?
Would you care to comment on the admission the ACM was amended to REMOVE max refuelling pressure?
As a Nimrod SME, maybe deep GE would also care to comment?
Last edited by nigegilb; 6th Dec 2007 at 13:28.
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Perhaps a few more 'no' men and women would be a good future direction. In the 23 years that I served it was always apparent that 'yes' men moved onwards and upwards. Those that chose to raise complaints and refused to see the 'big picture' were isolated and then removed. If the military ethos,culture and structure is based on blind servitude, we will continue to feel loses as hard as this.
5d2d
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Talk about shoot the messenger you are starting to sound deranged. Airsound was there at the BoI presentation. He was also on C4 News in front of the camera, on BBC Main News News 24, he is not afraid of anything. You received your personal briefing by the BoI team on the 5th at ISK as a direct result of Graham Knight's personal intervention.
You know what, as a direct result of Mick Smith and others raising the profile of this crash the MoD felt the need to offer interim compensation payments before an inquest. Some of the widows have been forced to go out to work because of changes to laws regarding widows' military pensions or simply a massively reduced income. Hopefully they will now have the choice of staying at home to look after their kids or simply work less.
Try thinking about that next time you open your mouth, or laptop. And before you open your mouth again, there have been 74 other deaths attributable to a lack of equipment or procedure in Afg and Iraq. Why is it that the MoD have reacted to the Nimrod tragedy in this specific way?
You know what, as a direct result of Mick Smith and others raising the profile of this crash the MoD felt the need to offer interim compensation payments before an inquest. Some of the widows have been forced to go out to work because of changes to laws regarding widows' military pensions or simply a massively reduced income. Hopefully they will now have the choice of staying at home to look after their kids or simply work less.
Try thinking about that next time you open your mouth, or laptop. And before you open your mouth again, there have been 74 other deaths attributable to a lack of equipment or procedure in Afg and Iraq. Why is it that the MoD have reacted to the Nimrod tragedy in this specific way?
Last edited by nigegilb; 6th Dec 2007 at 17:32.
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Would you care to comment on the admission the ACM was amended to REMOVE max refuelling pressure?
When MOD 715 was introduced, the trials for Tristar on the AEW Nimrod were also going on. It was established, from the manufacturer, (its in the BOI report) that the max pressure in the system on the AEW was 120 psi. We then used the same AEW system as the basis for MOD 715, which was the replacement AAR system.
The aircrew flying manual (Book 3) was then amended to reflect MOD 715 and the upper limit of 120 psi was so high as to be beyond anything we would reach, so it was not published. The previous info in Book 1 was removed. I noted at the time that the pressure limit had disappeared from our manuals but I was informed by the GSU that the new system was capable of much higher pressures, because the manufacturer had said so.
You used the word, "admission" in an accusatory context. Has that word or similar terminology appeared in the BOI report?
Regards
Ed Set