Habsheim
Thread Starter
Confit,
I think you are wrong to argue that the wind was calm, if only for the reasons HN39 has pointed out.
Also, if you look again at the Andre Karsenty video, you will see a large balloon in the backround about 7 seconds before the a/c reaches the treeline. It is leaning slightly towards the south, suggesting some kind of headwind component for the A320.
And, as you and any pilot of any size of a/c know well, the proximity of trees is always associated with some degree of wind-shear.
Wind components (W/Cs) can, of course, be estimated from a comparison between the TAS and the GS. (Any error in the GS readings from the IRS are likely to remain constant for the short period of the straight-line flypast. In this case, allowing for pressure altitude and temperature, adding 3 kt to each IAS value gives the approximate TAS.)
Starting from level-off at TGEN 321 and finishing with TGEN 334, the estimated W/Cs at one-second intervals are as follows:
-7, -4, -8, -9, -7, -7, -6, -4, -6, -5, -7, -7, -3, -3.
The above variations are consistent with small gusts of a light headwind.
I think you are wrong to argue that the wind was calm, if only for the reasons HN39 has pointed out.
Also, if you look again at the Andre Karsenty video, you will see a large balloon in the backround about 7 seconds before the a/c reaches the treeline. It is leaning slightly towards the south, suggesting some kind of headwind component for the A320.
And, as you and any pilot of any size of a/c know well, the proximity of trees is always associated with some degree of wind-shear.
Wind components (W/Cs) can, of course, be estimated from a comparison between the TAS and the GS. (Any error in the GS readings from the IRS are likely to remain constant for the short period of the straight-line flypast. In this case, allowing for pressure altitude and temperature, adding 3 kt to each IAS value gives the approximate TAS.)
Starting from level-off at TGEN 321 and finishing with TGEN 334, the estimated W/Cs at one-second intervals are as follows:
-7, -4, -8, -9, -7, -7, -6, -4, -6, -5, -7, -7, -3, -3.
The above variations are consistent with small gusts of a light headwind.
Last edited by Chris Scott; 13th Mar 2014 at 15:27. Reason: Last 3 paragraphs added.
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Originally Posted by HN39
That is not what I said in post #622 based on the graph in the report. In the simulation the airplane gained 10 ft and that is equivalent to 1 kt of airspeed.
It is ridiculous to dismiss the simulation for no other reason than that you can't see a difference of one knot on that plot.
Originally Posted by Chris Scott
I think you are wrong to argue that the wind was flat calm, if only for the reasons HN39 has pointed out.
The atmosphere was calm, and the wind less than 5 kt according to the Air Traffic Controller.
Thanks for bringing to our attention that DFDR Tome 2 of the same document appears to show a figure of 34 ft, in line with the narrative. The version you show magnified in your post is, I presume, the PDF copy, the poor quality and assembly of which we discussed earlier on this thread.
Another curious aspect of this matter is that an HTML version of the BEA report - Habsheim F-GFKC - clearly shows a figure of 24 ft in both Tomes 1 and 2.
Another curious aspect of this matter is that an HTML version of the BEA report - Habsheim F-GFKC - clearly shows a figure of 24 ft in both Tomes 1 and 2.
I am concerned that a guy with your background seems to give more credibility to such piece of cr@p from the BEA than to Ray Davis ...
dragging it out, heh?
C'mon, Confit.
The jet and its FCS worked as advertised. And then the laws of physics and aero came into play.
It could be that 'bus folks did not do enough testing at altitude to examine all the "protections" and "floors" and such using flight idle, TOGA, etc. The jet did not have the pitch coefficient problem we had in the Viper, so it had plenty of nose down authority at high AoA ( although we saw with AF447 that the THS position had to be compensated for to get the nose down). Nose up is "limited" by the flight control laws WRT AoA, not the actual capability of the plane, and we had that in the Viper. You can command everything, but HAL is only gonna let the jet "obey" the laws, best it can.
The jet and its FCS worked as advertised. And then the laws of physics and aero came into play.
It could be that 'bus folks did not do enough testing at altitude to examine all the "protections" and "floors" and such using flight idle, TOGA, etc. The jet did not have the pitch coefficient problem we had in the Viper, so it had plenty of nose down authority at high AoA ( although we saw with AF447 that the THS position had to be compensated for to get the nose down). Nose up is "limited" by the flight control laws WRT AoA, not the actual capability of the plane, and we had that in the Viper. You can command everything, but HAL is only gonna let the jet "obey" the laws, best it can.
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Originally Posted by Chris Scott
Another curious aspect of this matter is that an HTML version of the BEA report - Habsheim F-GFKC - clearly shows a figure of 24 ft in both Tomes 1 and 2.
Thread Starter
BEA Rapport Final
Quote from noske:
"Well, that's the risk you take with an unofficial publication. That document was probably derived from the BEA PDF, and transcribing those DFDR printouts must have been especially error-prone. I'd say that the evidence offered by CONF iture (the magnified scans, and the values as they appear in the narrative) is sufficiently convincing."
Yes, I agree with all of that. It is ironic, however, that the RA figure of 24 ft at TGEN 334 in the HTML version of Tome 2 is more plausible than the 34 ft figure in the PDF copy of the BEA report. The Karsenty video rules out any inference that the a/c might have climbed 10 ft in the last second.
Whichever of the two figures is correct, students of the report might expect that its final edition would have corrected an unnecessary anomaly that undermines the authority of the whole document. If that and other less imperative amendments were done, it is unfortunate that the BEA has not made the amended document accessible via their website.
In public transport, the Habsheim accident has unique aspects and complexities, and continues to provide a basis for the study of a broad range of aeronautics. In recent years, the BEA has published several very informative papers relating to flight safety matters in general. Its valuable contributions to the subject are somewhat undermined by the continuing deficiencies of the Habsheim document.
Hi gums,
Just a reminder to you and others that, in AF447, Pitch Alternate Law allowed the THS to continue auto-trimming to full nose-up trim. At Habsheim, starting with Pitch Normal law, the THS auto-trimming was disarmed first (briefly) by the premature, 2-second engagement of Flare mode at TGEN 313 (t -21) - triggered by flying over trees; and, secondly, when Flare mode was entered again at TGEN 317 (t -17). Finally, it remained disarmed when Alpha Protection mode took over from Flare mode at TGEN 330 (t -4). Earlier, in fact, it had had no need to trim between TGEN 306 (t -28) and t -21. So, to sum up, it remained at U04 (4 degrees nose-up trim) for about the last half a minute of flight. Full deflection in the nose-up trim sense is 13 degrees.
"Well, that's the risk you take with an unofficial publication. That document was probably derived from the BEA PDF, and transcribing those DFDR printouts must have been especially error-prone. I'd say that the evidence offered by CONF iture (the magnified scans, and the values as they appear in the narrative) is sufficiently convincing."
Yes, I agree with all of that. It is ironic, however, that the RA figure of 24 ft at TGEN 334 in the HTML version of Tome 2 is more plausible than the 34 ft figure in the PDF copy of the BEA report. The Karsenty video rules out any inference that the a/c might have climbed 10 ft in the last second.
Whichever of the two figures is correct, students of the report might expect that its final edition would have corrected an unnecessary anomaly that undermines the authority of the whole document. If that and other less imperative amendments were done, it is unfortunate that the BEA has not made the amended document accessible via their website.
In public transport, the Habsheim accident has unique aspects and complexities, and continues to provide a basis for the study of a broad range of aeronautics. In recent years, the BEA has published several very informative papers relating to flight safety matters in general. Its valuable contributions to the subject are somewhat undermined by the continuing deficiencies of the Habsheim document.
Hi gums,
Just a reminder to you and others that, in AF447, Pitch Alternate Law allowed the THS to continue auto-trimming to full nose-up trim. At Habsheim, starting with Pitch Normal law, the THS auto-trimming was disarmed first (briefly) by the premature, 2-second engagement of Flare mode at TGEN 313 (t -21) - triggered by flying over trees; and, secondly, when Flare mode was entered again at TGEN 317 (t -17). Finally, it remained disarmed when Alpha Protection mode took over from Flare mode at TGEN 330 (t -4). Earlier, in fact, it had had no need to trim between TGEN 306 (t -28) and t -21. So, to sum up, it remained at U04 (4 degrees nose-up trim) for about the last half a minute of flight. Full deflection in the nose-up trim sense is 13 degrees.
Last edited by Chris Scott; 14th Mar 2014 at 16:03. Reason: Last paragraph added. Penultimate paragraph improved.
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In France the official version is not the BEA file, but the "JOURNAL OFFICIEL" copy of the BEA file. Probably the BEA had two versions : 24 and 34 Ft. They have to verify and ask to the J.O. to register the true number. The J.O. would not modify such a number.
Thread Starter
Bon soir roulis,
The Journal Officiel is the document, available via the BEA website, which Confit shows.
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/1988/f-kc...f-kc880626.pdf
Can you explain more? Are you saying that, once the document has been published as the Journal Officiel, the BEA is completely powerless to publish any necessary corrections?
The Journal Officiel is the document, available via the BEA website, which Confit shows.
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/1988/f-kc...f-kc880626.pdf
Can you explain more? Are you saying that, once the document has been published as the Journal Officiel, the BEA is completely powerless to publish any necessary corrections?
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The Ray Davis angle was covered earlier in the thread more than once - here:
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/52803...ml#post8209613
and here (click the arrow to go to the original post):
One thing that I didn't mention before and may have some bearing is that Mr. Davis was hired by a UK TV production company making a documentary on the subject - not of the crash itself, but of Asseline's attempt to clear his name. The Airbus document explaining where Davis may have erred does not allude to this, but there is a distinct possibility that the information supplied him may have been missing some of the details mentioned in the above posts.
We also know that the Loral DFDR units fitted to the early A320s were later known to be susceptible to write errors when subjected to unexpected shock or vibration. The estimated value of +0248 RA at TGEN335, which CONF iture has helpfully provided in magnified form, is clearly erroneous - therefore it is within the realms of possibility that the previous value is also in error. That the video evidence clearly does not demonstrate an altitude gain of 10ft before impact with the trees supports this hypothesis in my opinion.
Hi Chris - I hope you find this interesting, though it's on a bit of a tangent. When we tested the AF447 scenario in an A320 sim (the best we could do as there were no A330 sims available), the autotrim was limited by the system well before we got into difficulties - to simulate the scenario, the TRE had to manually wind on full nose-up trim with the wheels. If such behaviour was consistent with the A320, it follows that autotrim behaviour on the A320 series is different from that on the A330/340.
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/52803...ml#post8209613
and here (click the arrow to go to the original post):
Notably, the ACI programme got this wrong too - it was not ATC's discrepancy with the CVR, it was a misinterpretation of the DFDR. [Davis] seems to have treated the DFDR's transmit/receive flag as referring to the call from ATC (which would be almost 5 seconds adrift from the ATC recording and unacceptable). In fact the DFDR does not flag incoming, only outgoing transmissions, and the DFDR referred to the crew's response (just shy of 1 second adrift from the ATC timestamp, and within the margin of error).
All this and more is in the Airbus document...
All this and more is in the Airbus document...
We also know that the Loral DFDR units fitted to the early A320s were later known to be susceptible to write errors when subjected to unexpected shock or vibration. The estimated value of +0248 RA at TGEN335, which CONF iture has helpfully provided in magnified form, is clearly erroneous - therefore it is within the realms of possibility that the previous value is also in error. That the video evidence clearly does not demonstrate an altitude gain of 10ft before impact with the trees supports this hypothesis in my opinion.
Hi Chris - I hope you find this interesting, though it's on a bit of a tangent. When we tested the AF447 scenario in an A320 sim (the best we could do as there were no A330 sims available), the autotrim was limited by the system well before we got into difficulties - to simulate the scenario, the TRE had to manually wind on full nose-up trim with the wheels. If such behaviour was consistent with the A320, it follows that autotrim behaviour on the A320 series is different from that on the A330/340.
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Originally Posted by Chris_Scott
Can you explain more? Are you saying that, once the document has been published as the Journal Officiel, the BEA is completely powerless to publish any necessary corrections?
Originally Posted by roulishollandais
In France the official version is not the BEA file, but the "JOURNAL OFFICIEL" copy of the BEA file. Probably the BEA had two versions : 24 and 34 Ft. They have to verify and ask to the J.O. to register the true number. The J.O. would not modify such a number.
1. My last sentence was perhaps at a wrong place?
Once the document has been published in the Journal Official any necessary correction is possible in a similar form and level of law hierarchy, probably in a short but accurate description of the modification but with the signature of the original administration . If the modification is not published you may ask a Court to apply the wrong text. The Journal Officiel does the maximum to avoid such mistakes and many verifications are done and redone before publishing, to respect every comma or space, but in the JO typography, design , with absolute rules of registering, diffusion, existence of copy. It often needs much time which brings a delay between the BEA text who has its own design, and rules, published so quickly as possible and the JO tex
It is unusual that the BEA text provides a copy of the Journal Officiel which gets a BEA report.. Why, when was the original BEA report replaced in their files?
2. The numbers provided by the sensors must not be replaced, the BEA may only comment them in his report
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Originally Posted by gums
The jet and its FCS worked as advertised.
You can command everything, but HAL is only gonna let the jet "obey" the laws, best it can.
Originally Posted by noske
That document was probably derived from the BEA PDF, and transcribing those DFDR printouts must have been especially error-prone.
Don't you think the transcribing to obtain such format must be part of an automatic process ?
Originally Posted by Dozy
We also know that the Loral DFDR units fitted to the early A320s were later known to be susceptible to write errors when subjected to unexpected shock or vibration. The estimated value of +0248 RA at TGEN335, which CONF iture has helpfully provided in magnified form, is clearly erroneous - therefore it is within the realms of possibility that the previous value is also in error.
BTW any data from TGEN335 has already no value has the tape is labelled as de synchronized.
That the video evidence clearly does not demonstrate an altitude gain of 10ft before impact with the trees supports this hypothesis in my opinion.
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To my mind it's two separate pieces of information out of context that you have yourself combined to come up with this ludicrous theory that the FCS was to blame, and not the arrogant*, incompetent** and stubborn*** (on that day at least) Capt. Asseline.
* - In blithely assuming that he was skilled enough to take a greater level of risk with pax on board than Airbus's own test pilots
** - Thoroughly making a hash of the approach with very poor thrust management
*** - Going ahead with the flypast on the first attempt when it was obvious that the briefing was wrong (regarding which runway to follow)
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 15th Mar 2014 at 14:33.
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Originally Posted by Dozy
Where does it say this? It doesn't say this in any of the documentation.
To my mind it's two separate pieces of information out of context that you have yourself combined to come up with this ludicrous theory that the FCS was to blame, and not the arrogant*, incompetent** and stubborn*** (on that day at least) Capt. Asseline.
* - In blithely assuming that he was skilled enough to take a greater level of risk with pax on board than Airbus's own test pilots
** - Thoroughly making a hash of the approach with very poor thrust management
*** - Going ahead with the flypast on the first attempt when it was obvious that the briefing was wrong (regarding which runway to follow)
* - In blithely assuming that he was skilled enough to take a greater level of risk with pax on board than Airbus's own test pilots
** - Thoroughly making a hash of the approach with very poor thrust management
*** - Going ahead with the flypast on the first attempt when it was obvious that the briefing was wrong (regarding which runway to follow)
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Neither of those posts state 17.5deg as being a guaranteed swift response upon full application of back stick, and in fact the Airbus documentation does not mention 17.5 degrees at all. You're taking the absolute value given in the BEA report out of context and grafting it to the Airbus documentation in a way that is not consistent with the way the documentation is written in order to claim that there should have been an expectation of 17.5 degrees, when that doesn't seem to be the case.
And I *am* sympathetic to Asseline in some respects, particularly the lack of oversight and poor preparation materials given him by the airline. This does not alter the fact that the conduct of the flight seems to be consistent with the negative traits sometimes ascribed him, and *on that particular day*, as I said, he seemed to be displaying those traits during the conduct of the flight. The two positions are not mutually exclusive.
And I *am* sympathetic to Asseline in some respects, particularly the lack of oversight and poor preparation materials given him by the airline. This does not alter the fact that the conduct of the flight seems to be consistent with the negative traits sometimes ascribed him, and *on that particular day*, as I said, he seemed to be displaying those traits during the conduct of the flight. The two positions are not mutually exclusive.
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Originally Posted by DozyWannabe
That the video evidence clearly does not demonstrate an altitude gain of 10ft before impact with the trees supports this hypothesis in my opinion.
Originally Posted by CONF iture
Not more than it demonstrates an altitude loss of 6 ft the second before ...
-- radio altitude
-- pressure altitude
-- x, y, and z accelerations
When comparing these three sources, the different heights of the respective sensors must be taken into account. The radio altimeter antenna is on the lower rear fuselage, the ambient pressure is sensed by Air Data Modules close to the static pressure ports on the front fuselage, and the three-axis accelerometer is located near the center of gravity. The relative height of the three sources varies with the pitch attitude of the airplane, and for the radio altitude also with the elevation of the terrain. The following graph shows the height of the CG taking those factors into account. The elevation of the terrain can be taken as 781 ft at TGEN=334 with a downhill slope of 0.15%. The pressure altitude depends on the local pressure, given in the report as QNH=1012 hPa and QFE=984 hPa. If the pressure has been accurately measured and properly rounded the QNH must then lie between 1012.1 hPa and 1012.5 hPa. The graph shows the CG height based on the pressure altitude for both values of QNH.
Gotta tellya, Confit, that until I see the actual FCS charts/functions for modes and such, I'll stay with Doze and others that the plane gave everything it was "programmed " do.
My problem is with the "flare mode", which requires increasing back stick once the jet is "x" feet above the ground. Could it be that the "flare mode" prevents the jet from reaching the advertised max AoA?
I swear, the 'bus has more "laws" and functions and everything else that the space shuttle, the Viper or the F-22 do not have. For a pilot, I want to know exactly what to expect without having to go thru modes, sub-modes and then sub-sub-modes. Sheesh.
I am not an advocate of "direct" laws, as some have mentioned on our discussion. But you can only do so much to prevent/help some hamfist to fly the jet.
My problem is with the "flare mode", which requires increasing back stick once the jet is "x" feet above the ground. Could it be that the "flare mode" prevents the jet from reaching the advertised max AoA?
I swear, the 'bus has more "laws" and functions and everything else that the space shuttle, the Viper or the F-22 do not have. For a pilot, I want to know exactly what to expect without having to go thru modes, sub-modes and then sub-sub-modes. Sheesh.
I am not an advocate of "direct" laws, as some have mentioned on our discussion. But you can only do so much to prevent/help some hamfist to fly the jet.
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Oops - got the above regarding OG's post completely wrong - apologies!
EDIT : As I said earlier, I have a suspicion that the airspeed deltas have an effect on how long it takes to consider the attitude "stable", and in a case such as this one where the aircraft was decelerating almost right up to impact, the duration would likely be longer than if it had airspeed in reserve.
I swear, the 'bus has more "laws" and functions and everything else that the space shuttle, the Viper or the F-22 do not have.
* - This aspect is discussed in more detail earlier in the thread.
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 16th Mar 2014 at 05:58.
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The only way to be 100% certain would be to have had a camera trained on the PFD, but since we don't have that, a degree of assumption will always be necessary. Folks, correct me if I'm wrong - but I think from recollection of the AF447 thread that the DFDR altimeter trace is fed from the ADIRU selected on the Captain's side (LHS).
As others have demonstrated, the DFDR trace seems to tally well with other data when it comes to actual baro altitude. QNH seems to have been correctly set, and all things considered the likelihood is that the baro alt on the PFD was showing the values recorded on the DFDR. For there to have been a discrepancy would mean a fault on the data bus between the ADIRU and the LHS PFD, for which no evidence seems to exist (though, admittedly, such evidence would be difficult to trace later on).
Asseline insists that the baro alt was reading 100ft throughout, and furthermore frames the possibility that it wasn't as tantamount to accusing him of lying. He mentions earlier baro alt misreadings on test flights and argues that may have happened in this case. I believe he states elsewhere that he was relying on the baro alt and external references because he found the digital RA display difficult to read.
I'm sure that Asseline believes fervently that the baro alt was reading 100ft, and if it wasn't, he may have still perceived it as such through confirmation bias - as the workload on the flight deck was significantly higher than anyone had anticipated due to the briefing errors. If the baro alt was in fact consistent with the DFDR, that doesn't make him dishonest - it just raises the possibility that he made a (completely understandable) mistake under pressure.
On the other hand, his own input raises further questions about the conduct of the flight as a whole - particularly with regard to the wisdom of relying solely on one instrument if you consider that instrument to be unreliable, with the only safeguard being external references at an unfamiliar airfield.
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Originally Posted by Dozy
You're taking the absolute value given in the BEA report out of context and grafting it to the Airbus documentation in a way that is not consistent with the way the documentation is written in order to claim that there should have been an expectation of 17.5 degrees, when that doesn't seem to be the case.
True I should always remember that you still don't know which config was used in Habsheim ... !?
As OG attested to - the Alpha Max command in High AoA Protection gives as much as it can, then likely waits a fraction of a second to stabilise before determining whether the remaining AoA is to be used for extra pitch or for bank input.
As I said earlier, I have a suspicion that the airspeed deltas have an effect on how long it takes to consider the attitude "stable", and in a case such as this one where the aircraft was decelerating almost right up to impact, the duration would likely be longer than if it had airspeed in reserve.
Originally Posted by gums
Gotta tellya, Confit, that until I see the actual FCS charts/functions for modes and such, I'll stay with Doze and others that the plane gave everything it was "programmed " do.
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As 17.5 deg value for alpha max at CONF3 given by the BEA is not good enough for you ... where do you think the BEA got that value if not from Airbus ?
True I should always remember that you still don't know which config was used in Habsheim ... !?
True I should always remember that you still don't know which config was used in Habsheim ... !?
Of course the BEA would have got the value from Airbus. But the issue I have with your position regarding 17.5deg is not the value itself - it's your interpretation of combining the absolute value as given in the BEA report with the less-specific (regarding values and how they are used by the EFCS) documentation that Airbus provided to flight crew.
Your argument seems to be that Airbus - to use your own word - "advertised" that in CONF 3, 17.5 degrees AoA would definitely be achieved under any circumstance with the application of full back-stick, when the documentation says no such thing.
AZR said much the same thing to you a couple of pages back:
From an aerodynamic point of view, there were probably more than 2.5 deg before stall. From an FCS point of view, for this to be correct, the FCOM should read that alphamax was to be attained immediately and without any damping.
Does the BEA report or the FCOM read this? No. You just quoted both.
The NTSB report on Hudson event, and numerous other discussions here and there have put forward several explanations as to why alphamax(17.5) would, in certain circonstances, not be reached immediately.
Does the BEA report or the FCOM read this? No. You just quoted both.
The NTSB report on Hudson event, and numerous other discussions here and there have put forward several explanations as to why alphamax(17.5) would, in certain circonstances, not be reached immediately.
Another nice piece of disinformation.
Then Bechet in his simulator just proved your suspicion wrong ...
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 16th Mar 2014 at 05:40.