Nimrod Information
L1A2
“The challenge is to identify, track and eradicate errors by assisting people all through the chain of events to do so in an open 'no blame' culture”.
I agree with this, but with caveats. The people in the chain of events (the safety/airworthiness chain in this case) must be properly trained and qualified to do their respective jobs, and their letters of delegation must clearly define their remit.
As I said earlier, there is no place in this chain for people who do not satisfy these criteria and conduct their business outside that remit. If someone, with no training or delegated authority whatsoever, makes a decision and signs-off on safety/airworthiness or technical and financial approval, purely on the premise “I’m more senior to you, so I must be right”; then I’m afraid he’s certifiable and should be removed from any position of authority. Likewise, anyone who condones this.
In saying this, I should concede that I have it in writing from 2*, 4* and various Ministers that I’m wrong. In turn, they concede I’m entitled to my opinion, but must accept the disciplinary consequences. No blame?
“The challenge is to identify, track and eradicate errors by assisting people all through the chain of events to do so in an open 'no blame' culture”.
I agree with this, but with caveats. The people in the chain of events (the safety/airworthiness chain in this case) must be properly trained and qualified to do their respective jobs, and their letters of delegation must clearly define their remit.
As I said earlier, there is no place in this chain for people who do not satisfy these criteria and conduct their business outside that remit. If someone, with no training or delegated authority whatsoever, makes a decision and signs-off on safety/airworthiness or technical and financial approval, purely on the premise “I’m more senior to you, so I must be right”; then I’m afraid he’s certifiable and should be removed from any position of authority. Likewise, anyone who condones this.
In saying this, I should concede that I have it in writing from 2*, 4* and various Ministers that I’m wrong. In turn, they concede I’m entitled to my opinion, but must accept the disciplinary consequences. No blame?
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Observations ..
Gents (I presume), Winco, tecumseh et al,
No snags with your comments on the premise we should be operating under, a more full explaination would take many pages but perhaps I should have said 'a robust and just culture'. e.g nail the reckless and the careless, ensure (as has been said above) that all personnel in the chain are properly trained, qualified, competent and authorised. With relevant checks and balances.
Regards L1
No snags with your comments on the premise we should be operating under, a more full explaination would take many pages but perhaps I should have said 'a robust and just culture'. e.g nail the reckless and the careless, ensure (as has been said above) that all personnel in the chain are properly trained, qualified, competent and authorised. With relevant checks and balances.
Regards L1
What checks and balances do the head honchos operate under L1A2? My question concerning 4*s remains unanswered. Is it perhaps unanswerable? When those who get "nailed" include the likes of Tucumseh...
....I begin to take more interest in those doing the nailing, rather than those that they have nailed! In short sir, and with all due respect, I suspect that your system sucks, and in the case of front line fleets more likely detracts from Flight Safety and Airworthiness, rather than enhances them.
In saying this, I should concede that I have it in writing from 2*, 4* and various Ministers that I’m wrong. In turn, they concede I’m entitled to my opinion, but must accept the disciplinary consequences. No blame?
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http://news.scotsman.com/uk.cfm?id=1066722007
MoD refuses request to fit Nimrods with new safety system
Mon 9 Jul 2007 The Scotsman
JAMES KIRKUP
DEFENCE chiefs have refused an RAF request to fit its Nimrod aircraft with an early-warning system that might have prevented a near-fatal incident.
The decision has caused unease among airmen, who fear that the ageing Scottish-based spyplanes are increasingly vulnerable to technical failures.
In November 2004, a Nimrod flying from RAF Kinloss in Moray developed a crack in a super-heated air pipe.
The rupture in flight XV227's Supplementary Cooling Pack caused air heated to around 230C to blast against the airframe of the plane, burning through cables and metal.
Seals around the plane's fuel tanks were also damaged, sparking fears of an explosion.
Crucially, the crew of flight XV227 had no indication of a leak while they were in the air - it was only discovered after they returned to their Moray base.
An internal investigation into the 2004 incident by Kinloss commanders last year recommended that all Nimrods be fitted with a warning system to inform pilots and crew about possible future incidents.
But the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has rejected the inquiry's safety recommendation as unnecessary and impractical.
In its formal response to the Kinloss team's request for an air-pipe warning mechanism, the MoD has ruled that there is no need for the new safety system.
"The duct failure was an isolated incident and was in the only part of the system where a leak would not have been detected," the MoD said, adding that Nimrod air ducts are expected to last "well beyond" the planes' expected retirement date, early in the next decade.
The ministry also raised practical objections to an upgrade.
"Fitting a discrete hot air leak warning system would be a complex modification that would have to be embodied across the fleet during its maintenance cycle and therefore take several years to embody," the MoD said.
Since the Nimrods are close to retirement, the MoD ruled "the fitting of such a system was not considered to be practicable".
As a result, the Kinloss inquiry team's recommendation has now been marked "closed".
But the MoD's conclusion that the hot air leak was an "isolated incident" has been challenged.
In September 2006, another Nimrod, flight XV230 from Kinloss, exploded over Afghanistan, killing all 14 people aboard. A formal investigation is due to report soon, but reports have suggested the plane was brought down by leaking fuel that ignited.
However, one Scottish-based RAF source suggested an air pipe rupture was another possible cause: "What if 230C air was to be blasted from a broken duct against a fuel pipe/tank?"
MoD refuses request to fit Nimrods with new safety system
Mon 9 Jul 2007 The Scotsman
JAMES KIRKUP
DEFENCE chiefs have refused an RAF request to fit its Nimrod aircraft with an early-warning system that might have prevented a near-fatal incident.
The decision has caused unease among airmen, who fear that the ageing Scottish-based spyplanes are increasingly vulnerable to technical failures.
In November 2004, a Nimrod flying from RAF Kinloss in Moray developed a crack in a super-heated air pipe.
The rupture in flight XV227's Supplementary Cooling Pack caused air heated to around 230C to blast against the airframe of the plane, burning through cables and metal.
Seals around the plane's fuel tanks were also damaged, sparking fears of an explosion.
Crucially, the crew of flight XV227 had no indication of a leak while they were in the air - it was only discovered after they returned to their Moray base.
An internal investigation into the 2004 incident by Kinloss commanders last year recommended that all Nimrods be fitted with a warning system to inform pilots and crew about possible future incidents.
But the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has rejected the inquiry's safety recommendation as unnecessary and impractical.
In its formal response to the Kinloss team's request for an air-pipe warning mechanism, the MoD has ruled that there is no need for the new safety system.
"The duct failure was an isolated incident and was in the only part of the system where a leak would not have been detected," the MoD said, adding that Nimrod air ducts are expected to last "well beyond" the planes' expected retirement date, early in the next decade.
The ministry also raised practical objections to an upgrade.
"Fitting a discrete hot air leak warning system would be a complex modification that would have to be embodied across the fleet during its maintenance cycle and therefore take several years to embody," the MoD said.
Since the Nimrods are close to retirement, the MoD ruled "the fitting of such a system was not considered to be practicable".
As a result, the Kinloss inquiry team's recommendation has now been marked "closed".
But the MoD's conclusion that the hot air leak was an "isolated incident" has been challenged.
In September 2006, another Nimrod, flight XV230 from Kinloss, exploded over Afghanistan, killing all 14 people aboard. A formal investigation is due to report soon, but reports have suggested the plane was brought down by leaking fuel that ignited.
However, one Scottish-based RAF source suggested an air pipe rupture was another possible cause: "What if 230C air was to be blasted from a broken duct against a fuel pipe/tank?"
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MOD Refuses to Fit New Safety System
I know it is of little significance, but I do not think that the Supplementary Cooling Pack ( SCP ) will be cleared again for operation on the MR2 fleet!
That is maybe why there will be no safety devices procured for it.
I know that we are all waiting on the board of inquiry, so I am not going to guess what did happen to " 30 ", but what has been mentioned already, is a possibility. I would also like clarification that sa18 was definitely not a player!
RIP Guys. I think about you all. God speed!
Minzastella
That is maybe why there will be no safety devices procured for it.
I know that we are all waiting on the board of inquiry, so I am not going to guess what did happen to " 30 ", but what has been mentioned already, is a possibility. I would also like clarification that sa18 was definitely not a player!
RIP Guys. I think about you all. God speed!
Minzastella
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RCOV 2 ENG
If you check the flight envelope for the SA18 and the height and location the crew were at after refuel, that should answer your question - poss low 4
The SCP safety device is already fitted - it's an ON/OFF switch left in the OFF position with the CB (power supply) tripped and collared - in which case, it will then be annotated in the F700, as not cleared for use
So yes, your post was of little significance, if this makes you feel better
If you check the flight envelope for the SA18 and the height and location the crew were at after refuel, that should answer your question - poss low 4
The SCP safety device is already fitted - it's an ON/OFF switch left in the OFF position with the CB (power supply) tripped and collared - in which case, it will then be annotated in the F700, as not cleared for use
So yes, your post was of little significance, if this makes you feel better
My posts on this thread point to the Achilles heel of the RAF Airworthiness and Flight Safety system, whereby its objectiveness is fundamentally compromised by the way it can be subject to interference and misdirection by those in command of the RAF, unlike their civilian counterparts who are under the direction of an independent authority. That contention has yet to be denied. This may or may not have been of significance historically, but in these days of a major part of the RAF being at war, while being under unprecedented financial and manpower restrictions, it is surely a cause of great concern now. Interestingly that leadership is being criticised in a similar way on the "parliamentary" thread re Hercules ESF, and is of course the immovable object in the fight to restore the reputations of the Mull Chinook pilots. It seems all roads are leading to the offices of those at the very top of the RAF. We need to speak the unspeakable if we are to see that leadership exercise some of its most important responsibilities, making the RAF fit for the wars it is fighting!
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Where are a the spares for Nimrods ? Well on Ebay of course !!!!
http://cgi.ebay.co.uk/RAF-Nimrod-Air...QQcmdZViewItem
RAF Nimrod Aircraft Nav instrument gague unit
http://cgi.ebay.co.uk/Fuel-Gauge-Comet-Nimrod-VC10-N-O-S_W0QQitemZ230125549640QQihZ013QQcategoryZ2983QQrdZ1QQssPage NameZWD1VQQcmdZViewItem
Fuel Gauge - Comet/Nimrod/VC10 - N.O.S
http://www.publications.parliament.u...006.htm_wqn116
July 2007
Mr. Harper: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many times a (a) C17A Globemaster, (b) Hercules C-130K, (c) Hercules C-130J, (d) Tristar, (e) VC-10 and (f) Nimrod MR2 has been cannibalised for spare parts. [148270]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The removal of serviceable parts from one aircraft for use on another is a routine and temporary measure to ensure that the maximum number of aircraft are available to the front line.
The number of these instances over the last 12 months (June 2006-May 2007), by donor aircraft, is given in the following table.
Aircraft type Number of cannibalisations
C17 25
C130J 781
C130K 156
TriStar 188
VC10 116
Nimrod MR2 307
http://cgi.ebay.co.uk/RAF-Nimrod-Air...QQcmdZViewItem
RAF Nimrod Aircraft Nav instrument gague unit
http://cgi.ebay.co.uk/Fuel-Gauge-Comet-Nimrod-VC10-N-O-S_W0QQitemZ230125549640QQihZ013QQcategoryZ2983QQrdZ1QQssPage NameZWD1VQQcmdZViewItem
Fuel Gauge - Comet/Nimrod/VC10 - N.O.S
http://www.publications.parliament.u...006.htm_wqn116
July 2007
Mr. Harper: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many times a (a) C17A Globemaster, (b) Hercules C-130K, (c) Hercules C-130J, (d) Tristar, (e) VC-10 and (f) Nimrod MR2 has been cannibalised for spare parts. [148270]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The removal of serviceable parts from one aircraft for use on another is a routine and temporary measure to ensure that the maximum number of aircraft are available to the front line.
The number of these instances over the last 12 months (June 2006-May 2007), by donor aircraft, is given in the following table.
Aircraft type Number of cannibalisations
C17 25
C130J 781
C130K 156
TriStar 188
VC10 116
Nimrod MR2 307
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23 July 2007 : Column 687W
Nimrod Aircraft
Mr. Liddell-Grainger: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what progress has been made on the Nimrod MRA4 project against the original timetable for work; what effect the time taken on the project has had on the future of the Nimrod MRA4 trainer facility in Kinloss; and if he will make a statement. [149571]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The current forecast In Service date for Nimrod MRA4 is 2010 against an original expectation of 2003 when the contract was let in 1996. The MRA4 training facility has been developed concurrently with the aircraft; the extended development programme for the aircraft has allowed risk to be removed from the training facility development programme through more extensive testing being conducted on site at RAF Kinloss by BAE Systems, assisted by the MOD.
Mr. Liddell-Grainger: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what problems have been encountered with (a) the software and (b) operation of the MRA4 trainer facility at Kinloss; and if he will make a statement. [149572]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The Nimrod MRA4 training facility is currently in the design and development phase. It is a sophisticated system which will provide training for aircrew and groundcrew operating one of the most complex weapon systems in the RAF. The recent, extensive, post-commissioning testing has, as intended, identified anomalies in the software which integrates the numerous and complex systems that make up the simulators. These have been addressed and the corrective actions will be consolidated during the planned upgrade of the simulators to the production delivery standard.
Mr. Liddell-Grainger: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the lifetime budget is for the MRA4 trainer at Kinloss. [149573]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The Nimrod MRA4 training facility does not have a separate budget. The costs of development and production of the facility form part of the prime contract with BAE Systems for the provision of the overall Nimrod MRA4 weapon system. The costs of the operation and maintenance of the training facility will form part of the contract for the future support of the weapon system, which has yet to be negotiated.
Mr. Liddell-Grainger: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what discussions departmental Ministers have had with BAE Systems on progress on the MRA4 trainer; and when such discussions took place. [149575]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: There have been no specific discussions between departmental Ministers and BAE Systems over progress on the Nimrod MRA4 training facility.
Mr. Liddell-Grainger: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how much has been spent from the public purse on the development of the Nimrod MRA4 since his announcement of the decision to procure the aircraft. [149576]
23 July 2007 : Column 688W
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: Total design and development costs for Nimrod MRA4 to date are some £1.73 billion of which about £215 million has been incurred since the production contract was signed in July 2006.
Mr. Liddell-Grainger: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the running costs of the Nimrod MRA4 trainers at Kinloss have been since the project commenced. [149580]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The Nimrod MRA4 training facility is currently in the design and development phase, the costs of which form part of the contract with BAE Systems for the provision of the overall Nimrod MRA4 weapon system. Contractual arrangements for operating and maintaining the training system have therefore yet to be negotiated.
Mr. Liddell-Grainger: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the length is of the contract with BAE Systems for the Nimrod MRA4 trainer at Kinloss; and what contractual provisions are in place to deal with the circumstances where the system does not work. [149582]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The development and production of the Nimrod MRA4 training facility forms part of the prime contract with BAE Systems for the overall Nimrod MRA4 weapon system. The contract requires the training system to replicate the standard of the first production aircraft and it will only be contractually accepted by MOD when it has successfully completed extensive testing to prove that it will function appropriately. The contract contains default provisions which could be implemented if the system did not meet the contractual requirement. Contractual arrangements for the operation and maintenance of the training facility have yet to be negotiated.
Mr. Liddell-Grainger: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether he has allocated further funds to the Nimrod MRA4 trainer facility at Kinloss to assist its development and against contingencies. [149583]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: Development and production of the Nimrod MRA4 training facility forms part of the overall prime contract with BAE Systems for provision of the overall Nimrod MRA4 weapon system and will be funded from the provision made for that contract. No additional funding has been allocated to that contract as a contingency provision for the training system.
http://www.publications.parliament.u...tm#column_687W
Nimrod Aircraft
Mr. Liddell-Grainger: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what progress has been made on the Nimrod MRA4 project against the original timetable for work; what effect the time taken on the project has had on the future of the Nimrod MRA4 trainer facility in Kinloss; and if he will make a statement. [149571]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The current forecast In Service date for Nimrod MRA4 is 2010 against an original expectation of 2003 when the contract was let in 1996. The MRA4 training facility has been developed concurrently with the aircraft; the extended development programme for the aircraft has allowed risk to be removed from the training facility development programme through more extensive testing being conducted on site at RAF Kinloss by BAE Systems, assisted by the MOD.
Mr. Liddell-Grainger: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what problems have been encountered with (a) the software and (b) operation of the MRA4 trainer facility at Kinloss; and if he will make a statement. [149572]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The Nimrod MRA4 training facility is currently in the design and development phase. It is a sophisticated system which will provide training for aircrew and groundcrew operating one of the most complex weapon systems in the RAF. The recent, extensive, post-commissioning testing has, as intended, identified anomalies in the software which integrates the numerous and complex systems that make up the simulators. These have been addressed and the corrective actions will be consolidated during the planned upgrade of the simulators to the production delivery standard.
Mr. Liddell-Grainger: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the lifetime budget is for the MRA4 trainer at Kinloss. [149573]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The Nimrod MRA4 training facility does not have a separate budget. The costs of development and production of the facility form part of the prime contract with BAE Systems for the provision of the overall Nimrod MRA4 weapon system. The costs of the operation and maintenance of the training facility will form part of the contract for the future support of the weapon system, which has yet to be negotiated.
Mr. Liddell-Grainger: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what discussions departmental Ministers have had with BAE Systems on progress on the MRA4 trainer; and when such discussions took place. [149575]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: There have been no specific discussions between departmental Ministers and BAE Systems over progress on the Nimrod MRA4 training facility.
Mr. Liddell-Grainger: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how much has been spent from the public purse on the development of the Nimrod MRA4 since his announcement of the decision to procure the aircraft. [149576]
23 July 2007 : Column 688W
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: Total design and development costs for Nimrod MRA4 to date are some £1.73 billion of which about £215 million has been incurred since the production contract was signed in July 2006.
Mr. Liddell-Grainger: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the running costs of the Nimrod MRA4 trainers at Kinloss have been since the project commenced. [149580]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The Nimrod MRA4 training facility is currently in the design and development phase, the costs of which form part of the contract with BAE Systems for the provision of the overall Nimrod MRA4 weapon system. Contractual arrangements for operating and maintaining the training system have therefore yet to be negotiated.
Mr. Liddell-Grainger: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the length is of the contract with BAE Systems for the Nimrod MRA4 trainer at Kinloss; and what contractual provisions are in place to deal with the circumstances where the system does not work. [149582]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The development and production of the Nimrod MRA4 training facility forms part of the prime contract with BAE Systems for the overall Nimrod MRA4 weapon system. The contract requires the training system to replicate the standard of the first production aircraft and it will only be contractually accepted by MOD when it has successfully completed extensive testing to prove that it will function appropriately. The contract contains default provisions which could be implemented if the system did not meet the contractual requirement. Contractual arrangements for the operation and maintenance of the training facility have yet to be negotiated.
Mr. Liddell-Grainger: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether he has allocated further funds to the Nimrod MRA4 trainer facility at Kinloss to assist its development and against contingencies. [149583]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: Development and production of the Nimrod MRA4 training facility forms part of the overall prime contract with BAE Systems for provision of the overall Nimrod MRA4 weapon system and will be funded from the provision made for that contract. No additional funding has been allocated to that contract as a contingency provision for the training system.
http://www.publications.parliament.u...tm#column_687W
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I understand there was once a fire suppression system fitted in the Bomb bay. Can anyone remember this and if so why it was removed??
PS Ben's brother gets married today.
PS Ben's brother gets married today.
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Apart from continuing the sport of BWoS and MRA4 bashing, although some may compare this sport to shooting fish in a barrel, what did comment 873 from Da4orce achieve?
I can't see how finding out how much money has been spent on the contract or the training simulator will help with finding out the causes of the crash of XV230 and help the families in any way or did I miss something?
I can't see how finding out how much money has been spent on the contract or the training simulator will help with finding out the causes of the crash of XV230 and help the families in any way or did I miss something?
Headstone - it proved that the questioner was chasing up a blind alley and clearly knew sod all about what he was trying to find out about. All the answers were quite reasonable, and what you'd expect. The only "better" way to do it from a procurement point of view would be to combine development, production and in-service into 1 contract to give MoD the best negotiating position, but given the volatility of the overall programme (how many are we buying etc.) this was almost certainly unrealistic/unlikely to be in the MoDs best interest, and therefore they have almost certainly taken the best approach in the circumstances.
It does usefully prove that many of the "stone throwers" at these kind of programmes are ill-informed mud rakers who should be treated on such occassions with a large amount of contempt.
It does usefully prove that many of the "stone throwers" at these kind of programmes are ill-informed mud rakers who should be treated on such occassions with a large amount of contempt.
TD, just to second Shack37s sentiments, and to wish the very best to the newly weds. I'm sorry that no one seems willing or able to answer your questions. If it is of any consolation mine aren't being answered either. You don't think that the word has gone out by any chance? Well a nod is as good as a wink, so I'll keep on asking, as I'm sure you will!
Regards Chug
Regards Chug
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JFZ90, Headstone.
Ah yes. It's been a few weeks since the MRA4 chaps have had a bashing etc on pprune. I agree that the comments in 873 have ABSOLUTELY nothing to do with 230. But, well, that's how it goes on here. I'm struggling to understand what this post has contributed to the thread; guess I'm missing something too...
Ah yes. It's been a few weeks since the MRA4 chaps have had a bashing etc on pprune. I agree that the comments in 873 have ABSOLUTELY nothing to do with 230. But, well, that's how it goes on here. I'm struggling to understand what this post has contributed to the thread; guess I'm missing something too...
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Chugalug2
Yes I think the word has gone out, however I am getting information sent to me some of which is very disturbing. Such as "This is the third ac with fuel leak issues post AAR sorties" and also I understand that an ac had a fuel line rupture whilst refuelling on the day after the crash.
Yes I think the word has gone out, however I am getting information sent to me some of which is very disturbing. Such as "This is the third ac with fuel leak issues post AAR sorties" and also I understand that an ac had a fuel line rupture whilst refuelling on the day after the crash.
I, too, wondered at the questions. I know little of Nimrod MR so can only assume there is a valid underlying reason. Now if the same questions had been asked about a related programme, initiated at the same time, within the same Directorate General, with a fraction of the resources and a more demanding timescale, the answers would have been illuminating, and gone something like this…. The programme was delivered to time and cost, and a better performance than requested by the Customer. The Customer did not ask for, or make financial provision for, a training facility. Lacking this, meeting the ISD would be impossible, as the aircraft could not be deemed operational without trained aircrew. Nevertheless, and despite the direction of senior staff (1* and above), who were completely ignored (a common feature in successful MoD programmes, certainly under that DG) the training facility was delivered and the ISD met. Lesson? There are people in MoD who can do this for fun, and get it right every time with effortless competence. Instead of treating them as “an embarrassment to the department” why not learn from them?
Mr Liddell-Grainger seems to have inherited his predecessors’ tendency to sign without first reading. (That he doesn’t actually understand his responses I take as read). In isolation, the questions and answers mean little. When compared with other similar programmes however, they reveal unpalatable and embarrassing truths. I’m sure the monies wasted on Nimrod could have been put to use elsewhere.
Mr Liddell-Grainger seems to have inherited his predecessors’ tendency to sign without first reading. (That he doesn’t actually understand his responses I take as read). In isolation, the questions and answers mean little. When compared with other similar programmes however, they reveal unpalatable and embarrassing truths. I’m sure the monies wasted on Nimrod could have been put to use elsewhere.
When compared with other similar programmes however, they reveal unpalatable and embarrassing truths.
JFZ90
Not talking about Apache - that was a relatively simple programme. No conversion / modification programme to worry about, and no operational capability to maintain during fleet conversion, which is where detail and the devil lurk, and which always causes problems if you don't get the properly trained people. The Apache Customer recognised the need to train aircrew and made proper materiel and financial provision. The trouble was PE (at the 1* and 2* level I mentioned - same ones) followed current political dogma and entered into PFI contracting knowing precisely what the outcome would be - delay. Ask why the other programme didn't go PFI, at precisely the same time. Answer (a) it would prevent the ISD being met (b) no firm overseas follow on sales potential - so you fill in a short application for waiver (more a statement of non-intent!) and move swiftly on.
It's like I said in previous posts. If you want to truly understand the issues being discussed here, you must write down the aircraft and equipments, and then list problems, timescales, personalities and related policies of the day. Also, identify the successful programmes and do the same thing. Then you'll see the common denominators and solutions.
Not talking about Apache - that was a relatively simple programme. No conversion / modification programme to worry about, and no operational capability to maintain during fleet conversion, which is where detail and the devil lurk, and which always causes problems if you don't get the properly trained people. The Apache Customer recognised the need to train aircrew and made proper materiel and financial provision. The trouble was PE (at the 1* and 2* level I mentioned - same ones) followed current political dogma and entered into PFI contracting knowing precisely what the outcome would be - delay. Ask why the other programme didn't go PFI, at precisely the same time. Answer (a) it would prevent the ISD being met (b) no firm overseas follow on sales potential - so you fill in a short application for waiver (more a statement of non-intent!) and move swiftly on.
It's like I said in previous posts. If you want to truly understand the issues being discussed here, you must write down the aircraft and equipments, and then list problems, timescales, personalities and related policies of the day. Also, identify the successful programmes and do the same thing. Then you'll see the common denominators and solutions.