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Habsheim

Old 23rd Feb 2014, 12:52
  #541 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by myself
For some reason, the "Rapport final (additif)" (starting at page 55) consists of odd-numbered pages only, with blank pages in between. So annexe 7 may just have been on one of those even-numbered pages.

That should be easy to verify with a printed copy of the Journal Officiel, volume 1990. (A brief search across libraries in Germany, for example, already seems to indicate seven such copies.) Did anyone ever bother?
Well, now I did. Since none of these libraries was close enough for me to make a visit in person, I made an interlibrary loan. For journal articles, these are routinely handled by copying (which today means scanning, file transfer, and printing at the receiving library).

I received my copy of the "Rapport final (additif)", consisting of odd-numbered pages only, with a handwritten note attached that mentioned a complaint about missing pages, answered by the supplying library (Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Kiel) with an affirmation that they scanned the article as it is.

So regarding preparation of the PDF from the printed "Journal Officiel", I'd say that the BEA did the best they could. Annexe 7 must have gone missing at an earlier stage.

And I'm glad to see that the discussion has already returned to technical matters anyway.
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Old 23rd Feb 2014, 17:20
  #542 (permalink)  
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Quote from Owain Glyndwr (my emphasis):
"Let us remember that the RA height over the last few seconds was 30 ft, the lowest point on the airframe would have been less than that because of the attitude and the average tree height was 39 ft."

For what it's worth, I think not, OG. The two RA TRx antennae are (were) on the bottom of the rear fuselage, around the beginning of the taper point. At an a/c pitch attitude of about +13 or +14 degrees, they are at the same level as the bottom of the main L/G wheels. However, IIRC, the indicators read zero if the a/c is parked on level ground (pitch zero), when the antennae are about 5 ft high. If that is so, the indications are likely to under-read increasingly as the pitch attitude increases, unless there is a correction for changing pitch.
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Old 23rd Feb 2014, 17:24
  #543 (permalink)  
 
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@ Chris Scott

I stand corrected

So that means that the recorded RA height was close to being the lowest point on the aircraft? Still well below tree height though

Last edited by Owain Glyndwr; 23rd Feb 2014 at 17:34.
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Old 23rd Feb 2014, 17:56
  #544 (permalink)  
 
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OG, I agree: I think we do agree.

But, the manufacturer sets the flight control rules to seek the best and safest outcome in the operations they foresee.

Should there be a "I'm a test pilot, get me out of here; let me fling it around the sky beyond the physical limits" button across the fleet? Probably not, since non-test-qualified people would surely push it, and get into more trouble. I'd suggest that the skill to train for is to know how the different nature of a FBW airliner means you have to be differently careful. Over many many contributions, I remember Capt Scott has pointed out lots of cases where these differences matter.

Quite the same with the Concordia, as r..t suggested - even of the helmsman had steered counterintuitively left as supposedly instructed, it wasn't going to make the evening's sailing suitable fare for a masterclass in ship handling, even if it might have saved a few tens of lives, and avoided putting 4000 in so much jeopardy in that particular case.

Spot on, the altimeter antennas are at the back. At that point of detail though, it does merit some wariness about the texture, reflectivity and slope of the ground across the radar altimeter beam, the attitude of the aircraft and the chance for stray reflections.
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Old 23rd Feb 2014, 20:22
  #545 (permalink)  
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Hello OG,

Yes: more or less. At a pitch attitude of +13.5 deg on T/O (main L/G oleos compressed), most of the length of the tapering part of the rear fuselage scrapes along the runway, and the RA antennae are just forward of it. If my tentative theory is correct, the RA readings in the cockpit at the same time would be a small negative value - perhaps -5 ft. I seem to recall receiving small negative RA readings momentarily on normal take-offs and landings.

So it's possible that the latter RA readings from the DFDR are a few feet lower than the lowest part of the a/c.

BTW, the pilot's eye level at the above pitch attitude (+13.5 deg) is about 27 ft above the lowest point of the a/c.

FWIW, the cockpit cut-off (visual) angle is 20 deg, i.e., the nose prevents the pilots seeing objects straight ahead which are lower than 20 deg relative to the longitudinal axis of the a/c.

So at t -11 - a couple of seconds after level-off, and at a pitch attitude of +12 - any object straight ahead which was more than 8 deg "below the horizon" would not have been visible. The recorded RA was +38 ft. Using the logic of my argument above, the pilot's eye height would have been about 25 ft above the main L/G, which itself would have been about 42 ft high. That makes the pilot's eye height about 65 - 70 ft above the ground.
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Old 24th Feb 2014, 02:50
  #546 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by awblain
At Bilbao, if the aircraft is being pitched around so that it enters a protection mode, then it's possible that at least briefly it needed protection - not smoothing the flight path, but avoiding stall. This might have caused it to impact the ground, but what if it had been allowed to stall and crash instead?
Don't panic with the stall scenario, at 10 deg of AoA they were just not there yet.
And if you think 4.5 G is not a ground impact, then what is an impact ... ?
Lack of pitch authority in short final was the problem.

Originally Posted by Owain Glyndwr
Seeing the steady loss of airspeed during the last few seconds this term led to a nosedown signal which offset the pilot's command for more AOA and restricted the aircraft to 15 deg AOA rather than the 17.5 deg of alphamax.
I have nothing against you wanting to state why alpha max was refused in Habsheim, but don't you think that was a task and duty for the BEA to endorse in the first place ... ?
That being said :
  1. 1kt/sec deceleration is nothing extraordinary and is precisely the deceleration rate recommended to adopt for testing the protections or voluntarily approaching the stall. The nose down signal in Bilbao was triggered by loosing 13kt for a 2 sec period.
  2. Last second of speed data shows already an acceleration.
  3. Engines were at 83%N1.
Everything was in place to benefit from the widely advertised wonder of alpha max and not simply straight fully fly into the forest.
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Old 24th Feb 2014, 03:14
  #547 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Owain Glyndwr
It would have been possible to gain a little more height at the expense of speed if the AOA had followed the pilot's command without any restriction but keeping sidestick movement and timing and throttle movement and timing unchanged, the height gain at the back end would have been no more than half of that required for clearance. Let us remember that the RA height over the last few seconds was only 30 ft and the average tree height 39ft.
  • 5 ft gain and the aircraft is probably back but not without leaves in the landing gear.
  • 10 ft gain and the aircraft is back.

Originally Posted by HN39
The phugoid oscillation as such has no relation with atmospheric disturbances.
Except that the system can interpret the external disturbance as a phugoid movement, which can result as in Bilbao in an automatic nose down input that the pilot cannot counteract.

Originally Posted by noske
So regarding preparation of the PDF from the printed "Journal Officiel", I'd say that the BEA did the best they could. Annexe 7 must have gone missing at an earlier stage.
As the crucial Annexe 7 is missing but part of Annexe 8 has been labelled Annexe 7 I see here a deliberate attempt for camouflage.
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Old 24th Feb 2014, 07:47
  #548 (permalink)  
 
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Originally posted by Con_fiture
5 ft gain and the aircraft is probably back but not without leaves in the landing gear.
  • 10 ft gain and the aircraft is back.
5 ft gain - maybe; but it is a bit speculative isn't it? At a pitch attitude of 17 deg the elevator hinge and the lowest point of the gear are at the same height, so with a 5ft gain you are just as likely to end up by tearing the elevators off accompanied by a vicious ND pitch and no hydraulics.

10 ft gain - again maybe - the AVERAGE tree height was 12m (39ft) so you have something like a 50% chance of going clear.

Last edited by Owain Glyndwr; 24th Feb 2014 at 08:10.
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Old 24th Feb 2014, 07:52
  #549 (permalink)  
 
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Originally posted by Con_fiture

Everything was in place to benefit from the widely advertised wonder of alpha max and not simply straight fully fly into the forest.
Everything that is except time and space for the system to do its job

Last edited by Owain Glyndwr; 24th Feb 2014 at 08:14.
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Old 24th Feb 2014, 18:12
  #550 (permalink)  
 
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1. From the CVR it is unclear if the F/O understood that Asseline wanted to fly at 100 FT height . He acted how if he understood 100 FT RA.

Final report Habsheim : Journal Officiel Documents administratifs Année 1990 N°28 Mardi 24 avril 1990 ISSN 0242-6773

12 h 30' 20" CDB Bon alors, décollage, virage à droite, on laisse le volet 1, enfin on fait un décollage normal, on rentre le train et avec les volets 1, tranquillement on va chercher notre truc. Dès qu'on l'a formellement identifié, on sort la tôle jusqu'à volets 3 train sorti, on fait un passage à cent pieds, train sorti et là, tu me laisses faire. Je t'amène en alpha max, je débraye l'alpha floor et à ce moment là, si je te dis que c'est dur, tu m'aides et tu tiens les gaz à vario zéro.

12 h 30' 59" CDB Et alors après on rentre toute la tôle, on s'éloigne, on s'accélère comme des bêtes à 340 noeuds et le deuxième tu te le passes aussi à 100 pieds, et là, c'est pas la peine de leur foutre 2,5 g dans la gueule parce que derrière, y vont pas aimer.


2. Nowhere do I find the reference to alpha prot ? (12° in Asseline's book)
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Old 24th Feb 2014, 20:51
  #551 (permalink)  
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Briefing of Co-pilot

Bon soir roulis,

Because my French is faible, I still have not finished Mr Asseline's book!

1) I also see nothing in the captain's briefing to stipulate (sorry!) which instrument would be used to maintain 100 ft. But, long after the flight, Mr Asseline explains it very clearly to all his readers, and he makes at least two good arguments for not using the RA. Unfortunately, as you know, baro indications are not accurate enough for his stated purpose.

But, whatever the co-pilot thought the captain meant, the a/c does not seem to have been levelled at 100 ft on the barometric altimeters - and certainly not on the radio altimeter. So it seems strange that the copilot made no call after the height-bust.

Here is a part of your quote from le Rapport Final BEA:
" '[...] on fait un passage à cent pieds, train sorti et là, tu me laisses faire. Je t'amène en alpha max, je débraye l'alpha floor et à ce moment là, si je te dis que c'est dur, tu m'aides et tu tiens les gaz à vario zéro.' "

This is my rough understanding of it:
"[...] one does a pass at a hundred feet, gear extended and there, you leave it to me. I get you to alpha max, I disengage alpha floor and at that point, if I tell you that it's too hard, you help me and you [adjust] the thrust at [for] V/S zero."

The captain goes on, if I understand the transcript correctly:
"...V/S zero and me, I'll hold alpha-max. At the signal, you [select] TOGA and me, I pull, and if you are there I bank away."
Co-pilot:
"You want to make to shine [?] there, eh?"
Captain:
"[?] there. I've done it twenty times, that one."
Co-pilot:
"OK, agreed."

That brief dialogue leads me to think that the co-pilot was not familiar with the technique that he was being briefed to perform. If he had done it before, I reckon he would have said so - if only in response to the captain's boast. However, CONF_iture seems to think that this task assigned to the co-pilot was a cinch. I wonder.


2) I do not understand your point at the moment. Was there any need to define alpha prot in the briefing?
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Old 25th Feb 2014, 18:05
  #552 (permalink)  
 
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1. Finaly I found in the Final report §1.16.1.2 the reference to "Alpha Prot". But the report says the incidence of alpha prot is 14.5°. That point is reached at tgen 333.0-334.0 , speed was 114 kt
Asseline says alpha prot incidence is 12° (page 420 of Asseline's book) . That point was reached a tgen 326.0 (speed was 120 kt).
Twelve seconds separate these two points.

In the report we find one time "alpha prot", and six times the word "incidence" concerning alpha prot 14.5° : "loi d'indidence" or "protection en incidence"

2. The Report §1.16.1.2 says that the end of the flight is done in alpha prot law " since t-4s :

"A t-4s, commutation sur la loi de pilotage en incidence, la valeur de 14.5° ayant été atteinte, cette loi étant ensuite conservée. (At - 4s, switching on the incidence law, thevalue of 14.5 ° has been reached, this law is then maintained)"

With alpha prot = 12° it would have been t-16s... (not better without thrust !)

Since alpha prot is reached, without thrust, I assume the EFCS modifies the THS to decrease incidence, and altitude is decreasing too

3. "100 FT" : What Asseline was asking to the F/FO was surely easy in any case (height or RA), but I think too they never trained that together. And the FO was unable to push the levers too.

Last edited by roulishollandais; 26th Feb 2014 at 08:46. Reason: my mistake exchanting data (tgen and speed) for incidence 14.#° an 12°
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Old 26th Feb 2014, 04:03
  #553 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Owain Glyndwr
5 ft gain - maybe; but it is a bit speculative isn't it? At a pitch attitude of 17 deg the elevator hinge and the lowest point of the gear are at the same height, so with a 5ft gain you are just as likely to end up by tearing the elevators off accompanied by a vicious ND pitch and no hydraulics.
No visible vicious ND pitch for at least 400 ft at 30 ft height through the forest so at 35 ft and climbing I think the elevators could have survived even better.

Everything that is except time and space for the system to do its job
If the system is that inefficient, better give the elevator control to the pilot when he needed to get alpha max ...

Originally Posted by Chris Scott
CONF_iture seems to think that this task assigned to the co-pilot was a cinch.
I can't remember saying it was a walk in the park but performing such presentation by assigning the thrust management to the PNF is a judicious move instead of exclusively relying on the PF.
Now if you want to suggest the Habscheim crew was ill prepared for such an ambitious and already highly questionable program ... I fully concur.
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Old 26th Feb 2014, 08:56
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@Conf_iture

I think the elevators could have survived even better.
If you want to so speculate feel free....

better give the elevator control to the pilot when he needed to get alpha max ...
It was of course poor judgement on the part of a pilot that produced the problem in the first place.
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Old 26th Feb 2014, 18:15
  #555 (permalink)  
 
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Cow Boys Airshows in France

It is clear that that flight would not have been scheduled. Many people had to refuse it. But we had already seen such crazy flight in La Ferté Allais, over the Park of Vincennes, aso.
Belonging to a parachutists union, they sent me regularly SINCE YEARS before Habsheim to watch airshows around Paris to verify if parachutists jumping during the airshow had the legal license which was only the Professional parachutist license depending from DGAC, or a military order. Infractions (missing license is not nothing !) were the rule. They only sent me when we had the Notam who showed who was jumping the next morning.The Union President wrote a great number of letters to complain, to DGAC, to GTA, to PAF, to Préfets, to organisers of airshows too, etc. Everybody from these people signed clearance and NOTAM they knew illegal. DURING YEARS !
The evening of Habsheim crash I thought to all that work we had done for nothing. The Prefet in Colmar had allowed that flight, DGAC, AF, aso.
But it was the last time. After Habsheim the rules for airshows have been radicaly modified and verified, included the Paris Le Bourget Airshow.
and finaly our Union won at the Cassation Court (the highest level in France)

Last edited by Jetdriver; 26th Feb 2014 at 19:19.
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Old 26th Feb 2014, 22:45
  #556 (permalink)  
 
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Snoop Alpha Prot 12 or 14.5°?

@Paul :
Thanks to double the size of our PMs during your hardware maintenance... Are you?

@Others:
I wonder why Asseline want to fly his Airbus at "alphamax" and uses that word in his briefing?

Why doesn't he mention Alpha Prot? Both pilots seem to have approximative knowing of their plane?

Why is the value of Alpha Prot from the BEA final report for Alpha Prot incidence 14.5° and differs from Asseline's book shematic p.420 where Alpha Prot is 12° ?

From the same book, page 432, why does Bernard Ziegler requests to R.DEQUE, G.PICHON, B.BISSEY, P.BAUD an improvment of Alpha Floor to alpha 12° (14 feb 1990, two months after Bengalore) and the Habsheim final report is giving Alpha Floor =15° ?

How many degrees incidence are given in books today to A320 pilots and correspondant speed for steady level flight, in the conditions of Habsheim flight and MLW for :
- Alphamax?
- Alpha Floor?
- Alpha Prot?
- Vs1g?
- Vref?

Last edited by roulishollandais; 26th Feb 2014 at 22:49. Reason: 14.5
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Old 26th Feb 2014, 23:07
  #557 (permalink)  
 
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Thank you, Rouli.

I jump back in from the peanut "light" gallery.

Good grief, we can go over all the control laws for years. As Doze and I and others seem to agree, it wasn't the control laws that caused the crash.

- Why in the world would you fly past the crowd at the max AoA? I will bet $1,000 that only one or two folks there would understand what was being demonstrated, and only with a narrator describing what you were seeing.

- Why did you not practice one or two times for the demo? Sheesh. The T-birds and Blue Angels come in a day or two earlier and do two or more practice demos for the particular venue. Same for the Red Bull and other acrobatic pilots at an airshow. Called professionalism, airmanship, and more. You just don't improvise, period. We even had a military flight lead resign from his position after he made a mistake on a maneuver and got too low with his three wingies. Had the guts to call an abort, and no harm done.

- Mission briefing? What's that? No evidence from documents or testimony or whatever that the planned flyby was briefed in detail. If the captain was solo, I might have a better understanding. With another crewmember, it is beyond my understanding.

- If the approach to the flyby was not going as planned ( that's a joke, as there seemed to be no plan), then turn around and give some excuse and set up correctly.

Trust me, I did my share of buzz jobs in fighters. I even "planned" some. If things didn't "look right" I went home. This guy at Habsheim was a "showboat" and I am still not sure about what he was trying to demonstrate, especially with SLF aboard.

Sorry to rant.
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Old 26th Feb 2014, 23:46
  #558 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by roulishollandais View Post
@Others:
I wonder why Asseline want to fly his Airbus at "alphamax" and uses that word in his briefing?
Because that was the point of that part of the sortie as briefed.

Why doesn't he mention Alpha Prot? Both pilots seem to have approximative knowing of their plane?
Alpha Max is the maximum achievable AoA when in High AoA Protection mode, whereas Alpha Prot (the value) is the AoA it will achieve without additional back-stick. It follows that if his intent was to achieve Alpha Max, then Alpha Prot would not require coverage in the briefing.

What can be confusing to people who are not as obsessive over the technical details as many of us is that some parties, when referring to the *mode* that Airbus name in their own documentation as "High AoA Protection", abbreviate that name as "Alpha Protection".

The "High AoA Protection" mode and "Alpha Prot" value are two very distinct things, and should not be confused.

It should be noted that Airbus themselves do not, to the best of my knowledge, use that particular abbreviation in their technical documentation.

Why is the value of Alpha Prot from the BEA final report for Alpha Prot incidence 14.5° and differs from Asseline's book shematic p.420 where Alpha Prot is 12° ?
Honestly, I don't know - it would depend on the sources Asseline is using, particularly with regard to the publishing dates.

I'm also unsure as to what point Asseline is trying to make, as the AoA of the aircraft during the phase where the protection logic commanded nose-down elevator was a little over 15 degrees, which is in excess of both stated values.

From the same book, page 432, why does Bernard Ziegler requests to R.DEQUE, G.PICHON, B.BISSEY, P.BAUD an improvment of Alpha Floor to alpha 12° (14 feb 1990, two months after Bengalore) and the Habsheim final report is giving Alpha Floor =15° ?
Presumably because that request (which - if accepted - would have reduced the Alpha Floor AoA trigger by some three degrees) was made over a year after Habsheim. Alpha Floor behaviour is somewhat moot in any case, because A/THR (and thus Alpha Floor) was supposed to have been disabled in order to maintain Alpha Max at a steady altitude - and in the event was inhibited by allowing the aircraft to descend below 100ft RA.

How many degrees incidence are given in books today to A320 pilots and correspondant speed for steady level flight, in the conditions of Habsheim flight and MLW for :
If you look at the graphs posted earlier in the thread, degrees incidence (at least of the Alpha values) are neither specified nor annotated in Airbus's recent pilot documentation, and I'd guess that they weren't then either.

The graphs can therefore convey only a qualitative idea of how the High AoA Protection responds, and this makes sense for at least two reasons I can think of off the top of my head.

Firstly, production A320s are not fitted with an AoA gauge - and so to annotate the graph with precise values would be of little use to flight crews.

Secondly, and as the general direction of the thread has indicated, the values themselves represent only what can *possibly* be achieved - i.e. in optimum conditions. In the case of Habsheim, the aircraft was low, slow - and with the engines spooled down until far too late it was continuing to decelerate until possibly a second or so prior to impact. These are pretty much the polar opposite of optimum conditions, and in such events the systems will comply as best they can with what they have to work with.

There's also (IMO less important) the aspect that the precise trigger values may change due to operational experience and feedback from the line, as the A. Floor request you mentioned hints at, but the overall behaviour pattern will not. No need to republish the FCOM if the values aren't specified.

Last edited by DozyWannabe; 27th Feb 2014 at 00:16.
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Old 27th Feb 2014, 12:01
  #559 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by gums
Why did you not practice one or two times for the demo? Sheesh. The T-birds and Blue Angels come in a day or two earlier and do two or more practice demos for the particular venue. Same for the Red Bull and other acrobatic pilots at an airshow. Called professionalism, airmanship, and more. You just don't improvise, period.
An explanation for this puzzling lack of preparation is, once again, in Asseline's book, p. 22 - 26.

The year before, the Habsheim flying club had chartered an Air France Concorde for roughly the same job: A sightseeing round trip from and to Bâle-Mulhouse, including a flyby over the Habsheim airfield. This Concorde crew arrived a day early, parked their bird at Bâle-Mulhouse, picked up their rented car, drove out to Habsheim airfield, had a look at the grounds and chatted with those in charge, then drove back to their hotel. That's not exactly "practice", but far better than nothing, and probably would have saved the day for Asseline. He wasn't given such an opportunity, because everyone in his flight division was on a tight schedule, working to put the A320 into service.

Then the book has some written statements (made in the context of the internal investigation at Air France) by Monsieur R. Simon of AF flight operations, tasked with the preparation of the charter flight, and Captain André Groppo of the A320 flight division, to whom he presented the results of his work. Captain Groppo says (my translation): "Feeling M. Simon slightly worried about the fact of not having gotten into contact with the captain of the flight, I recall telling him that this crew was particularly qualified for this kind of flight and that there was no reason for him to worry." On which Asseline himself comments: "Alas! No way were we particularly qualified for flight shows."

Btw., the flight presentation as envisaged by M. Simon would have been first a flyby at 600 ft in clean configuration, then at 100 ft in landing configuration.
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Old 27th Feb 2014, 12:40
  #560 (permalink)  
 
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Could Asseline refuse to do that scheduled flight, presold to the Newspapper l'Alsace and their readers, without to be fired by Air France ?
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