Mid-air collision over Brasil
Best regards,
Westhawk
PS
Just read Blackmail's post and wonder if the lost comm situation demanded the actions stated in his post. Intersting...
Last edited by westhawk; 6th Oct 2006 at 20:00. Reason: Additional comment after reading blackmail's post.
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Two points.
First,an attempt to answer
Think of the damage a piece of ultra lightweight foam insulation is capable of inflicting on the extra hard surface of a tile on the space shuttle. It's the "V squared" part of the "1/2MVsquared" equation that causes that.
If the winglet hit something aerodynamicaly critical on the 737, like a main spar, the "1/2MV squared" calculated around a "V" of approximately M1.5 to 1.6 (~850 knots?) wouldn't require a much of an "M" to result in an horrendous, destructive impact, certainly enough to cause massive damage to the other aircraft if it hit something critical.
The Legacy crew and pax were incredibly lucky that the parts of their aircraft that made contact were lightweight and frangible.
Second: offset tracking is allowed only in certain areas, namely NATS airspace (the oceanic part of a trans Atlantic route) and some remote airspace with less than RNP5 navigation accuracy requirments (In RNP5 airspace, it is strictly forbidden.)
However, in my experience, from observation, only an extremely small percentage of pilots bother to make use of it, while quite a few ATC people seem to think it is an insult to their professionalism.
First,an attempt to answer
kind of hard to imagine that winglet inflicting enough damage to render the aircraft unflyable.
If the winglet hit something aerodynamicaly critical on the 737, like a main spar, the "1/2MV squared" calculated around a "V" of approximately M1.5 to 1.6 (~850 knots?) wouldn't require a much of an "M" to result in an horrendous, destructive impact, certainly enough to cause massive damage to the other aircraft if it hit something critical.
The Legacy crew and pax were incredibly lucky that the parts of their aircraft that made contact were lightweight and frangible.
Second: offset tracking is allowed only in certain areas, namely NATS airspace (the oceanic part of a trans Atlantic route) and some remote airspace with less than RNP5 navigation accuracy requirments (In RNP5 airspace, it is strictly forbidden.)
However, in my experience, from observation, only an extremely small percentage of pilots bother to make use of it, while quite a few ATC people seem to think it is an insult to their professionalism.
Last edited by Wiley; 7th Oct 2006 at 19:05. Reason: Thanks to John for the formula correction
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gol collision
hello westhawk,
yes, sir. i looked up the procedure for lost comm's from the jeppesen emergency section, radiocomm failure & it clearly says amongst other things:sq 7600 & after 7 mins adjust(in this case descent to) flightlevel & route to FILED flightplan.
but i still think the legacy crew didn't realize they were in such a dire situation, that is before the collision of course. couple that with flimsy atc not knowing/realising what to do for one hour, a blackbox(transponder) that decides to quit at the wrong moment, so no tcas warning & disaster was set.
this is one of the situation i fear the most: you fly happily around, no shatter on the freq. see the testimony of the journo on board, visiting the flightdeck & one of the pilots commenting:"the thing flies beautyfully", while infact a terrible emergency & diabolic chain of events is building up against you & you don't see it & also you don't hear it(sometimes we say: your ears are your eyes), in short: SA(situational awareness).
as for the gol crew, i don't know if they heard the several(7) attempts of atc to contact the legacy, because , if they did, that should have alerted them too. but here maybe blackholes &/or different freq. were involved. anyway, here again murphy had its tragic day.
yes, sir. i looked up the procedure for lost comm's from the jeppesen emergency section, radiocomm failure & it clearly says amongst other things:sq 7600 & after 7 mins adjust(in this case descent to) flightlevel & route to FILED flightplan.
but i still think the legacy crew didn't realize they were in such a dire situation, that is before the collision of course. couple that with flimsy atc not knowing/realising what to do for one hour, a blackbox(transponder) that decides to quit at the wrong moment, so no tcas warning & disaster was set.
this is one of the situation i fear the most: you fly happily around, no shatter on the freq. see the testimony of the journo on board, visiting the flightdeck & one of the pilots commenting:"the thing flies beautyfully", while infact a terrible emergency & diabolic chain of events is building up against you & you don't see it & also you don't hear it(sometimes we say: your ears are your eyes), in short: SA(situational awareness).
as for the gol crew, i don't know if they heard the several(7) attempts of atc to contact the legacy, because , if they did, that should have alerted them too. but here maybe blackholes &/or different freq. were involved. anyway, here again murphy had its tragic day.
Last edited by blackmail; 6th Oct 2006 at 20:57.
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Might be helpful
ICAO Doc 7030
Supplementary procedures to PANS ATM (Doc 4444) and PANS OPS (Doc 8168)
5.1 As soon as it is known that two-way communication has failed, ATC shall maintain separation between the aircraft having the communication failure and other aircraft based on the assumption that the aircraft will operate in accordance with 5.2 or 5.3. (5.2-VMC, 5.3-IMC)
5.3.1 A controlled IFR flight experiencing communication failure in IMC, or where it does not appear feasible to continue in accordance with 5.2 shall:
a) set transponder to Code 7600;
b) maintain for a period of 7 minutes the last assigned speed and level or the minimum flight altitude, if the minimum flight altitude is higher than the last assigned level.
The period of 7 minutes commences:
1) if operating on a route without compulsory reporting points or if instructions have been received to omit position reports:
i) at the time the last assigned level or minimum flight altitude is reached, or
ii) at the time the transponder is set to Code 7600,
whichever is later; or
2) if operating on a route with compulsory reporting points and no instruction to omit position reports has been received:
i) at the time the last assigned level or minimum flight altitude is reached, or
ii) at the previously reported pilot estimate for the compulsory reporting point, or
iii) at the time of a failed report of position over a compulsory reporting point,
whichever is later;
Note.— The period of 7 minutes is to allow the necessary air traffic control and coordination measures.
c) thereafter, adjust level and speed in accordance with the filed flight plan;
Note.— With regard to changes to levels and speed, the filed flight plan, which is the flight plan as filed with an ATS unit by the pilot or a designated representative without any subsequent changes, will be used.
ICAO Doc 7030
Supplementary procedures to PANS ATM (Doc 4444) and PANS OPS (Doc 8168)
5.1 As soon as it is known that two-way communication has failed, ATC shall maintain separation between the aircraft having the communication failure and other aircraft based on the assumption that the aircraft will operate in accordance with 5.2 or 5.3. (5.2-VMC, 5.3-IMC)
5.3.1 A controlled IFR flight experiencing communication failure in IMC, or where it does not appear feasible to continue in accordance with 5.2 shall:
a) set transponder to Code 7600;
b) maintain for a period of 7 minutes the last assigned speed and level or the minimum flight altitude, if the minimum flight altitude is higher than the last assigned level.
The period of 7 minutes commences:
1) if operating on a route without compulsory reporting points or if instructions have been received to omit position reports:
i) at the time the last assigned level or minimum flight altitude is reached, or
ii) at the time the transponder is set to Code 7600,
whichever is later; or
2) if operating on a route with compulsory reporting points and no instruction to omit position reports has been received:
i) at the time the last assigned level or minimum flight altitude is reached, or
ii) at the previously reported pilot estimate for the compulsory reporting point, or
iii) at the time of a failed report of position over a compulsory reporting point,
whichever is later;
Note.— The period of 7 minutes is to allow the necessary air traffic control and coordination measures.
c) thereafter, adjust level and speed in accordance with the filed flight plan;
Note.— With regard to changes to levels and speed, the filed flight plan, which is the flight plan as filed with an ATS unit by the pilot or a designated representative without any subsequent changes, will be used.
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gol collision
hello jovica,
exactly. the legacy crew did not comply with above procedure, because they were not aware they were in that dreadfull commfail situation.
on the otherhand, atc was fully aware of the problem & called the legacy 7 times, but failed to act for about one full hour & then to read in the newspapers, amongst other crap, something like :" airforce officials stated that they found no irregularities with atc procedures, there are no blackholes etc".while all the locals testify the contrary, leaves me & probably others, speechless!
exactly. the legacy crew did not comply with above procedure, because they were not aware they were in that dreadfull commfail situation.
on the otherhand, atc was fully aware of the problem & called the legacy 7 times, but failed to act for about one full hour & then to read in the newspapers, amongst other crap, something like :" airforce officials stated that they found no irregularities with atc procedures, there are no blackholes etc".while all the locals testify the contrary, leaves me & probably others, speechless!
Wing structural characteristics - question
Aircraft wing leading edges are built to withstand impact by birds and hailstones, the speed at which those objects impact being approximately that of the aircraft's speed at the the time.
I think I'm right in saying that when the aircraft has leading edge slats, they are not loadbearing themselves. Same going for flaps, ailerons and other movable parts.
All the wingloading, presumably, is then borne by the main spar and the surrounding fixed structure. I'm not sure if the "wing box" includes the skin; perhaps someone can clarify this. I would imagine the wing skin contributes quite a lot to the wing's loadbearing characteristics.
If so, having watched the graphic linked to by ATC Watcher in post #360 and harking back to ProfitMax's post (#141) with a schematic of the two aircraft, I wonder what the effect of slicing open the stressed lower skin of a highly loaded aircraft wing would be. Would the wing spar alone bear the strain? Is it imaginable that it would have been designed to do so?
The graphic in ATC Watcher's link suggests it might not, and that the Legacy's winglet struck the 738's wing about 2/3rds from the root; the 738 wing then failing and taking the left elevator with it.
There's been a lot of speculation about the Legacy's winglet striking "vital" components such as hydraulic lines or cabling. Have we ignored one just as vital?
I think I'm right in saying that when the aircraft has leading edge slats, they are not loadbearing themselves. Same going for flaps, ailerons and other movable parts.
All the wingloading, presumably, is then borne by the main spar and the surrounding fixed structure. I'm not sure if the "wing box" includes the skin; perhaps someone can clarify this. I would imagine the wing skin contributes quite a lot to the wing's loadbearing characteristics.
If so, having watched the graphic linked to by ATC Watcher in post #360 and harking back to ProfitMax's post (#141) with a schematic of the two aircraft, I wonder what the effect of slicing open the stressed lower skin of a highly loaded aircraft wing would be. Would the wing spar alone bear the strain? Is it imaginable that it would have been designed to do so?
The graphic in ATC Watcher's link suggests it might not, and that the Legacy's winglet struck the 738's wing about 2/3rds from the root; the 738 wing then failing and taking the left elevator with it.
There's been a lot of speculation about the Legacy's winglet striking "vital" components such as hydraulic lines or cabling. Have we ignored one just as vital?
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earlier on I posted the concept of "EXPECTED ALTITUDE"...does anyone know what the actual clearance for legacy was?
had the pilots read back; maintain FL370, expect FL360 crossing Brazillia or something like that?
to the structural discussion, I can imagine what you say, slice the leading edge devices, they get ripped apart by aero loads and start a chain of events leading to disaster.
I can only imagine that the 737 was not on same frequency as legacy for ATC calls.
I can imagine the legacy crew might have not flipped the right audio selector, or turned down the ATC volume while chatting up the reporter.
j
had the pilots read back; maintain FL370, expect FL360 crossing Brazillia or something like that?
to the structural discussion, I can imagine what you say, slice the leading edge devices, they get ripped apart by aero loads and start a chain of events leading to disaster.
I can only imagine that the 737 was not on same frequency as legacy for ATC calls.
I can imagine the legacy crew might have not flipped the right audio selector, or turned down the ATC volume while chatting up the reporter.
j
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blackmail,
I can't agree more. Unfortunately, in my opinion, the blame game have started, so you cannot expect nothing better then that. Anyway, I don't know what could be more clear than: Note.— The period of 7 minutes is to allow the necessary air traffic control and coordination measures.
As an ATCO, I had such a situations so many times, that is almost imposible to except given statement, even in the blame game context. However, I can't judge 'cause I wasn't there and I don't know what was happening in the center, at the sector, at the time.
I can't agree more. Unfortunately, in my opinion, the blame game have started, so you cannot expect nothing better then that. Anyway, I don't know what could be more clear than: Note.— The period of 7 minutes is to allow the necessary air traffic control and coordination measures.
As an ATCO, I had such a situations so many times, that is almost imposible to except given statement, even in the blame game context. However, I can't judge 'cause I wasn't there and I don't know what was happening in the center, at the sector, at the time.
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...
All the wingloading, presumably, is then borne by the main spar and the surrounding fixed structure. I'm not sure if the "wing box" includes the skin; perhaps someone can clarify this. I would imagine the wing skin contributes quite a lot to the wing's loadbearing characteristics...
All the wingloading, presumably, is then borne by the main spar and the surrounding fixed structure. I'm not sure if the "wing box" includes the skin; perhaps someone can clarify this. I would imagine the wing skin contributes quite a lot to the wing's loadbearing characteristics...
If the 737 lower skin were substantially damaged by the Embraer winglet, I'd expect it to fail sooner or later. If there were no distress call from the Gol 737, IMHO it failed immediately. (OPINION ONLY!)
Last edited by barit1; 7th Oct 2006 at 00:31.
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One of the latest, and less-speculative press reports from Newsday, via AP ..
At this point, Brazilian ATC is not looking too good .. attempts to contact the Legacy 7 times .. without result .. failure to note a non-operational transponder .. and failure to warn the GOL pilots of an aircraft heading on a possible collision course with them, with a non-operational transponder .. look very much like poor quality ATC to me ..
Top that, with a collision point, where ATC control transferred to a different region .. and the circumstances that led to the collision seem to be coming together rapidly ..
The only other major area of investigation that is critical, is whether the Legacy pilots followed correct procedures, or whether they realised that crucial communications were being missed. It certainly appears that that 7 minutes loss-of-communications allowance, is going to be a crucial factor in the collision causes.
At this point, Brazilian ATC is not looking too good .. attempts to contact the Legacy 7 times .. without result .. failure to note a non-operational transponder .. and failure to warn the GOL pilots of an aircraft heading on a possible collision course with them, with a non-operational transponder .. look very much like poor quality ATC to me ..
Top that, with a collision point, where ATC control transferred to a different region .. and the circumstances that led to the collision seem to be coming together rapidly ..
The only other major area of investigation that is critical, is whether the Legacy pilots followed correct procedures, or whether they realised that crucial communications were being missed. It certainly appears that that 7 minutes loss-of-communications allowance, is going to be a crucial factor in the collision causes.
Communication failures a possible factor in crash
BY BILL BLEYER
Newsday Staff Writers
October 6, 2006, 9:01 PM EDT
The preliminary investigation into the cause of a deadly midair collision over the Amazon jungle eight days ago could be completed next week, Brazilian authorities said Friday.
Federal police investigator Renato Sayao said Friday he was heading to Brasilia, the capital, to interview air traffic controllers to wrap up the initial phase of the probe.
The announcement came as Brazilian media reported new details of communications and electronics problems that seem to have played a factor in the crash that killed 154.
On Thursday, attorney Jose Carlos Dias -- a former Brazilian national justice minister hired to represent the ExcelAire of Ronkonkoma and its two Long Island pilots who were flying the executive jet that who survived the collision -- broke the silence maintained by the company and its pilots about specifics of the collision.
Dias responded to Brazilian officials who contended that Joseph Lepore, 42, of Bay Shore, and Jan Paladino, 34, of Westhampton Beach, had turned off the transponder that gave the position of their Embraer Legacy 600 jet, possibly to try stunt maneuvers with the plane on its maiden flight. Dias told Globo TV, "They had no reason to do that." He called the allegation "nonsense."
Brazilian officials previously have said the pilots had told investigators that they had not disabled the system and it was working before impact.
Dias elaborated in a story in the O Globo newspaper, saying the pilots had already flown the same kind of airplane in the United States. "It is inconceivable that they would behave so mischievously in the air. ... This doesn't match their character, because they are very serious and competent."
A judge earlier this week ordered the pilots to turn over their passports while authorities investigate whether they flew at the wrong altitude, causing the collision with Gol Airlines Flight 1907 at 37,000 feet. Officials said the Legacy plane should have been at 36,000. Everyone on Flight 1907 died and all seven people on the Legacy were uninjured.
Dias addressed that issue as well. "The altitude question is controversial," he said. "They [the pilots] said that they were on the correct flight-plan altitude."
The lawyer was quoted by the O Estado de Sao Paulo newspaper as saying, "They were following the flight plan strictly. When approaching Brasilia, they contacted the control tower, to make sure that they should lower their altitude, but they couldn't communicate. But I don't want to attribute responsibility to anybody." He didn't elaborate on whether they changed altitude anyway.
O Globo reported that Lt. Brigadier General Paulo Roberto Cardoso Vilarinho, director of the air traffic control system, said that investigators had stated that controllers in Brasilia tried to contact the Legacy seven times in more than one hour and only made contact after the impact. He added that shortly after the executive jet passed Brasilia, controllers noticed the transponder on the jet was not operating, and it began to operate again after the collision.
Vilarinho stated that the Brazilian airliner was never notified that the smaller plane was in the area with a transponder that was not operating but did not explain why. "I don't want to speculate because I don't have the data," he said.
Vilarinho also said tests so far had ruled out any malfunction of Brazil's air traffic control system. He said that after flight controllers lost transponder and radio contact with the Legacy, they were still able to track the plane's course but not its altitude by radar.
Burson-Marsteller, an international public relations firm hired by ExcelAire, said the pilots were staying at an undisclosed location in Rio de Janeiro and would not be publicly commenting on the case.
BY BILL BLEYER
Newsday Staff Writers
October 6, 2006, 9:01 PM EDT
The preliminary investigation into the cause of a deadly midair collision over the Amazon jungle eight days ago could be completed next week, Brazilian authorities said Friday.
Federal police investigator Renato Sayao said Friday he was heading to Brasilia, the capital, to interview air traffic controllers to wrap up the initial phase of the probe.
The announcement came as Brazilian media reported new details of communications and electronics problems that seem to have played a factor in the crash that killed 154.
On Thursday, attorney Jose Carlos Dias -- a former Brazilian national justice minister hired to represent the ExcelAire of Ronkonkoma and its two Long Island pilots who were flying the executive jet that who survived the collision -- broke the silence maintained by the company and its pilots about specifics of the collision.
Dias responded to Brazilian officials who contended that Joseph Lepore, 42, of Bay Shore, and Jan Paladino, 34, of Westhampton Beach, had turned off the transponder that gave the position of their Embraer Legacy 600 jet, possibly to try stunt maneuvers with the plane on its maiden flight. Dias told Globo TV, "They had no reason to do that." He called the allegation "nonsense."
Brazilian officials previously have said the pilots had told investigators that they had not disabled the system and it was working before impact.
Dias elaborated in a story in the O Globo newspaper, saying the pilots had already flown the same kind of airplane in the United States. "It is inconceivable that they would behave so mischievously in the air. ... This doesn't match their character, because they are very serious and competent."
A judge earlier this week ordered the pilots to turn over their passports while authorities investigate whether they flew at the wrong altitude, causing the collision with Gol Airlines Flight 1907 at 37,000 feet. Officials said the Legacy plane should have been at 36,000. Everyone on Flight 1907 died and all seven people on the Legacy were uninjured.
Dias addressed that issue as well. "The altitude question is controversial," he said. "They [the pilots] said that they were on the correct flight-plan altitude."
The lawyer was quoted by the O Estado de Sao Paulo newspaper as saying, "They were following the flight plan strictly. When approaching Brasilia, they contacted the control tower, to make sure that they should lower their altitude, but they couldn't communicate. But I don't want to attribute responsibility to anybody." He didn't elaborate on whether they changed altitude anyway.
O Globo reported that Lt. Brigadier General Paulo Roberto Cardoso Vilarinho, director of the air traffic control system, said that investigators had stated that controllers in Brasilia tried to contact the Legacy seven times in more than one hour and only made contact after the impact. He added that shortly after the executive jet passed Brasilia, controllers noticed the transponder on the jet was not operating, and it began to operate again after the collision.
Vilarinho stated that the Brazilian airliner was never notified that the smaller plane was in the area with a transponder that was not operating but did not explain why. "I don't want to speculate because I don't have the data," he said.
Vilarinho also said tests so far had ruled out any malfunction of Brazil's air traffic control system. He said that after flight controllers lost transponder and radio contact with the Legacy, they were still able to track the plane's course but not its altitude by radar.
Burson-Marsteller, an international public relations firm hired by ExcelAire, said the pilots were staying at an undisclosed location in Rio de Janeiro and would not be publicly commenting on the case.
Last edited by onetrack; 7th Oct 2006 at 03:00. Reason: insert quotes ..
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The Brazilian DAC appears to be a competent body, and their Accident Investigation Commissions are presided over by a top-ranking AF Officer .. and the countrys aviation process appears to be largely tied in with Defence and the Brazilian AF ..
Note, that the Commissions job is purely to ascertain accident causes, and not apportion blame .. that process is handed over to Brazilian Police, if criminal activity is found .. or Administrative sanctions are applied under the Brazilian Aviation Code, (CBAer) if infractions of the BAC are found ..
They release three levels of reporting, in line with global standards ..
1. The Preliminary Report, which only summarises the initial data collected .. and which outlines the factors and lines of enquiry that the main report is to follow ..
2. The Aviation Accident Investigation Report, contains more detailed information, analyses and conclusions, that lead to Flight Safety Recommendations ..
3. The Final Report is THE definitive document, covering every single factor, causes, results, and recommendations resulting from the AA.
The Preliminary Report appears likely to appear in the next week or 10 days .. the AAIR will likely be 6-12 months down the track, and the Final Report could be up to 2 years away ..
http://www.dac.gov.br/segurancaing/seguranca1.asp
Note, that the Commissions job is purely to ascertain accident causes, and not apportion blame .. that process is handed over to Brazilian Police, if criminal activity is found .. or Administrative sanctions are applied under the Brazilian Aviation Code, (CBAer) if infractions of the BAC are found ..
They release three levels of reporting, in line with global standards ..
1. The Preliminary Report, which only summarises the initial data collected .. and which outlines the factors and lines of enquiry that the main report is to follow ..
2. The Aviation Accident Investigation Report, contains more detailed information, analyses and conclusions, that lead to Flight Safety Recommendations ..
3. The Final Report is THE definitive document, covering every single factor, causes, results, and recommendations resulting from the AA.
The Preliminary Report appears likely to appear in the next week or 10 days .. the AAIR will likely be 6-12 months down the track, and the Final Report could be up to 2 years away ..
http://www.dac.gov.br/segurancaing/seguranca1.asp
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The alleged transponder failure would also render the Legacy non RVSM capable, so ATC would need to separate according to non RVSM rules. It would mean 2000 ft separation above FL 290. GOL should have been descended to FL 350 (or even 330 if they thought the Legacy had a comm failure and would go down to FL 360) to acheive this.
It further complicates the picture as we (pilots) have procedures to avoid RVSM airspace when the transponder fails. They are fairly detailed as far as Oceanic airspace is concerned, but in other areas they generally tell you to inform ATC. If not able, follow regional contingency procedures. I have no idea what those are in Brasil.
I still think the Legacy crew was blissfully unaware of any transponder problems, and thought they were flying in a "black hole" as far as communications was concerned. Hence, no need to take any actions.
ATC (if the reports are correct), on the other hand, was aware of this problem for more than 1 hour...
It further complicates the picture as we (pilots) have procedures to avoid RVSM airspace when the transponder fails. They are fairly detailed as far as Oceanic airspace is concerned, but in other areas they generally tell you to inform ATC. If not able, follow regional contingency procedures. I have no idea what those are in Brasil.
I still think the Legacy crew was blissfully unaware of any transponder problems, and thought they were flying in a "black hole" as far as communications was concerned. Hence, no need to take any actions.
ATC (if the reports are correct), on the other hand, was aware of this problem for more than 1 hour...
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Technically, it doesn't matter if it failed or was swithced off, the correct separation should have been provided anyway.
Don't know about the Legacy, but the NG will only give you a local transponder "fail" light, but you do get a "TCAS FAIL" annunciation on your Map Display. I'm sure the Legacy will give you at least that.
Don't know about the Legacy, but the NG will only give you a local transponder "fail" light, but you do get a "TCAS FAIL" annunciation on your Map Display. I'm sure the Legacy will give you at least that.
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An animation video of one of the hypothesis of the collision :
http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/0,,IIF661-5598,00.html
http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/0,,IIF661-5598,00.html
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showpost.php?p=2882996
I still believe that this is the most likely scenario, especially if the Legacy was in level flight as reported by Joe Sharkey. I am not quite sure whether part of the wing of the 737 would have actually been ripped off by the Legacy's winglet, or just been seriously damaged.
Profit Max.
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Dear all,
-Have any of you ever had a communication problem over a most radar controlled area of a place with a dozen different frequencys in a country that has a large number of aircrafts flying at any time, call once and behave as nothing happen for an our or so? (It seems to me that Brazil has the second largest fleet of aircrafts, after US, for a single country)
-Does your airplanes have more than one radio equipment?
Do you know:
-That, as reported by the press there, it is said that the recordings do not have any call from the Legacy over Brasilia, but have the calls from the ATC to it.
-That the Legacy and the B737 were in different sectors so they could not hear the communications made to one another by the ATC?
- The radar recordings shows the Legacy as a primary target as "floating" from 35500 to 36500 feet? (According to reports from the local press quoting officials)
-That when the Transponder of the Legacy diseppeared, the Legacy and the 737 were 300 Km appart.
- That immediately when there was the collision, the Legacy transponder started "miracoulously" working with a 7700 code?
-Have any of you ever had a communication problem over a most radar controlled area of a place with a dozen different frequencys in a country that has a large number of aircrafts flying at any time, call once and behave as nothing happen for an our or so? (It seems to me that Brazil has the second largest fleet of aircrafts, after US, for a single country)
-Does your airplanes have more than one radio equipment?
Do you know:
-That, as reported by the press there, it is said that the recordings do not have any call from the Legacy over Brasilia, but have the calls from the ATC to it.
-That the Legacy and the B737 were in different sectors so they could not hear the communications made to one another by the ATC?
- The radar recordings shows the Legacy as a primary target as "floating" from 35500 to 36500 feet? (According to reports from the local press quoting officials)
-That when the Transponder of the Legacy diseppeared, the Legacy and the 737 were 300 Km appart.
- That immediately when there was the collision, the Legacy transponder started "miracoulously" working with a 7700 code?
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Brazil's air force said it investigated air traffic controllers' procedures on the day of the crash and found no irregularities
"Hey, Manaus, this is Brasilia, we've got Legacy N600XL here at 370 or 360, maybe 350 as primary radar only, also lost vhf comm. Presently xxx NM northwest BRS on UZ6 centerline inbound NABOL. If there is opposite traffic advise we better need lateral separation and it should stay at least 10 NM right of track. OK?"
"Brasilia from Manaus, thanks, we have GOL1907 at 370, NABOL at xxx, BRS at xxx, will advise to fly right of track."
I doubt. But exactly this would have been ATC's duty.
Whatever the reason for comm and xpdr failure was (actually it is fully irrelevant) ATC was not doing its duty when this sequence is not found on the tape.
I wonder when the first ATC controller will be suspended and held in custody.
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