Nimrod Information
Thanks Da4orce, I realise now what was being asked, but only those that currently work on the fleet can answer to that depth of detail, I can only assume from what was written in the text you posted, and I mearly copied and pasted from the source text you posted at #663, that if the implementation plan had been produced early that the duct replacement programme would already be in progress, though this does not appear to be the case. I can only assume again that it is possible that they are waiting for the BOI findings before deciding where to spend/not spend money, your last paragraph is probably closer to the mark.
It is difficult not to sound like a 'man from the MOD' as DV put it, but I am out of the RAF, allthough I still work within the military environment I am no longer close enough to give up to date in depth knowledge of what is happening in the Nimrod fleet today. Most of my responses have been to try and answer the technical systems info that TD and others have asked, and this is from memory of my days within the Nimrod groundcrew world and from the recent platforms that I have fuel system knowledge of, additionally some comments are my own personnel opinions on what is happening and on responses from other posters. If this means that my inputs are not valid or relevant then I will consider waiting for any official outputs on the findings before posting again.
It is difficult not to sound like a 'man from the MOD' as DV put it, but I am out of the RAF, allthough I still work within the military environment I am no longer close enough to give up to date in depth knowledge of what is happening in the Nimrod fleet today. Most of my responses have been to try and answer the technical systems info that TD and others have asked, and this is from memory of my days within the Nimrod groundcrew world and from the recent platforms that I have fuel system knowledge of, additionally some comments are my own personnel opinions on what is happening and on responses from other posters. If this means that my inputs are not valid or relevant then I will consider waiting for any official outputs on the findings before posting again.
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Exrigger: I understand all that was said in the posting, which for the record happens to be the answer to a PQ that Tapper's Dad's MP raised. I also know that a sample analysis on similar pipes was carried out between July 2005 and April 2007 on MR2 a/c returned to BAE on MRA programme. (Obtained under FOI)
TD simply wants to know if the maitenance/lifing progaramme has been defined and when will it swing into action? As things stand at present we could have Nimrods flying around with defective piping.
When did Noah build the Ark ------ before the flood.
DV
TD simply wants to know if the maitenance/lifing progaramme has been defined and when will it swing into action? As things stand at present we could have Nimrods flying around with defective piping.
When did Noah build the Ark ------ before the flood.
DV
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Thanks Da4orce,Distant Voice and Exrigger for your answers.
However what I really wanted to know was if the SCP duct on XV230 was replaced with new manufacture items before the crash
RECOMMENDATIONS made after the XV227 incident in 22 Nov 04
were that
The SCP duct is with replaced with new manufacture items on a fleet-wide basis as soon as possible
However what I really wanted to know was if the SCP duct on XV230 was replaced with new manufacture items before the crash
RECOMMENDATIONS made after the XV227 incident in 22 Nov 04
were that
The SCP duct is with replaced with new manufacture items on a fleet-wide basis as soon as possible
TD: I only answered the general question you asked, had you asked that specific question I would have been unable to answer, the only people that can answer that specific question about XV230 are the groundcrew who would of actually signed a job card to do the duct replacement task, or engineering records who would have the card filed away.
DV: Noah had a crystal ball in the form of God, thats why he built the Ark before the flood. I believe the Nimrod personnel are working after the flood with regards to this specific problem i.e. in hindsight, with not much actual evidence to say categorically that we need to spend money on a specific 'Ark', allthough they have decided to go with the SCP duct replacement 'Ark' , again in hindsight after an investigation into one incident.
DV: Noah had a crystal ball in the form of God, thats why he built the Ark before the flood. I believe the Nimrod personnel are working after the flood with regards to this specific problem i.e. in hindsight, with not much actual evidence to say categorically that we need to spend money on a specific 'Ark', allthough they have decided to go with the SCP duct replacement 'Ark' , again in hindsight after an investigation into one incident.
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Exrigger: I think the warning was there with the XV227 incident, and very little was done. A defective pipe was replaced and we then went on flying using the SCP and a filled No. 7 tank. As soon as XV230 was lost we immediately isolate the SCP and No.7 tank. That had to done based on the data from XV227.
XV227 was the word of God, XV 230 was the flood, and MoD are still thinking about building the Ark.
DV
XV227 was the word of God, XV 230 was the flood, and MoD are still thinking about building the Ark.
DV
Fair enough DV, my intention was not to start or get involved in a war of words and get into a philosophical debate on the subject, as all people have a different perspective on this depending on which part of the system one is sat in. The bottom line is we are all trying to help answer the likes of TD's questions where we can so he and other families can get the answers they need to come to terms with their loss and hopefully prevent the same thing happening again with more unnecessary loss of life.
Allthough I will say that XV227 may have been the word of god, but if XV230 was caused by something else unrelated to the cause of XV227s incident (its only conjecture, but probably a fairly accurate guess for all that, that this is the same root cause for XV230) then it was not the flood, but still agree that the MOD will be still thinking about building the ark long after this aircraft/other aircraft and they themselves have left the RAF.
Allthough I will say that XV227 may have been the word of god, but if XV230 was caused by something else unrelated to the cause of XV227s incident (its only conjecture, but probably a fairly accurate guess for all that, that this is the same root cause for XV230) then it was not the flood, but still agree that the MOD will be still thinking about building the ark long after this aircraft/other aircraft and they themselves have left the RAF.
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TD:
I can assure you of the folllowing facts:
Immediately following the incident with XX227, the SCP system was taken out of service on all aircraft, although the system itself remained in place. One by one, the SCP ducts were replaced and only those SCPs with replaced ducts were cleared for use.
All aircraft in the Gulf in Sep 06 had replacement SCP ducts fitted.
However what I really wanted to know was if the SCP duct on XV230 was replaced with new manufacture items before the crash
Immediately following the incident with XX227, the SCP system was taken out of service on all aircraft, although the system itself remained in place. One by one, the SCP ducts were replaced and only those SCPs with replaced ducts were cleared for use.
All aircraft in the Gulf in Sep 06 had replacement SCP ducts fitted.
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AC Ovee;
It is understood the the defective duct was replaced on all aircraft within about one year after the XV227 incident. What would be useful to know is whether or not the maintenance programme for "similar" ducts has been introducted.
DV
It is understood the the defective duct was replaced on all aircraft within about one year after the XV227 incident. What would be useful to know is whether or not the maintenance programme for "similar" ducts has been introducted.
DV
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Confused with the post on the 17th August 2007 19:24?
Ex-Rigger/Da4orce/TD,
The recommendations/actions taken, where have these come from?
Firstly you don't recommend a fleet wide replacement until you have established that the duct in question is the root cause of failure and that the proposed recommended fix/corrective action will remove the single point of critical failure entirely. This requires extensive system wide and platform analysis, testing, proving and flight testing first this sounds more like a quick fix.
25 years of previous life is irrelevant how can you determine if it has failed before, if its already not detectable you can't rely on the 25 years of maintenance archives, the duct in question may have been replaced during a primary/minor/major as part of an assembly and not checked for failure, who knows?
The Aircraft Design Office has to maintain the Declaration of Design & Performance (DDP) for the platform and any other platforms it has ADO over, as part of their remittance in maintaining the DDP they must maintain the FMECA and FTA, if this failure has not been identified previously then it must be added to the FMECA and FTA before the DDP can be signed off, if the item's failure still cannot be detected then a preventative maintenance (PM) task with another method of detection must be put in it's place prior to allowing the platform to go on operational duties.
Assuming as the platforms, are and have been operational since the XV227 incident (the DDP must be current) the FMECA and FTA has been updated, the PM task will have already been put in place with the required detection methods.
If I understand you correctly this fault occurred in 2004 and the PM task will not be in place until Dec 2007, would it be fairer to say that the required analysis and testing will not be complete on MRA4 until Dec 2007 and then be retro-fitted across the MR2 fleet. This approach would not be the best way forward as the two platforms are significantly different, different equipment fits, enviroments, cooling, engines, etc, the itself maybe the same fit, form and function but the systems and platform are not read accross would not be recommended.
As an ex-Nimrod techie (10 years of ISK experience), extensive Reliability & Flight Safety experience and with a cousin still flying in normans regularly, I would urge you all to wait until the BOI is published, when it is, if it doesn't clearly address the issues and identify the root cause of failure, then ask the right questions and don't pull punches as there are a lot of other parties other than the lost crew (RIP) and their families, who will not be prepared to shoulder any of the blame, as blame equals £'s and therefore significant pay outs.
Please wait for the BOI!
The recommendations/actions taken, where have these come from?
Firstly you don't recommend a fleet wide replacement until you have established that the duct in question is the root cause of failure and that the proposed recommended fix/corrective action will remove the single point of critical failure entirely. This requires extensive system wide and platform analysis, testing, proving and flight testing first this sounds more like a quick fix.
25 years of previous life is irrelevant how can you determine if it has failed before, if its already not detectable you can't rely on the 25 years of maintenance archives, the duct in question may have been replaced during a primary/minor/major as part of an assembly and not checked for failure, who knows?
The Aircraft Design Office has to maintain the Declaration of Design & Performance (DDP) for the platform and any other platforms it has ADO over, as part of their remittance in maintaining the DDP they must maintain the FMECA and FTA, if this failure has not been identified previously then it must be added to the FMECA and FTA before the DDP can be signed off, if the item's failure still cannot be detected then a preventative maintenance (PM) task with another method of detection must be put in it's place prior to allowing the platform to go on operational duties.
Assuming as the platforms, are and have been operational since the XV227 incident (the DDP must be current) the FMECA and FTA has been updated, the PM task will have already been put in place with the required detection methods.
If I understand you correctly this fault occurred in 2004 and the PM task will not be in place until Dec 2007, would it be fairer to say that the required analysis and testing will not be complete on MRA4 until Dec 2007 and then be retro-fitted across the MR2 fleet. This approach would not be the best way forward as the two platforms are significantly different, different equipment fits, enviroments, cooling, engines, etc, the itself maybe the same fit, form and function but the systems and platform are not read accross would not be recommended.
As an ex-Nimrod techie (10 years of ISK experience), extensive Reliability & Flight Safety experience and with a cousin still flying in normans regularly, I would urge you all to wait until the BOI is published, when it is, if it doesn't clearly address the issues and identify the root cause of failure, then ask the right questions and don't pull punches as there are a lot of other parties other than the lost crew (RIP) and their families, who will not be prepared to shoulder any of the blame, as blame equals £'s and therefore significant pay outs.
Please wait for the BOI!
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Murphy wrote:
Maybe your point would be better directed at the RAF as the recommendations were made in a report published in July 2005 into the XV227 incident.
This is not about blame or compensation, nothing can compensate for losing a loved one in such a way, especially one who was so full of life.
361 days and waiting
Ex-Rigger/Da4orce/TD,
The recommendations/actions taken, where have these come from?
Firstly you don't recommend a fleet wide replacement until you have established that the duct in question is the root cause of failure and that the proposed recommended fix/corrective action will remove the single point of critical failure entirely. This requires extensive system wide and platform analysis, testing, proving and flight testing first this sounds more like a quick fix.
The recommendations/actions taken, where have these come from?
Firstly you don't recommend a fleet wide replacement until you have established that the duct in question is the root cause of failure and that the proposed recommended fix/corrective action will remove the single point of critical failure entirely. This requires extensive system wide and platform analysis, testing, proving and flight testing first this sounds more like a quick fix.
This is not about blame or compensation, nothing can compensate for losing a loved one in such a way, especially one who was so full of life.
361 days and waiting
Da4orce you beat me to it. The duct that was replaced was the root cause of the incident with XV227, and an analysis was carried out by BAE Systems into the SCP duct and others in the system and hence the recommended lifing policy that will be/has been introduced to the MR2, as Da4orce said if you wish to know more ask the RAF/MOD/BAE Systems.
25 years history is hardly irrelevant, especially if you are able to trawl the archived maintenance documentation/supply documentation/use the IPT/DA to do a check against the part number of a component and find how many of those components have been replaced and why, this is done in every maintenance/first line environment when something is found that appears out of the 'norm' or post a ground/air incident. Additionally why are you bringing MRA4 into the discussion it is not relevant, the analysis referred to has been carried out on MR2 post XV227 not on MRA4, as you rightly pointed out it is has different systems/engines/layout to the MR2.
Throughout this thread most of the people are advising waiting for the outcome of the BOI, but TD/Da4orce and others have a right to ask technical questions so they can understand what could of gone wrong, to help them ask the right questions under the FOI/understand those responses, to help get closure for their loss and prepare them better to understand the technical content of the BOI when it is released.
25 years history is hardly irrelevant, especially if you are able to trawl the archived maintenance documentation/supply documentation/use the IPT/DA to do a check against the part number of a component and find how many of those components have been replaced and why, this is done in every maintenance/first line environment when something is found that appears out of the 'norm' or post a ground/air incident. Additionally why are you bringing MRA4 into the discussion it is not relevant, the analysis referred to has been carried out on MR2 post XV227 not on MRA4, as you rightly pointed out it is has different systems/engines/layout to the MR2.
Throughout this thread most of the people are advising waiting for the outcome of the BOI, but TD/Da4orce and others have a right to ask technical questions so they can understand what could of gone wrong, to help them ask the right questions under the FOI/understand those responses, to help get closure for their loss and prepare them better to understand the technical content of the BOI when it is released.
From today's Sunday Times:
September 2, 2007
MoD rejected fire safety plan for doomed Nimrod
Michael Smith
THE manufacturers of the RAF's Nimrod aircraft recommended a fire detection and suppression system be fitted to its bomb bay two years before one of the planes exploded over Afghanistan, killing all 14 on board.
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) rejected the proposal on the basis that it was unlikely to be effective. The fire leading to the explosion, a year ago today, started in the bomb bay.
BAE Systems made the recommendation in August 2004 in a "safety case" report commissioned by the MoD to ensure the ageing aircraft was safe to continue flying amid continuing delays to its replacement.
The safety report was needed because the Nimrod aircraft, originally introduced in 1969 and due to go out of service in 1995, had to continue flying on operations over Iraq and Afghanistan. Its replacement will not now be introduced until 2010.
The recommendation was one of two warnings concerning the age of the aircraft and the dangers of a fire in the bomb bay given to the MoD. Three months after BAE Systems urged that the fire suppression system be fitted, a leak of superheated air in one of the Nimrod's bomb bays came close to starting a fire.
In an internal report into the incident, the RAF Kinloss station commander said the incident was "a particular concern as the ageing Nimrod MR2 is extended beyond its original out-of-service date", and warned of similar such failures in the future.
The MoD's admission that it did not act on the BAE Systems recommendation was made in response to a freedom of information request from Graham Knight, whose son Ben died onboard.
The statement comes on the first anniversary of the explosion with the families of the 12 dead airmen attending a private memorial service at RAF Kinloss today. The other two killed were special forces radio operators.
Knight said: "Had a fire detection suppression system been fitted to my son's aircraft, it might have bought them the three minutes they needed in which to land. What price does the MoD put on 14 human lives?"
The pilot of the Nimrod reported a fire in his bomb bay. The aircraft's starboard wing exploded, followed a few seconds later by the rest of the aircraft.
The board of inquiry into the explosion has focused on the bomb bay where a combination of leaks of fuel from the air-to-air refueling system and from other pipes carrying hot air are seen as the most likely causes. The leaking air was superheated to temperatures higher than the automatic ignition point of the aircraft's Avtur fuel.
New documents passed to The Sunday Times show that the pipe carrying the superheated air was isolated after last year's crash. At the same time, the number seven tank, which is next to the bomb bay and at the root of the wing, was taken out of use.
Jimmy Jones, a former RAF flight trials engineer, who worked on the Nimrod, said this "clearly indicates that was considered to be a potential risk following the November 2004 incident and therefore before [the plane] exploded".
Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, chief of the defence staff, has insisted that the Nimrod aircraft are safe to continue flying. But Jones said: "It is not good enough for [him] to say that Nimrod has a good safety record, therefore it is safe. "By the MoD's own safety case standard they have to provide 'compelling, comprehensive and valid' evidence the aircraft is safe. It doesn't exist."
The MoD said the BAE Systems recommendation was "only one" of a number of suggestions made. "We needed to take into account the practicalities of the suggested changes and the operational impact on the aircraft. Based on these, it was not thought appropriate to follow their suggestion."
"Not thought appropriate".........??
September 2, 2007
MoD rejected fire safety plan for doomed Nimrod
Michael Smith
THE manufacturers of the RAF's Nimrod aircraft recommended a fire detection and suppression system be fitted to its bomb bay two years before one of the planes exploded over Afghanistan, killing all 14 on board.
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) rejected the proposal on the basis that it was unlikely to be effective. The fire leading to the explosion, a year ago today, started in the bomb bay.
BAE Systems made the recommendation in August 2004 in a "safety case" report commissioned by the MoD to ensure the ageing aircraft was safe to continue flying amid continuing delays to its replacement.
The safety report was needed because the Nimrod aircraft, originally introduced in 1969 and due to go out of service in 1995, had to continue flying on operations over Iraq and Afghanistan. Its replacement will not now be introduced until 2010.
The recommendation was one of two warnings concerning the age of the aircraft and the dangers of a fire in the bomb bay given to the MoD. Three months after BAE Systems urged that the fire suppression system be fitted, a leak of superheated air in one of the Nimrod's bomb bays came close to starting a fire.
In an internal report into the incident, the RAF Kinloss station commander said the incident was "a particular concern as the ageing Nimrod MR2 is extended beyond its original out-of-service date", and warned of similar such failures in the future.
The MoD's admission that it did not act on the BAE Systems recommendation was made in response to a freedom of information request from Graham Knight, whose son Ben died onboard.
The statement comes on the first anniversary of the explosion with the families of the 12 dead airmen attending a private memorial service at RAF Kinloss today. The other two killed were special forces radio operators.
Knight said: "Had a fire detection suppression system been fitted to my son's aircraft, it might have bought them the three minutes they needed in which to land. What price does the MoD put on 14 human lives?"
The pilot of the Nimrod reported a fire in his bomb bay. The aircraft's starboard wing exploded, followed a few seconds later by the rest of the aircraft.
The board of inquiry into the explosion has focused on the bomb bay where a combination of leaks of fuel from the air-to-air refueling system and from other pipes carrying hot air are seen as the most likely causes. The leaking air was superheated to temperatures higher than the automatic ignition point of the aircraft's Avtur fuel.
New documents passed to The Sunday Times show that the pipe carrying the superheated air was isolated after last year's crash. At the same time, the number seven tank, which is next to the bomb bay and at the root of the wing, was taken out of use.
Jimmy Jones, a former RAF flight trials engineer, who worked on the Nimrod, said this "clearly indicates that was considered to be a potential risk following the November 2004 incident and therefore before [the plane] exploded".
Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, chief of the defence staff, has insisted that the Nimrod aircraft are safe to continue flying. But Jones said: "It is not good enough for [him] to say that Nimrod has a good safety record, therefore it is safe. "By the MoD's own safety case standard they have to provide 'compelling, comprehensive and valid' evidence the aircraft is safe. It doesn't exist."
The MoD said the BAE Systems recommendation was "only one" of a number of suggestions made. "We needed to take into account the practicalities of the suggested changes and the operational impact on the aircraft. Based on these, it was not thought appropriate to follow their suggestion."
"Not thought appropriate".........??
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As I approach my 70th anniversary I am minded of the anniversary that I would rather did not exist - when the MR fleet and 120 Squadron lost one of their aircraft and crews in operations in Afghanistan.
May I take the opportunity to extend my sympathy to all of the families concerned.
I was prompted to post by the article that precedes this one concerning the bomb bay fire system that isn't; I was on board what I believe was the first Nimrod that had a bomb bay fire problem and I know only too well how vulnerable the aircraft is in this area and I was indeed surprised to see that this vulnerability had still not been fixed! The existence of the IFR capability has actually exacerbated this vulnerability.
On that one we were fortunate in that the No 6 tank did not explode with the heat from the fire, as it was, amongst other things, we lost hydraulic services which included one of the primary flying controls services and undercarriage.
We did not have an emergency drill for a bomb bay fire in those days and the engineer on board 'Moose Moxon, was a relative rookie but he coped admirably as did the rest of the crew!
I am sorry but I have digressed from the thread so once again I offer my heartfelt condolences on this sad anniversary.
GT
May I take the opportunity to extend my sympathy to all of the families concerned.
I was prompted to post by the article that precedes this one concerning the bomb bay fire system that isn't; I was on board what I believe was the first Nimrod that had a bomb bay fire problem and I know only too well how vulnerable the aircraft is in this area and I was indeed surprised to see that this vulnerability had still not been fixed! The existence of the IFR capability has actually exacerbated this vulnerability.
On that one we were fortunate in that the No 6 tank did not explode with the heat from the fire, as it was, amongst other things, we lost hydraulic services which included one of the primary flying controls services and undercarriage.
We did not have an emergency drill for a bomb bay fire in those days and the engineer on board 'Moose Moxon, was a relative rookie but he coped admirably as did the rest of the crew!
I am sorry but I have digressed from the thread so once again I offer my heartfelt condolences on this sad anniversary.
GT
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Wisperer
Thank you for your kind words. I have been up in Inverness all week and visited ISK on Sunday to lay flowers and Wednesday to talk to one of the senior ranks. I have had a request for information via the FOI turned down which is interesting as it concerned bomb bay fires.
Thank you for your kind words. I have been up in Inverness all week and visited ISK on Sunday to lay flowers and Wednesday to talk to one of the senior ranks. I have had a request for information via the FOI turned down which is interesting as it concerned bomb bay fires.
The BOZ pods are Pylon mounted CHAFF Dispensers, basically it spits out shredded tin foil. The R Mk1 has it fitted to wing pylons as does the MR2.
From aeroflight web site:
I can only assume that Rib 7 is the Wing Rib that the pylon, then BOZ pod are mounted on, this would not be near the bomb bay and should not be relevant to the incident, but not knowing any of the facts of the incident, I can only make an assumption
And before anyone mentions security this information is readily accessible from the internet.
From aeroflight web site:
In late 1990 several Nimrod MR.2s were fitted with an underwing FLIR turret under the starboard wing, BOZ pod under the port wing and a Towed Radar Decoy, under the unofficial designation MR.2(GM) - where GM stood for Gulf Mod.
And before anyone mentions security this information is readily accessible from the internet.
Last edited by Exrigger; 9th Sep 2007 at 16:33. Reason: Added possible answer to question on Rib 7