Lionair plane down in Bali.

[tmny]

NTSC Republic of Indonesia, FDR and CVR

@philipat

The NTSC in Jakarta is be able to download the data from the recorders by itself.

Look at the final report 97004 of the Sukhoi accident 2012 at page X:

Both recorders were downloaded in the NTSC facility by the NTSC experts and were assisted by the Russian experts.

There is no reason to blame the Indonesia authorities, to them Lion Air is in the focus already and Lion Air is responsible who and how is flying there aircrafts in some way. Maybe more important than rain, clouds, ts, etc.

Maybe Lion Air needs help in education or finding well educated pilots for their huge growing. Maybe to be a pilot is more than to push the buttom or maybe speech recognition in the cockpit in future is a good idea to command as we have already in modern cars.

[sevenstrokeroll]

PJ2

I did monitored approaches in the DC9 for CATII ops...worked fine.

When I lived in Boston, I went to the Public Library there and read every back issue of Aviation Week...in 1965 when the DC9 came out, there was a nice article on the monitored approach.

[fireflybob]

Last Company I flew for (a well known European loco) flies monitored approaches when weather below specified minima. Had never operated this way but rapidly came to the conclusion that it was a sound way of managing the approach.

I believe quite a large analysis of approach accidents discovered that 75% of them occurred on a non precision approach when the Captain was flying the aircraft. (No sleight intended against Captains but statistically just a fact of life).

[PJ2]

sevenstrokeroll;

Yes, it worked really well, didn't it? It required that the guy flying hand over a stable airplane, 'in-the-slot' so the guy looking out could just keep going.

Technology has outpaced such techniques I think and part of my point is that this is both a good thing and a problem, depending upon whether one knows what one is doing or not, and that in turn is a result of training, experience and one's individual keeness to work hard learning one's craft and profession. (I don't hear the word 'keen' too often anymore but then the profession has been altered vastly.)

If one believes in, and has confidence in technology to the exclusion of one's own belief and confidence in one's own skills, then it is a matter of time before circumstances overwhelm one's abilities if they're only honed "inside". I offered all the time and even taught but I couldn't get any F/Os to hand-fly and that was in 1992! What's it like today? I think we're seeing the outlines of an answer. So it will be very interesting to see what's on the recorders.

[framer]

There is no reason to blame the Indonesia authorities.

You may be right. We'll see shortly I hope. My bet is that you are wrong though.

Lion Air is responsible who and how is flying there aircrafts in some way.

The Indonesian Authorities are responsible to the citizens of Indonesia to ensure a safe development and operation of the Indonesian aviation industry. This includes ensuring that rules and regulations around minimum qualifications and ongoing training standards are enforced. It also decides what rules are there in the first place to serve the Indonesian people's interests. It also determines how quickly Lion Air can grow and expand and whether or not P2F pilots can be recruited and in what numbers. It approves the SOP's that seemingly allow the company to make rules such as f/o's not being PF below 5000ft.
The companies will gravitate towards the most " cost effective " methods of operating, it is the Indonesian Authority's role to draw a line in the sand and ( on behalf of the Indonesian public) prevent unsafe operating procedures from developing.
I would be surprised if one of the links in this chain wasn't produced within their halls.

Maybe Lion Air needs help in education or finding well educated pilots for their huge growing.

Maybe they could pay Rishworth or Parc Aviation to do this, it is certainly not the job of the Indonesian Authorities.

[Loose rivets]

Yep, MAPs in British Eagle c 64-65. Men from the ministry of planes sometimes came along to observe.

.

[ExSp33db1rd]

(No sleight intended against Captains but statistically just a fact of life).

Quote "There are lies, damned lies, and Statistics." ( Disraeli ? )

I would say that 'statistically' a Captain would do the flying when an approach was considered more demanding, i.e. a non-precision one, why stick your neck out and give it to a F/O whose skills one might not have had personal experience of, so if 'statistically' more Captains fly NPA's then 'statistically' most of the NPA accidents would happen when a Captain was flying.

QED

[Jet Jockey A4]

PJ2 and sevenstrokeroll;

Yes, it worked really well, didn't it? It required that the guy flying hand over a stable airplane, 'in-the-slot' so the guy looking out could just keep going.

I have to wonder with today's HUD and EVS equipped aircrafts if this is a thing of the past?

Because you are flying the HUD, there is no more transitioning to the outside at minimums so doesn't this make it safer?

[fireflybob]

I would say that 'statistically' a Captain would do the flying when an approach was considered more demanding, i.e. a non-precision one, why stick your neck out and give it to a F/O whose skills one might not have had personal experience of, so if 'statistically' more Captains fly NPA's then 'statistically' most of the NPA accidents would happen when a Captain was flying.

One assumes that both crew members have been adequately trained in their respective roles. Notwithstanding that on a monitored approach the FO is the pilot flying the autopilot would normally be utilised.
The monitored approach concept frees up the Captain from the task of flying the aircraft with, I would suggest, a reduction in the workload. Also if on reaching minima there is no visual reference the FO will stay on instruments and execute a Go Around.

I agree that there is more than one way of operating an a/c but speaking personally I have found it a very effective and I would suggest safer way of operating the a/c in conditions of lower cloudbase and/or viz. Of course I take your point that anything can be proved with statistics and am aware of the Disraeli quote.

[PJ2]

Jet Jockey A4;

Regretably I haven't flown using a HUD so can't compare the experience. However, your observation makes sense because one is already "looking through" the information at the environment ahead.

I think on a approach where weather, airfield conditions, terrain, fatigue or aircraft limitations may place unusual demands on a crew, the monitored approach may be one way to conduct the manoeuvre. But it has to be a company's SOPs and trained for; deciding to do it at the last minute because it seems like a good idea then making it up as the approach unfolds is obviously not as good as following one's company's familiar and trained SOPs. It does require practise.

It sure worked well in the maritimes . . . ;-)

PJ2

[framer]

I don't believe it to be a condemnation of Captains flying abilities at all and I think the premise is accurate.

Think of it this way, if the f/o is flying, and starts to get a fraction low or a fraction slow, how far will the Captain let it develop before he/ she verbalises the deviation?
If the Captain is the PF and starts to get a fraction low or a fraction slow how far will the f/o let it develop before he/ she verbalises it?

In an ideal world the answer to both questions would be the same but we don't live in an ideal world and the answer is not normally the same.
Some might be tempted to reply with " if the f/o did their job correctly then that wouldn't be a problem etc etc" but saying that doesn't change the reality that the answers are different, it doesn't change human nature, and therefore doesn't reduce the chances of dirt coming in the windows.
If you want to reduce the likelihood of CFIT then a step in the right direction is to have the f/o fly the approach while the Captain monitors it's progress and calls any deviations. The Captain will have more available mental processing power than he/she would have if they were PF and that fact combined with their presumably greater experience also helps to reduce the CFIT risk.

So.....how do you follow the Flight Safety Foundations recommendation to have the f/o as PF in this situation when your regulator allows the bean counters running the operation to employ pilots of such low experience and flying ability that an SOP is created to prevent them flying below 5000ft? The answer is that you can't and both the regulator and the airline management are negligent in their responsibilities to the travelling public.

[sevenstrokeroll]

FAIL SAFE

I am reminded of the film (and book) "FAIL SAFE"...early on in the film, the head of the electronics firm, responsible for the gadgets in the war room, says: the machines are too fast , the human element is gone, but there is a new kind of problem, the machines can't be monitored by the men.


anyone who hasn't seen this film should really watch it (my words are a paraphrase, not a quote).

and the same thing with the advanced automation planes.

we have reached a turning point in the man / machine interface...and we are losing!

[onetrack]

One must not lose sight of the fact, that in this event being discussed, the end result would almost certainly have been vastly different, if there had been terra firma instead of water under the approach path.
The end result would have been another event virtually identical to the Afriqiyah Airbus A330 crash at Tripoli (flight 8U771). Different aircraft, yes - but a final result that would have been little different.
The fact that all pax and crew virtually walked away from this event should not mean that the crash should be treated with less importance than the Afriqiyah crash.
Both events appear to show serious deficiencies in CRM and piloting skills - that have survived training programmes, as well as extensive hour logging, by both the PIC and FO.

Pilot error caused 2010 Afriqiyah crash | Libya Herald

[framer]

One track you have just reminded me of the Schiphol 737-800 that had the radio altimeter fail on the left side. If that occurred again( or was MEL'd u/s) and the thrust levers retarded because the aircraft thought it was approaching the flare, and the crew picked it up late, could we get the result we see here? I don't know enough about the Schiphol crash to make comment....anyone else here know more?

[radken]

Hard to stay current with all the writing going on so quickly in this thread... Maybe someone's already said this? But our -300's back in the 90's were all placarded with a nice big, red placard in front of both pilots, cautioning crew to "MAINTAIN AT LEAST 45% N1 WHEN OPERATING IN RAIN OR VISIBLE MOISTURE." This was done in deference to the CFM-56's tendency (small core dia) to lose its fire too easily during water ingestion. Keeping rpm up I suppose was the engineers solution to avoiding unpowered flight. Are those placards still on 737 dashboards? Can some of you pro's address this? What's it like to fly in those monsoon rains out in Bali? Could it be like ingesting birds, with similar loss of options and similar outcomes like Sully experienced?

[philipat]

Where are those Lawyers when you need them?

Lion Air will pay maximum Rp 4m baggage compensation | The Jakarta Post

(IDR 4m is about USD 400)

Lion will treat the incident as "Damaged or lost baggage" and will also cover medical expenses of those injured. Generous to a fault......

[Centaurus]

Both events appear to show serious deficiencies in CRM

Am I the only person to wonder if the term "CRM" is in danger of being a catch-all excuse for todays aircraft accidents in general? if the captain or his first officer flares too late and does a hard landing, the first thing that people talk about on Pprune is that he didn't use enough CRM -as if it is some type of new sunscreen or something.

From the current evidence on Pprune there is a good possibility that the cause of the Lion Air accident will be found to be the failure of the captain to conduct a safe go-around after losing all forward vision due heavy rain at or below the MDA. Where the actions of his first officer will come into the equation, has yet to be revealed.

But lack of CRM, or poor CRM or whatever other label can be applied to CRM, is steadily becoming a tired cliche applied to almost every accident report. In turn, this has fuelled an enthusiastic acceptance in the industry by professional and amateur pilots alike, that CRM must have been involved otherwise there probably would not have been an accident.

It should be remembered that CRM as a published concept first came to vogue after the PANAM/KLM double 747 crashes in the Canary islands that caused such great loss of life.

Suddenly the spectre of the God-like arrogant captain figure became alive and so CRM was designed to encourage subordinates to speak up and not cower before the Captain Queegs of the LH seat.

[lomapaseo]

Hard to stay current with all the writing going on so quickly in this thread... Maybe someone's already said this? But our -300's back in the 90's were all placarded with a nice big, red placard in front of both pilots, cautioning crew to "MAINTAIN AT LEAST 45% N1 WHEN OPERATING IN RAIN OR VISIBLE MOISTURE." This was done in deference to the CFM-56's tendency (small core dia) to lose its fire too easily during water ingestion. Keeping rpm up I suppose was the engineers solution to avoiding unpowered flight. Are those placards still on 737 dashboards? Can some of you pro's address this? What's it like to fly in those monsoon rains out in Bali? Could it be like ingesting birds, with similar loss of options and similar outcomes like Sully experienced?

best taken to the Tech section

[fireflybob]

Centaurus, well said!

[philipat]

CRM

Perhaps CRM failures have come to include a more basic concept that, First, someone should, FTFA?