Nimrod Information
Yes, a pretty damning summary of MoD policy and practice this past 16 years or so. I hope the multi-Stars who were specifically warned of the consequences are asked why they chose to ignore the warnings.
I'd say what they couldn't find was a documented audit trail that demonstrated that the mandated airworthiness requirements / regs were actually implemented properly. Not surprising, given the sheer weight of evidence that they weren't. The requirements themselves are there for all to see and any agreed deviation from them should be documented. (Notwithstanding the above multi-Stars' rulings that they are optional and can be ignored).
Nobody in the RAF or the MoD could find a copy of the airworthiness requirements for the version of the aircraft that caught fire
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Tucumseh wrote:
Hopefully they will have to do exactly that in May, assuming that the Coroner can identify them and call them to account.
I hope the multi-Stars who were specifically warned of the consequences are asked why they chose to ignore the warnings.
Hopefully they will have to do exactly that in May, assuming that the Coroner can identify them and call them to account.
But look at the problem in simple terms. While the original airworthiness audit trail has apparently gone cold, what was achieved and delivered had to form the basis for MAINTAINING airworthiness, as opposed to ATTAINING.
WHO was responsible for maintaining the build standard(s). They would know what their baseline was. If they didn’t have a baseline to maintain, how could they accept the task when transferred from the procurers? How could they (both) bring the design Under Ministry Control? The Def Stan has a form with a checklist they MUST complete. Tick missing? Walk away. So, for example, if you want the 2 Stars name for most of the last 15 years or so, you go to Bazelgette Pavilion at Wyton and look at the name boards in the foyer. I don’t know them all by any means, but will never forget the one who threatened to sack me for daring to insist mandated regs should be implemented.
We’ve established that MRA4 should also form part of the equation, because it is a modification to MR2. Same idea, go to Abbey Wood. Look for the word “Air” in the titles. Neither he nor his staff could begin to think about what is now called MRA4 without first establishing that the current in-service build standard is (a) known and (b) either maintained or recoverable. (One has to be realistic, and it is ALWAYS the first item in the risk register to assume legacy kit is not supported properly and those responsible won’t support YOU. This may be acceptable for the TV in the crew room, but not for an aircraft fuel system). They couldn’t contract BAeS without establishing their position and level of risk they were facing, and BAeS would be mad to accept a contract on that basis (although I concede it would be attractively lucrative as they’d spot the blank cheques a mile off). Come to think of it………….
And so on. I’d just work back through the baselines until I came to the point where someone didn’t say “It’s what I inherited” but found the instruction to “Slash funding, don’t bother about maintaining airworthiness”. But I’d start with BAeS. They MUST know when their MoD contracting moved from “Full” to “Limited” (defined in the relevant Def Stan but its self explanatory). Ask these questions of ANY equipment Design Authority or Custodian.
