Astra Driver and
Hokie Nation
Can you provide a reference document to your RT Failure 'procedures' ?
Assuming Brasil uses the ICAO standard procedure, then you are both simply (and possibly dangerously) wrong with the assertion the pilot should not change level from that last assigned.
From ICAO Annex 2:
3.6.5.2 Communication failure.
If a communication failure precludes compliance with 3.6.5.1, the aircraft shall comply with the voice communication failure procedures of Annex 10,
Volume II, and with such of the following procedures as are appropriate.
The aircraft shall attempt to establish communications with the appropriate air traffic control unit using all other available means. In addition, the aircraft, when forming part of the aerodrome traffic at a controlled aerodrome, shall keep a watch for such instructions as may be issued by visual signals.
3.6.5.2.1 If in visual meteorological conditions, the aircraft shall:
a) continue to fly in visual meteorological conditions; land at the nearest suitable aerodrome; and report its arrival by the most expeditious means to the appropriate air traffic control unit;
b) if considered advisable, complete an IFR flight in accordance with 3.6.5.2.2.
3.6.5.2.2 If in instrument meteorological conditions or when the pilot of an IFR flight considers it inadvisable to complete the flight in accordance with 3.6.5.2.1 a), the aircraft shall:
a) unless otherwise prescribed on the basis of regional air navigation agreement, in airspace where radar is not used in the provision of air traffic control, maintain the last assigned speed and level, or minimum flight altitude
if higher, for a period of 20 minutes following the aircraft’s failure to report its position over a compulsory reporting point and thereafter adjust level and speed in accordance with the filed flight plan;
b) in airspace where radar is used in the provision of air traffic control, maintain the last assigned speed and level, or minimum flight altitude if higher, for a period of 7 minutes following:
1) the time the last assigned level or minimum flight altitude is reached; or
2) the time the transponder is set to Code 7600; or
3) the aircraft’s failure to report its position over a compulsory reporting point;
whichever is later, and thereafter adjust level and speed in accordance with the filed flight plan;
c) when being radar vectored or having been directed by ATC to proceed offset using RNAV without a specified limit, rejoin the current flight plan route no later than the next significant point, taking into consideration the
applicable minimum flight altitude.
The questions this then would raise for any investigator would be;
What was the aircraft's filed level (in other words, was it already at FPL level or was a change required to comply with the ICAO procedures) ?
and if a level change was required;
How many minutes was it between the collision taking place and the later of the the conditions specified in 3.6.5.2.2 Para b) ?
Hokie Nation
You are right about the lack of a transponder removing the RVSM capability, and the need for 2000' separation to be applied. Forcing the aircraft to leave RVSM airspace would of course be the preferred course of action, but then no one was in contact with the aircraft (for whatever reason). Perhaps the investigation will reveal that the Brasilian ATC guys were basing the separation on the Legacy filing a FPL level at least 2000' away from that of the B737, and ICAO time parameters had been met such that they expected the Legacy to now be at that level having followed published RT Failure procedures in an ICAO contracting States airspace ??
Before you start 'banana republic' smears, consider that scenario.