Mid-air collision over Brasil
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... Air ... Traffic ... Control ..
Maybe I'm missing something here .. but I understood that essentially, ATC's job is to provide guidance to, and separation between aircraft, to prevent collision between them, or terra firma. There has been a MAC, which indicates a failure of ATC. How much simpler do you want it?
The ultimate responsibility relies on the pilot! That Simple.
[The main area under question, of course, is the reason the pilots flew North on the Manaus leg at FL370. They reported that they believed they did this with Cindacta 1 approval.
Thats right , BELIEVED, that seven calls were probably the confirmation of an authorization.
I am neither insensitive, nor hypocritical, nor unfair. The AT Controller has been removed, and I feel for that person. However, the fact that they have been removed surely indicates that overwhelming guilt and the usually resultant depression set in on this person.
That does not indicate anything, investigation pending in certain points, there is an enourmous psicological effect.
That only happens, once someone realises that they have failed in the proper execution of their highly-responsible job, and people have died as a result. It has happened with ATC's before, and no doubt it will happen again. Seems pretty clear-cut to me.
Since people do not realise errors, they can just continue working. Is that correct what you are saying?
Maybe the factor that will never be investigated .. but needs to be .. is the military control of civil airspace in Brazil. As has been noted before, military people are trained to push everything to the limit, and take extreme risks. Civilian trainees, particularly where pax are concerned, are trained, to never take risks. Whether this conflict comes up, in Brazilian ATC, is a point that maybe needs serious examination.
The controler was replaced in the screen after (recorded) 1hour and 59 minutes.
Despite FW190's reassurances .. ATC in Brazil has failed, this time .. in the worst possible way. Careful examination of all features of Brazilian ATC is now warranted to find the weak points.
As is noted in construction and mining industries .. despite extreme safety cultures being instigated .. there is a "risk-taking" mentality, that still exists amongst a small section of employees and managers .. which leads to fatalities. Whether that same mentality exists in Brazilian ATC needs to be examined as part of the accident investigation process.
Yes ATC is being investigated as well., even with the presence of the FAA and the NTSB, someone forgot to mention, you concluded that the seven calls were not enough, that the tapes showing the legacy desapearing as secondary target were deceiving and there was a "blackhole" in the area were the radar traces show everybody else but the N600XL as it should.
Besides:
UNSAFE CONDITION
(d) This AD results from the transponder erroneously going into standby
mode if the flightcrew takes longer than five seconds when using the
rotary knob of the radio management unit to change the air traffic
control code. We are issuing this AD to prevent the transponder of
the COM unit from going into standby mode, which could increase the
workload on the flightcrew and result in improper functioning of the
traffic alert and collision avoidance system.
Was he after 40 minutes or so instructed to change code and he did not do so in 5 s? Was this aircraft equipped with the "rotary knobs" transponder? Is that why the transponder "went" on stby? But, how come, if he was in comms failure, being instructed to do so and stating that he was in that situation only on ground after landing? By chance, they never stated changing any code that we know.
Maybe I'm missing something here .. but I understood that essentially, ATC's job is to provide guidance to, and separation between aircraft, to prevent collision between them, or terra firma. There has been a MAC, which indicates a failure of ATC. How much simpler do you want it?
The ultimate responsibility relies on the pilot! That Simple.
[The main area under question, of course, is the reason the pilots flew North on the Manaus leg at FL370. They reported that they believed they did this with Cindacta 1 approval.
Thats right , BELIEVED, that seven calls were probably the confirmation of an authorization.
I am neither insensitive, nor hypocritical, nor unfair. The AT Controller has been removed, and I feel for that person. However, the fact that they have been removed surely indicates that overwhelming guilt and the usually resultant depression set in on this person.
That does not indicate anything, investigation pending in certain points, there is an enourmous psicological effect.
That only happens, once someone realises that they have failed in the proper execution of their highly-responsible job, and people have died as a result. It has happened with ATC's before, and no doubt it will happen again. Seems pretty clear-cut to me.
Since people do not realise errors, they can just continue working. Is that correct what you are saying?
Maybe the factor that will never be investigated .. but needs to be .. is the military control of civil airspace in Brazil. As has been noted before, military people are trained to push everything to the limit, and take extreme risks. Civilian trainees, particularly where pax are concerned, are trained, to never take risks. Whether this conflict comes up, in Brazilian ATC, is a point that maybe needs serious examination.
The controler was replaced in the screen after (recorded) 1hour and 59 minutes.
Despite FW190's reassurances .. ATC in Brazil has failed, this time .. in the worst possible way. Careful examination of all features of Brazilian ATC is now warranted to find the weak points.
As is noted in construction and mining industries .. despite extreme safety cultures being instigated .. there is a "risk-taking" mentality, that still exists amongst a small section of employees and managers .. which leads to fatalities. Whether that same mentality exists in Brazilian ATC needs to be examined as part of the accident investigation process.
Yes ATC is being investigated as well., even with the presence of the FAA and the NTSB, someone forgot to mention, you concluded that the seven calls were not enough, that the tapes showing the legacy desapearing as secondary target were deceiving and there was a "blackhole" in the area were the radar traces show everybody else but the N600XL as it should.
Besides:
UNSAFE CONDITION
(d) This AD results from the transponder erroneously going into standby
mode if the flightcrew takes longer than five seconds when using the
rotary knob of the radio management unit to change the air traffic
control code. We are issuing this AD to prevent the transponder of
the COM unit from going into standby mode, which could increase the
workload on the flightcrew and result in improper functioning of the
traffic alert and collision avoidance system.
Was he after 40 minutes or so instructed to change code and he did not do so in 5 s? Was this aircraft equipped with the "rotary knobs" transponder? Is that why the transponder "went" on stby? But, how come, if he was in comms failure, being instructed to do so and stating that he was in that situation only on ground after landing? By chance, they never stated changing any code that we know.
I'm in one of those moods
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westhawk, ATC Watcher, markjoy, Flagon et al … sage words!
.
onetrack .. I dislike having to dissect a persons musing in this place, however given the sensitivities (both state and those directly affected) of this ‘accident’, and the number of people around the world watching this discussion, it would be remise not to address some of the statements you have made!
… with respect, you do not know precisely how air traffic control works! .. your musings indicate a simplistic penchant to blame ATC whenever two aircraft are not separated .. yet anyone with half a clue would understand the myriad of circumstances that could lead to an Airprox or MAC that could have zero to do with the Air Traffic Controllers on duty i.e.
.
- Aircraft encoder errors (would also likely include miscommunication)
- Aircraft malfunction
- Aircrew miscommunication (primary radar or procedural airspaces)
- Air traffic control equipment failure (surveillance and/or comm)
- Weather related unforseen upsets
- There are others but lets not go there in the current global climate for fear of the un-informed assuming it might apply in this case!
…. as far as is practicable!
…again, from a simplistic un-informed point of view, you might draw that conclusion … in reality, do you think ATC are responsible in the above sorts of scenarios … because that is what you have erroneously implied! ...… how much simpler do you want it??
… yes, we have all read that!
.
Lets assume
for the sake of argument that Mr Pereira was referring to the TXPDR being ‘off’ in the raw sense of the word, not necessarily saying the crew physically turned it off! .. could this have been his intended context?! …. if it was, it would be an accurate statement as it is clear the TXPDR was OFF! … or;
.
… the other being your implied/assumed context of his statement that the crew turned it off for some reason!!
.
If that is indeed what he meant … there has been no follow-up statement to corroborate it, in fact, that context is being actively debunked by the lawyers for the Embraer crew (not suprisingly)!
.
….that may mean one of three things:-
.
1. Mr Pereira is not saying anything else until the report is out.
2. It may have been said without witness or corroborating evidence (DFDR/CVR) and can no longer be substantiated.
3. It was hearsay in the first place (in which case he will have his empennage sued off).
…. do you see the point? .. it is not too difficult to grasp I would have thought!
.. I would beg to differ 
… as has been eloquently stated by others, you have no empathy for or understanding of the responsibilities and seriousness with which the provision of air traffic control services is taken by those who hold that responsibility every day around the globe moving thousands of aircraft!
.
… an air traffic controller (irrespective of the role he or she may have played in any given incident or accident) involved in an incident is/should be removed from operational duties as soon as safely practicable to ensure service safety and continuity!
…. a dramatic example of crisis management of this type (post accident ATC ‘distraction’) is to be found in the actions of Sky Guide following the horrific MAC over Lake Constance in Europe! … very serious consideration was given to the likely ‘psychological’ effect on all of the staff in that centre and surrounds! … traffic metering and other measures were promulgated to allow the controllers (ALL of them first class professionals) time to reacquire their focus, absorb and adjust to the horror of what had occurred to the passengers and crew of both aircraft as well as their colleague! …. to do otherwise would have been irresponsible and unthinkable!
.
.. following your logic …… do you consider all of them guilty because they were stood-down??
.. well it might ... from a position of ignorance!!
.. that is a hideous slur against Brazilian ATC’s! … provide some factual basis for this or do the decent thing and retract your statement!
… again, provide us with something other than a motherhood statement to support this contention!
… that has not been inferred or established on public record!
I am sure if any ‘systemic’ deficiencies are identified, they will be recorded and corrected!!
.. mate, you may well be a competent miner and knowledgeable regarding wilful risk taking in that industry, but I am certain beyond doubt that air traffic controllers (no matter their location) would never wilfully place the travelling public in jeopardy!
… anyone that displayed even the slightest inclination to unreasonable ‘risk taking’ would not pass first base .. that is why we have psych testing, training, simulators, supervision and recurrent check and standards systems!
.
.. now it might be fair to say that commercial pressures are apparent in ATS in certain areas around the world ... if it is found that these 'systemic' issues play any part in an accident .. is it then reasonable to apportion blame to individual air traffic controllers??
.
… even if by some stretch of the imagination an operator did err unresonably or intentionally, multi-layered system defences come into play! .. and they would not last long in operations!
.
.. we do not muck about with other peoples lives FULL STOP!!!
.
… good day to you!
.
onetrack .. I dislike having to dissect a persons musing in this place, however given the sensitivities (both state and those directly affected) of this ‘accident’, and the number of people around the world watching this discussion, it would be remise not to address some of the statements you have made!
ATC watcher - I know precisely how ATC works .. and maybe you should repeat slowly to yourself ... Air ... Traffic ... Control ..
.
- Aircraft encoder errors (would also likely include miscommunication)
- Aircraft malfunction
- Aircrew miscommunication (primary radar or procedural airspaces)
- Air traffic control equipment failure (surveillance and/or comm)
- Weather related unforseen upsets
- There are others but lets not go there in the current global climate for fear of the un-informed assuming it might apply in this case!
Maybe I'm missing something here .. but I understood that essentially, ATC's job is to provide guidance to, and separation between aircraft, to prevent collision between them, or terra firma.
There has been a MAC, which indicates a failure of ATC. How much simpler do you want it?
Scurvy Dawg - The Brazilian media produced this report .. http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N04331952.htm .. in which this quote is found .. "We know that the transponder was turned off," said Jose Carlos Pereira, the head of Brazil's airports authority, the Estado De Sao Paulo newspaper reported on Wednesday ..
.
Lets assume
for the sake of argument that Mr Pereira was referring to the TXPDR being ‘off’ in the raw sense of the word, not necessarily saying the crew physically turned it off! .. could this have been his intended context?! …. if it was, it would be an accurate statement as it is clear the TXPDR was OFF! … or;.
… the other being your implied/assumed context of his statement that the crew turned it off for some reason!!
.
If that is indeed what he meant … there has been no follow-up statement to corroborate it, in fact, that context is being actively debunked by the lawyers for the Embraer crew (not suprisingly)!
.
….that may mean one of three things:-
.
1. Mr Pereira is not saying anything else until the report is out.
2. It may have been said without witness or corroborating evidence (DFDR/CVR) and can no longer be substantiated.
3. It was hearsay in the first place (in which case he will have his empennage sued off).
So .. who's casting the slurs here?? .. this guy (head of the Brazil AA, note) KNOWS for sure, the transponder was TURNED OFF .. long before even any preliminary investigation is completed ..
I am neither insensitive, nor hypocritical, nor unfair.
The AT Controller has been removed, and I feel for that person. However, the fact that they have been removed surely indicates that overwhelming guilt and the usually resultant depression set in on this person.
.
… an air traffic controller (irrespective of the role he or she may have played in any given incident or accident) involved in an incident is/should be removed from operational duties as soon as safely practicable to ensure service safety and continuity!
That only happens, once someone realises that they have failed in the proper execution of their highly-responsible job, and people have died as a result.
.
.. following your logic …… do you consider all of them guilty because they were stood-down??
Seems pretty clear-cut to me.
Maybe the factor that will never be investigated .. but needs to be .. is the military control of civil airspace in Brazil. As has been noted before, military people are trained to push everything to the limit, and take extreme risks.
Civilian trainees, particularly where pax are concerned, are trained, to never take risks. Whether this conflict comes up, in Brazilian ATC, is a point that maybe needs serious examination.
Despite FW190's reassurances .. ATC in Brazil has failed, this time .. in the worst possible way.
Careful examination of all features of Brazilian ATC is now warranted to find the weak points.
As is noted in construction and mining industries .. despite extreme safety cultures being instigated .. there is a "risk-taking" mentality, that still exists amongst a small section of employees and managers .. which leads to fatalities. Whether that same mentality exists in Brazilian ATC needs to be examined as part of the accident investigation process.
… anyone that displayed even the slightest inclination to unreasonable ‘risk taking’ would not pass first base .. that is why we have psych testing, training, simulators, supervision and recurrent check and standards systems!
.
.. now it might be fair to say that commercial pressures are apparent in ATS in certain areas around the world ... if it is found that these 'systemic' issues play any part in an accident .. is it then reasonable to apportion blame to individual air traffic controllers??
.
… even if by some stretch of the imagination an operator did err unresonably or intentionally, multi-layered system defences come into play! .. and they would not last long in operations!
.
.. we do not muck about with other peoples lives FULL STOP!!!
.
… good day to you!
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i think the reporter in question is faced with a conflict of interest...to tell the truth, and to somehow protect those who managed to get him on the ground safely.
the trouble is, if it was the LEGACY's crew's fault, he wouldn't be faced with this conflict of interest.
I think speculation is fine, it brings out a wealth of knowledge and anti-knowledge.
in time it will all be sorted out.
the trouble is, if it was the LEGACY's crew's fault, he wouldn't be faced with this conflict of interest.
I think speculation is fine, it brings out a wealth of knowledge and anti-knowledge.
in time it will all be sorted out.
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Hmmm .. seems like I've poked a raw nerve here .... 
This following Princeton/Rochlin publication is an excellent read .. see paragraph 37 for the point I previously made about military vs civilian training ..
http://www.pupress.princeton.edu/boo...hapter_07.html
This is not an article that I've just found to satisfy your regular need for irrefutable proof .. its an issue that has been raised previously, as a matter of possible concern .. and the issue was .. the large number of RAAF trained pilots, who left the RAAF, to join Qantas. It was a regular joke that the RAAF was known as the Qantas flying school.
Note that the Princeton/Rochlin article goes on at length about the workload on AT Controllers possibly being subtly increased by extensive computerisation.
Seeing as Brazil is reputed to have spent $122M on ATC upgrades in the last couple of years, one has to ponder the possibilities of too much of that money going into technology, and not enough into training, and the human factor.
Despite you trying to savage me over every single one of my comments, there can be no doubt that ATC failed in this case in at least two areas. No doubt other contributing factors will be found .. but Brazilian ATC will in no way come out of this, squeaky clean.
This following Princeton/Rochlin publication is an excellent read .. see paragraph 37 for the point I previously made about military vs civilian training ..
http://www.pupress.princeton.edu/boo...hapter_07.html
This is not an article that I've just found to satisfy your regular need for irrefutable proof .. its an issue that has been raised previously, as a matter of possible concern .. and the issue was .. the large number of RAAF trained pilots, who left the RAAF, to join Qantas. It was a regular joke that the RAAF was known as the Qantas flying school.
Note that the Princeton/Rochlin article goes on at length about the workload on AT Controllers possibly being subtly increased by extensive computerisation.
Seeing as Brazil is reputed to have spent $122M on ATC upgrades in the last couple of years, one has to ponder the possibilities of too much of that money going into technology, and not enough into training, and the human factor.
Despite you trying to savage me over every single one of my comments, there can be no doubt that ATC failed in this case in at least two areas. No doubt other contributing factors will be found .. but Brazilian ATC will in no way come out of this, squeaky clean.
In the case of communications failure during the IFR flight, pilots will follow the exact route in the IFR clearance, and ATC will anticipate their path, altitudes, and times along the route, based upon a combination of the IFR flight plan and the IFR clearance issued by ATC to the pilot.
I'm in one of those moods
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, there can be no doubt that ATC failed in this case in at least two areas. No doubt other contributing factors will be found .. but Brazilian ATC will in no way come out of this, squeaky clean.
.
.. come on ... out with it!
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onetrack
I have been savaged many times on pprune. I offer my support and will take some flack for you if I may.
That a collision happened with two IFR planes means ATC failed somewhere.
Now if the controller has a tape of him shouting at both planes to do something and both planes didn't hear, there might be a technical problem...manmade or otherwise.
Including someone not having the audio panel set up properly.
ATC , when giving a clearance, must assume loss of radio communication from the moment of takeoff all the way to landing, there should be a watchful eye on the progression of all flights to make sure things are working as planned...and if not fix it up somehow.
I agree with you, I would prefer moeny to be spent on the human side of ATC rather than all the fancy computers.
In the US, you may certainly recall the comair crash...the one controller on duty was doing paperwork rather than watching out the window. While possibly within regs, possibly not, I would prefer regs and policies to be changed to have more HUMAN eyes and minds involved with ATC. I would also like to see reduced vertical seperation minimums removed and the 2000' spacing above FL290 resumed.
Add to that, the concept of one way airways, so planes are never head on.
People make mistakes, people make computer systems, people deal with computer systems/automation, and it is time to make sure the people side is cared for!
j
I have been savaged many times on pprune. I offer my support and will take some flack for you if I may.
That a collision happened with two IFR planes means ATC failed somewhere.
Now if the controller has a tape of him shouting at both planes to do something and both planes didn't hear, there might be a technical problem...manmade or otherwise.
Including someone not having the audio panel set up properly.
ATC , when giving a clearance, must assume loss of radio communication from the moment of takeoff all the way to landing, there should be a watchful eye on the progression of all flights to make sure things are working as planned...and if not fix it up somehow.
I agree with you, I would prefer moeny to be spent on the human side of ATC rather than all the fancy computers.
In the US, you may certainly recall the comair crash...the one controller on duty was doing paperwork rather than watching out the window. While possibly within regs, possibly not, I would prefer regs and policies to be changed to have more HUMAN eyes and minds involved with ATC. I would also like to see reduced vertical seperation minimums removed and the 2000' spacing above FL290 resumed.
Add to that, the concept of one way airways, so planes are never head on.
People make mistakes, people make computer systems, people deal with computer systems/automation, and it is time to make sure the people side is cared for!
j
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In my opinion it will be highly interesting to see the actions of Air Traffic Control of Brasilia and Manaus and the communication between the two control centers indeed. In the light, that Brasil officials maintain, that Brasilia Center did try to contact the Legacy for 7 times (over a period of about one hour), but did not receive a reply, and at the same time states, that the transponder of the Legacy was off, what would have been sensible for ATC to do indeed, and what was ATC required to do? Should they leave it at that - and do nothing, trusting that the pilots would follow proper procedures? Or should they have done something?
From my point of view it would have been logical to block both FL360 (their flight planned level in case they followed loss of communication procedures) as well as FL370 (the last known level they were on and that they were cleared to, in case they didn't notice the loss of communication) for all other traffic. At the same time, with loss of voice communication and transponder signal, it would seem prudent to no longer assume RVSM, so at least separate aircraft by 2000 feet minimum, as has been suggested before in this thread already. That would mean, that the B737 could have been assigned to FL390 (if able) or to FL330, perhaps as an additional safety margin asking her to track parallel (and not on) the centerline of the airway at say 5 or 10 nm deviation.
Now add the picture, that the Legacy was seen turning, climbing and descending without clearance on radar, which led to the conclusion by officials, that the pilots had turned their transponder off to "show off the airplane to the new owners". Would that not set off all alarm bells with Air Traffic Controllers? Would that, in an unexpected loss of communication scenario, not trigger suspicions, that the airplane may be in an emergency and the pilots just not able to communicate (following the principle aviate, navigate, communicate), and invoke according ATC emergency procedures?
So this is why I have this hot burning question: what did Brasilia Center do indeed? Did they talk to Manaus and tell them, that there is a likelihood of an airplane approaching the intersection at (the wrong) FL370 or FL360, and then coordinate a level change for the oncoming B737? Did they indeed (attempt to) clear the airspace around the Legacy? What is the procedure for an air traffic controller, who cannot ascertain, that an airplane under his control approaches the boundaries of his sector at the correct altitudes/flight levels, that have been assigned for transferring the airplane into the responsibility of the next sector?
So far, the lack of any information on that topic as well as the facts, that the Boeing was still on flight level 370 (the last level the Legacy was known on too) and the collision occured close to the section boundary, seems to suggest, that there was no such coordination between the two centers. Such a coordination would however have broken this link in the chain to disaster.
Don't get me wrong here - if the Legacy crew indeed did turn off the transponder or did wrong as is being alleged, then they should face the consequences. The actions of ATC (or the lack thereof) may however well have contributed to the collision. Within that hour between the loss of communication and the collision ATC did have a significant chance to break one of the links in this chain to disaster. BTW, I am aware of the AD, which may also explain the loss of transponder signal, but would not explain why their CVR recorded the 7 attempts by Brasilia ATC to contact the airplane (which prompts me to be very suspicious regarding the Legacy crew, although there may be another technical reason not yet discussed, why the CVR could read Brasilia, but the crew would not - but that's not the purpose of my posting).
What's the implication, BTW, with the automatic descent or climb to flight level according to flight plan, if the airplane looses communication at quite some different flight level or perhaps altitude (e.g. cleared to FL120, flight plan at FL330)? Would that automatic climb/descend not create a lot of havoc and risk of midair collisions with planes on flight levels in between, especially in a busy airspace? While I might see, how air traffic control could handle such a scenario with working transponder signals by knowing exactly, what altitude the losscom airplane is at, without a working transponder and thus without knowing exactly what the losscom airplane is doing, that seems to be an impossible task, except clearing the entire airspace around that airplane ... Any insight?
Servus, Simon
From my point of view it would have been logical to block both FL360 (their flight planned level in case they followed loss of communication procedures) as well as FL370 (the last known level they were on and that they were cleared to, in case they didn't notice the loss of communication) for all other traffic. At the same time, with loss of voice communication and transponder signal, it would seem prudent to no longer assume RVSM, so at least separate aircraft by 2000 feet minimum, as has been suggested before in this thread already. That would mean, that the B737 could have been assigned to FL390 (if able) or to FL330, perhaps as an additional safety margin asking her to track parallel (and not on) the centerline of the airway at say 5 or 10 nm deviation.
Now add the picture, that the Legacy was seen turning, climbing and descending without clearance on radar, which led to the conclusion by officials, that the pilots had turned their transponder off to "show off the airplane to the new owners". Would that not set off all alarm bells with Air Traffic Controllers? Would that, in an unexpected loss of communication scenario, not trigger suspicions, that the airplane may be in an emergency and the pilots just not able to communicate (following the principle aviate, navigate, communicate), and invoke according ATC emergency procedures?
So this is why I have this hot burning question: what did Brasilia Center do indeed? Did they talk to Manaus and tell them, that there is a likelihood of an airplane approaching the intersection at (the wrong) FL370 or FL360, and then coordinate a level change for the oncoming B737? Did they indeed (attempt to) clear the airspace around the Legacy? What is the procedure for an air traffic controller, who cannot ascertain, that an airplane under his control approaches the boundaries of his sector at the correct altitudes/flight levels, that have been assigned for transferring the airplane into the responsibility of the next sector?
So far, the lack of any information on that topic as well as the facts, that the Boeing was still on flight level 370 (the last level the Legacy was known on too) and the collision occured close to the section boundary, seems to suggest, that there was no such coordination between the two centers. Such a coordination would however have broken this link in the chain to disaster.
Don't get me wrong here - if the Legacy crew indeed did turn off the transponder or did wrong as is being alleged, then they should face the consequences. The actions of ATC (or the lack thereof) may however well have contributed to the collision. Within that hour between the loss of communication and the collision ATC did have a significant chance to break one of the links in this chain to disaster. BTW, I am aware of the AD, which may also explain the loss of transponder signal, but would not explain why their CVR recorded the 7 attempts by Brasilia ATC to contact the airplane (which prompts me to be very suspicious regarding the Legacy crew, although there may be another technical reason not yet discussed, why the CVR could read Brasilia, but the crew would not - but that's not the purpose of my posting).
What's the implication, BTW, with the automatic descent or climb to flight level according to flight plan, if the airplane looses communication at quite some different flight level or perhaps altitude (e.g. cleared to FL120, flight plan at FL330)? Would that automatic climb/descend not create a lot of havoc and risk of midair collisions with planes on flight levels in between, especially in a busy airspace? While I might see, how air traffic control could handle such a scenario with working transponder signals by knowing exactly, what altitude the losscom airplane is at, without a working transponder and thus without knowing exactly what the losscom airplane is doing, that seems to be an impossible task, except clearing the entire airspace around that airplane ... Any insight?
Servus, Simon
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simon
while clearing all altitudes for NORDO (no radio) plane with an expected altitude change will cause havoc, it will not cause a collision...controllers will have to do more work, pilots and planes will have to use more fuel, people will be delayed, but they will not die.
I do THINK, SPECULATE, conjecture, that the LEGACY crew may have turned down their radio volume in one of a number of ways in order to chat up the guests in back as they came to the cockpit to look around. It happens.
And for the legacy crew to NOT hear a radio transmission would make me suspicious as a pilot and I would key the MIC and ask for a radio check.
1 hour of flying is more than 400 nautical miles...that is a long way to go without a how do you do?
j
while clearing all altitudes for NORDO (no radio) plane with an expected altitude change will cause havoc, it will not cause a collision...controllers will have to do more work, pilots and planes will have to use more fuel, people will be delayed, but they will not die.
I do THINK, SPECULATE, conjecture, that the LEGACY crew may have turned down their radio volume in one of a number of ways in order to chat up the guests in back as they came to the cockpit to look around. It happens.
And for the legacy crew to NOT hear a radio transmission would make me suspicious as a pilot and I would key the MIC and ask for a radio check.
1 hour of flying is more than 400 nautical miles...that is a long way to go without a how do you do?
j
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You'll forgive, perhaps, my insolance in asserting that "Air Traffic Control" is a misnomer. Obviously ATC has no mechanical or electronic control of an aircraft, but has the responsibility to provide a path clear of hazards to the aircraft's destination, and provide appropriate communication.
ATC also has alternate procedures for loss of contact with an aircraft. If a flight "goes dark" for whatever reason--intentional or not--it becomes a hazard to other aircraft, and ATC must follow those contingency procedures.
Do I have it right?
ATC also has alternate procedures for loss of contact with an aircraft. If a flight "goes dark" for whatever reason--intentional or not--it becomes a hazard to other aircraft, and ATC must follow those contingency procedures.
Do I have it right?
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You'll forgive, perhaps, my insolance in asserting that "Air Traffic Control" is a misnomer. Obviously ATC has no mechanical or electronic control of an aircraft, but has the responsibility to provide a path clear of hazards to the aircraft's destination, and provide appropriate communication.
ATC also has alternate procedures for loss of contact with an aircraft. If a flight "goes dark" for whatever reason--intentional or not--it becomes a hazard to other aircraft, and ATC must follow those contingency procedures.
Do I have it right?
ATC also has alternate procedures for loss of contact with an aircraft. If a flight "goes dark" for whatever reason--intentional or not--it becomes a hazard to other aircraft, and ATC must follow those contingency procedures.
Do I have it right?
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And most of us are not trying to crucify ATC either. But IMO it appears their performance left something to be desired. You have two converging targets, one of which is not squawking and not responding to calls at a last known alt. of 370. The other is both squawking and responding and climbing 350-390. What do you do ?
Hint: simply watching the blips merge should not be an option.
Last edited by PaperTiger; 9th Oct 2006 at 16:23.
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barit 1
yes, air traffic control is a misnomer, but has been around for about 70 years or so.
your summing up is just about right.
It seems that things are repeating themselves in aviation history...collisions etc
j
yes, air traffic control is a misnomer, but has been around for about 70 years or so.
your summing up is just about right.
It seems that things are repeating themselves in aviation history...collisions etc
j
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Legacy-US Pilot's passports seized by Brazil
October 4, 2006
Brazilian authorities confiscated the passports of two American pilots on Tuesday who were flying a business jet that apparently collided with a Gol commercial airliner that crashed last week deep in the Amazon jungle, killing all 155 people on board.
Judge Tiago de Abril in Mato Grosso state, where the plane went down, said police had seized the passports of Joe Lepore and Jan Paladino on his orders for the duration of the investigation.
"That's a cautionary measure. If they returned to the United States it would require a lot of time and effort for us to collect their testimony," the judge said, adding that the investigation should not take long.
The two pilots, who were flying a newly built executive jet that authorities believe clipped the Boeing 737-800 in midair, arrived on Tuesday in Rio de Janeiro for medical and psychological tests as part of the investigation.
They face more questioning on Wednesday.
"They are being interviewed by the authorities and are giving their total cooperation with the investigation," said Glauco Paiva, a US consulate official in Rio.
The business jet, a Legacy 600 made by Brazilian manufacturer Embraer, was recently purchased by ExcelAire Service, a charter company based in Ronkonkoma, New York. The pilots were flying it to the United States when it apparently hit the airliner flown by low-cost Brazilian carrier Gol Linhas Aereas Inteligentes.
The business jet was able to land safely at a military base in the jungle. None of the seven people on board were hurt.
Air Force commander Luiz Carlos Bueno said on Monday both planes were flying at 37,000 feet, which means that one of them had strayed from its flight plan.
Investigators want to know why modern collision avoidance equipment installed on both planes did not prevent the accident, local aviation authorities said.
Brazilian news reports have offered a range of conflicting theories about the accident's cause, some speculating that the Legacy jet may have deviated from its flight plan.
Christine Negroni, with US law firm Kreindler & Kreindler which is not involved in the investigation, said all planes heading west in Brazil fly at even multiples of 1,000 feet, and those heading east at odd multiples.
"Since the American pilots were flying northwest, they should not have been at 37,000 (feet). That's very odd," she said.
At the crash site in a dense, remote area in the rain forest, salvage crews had recovered the remains of about 50 victims by Tuesday, including the airliner's two pilots.
"Parts of the plane and many bodies are scattered over an area of some 20 square kilometres in the forest and searchers have to scare away wild animals, especially at night, by burning large fires," an air force spokesman said.
A badly damaged black box from the Boeing will probably be taken for analysis to the United States or Canada, after which it will be compared with the data from the business jet, aviation authorities said.
As it often does, the US National Transportation Safety Board sent investigators to help with the probe in Brazil.
Grieving relatives were asked to provide dental records or descriptions that could help identify the bodies, as well as blood samples for DNA tests.
(Reuters) http://news.airwise.com/story/view/1159921223.html
Brazilian authorities confiscated the passports of two American pilots on Tuesday who were flying a business jet that apparently collided with a Gol commercial airliner that crashed last week deep in the Amazon jungle, killing all 155 people on board.
Judge Tiago de Abril in Mato Grosso state, where the plane went down, said police had seized the passports of Joe Lepore and Jan Paladino on his orders for the duration of the investigation.
"That's a cautionary measure. If they returned to the United States it would require a lot of time and effort for us to collect their testimony," the judge said, adding that the investigation should not take long.
The two pilots, who were flying a newly built executive jet that authorities believe clipped the Boeing 737-800 in midair, arrived on Tuesday in Rio de Janeiro for medical and psychological tests as part of the investigation.
They face more questioning on Wednesday.
"They are being interviewed by the authorities and are giving their total cooperation with the investigation," said Glauco Paiva, a US consulate official in Rio.
The business jet, a Legacy 600 made by Brazilian manufacturer Embraer, was recently purchased by ExcelAire Service, a charter company based in Ronkonkoma, New York. The pilots were flying it to the United States when it apparently hit the airliner flown by low-cost Brazilian carrier Gol Linhas Aereas Inteligentes.
The business jet was able to land safely at a military base in the jungle. None of the seven people on board were hurt.
Air Force commander Luiz Carlos Bueno said on Monday both planes were flying at 37,000 feet, which means that one of them had strayed from its flight plan.
Investigators want to know why modern collision avoidance equipment installed on both planes did not prevent the accident, local aviation authorities said.
Brazilian news reports have offered a range of conflicting theories about the accident's cause, some speculating that the Legacy jet may have deviated from its flight plan.
Christine Negroni, with US law firm Kreindler & Kreindler which is not involved in the investigation, said all planes heading west in Brazil fly at even multiples of 1,000 feet, and those heading east at odd multiples.
"Since the American pilots were flying northwest, they should not have been at 37,000 (feet). That's very odd," she said.
At the crash site in a dense, remote area in the rain forest, salvage crews had recovered the remains of about 50 victims by Tuesday, including the airliner's two pilots.
"Parts of the plane and many bodies are scattered over an area of some 20 square kilometres in the forest and searchers have to scare away wild animals, especially at night, by burning large fires," an air force spokesman said.
A badly damaged black box from the Boeing will probably be taken for analysis to the United States or Canada, after which it will be compared with the data from the business jet, aviation authorities said.
As it often does, the US National Transportation Safety Board sent investigators to help with the probe in Brazil.
Grieving relatives were asked to provide dental records or descriptions that could help identify the bodies, as well as blood samples for DNA tests.
(Reuters) http://news.airwise.com/story/view/1159921223.html
Not being from the “big iron” side of the fence, I was hesitant to post. However, curiosity got the best of me as I did not see any discussion about the cockpit displays.
What kind of visual references / information (route, traffic, terrain, etc.) would the pilots have seen on their respective PFD’s and MFD’s?
We have been interfacing Sky Watch (TCAS system) data to Garmin 430’s which allow for a visual, layered digital reference to the “outside” space around the aircraft.
What really sticks out to me, aside from all the other issues, is that 2 modern, independent TCAS / XPNDR systems failed to “see” the threat. I don’t know what TCAS range settings are used at FL370, however, it just seems unfathomable that someone didn’t see something at one point in time.
This brings me to another question…
Can a TCAS / XPNDR signal be interfered with by an outside source?
We have to perform a number of EMI tests anytime a new type of equipment is installed to ensure there is no adverse interference with critical systems. However, these tests are only required for items installed on that particular aircraft, with no checks performed using outside signal sources. I can recall back when digital controls were entering the civilian market and one particular engine mfg. used a digital overspeed controller that worked great except when you flew by a high power tension line which put out enough EMI to trip the overspeed control and decel the engine to idle.
As stated previously, the aircraft were in a military control zone, and the Legacy did land on a hidden air force base. I am not a “spark chaser” so maybe I am off track, but I have seen where some simple outside signals played hell on equipment displays, and caused a lot of grief to the mechanics troubleshooting the problem.
What kind of visual references / information (route, traffic, terrain, etc.) would the pilots have seen on their respective PFD’s and MFD’s?
We have been interfacing Sky Watch (TCAS system) data to Garmin 430’s which allow for a visual, layered digital reference to the “outside” space around the aircraft.
What really sticks out to me, aside from all the other issues, is that 2 modern, independent TCAS / XPNDR systems failed to “see” the threat. I don’t know what TCAS range settings are used at FL370, however, it just seems unfathomable that someone didn’t see something at one point in time.
This brings me to another question…
Can a TCAS / XPNDR signal be interfered with by an outside source?
We have to perform a number of EMI tests anytime a new type of equipment is installed to ensure there is no adverse interference with critical systems. However, these tests are only required for items installed on that particular aircraft, with no checks performed using outside signal sources. I can recall back when digital controls were entering the civilian market and one particular engine mfg. used a digital overspeed controller that worked great except when you flew by a high power tension line which put out enough EMI to trip the overspeed control and decel the engine to idle.
As stated previously, the aircraft were in a military control zone, and the Legacy did land on a hidden air force base. I am not a “spark chaser” so maybe I am off track, but I have seen where some simple outside signals played hell on equipment displays, and caused a lot of grief to the mechanics troubleshooting the problem.
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I find it interesting that certain media sources are implying that the Legacy, flying at FL370 was at the incorrect altitude, when, in fact, following correct lost com procedures they were doing exactly the right thing, namely flying their last assigned route and flight level.
We also need to acknowledge that it is your last CLEARANCE that determines your route and altitude of flight, not your flight plan.
In the event of lost communications, you are expected to do the following in regards to your route of flight in the following order;
1.)Last Assigned route,
2.)Last assigned Heading if you were on radar vectors,
3.)What you were told to expect (ie, "in the event of lost comm, fly direct XXX and hold")
4.)Your Filed route.
In regards to Altitude you are expected to fly the HIGHEST of the following altitudes;
1.) The MEA for the airway
2.) The altitude you were told to Expect in your Last CLEARANCE.
3.) The last Assigned altitude given in your last communication.
Apply this to the lost comm situation the Legacy crew was allegedly experiencing and you do the following;
Fly your assigned route as per your last ATC Clearance
Fly your last assigned Altitude.
You DO NOT change altitudes after passing Brasilia, even though this was in your flight plan, as your last assigned altitude takes priority. The only exception to this would be if, in their last recieved ATC clearance they were told to,
"Maintain FL 370, at Brasilia VOR descend and maintain FL 360".
To my knowledge no such clearance was given.
Given the circumstances the Legacy crew were flying the correct altitude.
We also need to acknowledge that it is your last CLEARANCE that determines your route and altitude of flight, not your flight plan.
In the event of lost communications, you are expected to do the following in regards to your route of flight in the following order;
1.)Last Assigned route,
2.)Last assigned Heading if you were on radar vectors,
3.)What you were told to expect (ie, "in the event of lost comm, fly direct XXX and hold")
4.)Your Filed route.
In regards to Altitude you are expected to fly the HIGHEST of the following altitudes;
1.) The MEA for the airway
2.) The altitude you were told to Expect in your Last CLEARANCE.
3.) The last Assigned altitude given in your last communication.
Apply this to the lost comm situation the Legacy crew was allegedly experiencing and you do the following;
Fly your assigned route as per your last ATC Clearance
Fly your last assigned Altitude.
You DO NOT change altitudes after passing Brasilia, even though this was in your flight plan, as your last assigned altitude takes priority. The only exception to this would be if, in their last recieved ATC clearance they were told to,
"Maintain FL 370, at Brasilia VOR descend and maintain FL 360".
To my knowledge no such clearance was given.
Given the circumstances the Legacy crew were flying the correct altitude.
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Joe Sharkey, the reporter for the NY Times, has revised his blog and his comments on it might prove educational. There are two entries; the one I reference is wayyyyy down the bottom of his blog site. The top blog is an AD.
www.joesharkey.com
www.joesharkey.com
Last edited by RiverCity; 8th Oct 2006 at 18:42. Reason: Forgot to add Joe's URL
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I find it interesting that certain media sources are implying that the Legacy, flying at FL370 was at the incorrect altitude, when, in fact, following correct lost com procedures they were doing exactly the right thing, namely flying their last assigned route and flight level.
We also need to acknowledge that it is your last CLEARANCE that determines your route and altitude of flight, not your flight plan.
In the event of lost communications, you are expected to do the following in regards to your route of flight in the following order;
1.)Last Assigned route,
2.)Last assigned Heading if you were on radar vectors,
3.)What you were told to expect (ie, "in the event of lost comm, fly direct XXX and hold")
4.)Your Filed route.
In regards to Altitude you are expected to fly the HIGHEST of the following altitudes;
1.) The MEA for the airway
2.) The altitude you were told to Expect in your Last CLEARANCE.
3.) The last Assigned altitude given in your last communication.
Apply this to the lost comm situation the Legacy crew was allegedly experiencing and you do the following;
Fly your assigned route as per your last ATC Clearance
Fly your last assigned Altitude.
You DO NOT change altitudes after passing Brasilia, even though this was in your flight plan, as your last assigned altitude takes priority. The only exception to this would be if, in their last recieved ATC clearance they were told to,
"Maintain FL 370, at Brasilia VOR descend and maintain FL 360".
To my knowledge no such clearance was given.
Given the circumstances the Legacy crew were flying the correct altitude.
We also need to acknowledge that it is your last CLEARANCE that determines your route and altitude of flight, not your flight plan.
In the event of lost communications, you are expected to do the following in regards to your route of flight in the following order;
1.)Last Assigned route,
2.)Last assigned Heading if you were on radar vectors,
3.)What you were told to expect (ie, "in the event of lost comm, fly direct XXX and hold")
4.)Your Filed route.
In regards to Altitude you are expected to fly the HIGHEST of the following altitudes;
1.) The MEA for the airway
2.) The altitude you were told to Expect in your Last CLEARANCE.
3.) The last Assigned altitude given in your last communication.
Apply this to the lost comm situation the Legacy crew was allegedly experiencing and you do the following;
Fly your assigned route as per your last ATC Clearance
Fly your last assigned Altitude.
You DO NOT change altitudes after passing Brasilia, even though this was in your flight plan, as your last assigned altitude takes priority. The only exception to this would be if, in their last recieved ATC clearance they were told to,
"Maintain FL 370, at Brasilia VOR descend and maintain FL 360".
To my knowledge no such clearance was given.
Given the circumstances the Legacy crew were flying the correct altitude.
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Astra Driver and Hokie Nation
Can you provide a reference document to your RT Failure 'procedures' ?
Assuming Brasil uses the ICAO standard procedure, then you are both simply (and possibly dangerously) wrong with the assertion the pilot should not change level from that last assigned.
From ICAO Annex 2:
The questions this then would raise for any investigator would be;
What was the aircraft's filed level (in other words, was it already at FPL level or was a change required to comply with the ICAO procedures) ?
and if a level change was required;
How many minutes was it between the collision taking place and the later of the the conditions specified in 3.6.5.2.2 Para b) ?
Hokie Nation
You are right about the lack of a transponder removing the RVSM capability, and the need for 2000' separation to be applied. Forcing the aircraft to leave RVSM airspace would of course be the preferred course of action, but then no one was in contact with the aircraft (for whatever reason). Perhaps the investigation will reveal that the Brasilian ATC guys were basing the separation on the Legacy filing a FPL level at least 2000' away from that of the B737, and ICAO time parameters had been met such that they expected the Legacy to now be at that level having followed published RT Failure procedures in an ICAO contracting States airspace ??
Before you start 'banana republic' smears, consider that scenario.
Can you provide a reference document to your RT Failure 'procedures' ?
Assuming Brasil uses the ICAO standard procedure, then you are both simply (and possibly dangerously) wrong with the assertion the pilot should not change level from that last assigned.
From ICAO Annex 2:
3.6.5.2 Communication failure.
If a communication failure precludes compliance with 3.6.5.1, the aircraft shall comply with the voice communication failure procedures of Annex 10,
Volume II, and with such of the following procedures as are appropriate.
The aircraft shall attempt to establish communications with the appropriate air traffic control unit using all other available means. In addition, the aircraft, when forming part of the aerodrome traffic at a controlled aerodrome, shall keep a watch for such instructions as may be issued by visual signals.
3.6.5.2.1 If in visual meteorological conditions, the aircraft shall:
a) continue to fly in visual meteorological conditions; land at the nearest suitable aerodrome; and report its arrival by the most expeditious means to the appropriate air traffic control unit;
b) if considered advisable, complete an IFR flight in accordance with 3.6.5.2.2.
3.6.5.2.2 If in instrument meteorological conditions or when the pilot of an IFR flight considers it inadvisable to complete the flight in accordance with 3.6.5.2.1 a), the aircraft shall:
a) unless otherwise prescribed on the basis of regional air navigation agreement, in airspace where radar is not used in the provision of air traffic control, maintain the last assigned speed and level, or minimum flight altitude
if higher, for a period of 20 minutes following the aircraft’s failure to report its position over a compulsory reporting point and thereafter adjust level and speed in accordance with the filed flight plan;
b) in airspace where radar is used in the provision of air traffic control, maintain the last assigned speed and level, or minimum flight altitude if higher, for a period of 7 minutes following:
1) the time the last assigned level or minimum flight altitude is reached; or
2) the time the transponder is set to Code 7600; or
3) the aircraft’s failure to report its position over a compulsory reporting point;
whichever is later, and thereafter adjust level and speed in accordance with the filed flight plan;
c) when being radar vectored or having been directed by ATC to proceed offset using RNAV without a specified limit, rejoin the current flight plan route no later than the next significant point, taking into consideration the
applicable minimum flight altitude.
If a communication failure precludes compliance with 3.6.5.1, the aircraft shall comply with the voice communication failure procedures of Annex 10,
Volume II, and with such of the following procedures as are appropriate.
The aircraft shall attempt to establish communications with the appropriate air traffic control unit using all other available means. In addition, the aircraft, when forming part of the aerodrome traffic at a controlled aerodrome, shall keep a watch for such instructions as may be issued by visual signals.
3.6.5.2.1 If in visual meteorological conditions, the aircraft shall:
a) continue to fly in visual meteorological conditions; land at the nearest suitable aerodrome; and report its arrival by the most expeditious means to the appropriate air traffic control unit;
b) if considered advisable, complete an IFR flight in accordance with 3.6.5.2.2.
3.6.5.2.2 If in instrument meteorological conditions or when the pilot of an IFR flight considers it inadvisable to complete the flight in accordance with 3.6.5.2.1 a), the aircraft shall:
a) unless otherwise prescribed on the basis of regional air navigation agreement, in airspace where radar is not used in the provision of air traffic control, maintain the last assigned speed and level, or minimum flight altitude
if higher, for a period of 20 minutes following the aircraft’s failure to report its position over a compulsory reporting point and thereafter adjust level and speed in accordance with the filed flight plan;
b) in airspace where radar is used in the provision of air traffic control, maintain the last assigned speed and level, or minimum flight altitude if higher, for a period of 7 minutes following:
1) the time the last assigned level or minimum flight altitude is reached; or
2) the time the transponder is set to Code 7600; or
3) the aircraft’s failure to report its position over a compulsory reporting point;
whichever is later, and thereafter adjust level and speed in accordance with the filed flight plan;
c) when being radar vectored or having been directed by ATC to proceed offset using RNAV without a specified limit, rejoin the current flight plan route no later than the next significant point, taking into consideration the
applicable minimum flight altitude.
What was the aircraft's filed level (in other words, was it already at FPL level or was a change required to comply with the ICAO procedures) ?
and if a level change was required;
How many minutes was it between the collision taking place and the later of the the conditions specified in 3.6.5.2.2 Para b) ?
Hokie Nation
You are right about the lack of a transponder removing the RVSM capability, and the need for 2000' separation to be applied. Forcing the aircraft to leave RVSM airspace would of course be the preferred course of action, but then no one was in contact with the aircraft (for whatever reason). Perhaps the investigation will reveal that the Brasilian ATC guys were basing the separation on the Legacy filing a FPL level at least 2000' away from that of the B737, and ICAO time parameters had been met such that they expected the Legacy to now be at that level having followed published RT Failure procedures in an ICAO contracting States airspace ??
Before you start 'banana republic' smears, consider that scenario.
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so much being said about this
does anyone know the wx conditions at the time of the crash...complete loss of comm does, as stated above, require a plane to maintain VMC, land as soon as practicable.
I imagine brazillia has a nice airport and if LEGACY WAS truly out of touch for an hour, it might have been an option.
as far as expected altitudes, until we actually have a copy of the clearance we simply don't know if the legacy was told to expect a different altitude crossing a certain fix...HOWEVER if this was part of the clearance it factors into the equation. It will also be of interest whether the LEGACy crew questioned the wrong altitude for direction of flight.
does anyone know the wx conditions at the time of the crash...complete loss of comm does, as stated above, require a plane to maintain VMC, land as soon as practicable.
I imagine brazillia has a nice airport and if LEGACY WAS truly out of touch for an hour, it might have been an option.
as far as expected altitudes, until we actually have a copy of the clearance we simply don't know if the legacy was told to expect a different altitude crossing a certain fix...HOWEVER if this was part of the clearance it factors into the equation. It will also be of interest whether the LEGACy crew questioned the wrong altitude for direction of flight.