... Air ... Traffic ... Control ..
Maybe I'm missing something here .. but I understood that essentially, ATC's job is to provide guidance to, and separation between aircraft, to prevent collision between them, or terra firma. There has been a MAC, which indicates a failure of ATC. How much simpler do you want it?
The ultimate responsibility relies on the pilot! That Simple.
[The main area under question, of course, is the reason the pilots flew North on the Manaus leg at FL370. They reported that they believed they did this with Cindacta 1 approval.
Thats right , BELIEVED, that seven calls were probably the confirmation of an authorization.
I am neither insensitive, nor hypocritical, nor unfair. The AT Controller has been removed, and I feel for that person. However, the fact that they have been removed surely indicates that overwhelming guilt and the usually resultant depression set in on this person.
That does not indicate anything, investigation pending in certain points, there is an enourmous psicological effect.
That only happens, once someone realises that they have failed in the proper execution of their highly-responsible job, and people have died as a result. It has happened with ATC's before, and no doubt it will happen again. Seems pretty clear-cut to me.
Since people do not realise errors, they can just continue working. Is that correct what you are saying?
Maybe the factor that will never be investigated .. but needs to be .. is the military control of civil airspace in Brazil. As has been noted before, military people are trained to push everything to the limit, and take extreme risks. Civilian trainees, particularly where pax are concerned, are trained, to never take risks. Whether this conflict comes up, in Brazilian ATC, is a point that maybe needs serious examination.
The controler was replaced in the screen after (recorded) 1hour and 59 minutes.
Despite FW190's reassurances .. ATC in Brazil has failed, this time .. in the worst possible way. Careful examination of all features of Brazilian ATC is now warranted to find the weak points.
As is noted in construction and mining industries .. despite extreme safety cultures being instigated .. there is a "risk-taking" mentality, that still exists amongst a small section of employees and managers .. which leads to fatalities. Whether that same mentality exists in Brazilian ATC needs to be examined as part of the accident investigation process.
Yes ATC is being investigated as well., even with the presence of the FAA and the NTSB, someone forgot to mention, you concluded that the seven calls were not enough, that the tapes showing the legacy desapearing as secondary target were deceiving and there was a "blackhole" in the area were the radar traces show everybody else but the N600XL as it should.
Besides:
UNSAFE CONDITION
(d) This AD results from the transponder erroneously going into standby
mode if the flightcrew takes longer than five seconds when using the
rotary knob of the radio management unit to change the air traffic
control code. We are issuing this AD to prevent the transponder of
the COM unit from going into standby mode, which could increase the
workload on the flightcrew and result in improper functioning of the
traffic alert and collision avoidance system.
Was he after 40 minutes or so instructed to change code and he did not do so in 5 s? Was this aircraft equipped with the "rotary knobs" transponder? Is that why the transponder "went" on stby? But, how come, if he was in comms failure, being instructed to do so and stating that he was in that situation only on ground after landing? By chance, they never stated changing any code that we know.