Mid-air collision over Brasil
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gol collision
hello 3 miles,
you are spot on.
another reflexion i never thought about until now & i think neither did the designer of the winglets(dr withcomb): if the collision scenario was as the embraerfolks reproduced in their animation : then those fancy wingletdesigns on all those beautiful new aeroplanes, apart from their aerodynamic benefits, are also so many new potential jigsaw hazards in case of collision scenario's. add to that, as mention in many other posts, the new diabolic precision of GPS & voilà, the stage for disaster is 2 steps closer.
you are spot on.
another reflexion i never thought about until now & i think neither did the designer of the winglets(dr withcomb): if the collision scenario was as the embraerfolks reproduced in their animation : then those fancy wingletdesigns on all those beautiful new aeroplanes, apart from their aerodynamic benefits, are also so many new potential jigsaw hazards in case of collision scenario's. add to that, as mention in many other posts, the new diabolic precision of GPS & voilà, the stage for disaster is 2 steps closer.
Last edited by blackmail; 7th Oct 2006 at 11:15.
I'm in one of those moods
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The radar recordings shows the Legacy as a primary target as "floating" from 35500 to 36500 feet? (According to reports from the local press quoting officials)
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.. does the DFDR on the Embraer record TXPDR/TCAS setting/serviceability??
…. repeatedly told investigators they never turned off the device that transmits a plane's location and believed that it was working just before the collision, said Denise Niederauer, a spokeswoman for the Mato Grosso do Sul State Public Safety Department.
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.. the Comm's/Electrical issue is intriguing ...
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.. how much stored data (time) is on the CVR??
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.. truly amazing that a brand new aeroplane can have apparently no problems .. then ... coincidental Comm and TXPDR/TCAS faults that both correct immediately after a bump!
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.. I am still not clear on wether that report of the ATC calls were found on the Embraer recorders or just the ATC tapes??
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.. did the Embraer pilots make any attempt to contact ATC during that hour (CVR)?? an hour that included a turn on to a new airway that included a flight plan descent requirement??
Brazil's air force said it investigated air traffic controllers' procedures on the day of the crash and found no irregularities.
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.... was the descent instruction read back before TXPDR and Comm loss??
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.. does anyone know for sure that the Embraer pilots had not reported at FL360???
Authorities said, however, that there was not enough evidence to accuse anybody.
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"We don't have elements to talk about that," Federal Police Investigator Renato Sayao told the official government news service Agencia Brasil
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"We don't have elements to talk about that," Federal Police Investigator Renato Sayao told the official government news service Agencia Brasil
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can someone explain to me how modern Primary (skin return only) Radar can calculate altitude?!? … I have never seen nor heard of it in a civil sense
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clearing all traffic from, at least a 1,000 ft above his last know height and a 1,000 feet below approaching flight plan level, upon reflection, would have been a good idea ....
..... and send up a couple of 'fast jets' to locate and guide him to the nearest field (bearing in mind the 1 hour loss of contact) ..... I would have thought the Mil guys would have jumped at the opportunity ....
..... and send up a couple of 'fast jets' to locate and guide him to the nearest field (bearing in mind the 1 hour loss of contact) ..... I would have thought the Mil guys would have jumped at the opportunity ....
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. truly amazing that a brand new aeroplane can have apparently no problems .. then ... coincidental Comm and TXPDR/TCAS faults that both correct immediately after a bump!
Many electrical faults can be cleared (albeit sometimes only temporarily) by a "shock".
(In the computer and control systems worlds) a sharp tap on the top of a circuit board to "reseat it" can do it, or plugging and unplugging a connector. All it takes is a bit of muck, corrosion (not on a new machine admittedly) or dust/grit, which can be shifted by a "bump" - or a "calibrated thump".
As was mentioned earlier, "intermitent" electrical faults can be a real bugger to find - they always disappear just when the engineer arrives to fix them.
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FolhaOnline has revealed, in a current news item, that at least one of the ATC's involved in this incident, has been removed from his position and taken for "psychological treatment" .. indicating a possible realisation of his ATC error/s, and an accompanying nervous breakdown.
The item continues that the ATC had 6 years in the job, and was regarded as experienced .. however, the article also goes on, to discuss the work load on the ATC's and the likely possibility of overwork with this particular ATC, with inadequate breaks.
The article states that the ATC's are supposed to work 2 hrs and then have 2 hrs break .. but this rarely happens, due to the work pressure from the Military heirarchy that controls Brazilian airspace (around 2500 civilian and 10,469 military employees) .. the relatively poor pay, and the threat of job loss, if they don't put in more hours than laid down.
Another item on the same site, states that the ATC people, know of a communications 'Black hole' in the region of the Cachimbo Mtn Range, between Manaus and Brasilia .. in precisely the region where the planes collided .. and that .. (quote) "Pilots tell, that there, they count only on the equipment of the airplanes" ..
Of course, the biggest single question is why the Legacy was at FL37, when it should have been at FL36, in line with the odd/even separation of the Nth/Sth air routes. This odd/even separation of FL's has been in place for a couple of years, according to reports, so it's not that unfamiliarity could be brought up as a contributing factor ..
The item continues that the ATC had 6 years in the job, and was regarded as experienced .. however, the article also goes on, to discuss the work load on the ATC's and the likely possibility of overwork with this particular ATC, with inadequate breaks.
The article states that the ATC's are supposed to work 2 hrs and then have 2 hrs break .. but this rarely happens, due to the work pressure from the Military heirarchy that controls Brazilian airspace (around 2500 civilian and 10,469 military employees) .. the relatively poor pay, and the threat of job loss, if they don't put in more hours than laid down.
Another item on the same site, states that the ATC people, know of a communications 'Black hole' in the region of the Cachimbo Mtn Range, between Manaus and Brasilia .. in precisely the region where the planes collided .. and that .. (quote) "Pilots tell, that there, they count only on the equipment of the airplanes" ..
Of course, the biggest single question is why the Legacy was at FL37, when it should have been at FL36, in line with the odd/even separation of the Nth/Sth air routes. This odd/even separation of FL's has been in place for a couple of years, according to reports, so it's not that unfamiliarity could be brought up as a contributing factor ..
I'm in one of those moods
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threemiles .... are you saying (with certainty) that ATC in this area can use slant range primary radar??? ... some one correct me if I am wrong …. it is useless and impossible to calculate from a single Primary head source… to have even a remotely accurate guesstimate of alt based on slant range you have to have a mosaic (from multiple primary head positions) from which to calculate slant angle and therefore estimate alt?
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The other thing that seems odd to me is the seemingly (implied) cool collected demeanour of the Embraer crew during Mr Starkey’s visit to the flight deck minutes before the collision … an hour out of comm’s … TXPDR and TCAS U/S …. Flying at a non standard level … Yet no ‘apparent’ problems up front ….. in a multi-million dollar Jet??? …. are we seriously suggesting that these failures could occur without the crew knowing something was amiss?? .. if so, Embraer, the avionics and systems folks need to have a serious rethink about crew alerting and fail safe modes in their aircraft systems!
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… how many other Embraer 135 aircraft have suffered these single or multiple failure modes?? … how many comms are in those machines?? .. how many Microphones sources??
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Comon folks this is getting ridiculous!
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.. and lets be fair to ATC, those 7 calls may have happened in quick succession close to or after the turning point ….. the sector boundaries (from what I could glean from the H4) is just before the airway junction prior to the collision point ..that is at best 125nmish’ to run (more like 100nm or less based on collision point and then flight to the mil base) nose to nose … at 850+kts closing … in all probability less than 10 minutes …. Comm. checks, coordination blah blah, all the while thinking that the aircraft had vert sep …. then whamo …
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….. like they said early on in the piece …. INEXPLICABLE!
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… it is possible that the frequency transfer point is relevant!!
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.. regarding the ATC/s and surviving pilots .... christ, imagine the stress, the self doubt, the 'what if I had done X or Y' syndrome ..
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.... bloody hell, anyone in that situation would 'pack-up' ... I sure as **** would, even if I had done everything within my power to avoid the accident!
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... what seems reasonable, even normal before such events never is after the fact ... makes me sick in the guts just thinking about it!!!!
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... support them well ... they will never get over this!!
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The other thing that seems odd to me is the seemingly (implied) cool collected demeanour of the Embraer crew during Mr Starkey’s visit to the flight deck minutes before the collision … an hour out of comm’s … TXPDR and TCAS U/S …. Flying at a non standard level … Yet no ‘apparent’ problems up front ….. in a multi-million dollar Jet??? …. are we seriously suggesting that these failures could occur without the crew knowing something was amiss?? .. if so, Embraer, the avionics and systems folks need to have a serious rethink about crew alerting and fail safe modes in their aircraft systems!
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… how many other Embraer 135 aircraft have suffered these single or multiple failure modes?? … how many comms are in those machines?? .. how many Microphones sources??
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Comon folks this is getting ridiculous!
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.. and lets be fair to ATC, those 7 calls may have happened in quick succession close to or after the turning point ….. the sector boundaries (from what I could glean from the H4) is just before the airway junction prior to the collision point ..that is at best 125nmish’ to run (more like 100nm or less based on collision point and then flight to the mil base) nose to nose … at 850+kts closing … in all probability less than 10 minutes …. Comm. checks, coordination blah blah, all the while thinking that the aircraft had vert sep …. then whamo …
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….. like they said early on in the piece …. INEXPLICABLE!
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… it is possible that the frequency transfer point is relevant!!
.
.. regarding the ATC/s and surviving pilots .... christ, imagine the stress, the self doubt, the 'what if I had done X or Y' syndrome ..
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.... bloody hell, anyone in that situation would 'pack-up' ... I sure as **** would, even if I had done everything within my power to avoid the accident!
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... what seems reasonable, even normal before such events never is after the fact ... makes me sick in the guts just thinking about it!!!!
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... support them well ... they will never get over this!!
Last edited by Scurvy.D.Dog; 7th Oct 2006 at 14:25. Reason: addition
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threemiles .... are you saying (with certainty) that ATC in this area can use slant range primary radar??? ...
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One of the hallmarks of safety of all IFR flight is the lost communications procedure ... IF ATC had given an expected clearance to a different altitude as part of the original or any ammendments to the clearance the pilots of LEGACY would be duty bound to follow it.
If while attempting to contact ATC to make sure of the descent and NOT hearing any communication from ATC, the sequence of events should have been standard including
7600 in transponder
and trying multiple methods of communications, including all radios, all mics and as this is a super duper biz jet, any air to ground phone system ( sat phone for example) if installed.
And after all of this, which would have checked transponder, and all audio panels, the pilots should have looked at their TCAS display ( in an effor to check for traffic in descent path), which would also confirm TCAS working)and then descended in accordance with "EXPECTED" altitude clearance. Additionally turning on all exterior lights and being more vigilante for all traffic would be reasonable precautions.
Let me add: if this all happened in VMC (VFR conditions) and the legacy crew had lost all comm, landing at the first suitable airport under VMC is also part of the procedure.
If while attempting to contact ATC to make sure of the descent and NOT hearing any communication from ATC, the sequence of events should have been standard including
7600 in transponder
and trying multiple methods of communications, including all radios, all mics and as this is a super duper biz jet, any air to ground phone system ( sat phone for example) if installed.
And after all of this, which would have checked transponder, and all audio panels, the pilots should have looked at their TCAS display ( in an effor to check for traffic in descent path), which would also confirm TCAS working)and then descended in accordance with "EXPECTED" altitude clearance. Additionally turning on all exterior lights and being more vigilante for all traffic would be reasonable precautions.
Let me add: if this all happened in VMC (VFR conditions) and the legacy crew had lost all comm, landing at the first suitable airport under VMC is also part of the procedure.
Last edited by jondc9; 7th Oct 2006 at 22:04.
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Has anyone heard if there was usable data from the Legacy CVR?
My assumption is that is has a digital CVR, and that after 30-120 minutes,, depending on model, all data is lost (with the old loop tape recorders, enhancement could sometimes get the taped over portion - not so with digital units).
If the CB was not pulled shortly after touchdown and the aircraft was powered, the CVR would continue to operate, using up the memory also.
My assumption is that is has a digital CVR, and that after 30-120 minutes,, depending on model, all data is lost (with the old loop tape recorders, enhancement could sometimes get the taped over portion - not so with digital units).
If the CB was not pulled shortly after touchdown and the aircraft was powered, the CVR would continue to operate, using up the memory also.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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Regarding the serviceability/usability of the Legacy's CVR:
From post #348
"O Globo is the major newspaper in Rio de Janeiro state and one of the most influential in the country. It is part of a media conglomerate by the same name.
The article says the investigators´ team has crossed the data between Cindacta 1 (Brasilia) and the Legacy´s black box. According to the newspaper the flight controllers made seven attempts to contact the Legacy and those attempts were recorded by the box."
ASSUMING this paper's report is accurate, there is the answer to that.
Has anyone heard if there was usable data from the Legacy CVR? My assumption is that is has a digital CVR, and that after 30-120 minutes,, depending on model, all data is lost (with the old loop tape recorders, enhancement could sometimes get the taped over portion - not so with digital units). If the CB was not pulled shortly after touchdown and the aircraft was powered, the CVR would continue to operate, using up the memory also.
"O Globo is the major newspaper in Rio de Janeiro state and one of the most influential in the country. It is part of a media conglomerate by the same name.
The article says the investigators´ team has crossed the data between Cindacta 1 (Brasilia) and the Legacy´s black box. According to the newspaper the flight controllers made seven attempts to contact the Legacy and those attempts were recorded by the box."
ASSUMING this paper's report is accurate, there is the answer to that.
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There will be witness marks on the 737 wreck which should indicate the nature and severity of the damage.
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gol collision
maybe the comm/transponder off, was just "fingertrouble". with these push/flip-flop button cockpits, it is easy to dial in a frequency(in the sby window) & then forget to push the "activate" button. i understand one of the crew had only 5 hours on type? so it could very well be they were not aware
there was a comm/tpd problem. audioboxes can have the volume knob closed, so radio = ok, but no audio. by changing freq. again, tpd unintentionnally switched to sby etc... . when you are new/unfamiliar with a full glasscockpit, initially the information is so overwhelming, you are just saturated & don't see anything, then with experience things become more clear & meaningfull. it's like adapting to nightvision, in the beginning you see nothing & then your eyes adapt & you start seeing more & more details.
there was a comm/tpd problem. audioboxes can have the volume knob closed, so radio = ok, but no audio. by changing freq. again, tpd unintentionnally switched to sby etc... . when you are new/unfamiliar with a full glasscockpit, initially the information is so overwhelming, you are just saturated & don't see anything, then with experience things become more clear & meaningfull. it's like adapting to nightvision, in the beginning you see nothing & then your eyes adapt & you start seeing more & more details.
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maybe the comm/transponder off, was just "fingertrouble". with these push/flip-flop button cockpits, it is easy to dial in a frequency(in the sby window) & then forget to push the "activate" button. i understand one of the crew had only 5 hours on type? so it could very well be they were not aware
there was a comm/tpd problem. audioboxes can have the volume knob closed, so radio = ok, but no audio. by changing freq. again, tpd unintentionnally switched to sby etc... . when you are new/unfamiliar with a full glasscockpit, initially the information is so overwhelming, you are just saturated & don't see anything, then with experience things become more clear & meaningfull. it's like adapting to nightvision, in the beginning you see nothing & then your eyes adapt & you start seeing more & more details.
there was a comm/tpd problem. audioboxes can have the volume knob closed, so radio = ok, but no audio. by changing freq. again, tpd unintentionnally switched to sby etc... . when you are new/unfamiliar with a full glasscockpit, initially the information is so overwhelming, you are just saturated & don't see anything, then with experience things become more clear & meaningfull. it's like adapting to nightvision, in the beginning you see nothing & then your eyes adapt & you start seeing more & more details.
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Question
Can the CVR and the FDR be accessed from an aircraft which landed safely
after a midair incident, ie the legacy? If so surely the investigators will be able to establish the flight path, transponder settings, manoeuvres, etc of the surviving aircraft involved?
Or does the the aircraft have to crash before the removal of the FDR?
after a midair incident, ie the legacy? If so surely the investigators will be able to establish the flight path, transponder settings, manoeuvres, etc of the surviving aircraft involved?
Or does the the aircraft have to crash before the removal of the FDR?
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Response to nooluv
Nooluv,
Can the CVR and the FDR be accessed from an aircraft which landed safely after a midair incident, i.e. the legacy?
Yes, designed for easy removal and replacement (typically for maintenance purposes).
If so surely the investigators will be able to establish the flight path, transponder settings, maneuvers, etc of the surviving aircraft involved?
Read through the thread. I believe that you will see that it is already in process. See Cesar's post # 348.
Or does the aircraft have to crash before the removal of the FDR?
That would probably be the worst case scenario.
Can the CVR and the FDR be accessed from an aircraft which landed safely after a midair incident, i.e. the legacy?
Yes, designed for easy removal and replacement (typically for maintenance purposes).
If so surely the investigators will be able to establish the flight path, transponder settings, maneuvers, etc of the surviving aircraft involved?
Read through the thread. I believe that you will see that it is already in process. See Cesar's post # 348.
Or does the aircraft have to crash before the removal of the FDR?
That would probably be the worst case scenario.
There is no indication yet that this was a factor here. Just informed speculation on his part. In fact, there is really very little reliable information on which to base any conclusions at this early date. If anything useful is gained from such speculation, then IMHO, it is probably the questions which are generated by the discussion.
Best regards,
Westhawk
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Just for curiosity there is an AD issued by the FAA in August to be effective on October on the transponder that ALSO equipped the Legacy.
The problem? It can go to STBY mode without the crew knowing.
The problem? It can go to STBY mode without the crew knowing.
Pegase Driver
So is that here on the tape that recorded Brasilia/Manaus ATC intercom?
"Hey, Manaus, this is Brasilia, we've got Legacy N600XL here at 370 or 360, maybe 350 as primary radar only, also lost vhf comm. Presently xxx NM northwest BRS on UZ6 centerline inbound NABOL. If there is opposite traffic advise we better need lateral separation and it should stay at least 10 NM right of track. OK?"
"Brasilia from Manaus, thanks, we have GOL1907 at 370, NABOL at xxx, BRS at xxx, will advise to fly right of track."
I doubt. But exactly this would have been ATC's duty.
Whatever the reason for comm and xpdr failure was (actually it is fully irrelevant) ATC was not doing its duty when this sequence is not found on the tape.
I wonder when the first ATC controller will be suspended and held in custody.
"Hey, Manaus, this is Brasilia, we've got Legacy N600XL here at 370 or 360, maybe 350 as primary radar only, also lost vhf comm. Presently xxx NM northwest BRS on UZ6 centerline inbound NABOL. If there is opposite traffic advise we better need lateral separation and it should stay at least 10 NM right of track. OK?"
"Brasilia from Manaus, thanks, we have GOL1907 at 370, NABOL at xxx, BRS at xxx, will advise to fly right of track."
I doubt. But exactly this would have been ATC's duty.
Whatever the reason for comm and xpdr failure was (actually it is fully irrelevant) ATC was not doing its duty when this sequence is not found on the tape.
I wonder when the first ATC controller will be suspended and held in custody.
What do you know more than we do ? Before blaming individuals and wishing them in jail ( being the Legacy pilots or now the controller ) wait a bit for the CVR/FDR and ATC tapes transcripts .The lawers are going to have a ball with this anyway.
In any case Aviation professionals are not interesting in blaming individuals, we like to know what happenned to prevent it from hapenning again, not to fall in the same trap.
If ATC malfunctionned we will know it pretty soon, as both R/T and telephone interactions between the Manaus and Brasilia ACCs are recorded together with a time stamp.
I would bet this case is a combination of many factors, but then it always is, isn't it ?
Be nice to those involved, it could be you next time.
