Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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For the record, and particularly for Walter Kennedy , who has persistently raised the subject of the IFF 'squawk' worn by ZD576, I have elicited the following information from an appropriate authority:
1. Aldergrove ATC was not fitted with SSR in June 94 and as such the aircraft would not have been allocated a Mode 3 IFF Squawk.
2. As there was no SSR in place, there is also no way of telling whether he was using a self allocated squawk such as 7000.
We will therefore never know what squawk was in use and, whilst I cannot subscribe to Mr Kennedy's bizarre theory, this simply adds another doubt as to what actually happened.
Responding to other points raised, please remember that just because the crew appear to have been in control of the aircraft at the Waypoint change and to have had some semblance of manoeuvre authority (as opposed to control) at impact, does not mean that there wasn't a period between of 'loss of control'. It is therefore unsafe to make the assumption that, because they did not turn or climb to avoid the Mull, they are guilty of gross negligence "beyond any doubt whatsoever" or, IMHO, "beyond reasonable doubt". Indeed, the more I research this accident, the less I consider their negligence to be even likely.
1. Aldergrove ATC was not fitted with SSR in June 94 and as such the aircraft would not have been allocated a Mode 3 IFF Squawk.
2. As there was no SSR in place, there is also no way of telling whether he was using a self allocated squawk such as 7000.
We will therefore never know what squawk was in use and, whilst I cannot subscribe to Mr Kennedy's bizarre theory, this simply adds another doubt as to what actually happened.
Responding to other points raised, please remember that just because the crew appear to have been in control of the aircraft at the Waypoint change and to have had some semblance of manoeuvre authority (as opposed to control) at impact, does not mean that there wasn't a period between of 'loss of control'. It is therefore unsafe to make the assumption that, because they did not turn or climb to avoid the Mull, they are guilty of gross negligence "beyond any doubt whatsoever" or, IMHO, "beyond reasonable doubt". Indeed, the more I research this accident, the less I consider their negligence to be even likely.
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Tandemrotor,
The Mk 1 and Mk 2 are 'essentially the same' for the purposes of icing clearance - if you know different please enlighten me.
It is a fact that, at the time of the accident, the aircraft had not yet been trialled down to Mk 1 limits. But that does not change my fundamental point - what would you do when faced with the dilema? Fly below SALT in IMC or exceed an icing limit? What does it matter what is on the OAT guage.
If BD pilots refused to fly the aircraft because it was unsafe, with your vast knowlegde of the Chinook, what did they change that allowed them to subsequently conduct the trial - in fact can you tell me what has been changed since then to turn an unsafe aircraft into the one flown today?
By the way, I do know the Mk 2 icing limits, thankyou, and I have flown the Mk 2, just to get the willy waving bit out of the way.
The Mk 1 and Mk 2 are 'essentially the same' for the purposes of icing clearance - if you know different please enlighten me.
It is a fact that, at the time of the accident, the aircraft had not yet been trialled down to Mk 1 limits. But that does not change my fundamental point - what would you do when faced with the dilema? Fly below SALT in IMC or exceed an icing limit? What does it matter what is on the OAT guage.
If BD pilots refused to fly the aircraft because it was unsafe, with your vast knowlegde of the Chinook, what did they change that allowed them to subsequently conduct the trial - in fact can you tell me what has been changed since then to turn an unsafe aircraft into the one flown today?
By the way, I do know the Mk 2 icing limits, thankyou, and I have flown the Mk 2, just to get the willy waving bit out of the way.
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Had a phone call this evening from local Labour Party candidate. After we had discussed the Iraq War, or rather I gave a one way transmission - "i was in the military, I saw the intelligence, I knew what the threat was really...."
"Let's move on" he suggested.
"OK. Where do you stand on the Mull Chinook crash?"
"It's my opinion" he said, "that it was not pilot error that caused the crash".
"Oh rite, so why is the Government still maintaining that it is?"
"I have no idea".
He later revealed as we discussed another topic he worked for Westlands in his day job.
All very interesting.
Journo's free to IM me for further details if you want.
"Let's move on" he suggested.
"OK. Where do you stand on the Mull Chinook crash?"
"It's my opinion" he said, "that it was not pilot error that caused the crash".
"Oh rite, so why is the Government still maintaining that it is?"
"I have no idea".
He later revealed as we discussed another topic he worked for Westlands in his day job.
All very interesting.
Journo's free to IM me for further details if you want.
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BD pilots DID refuse to fly the aircraft because they could not have confidence in the behaviour of the FADEC. As I wrote on this thread earlier, Jon and Rick briefed all FADEC emergencies in the minutes before the flight because they were not confident in FADEC performance. Jon expained the wacky things that had been reported over a coffee. They were not happy flying the Mk 2, that is fact, because they said so to me less than 1 hour before lifting.
I indicated a few post ago that pilots flying the Mk2 from Mount Pleasant, just before the terrible Mull incident, were advised to remain able to land ASAP. I must add that included avoiding any climb to IMC, (which considering the state of knowledge of potential and likely FADEC problems at the time was akin to negligent action.)
Access to the engineering records on that particular Mk2 would show that, post the Mull crash, the airframe was grounded for "vibration problems" for quite a period of time.
Access to the engineering records on that particular Mk2 would show that, post the Mull crash, the airframe was grounded for "vibration problems" for quite a period of time.
Last edited by Bertie Thruster; 28th Apr 2005 at 06:00.
sw
The grounding occured as soon after the Mull crash as a reasonable excuse was found. As it was a vibration (blade) problem, it was possible to keep the fault finding on- going for several weeks.
The grounding occured as soon after the Mull crash as a reasonable excuse was found. As it was a vibration (blade) problem, it was possible to keep the fault finding on- going for several weeks.
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Meadowbank
<<1. Aldergrove ATC was not fitted with SSR in June 94 and as such the aircraft would not have been allocated a Mode 3 IFF Squawk.
2. As there was no SSR in place, there is also no way of telling whether he was using a self allocated squawk such as 7000.
>>
Hopefully then the operator who was interviewed witnessed the radar somewhere else - only time will tell - sorry about the delay.
(Intuitively, it would seem to be unlikely that ZD576 could have been followed up to impact at its level by primary radar from Aldergrove anyway.)
<<1. Aldergrove ATC was not fitted with SSR in June 94 and as such the aircraft would not have been allocated a Mode 3 IFF Squawk.
2. As there was no SSR in place, there is also no way of telling whether he was using a self allocated squawk such as 7000.
>>
Hopefully then the operator who was interviewed witnessed the radar somewhere else - only time will tell - sorry about the delay.
(Intuitively, it would seem to be unlikely that ZD576 could have been followed up to impact at its level by primary radar from Aldergrove anyway.)
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Walter Kennedy
Can't help laughing at this comment. It was me that pointed out the limitations of radar horizon to you!
Can you reference a quote from the "operator who was interviewed" (presumably about Mode 3 squawk)?
Intuitively, it would seem to be unlikely that ZD576 could have been followed up to impact at its level by primary radar from Aldergrove anyway
Can't help laughing at this comment. It was me that pointed out the limitations of radar horizon to you!Can you reference a quote from the "operator who was interviewed" (presumably about Mode 3 squawk)?
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Twinact
When you use the term "essentially the same" to describe the relative icing clearances of the Mk1 and Mk2; could you tell us exactly what you mean by the word "essentially"?
Seems a strange word to use. After all, when the MOD spend very many millions of pounds UPGRADING a current type, shouldn't it be at least AS GOOD AS it's predecessor? Wouldn't it be strange if they ended up with something LESS capable!
Oh but then, for some very considerable time, the Mk2 had a much LOWER MAUM than the Mk1 didn't it.
Why was that?
Do you know?
Perhaps it still does! How strange, all those millions of pounds, and a LESS capable aircraft!
I would like to respond in two ways to your post.
Firstly, you would be partly correct if you were seeking to imply that, the interests of many people here, in the SUBSEQUENT development process of the Mk2, largely ended in the summer of 1994.
I for one accept whatever you care to tell me about the CURRENT capabilities, of an aircraft that was introduced into service, in a cavalier manner owing more to the demands of the service, than concern for those flying in it!
Truth is, fortunately for me, I have absolutely no interest whatsoever in it's capability now. But you really should not seek to imply that it's current capability has any relevance to it's appalling state in the early part of 1994
I know Flt Lts Tapper and Cook would rather not have been amongst the guinea pigs in those early days!
Secondly:
You asked the question of 'what would I do' regarding breaking the rules and exceeding an icing limit, when there were a number of other options open to me.
I can tell you this: Regardless of ANY icing limit, the LAST place I would wish to put myself in an aircraft that I had very serious (AND VALID) concerns about, would be in cloud. Read Bertie Thruster's post!
I restate, there were other, more appealing options!
I also have to add, that I am rather surprised to read your rather cavalier attitude to such apparent 'inconveniences' as 'limitations.' Clearly you know better than those issuing the icing restrictions. Probably that's why you wouldn't be too concerned about checking the OAT beore committing yourself to IMC!
But then, as a war hero (landing in the desert in zero millilux...etc)and "with your vast knowlegde (sic) of the Chinook", perhaps you are too experienced to worry about the rule book!
Fly safe
When you use the term "essentially the same" to describe the relative icing clearances of the Mk1 and Mk2; could you tell us exactly what you mean by the word "essentially"?
Seems a strange word to use. After all, when the MOD spend very many millions of pounds UPGRADING a current type, shouldn't it be at least AS GOOD AS it's predecessor? Wouldn't it be strange if they ended up with something LESS capable!
Oh but then, for some very considerable time, the Mk2 had a much LOWER MAUM than the Mk1 didn't it.
Why was that?
Do you know?
Perhaps it still does! How strange, all those millions of pounds, and a LESS capable aircraft!
I would like to respond in two ways to your post.
Firstly, you would be partly correct if you were seeking to imply that, the interests of many people here, in the SUBSEQUENT development process of the Mk2, largely ended in the summer of 1994.
I for one accept whatever you care to tell me about the CURRENT capabilities, of an aircraft that was introduced into service, in a cavalier manner owing more to the demands of the service, than concern for those flying in it!
Truth is, fortunately for me, I have absolutely no interest whatsoever in it's capability now. But you really should not seek to imply that it's current capability has any relevance to it's appalling state in the early part of 1994
I know Flt Lts Tapper and Cook would rather not have been amongst the guinea pigs in those early days!
Secondly:
You asked the question of 'what would I do' regarding breaking the rules and exceeding an icing limit, when there were a number of other options open to me.
I can tell you this: Regardless of ANY icing limit, the LAST place I would wish to put myself in an aircraft that I had very serious (AND VALID) concerns about, would be in cloud. Read Bertie Thruster's post!
I restate, there were other, more appealing options!
I also have to add, that I am rather surprised to read your rather cavalier attitude to such apparent 'inconveniences' as 'limitations.' Clearly you know better than those issuing the icing restrictions. Probably that's why you wouldn't be too concerned about checking the OAT beore committing yourself to IMC!
But then, as a war hero (landing in the desert in zero millilux...etc)and "with your vast knowlegde (sic) of the Chinook", perhaps you are too experienced to worry about the rule book!
Fly safe
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Tandemrotor,
Wow, what a long post, had to read it 5 or 6 times to work out what you were saying. I'll try to be concise to answer your various points and accusations about my professionalism:
- All aircraft new into service increase their 'capablity' through time, the Mk 2 now has a MAUM nearly 2 tons more than the Mk 1. The initial MAUM was a limit applied in the RTS, giving the aircraft a disposable payload of nearly 5 1/2 tons, 1 ton more than a Merlin has today.
- Not quite sure what you're talking about next when you ramble on about current capability, but my point is that 'it's appalling state in the early part of 1994' is largely the same as it is now. If it was in an 'appalling state' then and nothing has changed since, shouldn't the current fleet be grounded?
- Your decision on entering IMC in the vicinity of high ground below SALT is interesting and you are entitled to it. Can't comment on the attempts to ground an aircraft in the FI, if I read Bertie's post correctly.
- I don't believe I said limitations were 'inconveniences', your words. This was in the context of Arkroyal's earlier quote of 'another escape route that simply did not exist'. My comments were of being faced with the option of exceeding an icing limit or flying in cloud below SALT, I agree remaining VMC is the more 'appealing' option, who wouldn't. I believe that the safer option would be to climb, if you believe that represents a 'cavalier attitude' and 'too experienced to worry about the rule book' so be it.
- While I do not profess to 'know better than those issuing the icing restrictions', I do believe that using the read across between the Mk 1 and Mk 2, in terms of icing clearance, would have been a reasonable risk to take in an emergency situation.
I hope this answers your points.
Wow, what a long post, had to read it 5 or 6 times to work out what you were saying. I'll try to be concise to answer your various points and accusations about my professionalism:
- All aircraft new into service increase their 'capablity' through time, the Mk 2 now has a MAUM nearly 2 tons more than the Mk 1. The initial MAUM was a limit applied in the RTS, giving the aircraft a disposable payload of nearly 5 1/2 tons, 1 ton more than a Merlin has today.
- Not quite sure what you're talking about next when you ramble on about current capability, but my point is that 'it's appalling state in the early part of 1994' is largely the same as it is now. If it was in an 'appalling state' then and nothing has changed since, shouldn't the current fleet be grounded?
- Your decision on entering IMC in the vicinity of high ground below SALT is interesting and you are entitled to it. Can't comment on the attempts to ground an aircraft in the FI, if I read Bertie's post correctly.
- I don't believe I said limitations were 'inconveniences', your words. This was in the context of Arkroyal's earlier quote of 'another escape route that simply did not exist'. My comments were of being faced with the option of exceeding an icing limit or flying in cloud below SALT, I agree remaining VMC is the more 'appealing' option, who wouldn't. I believe that the safer option would be to climb, if you believe that represents a 'cavalier attitude' and 'too experienced to worry about the rule book' so be it.
- While I do not profess to 'know better than those issuing the icing restrictions', I do believe that using the read across between the Mk 1 and Mk 2, in terms of icing clearance, would have been a reasonable risk to take in an emergency situation.
I hope this answers your points.
Last edited by Twinact; 2nd May 2005 at 13:29.
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Twinact
I accept you and I may have opposing views of this accident. As people who have some relevant experience, we are each entitled to that.
I also accept that you have every confidence in the aircraft I believe you may still be flying. Indeed that confidence is essential, for you, and yours.
Please accept that Jonathan, and Rick, did not share that confidence in the early summer of 1994. I, and many others, believe they had good reason.
To say that because the aircraft was in an appalling state in 1994, it must be the same now, is not of course, necessarily so. You say nothing has changed since.
Does that mean the FADEC system is still in the same appalling, state as in early 1994? - I guess not.
Does that mean critical parts of the flight control system are still becoming detached from their mounting pallet? - I guess not.
Does that mean there are still large sections of the flying manual yet to be issued? - I guess not.
Does that mean the Flight Reference Cards are still confusing, and do not reflect the systems found on a Mk2? - I guess not.
I accept you probably think the Mk2 is a wonderful aircraft NOW.
My point is this; anyone who suggests it was similarly wonderful in the early part of 1994, will have a rather problematic position to defend.
I see you prefer brevity. How was that?
I accept you and I may have opposing views of this accident. As people who have some relevant experience, we are each entitled to that.
I also accept that you have every confidence in the aircraft I believe you may still be flying. Indeed that confidence is essential, for you, and yours.
Please accept that Jonathan, and Rick, did not share that confidence in the early summer of 1994. I, and many others, believe they had good reason.
To say that because the aircraft was in an appalling state in 1994, it must be the same now, is not of course, necessarily so. You say nothing has changed since.
Does that mean the FADEC system is still in the same appalling, state as in early 1994? - I guess not.
Does that mean critical parts of the flight control system are still becoming detached from their mounting pallet? - I guess not.
Does that mean there are still large sections of the flying manual yet to be issued? - I guess not.
Does that mean the Flight Reference Cards are still confusing, and do not reflect the systems found on a Mk2? - I guess not.
I accept you probably think the Mk2 is a wonderful aircraft NOW.
My point is this; anyone who suggests it was similarly wonderful in the early part of 1994, will have a rather problematic position to defend.
I see you prefer brevity. How was that?
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Tandem,
You are clearly a graduate of ISS, brevity much improved.
To the best of my knowledge:
- FADEC has had one software change to remove the Eng Fail caption problem.
- The control pallets are inspected more regularly, although I believe 576's pallets were also inspected just before its last flight.
- The aircrew manual is largely unchanged, people just understand it better through time and familiarity.
- The FRCs have always reflected the Mk 2, but as systems are now better understood, the drills are written more clearly.
You don't address the icing limits?
You don't know if we have 'opposing' views, I haven't stated what I believe the cause of the crash was, but this thread prides itself on facts and I believe some contributors have been understandably 'economic' with the facts to support their case. The fact remains that the aircraft that flew in mid-June 1994, is 'essentially' the same as the one flown in Bosnia, Iraq, Sierra Leone, etc. (I use 'essentially' in its dictionary defn of 'the qualities that make any object it what it is', ie the mechanical components.)
The position does not need to be defended, in as much as the aircraft is unchanged, no dramatic mod programme or software rewrite has taken place. Aircrew then and now are happy to fly it, although some will argue otherwise. People may have been wary of something they didn't completely understand, but that is the nature of professionals in all walks of life.
You are clearly a graduate of ISS, brevity much improved.
To the best of my knowledge:
- FADEC has had one software change to remove the Eng Fail caption problem.
- The control pallets are inspected more regularly, although I believe 576's pallets were also inspected just before its last flight.
- The aircrew manual is largely unchanged, people just understand it better through time and familiarity.
- The FRCs have always reflected the Mk 2, but as systems are now better understood, the drills are written more clearly.
You don't address the icing limits?
You don't know if we have 'opposing' views, I haven't stated what I believe the cause of the crash was, but this thread prides itself on facts and I believe some contributors have been understandably 'economic' with the facts to support their case. The fact remains that the aircraft that flew in mid-June 1994, is 'essentially' the same as the one flown in Bosnia, Iraq, Sierra Leone, etc. (I use 'essentially' in its dictionary defn of 'the qualities that make any object it what it is', ie the mechanical components.)
The position does not need to be defended, in as much as the aircraft is unchanged, no dramatic mod programme or software rewrite has taken place. Aircrew then and now are happy to fly it, although some will argue otherwise. People may have been wary of something they didn't completely understand, but that is the nature of professionals in all walks of life.
Last edited by Twinact; 2nd May 2005 at 17:57.
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Twinact
I am unsure as to what you want me to address regarding the icing limits.
Perhaps this will suffice:
When an aircraft such as the Chinook HC2, which had, effectively, NO icing clearance (plus 4 degrees) is being compared to an aircraft that DID have an icing clearance (minus 6 degrees) It is difficult to comprehend, how the term "essentially similar" is appropriate.
Of course, we know exactly why those icing trials had not been conducted.
The control pallets MAY have been inspected on ZD576 before it's final flight. I DO know that they were inspected afterwards. I saw them. All the mounting brackets had become detached. The AAIB could not tell when this had happened.
The FRCs may have always 'reflected' the Mk2. But of course the version in use by the crew of ZD576 were 'based on' the US's D model, which was not fitted with FADEC.
You are right, I do not know if we have opposing views, that's why I said we 'may' have. Why not give me an idea as to where we can agree?
You have edited your post to suggest that aircrew 'then' were happy to fly the Mk2. You are attempting to rewrite history with that assertion!
I am unsure as to what you want me to address regarding the icing limits.
Perhaps this will suffice:
When an aircraft such as the Chinook HC2, which had, effectively, NO icing clearance (plus 4 degrees) is being compared to an aircraft that DID have an icing clearance (minus 6 degrees) It is difficult to comprehend, how the term "essentially similar" is appropriate.
Of course, we know exactly why those icing trials had not been conducted.
The control pallets MAY have been inspected on ZD576 before it's final flight. I DO know that they were inspected afterwards. I saw them. All the mounting brackets had become detached. The AAIB could not tell when this had happened.
The FRCs may have always 'reflected' the Mk2. But of course the version in use by the crew of ZD576 were 'based on' the US's D model, which was not fitted with FADEC.
You are right, I do not know if we have opposing views, that's why I said we 'may' have. Why not give me an idea as to where we can agree?
You have edited your post to suggest that aircrew 'then' were happy to fly the Mk2. You are attempting to rewrite history with that assertion!
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Tandem,
The Mk 1 and 2 were 'essentially similar' in airframe, blades and engines, the main areas of a helicopter affected by ice. Therefore, read across would have been a reasonable risk to take by experienced Chinook aircrew in an emergency climb.
The Mk 2 is a D Model, it is not surprising that the FRCs were based on it. They were written by Boeing/Handling Sqn and included our FADEC drills.
I edited the post a number times without any hidden motive other than to add to my original thoughts. Not sure what element of history this would rewrite, as it is my recollection of events at the time. Sorry if it doesn't accord with yours. (The last bit was an edit)
The Mk 1 and 2 were 'essentially similar' in airframe, blades and engines, the main areas of a helicopter affected by ice. Therefore, read across would have been a reasonable risk to take by experienced Chinook aircrew in an emergency climb.
The Mk 2 is a D Model, it is not surprising that the FRCs were based on it. They were written by Boeing/Handling Sqn and included our FADEC drills.
I edited the post a number times without any hidden motive other than to add to my original thoughts. Not sure what element of history this would rewrite, as it is my recollection of events at the time. Sorry if it doesn't accord with yours. (The last bit was an edit)
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Response to Walter Kennedy (again):
I'll look at a map, but I think ZD576 would have been over the radar horizon or even 'behind' the Mull as far as Prestwick radar is concerned.
I'll look at a map, but I think ZD576 would have been over the radar horizon or even 'behind' the Mull as far as Prestwick radar is concerned.
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Twinact
If:
"The Mk 1 and 2 were 'essentially similar' in airframe, blades and engines, the main areas of a helicopter affected by ice. Therefore, read across would have been a reasonable risk to take by experienced Chinook aircrew"
Why didn't Boscombe Down test pilots simply do that when writing the Release To Service?
If:
"The Mk 1 and 2 were 'essentially similar' in airframe, blades and engines, the main areas of a helicopter affected by ice. Therefore, read across would have been a reasonable risk to take by experienced Chinook aircrew"
Why didn't Boscombe Down test pilots simply do that when writing the Release To Service?
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Tandem,
I can only give my opinion (and that of many other Chinook operators) of options open to you if faced with the emergency situation posed by an earlier contributor. Regretably, I cannot answer for those involved in the airworthiness process.
a reasonable risk to take by experienced Chinook aircrew in an emergency climb
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This thread has many sub-threads, some technical, some political. Given Brian's comments:
"You don't need to be an Air Marshal to realise that Absolutely No Doubt Whatsoever means Absolutely No Doubt Whatsoever."
and
"The Campaign's point is that you cannot say why they ended up where they did with absolutely no doubt whatsoever."
I am left with a political view:
The Mount Erebus disaster occurred in 1979 and supplied new thinking on how correct investigations could lead to higher standards of safety. The general statement given to the press following most disasters gave ‘pilot error’ as the cause.
A Commission was set up to assuage public uneasiness and the rising anger felt by the airline pilots investigating team and next-of-kin of the crew members. The Inquiry under the auspices of Justice Mahon, and assisted by barristers, David Baragwanath and Gary Harrison, was meant to ‘rubberstamp’ this view. This case changed that. They found the ‘probable cause’ theory untenable.
The Chief Inspector of Air Accidents had left no room for manoeuvre. His verdict was pilot error. However, evidence pointed to a computer error programmed into the system. (A mistake that continues to be made.) However, the Chief Inspector, who had no expertise in the piloting or navigation of sophisticated jet airlines, relied on verbal hearsay. He kept his own view that the “probable cause” was due to flying in cloud, and pilot error. The airline received virtually no criticism.
Captain Gordon Vette put on one side the Chief Inspector’s “honest but misconceived opinion.” He sought to find the scientific evidence behind the disaster. Thus it was that Vette started out on the quest which is described so vividly in his book, Impact Erebus, and which was to make him so unpopular with the Chief Inspector and with the Company Management.
During the enquiry the Chief Inspector’s views gradually came to be discarded by everyone except Air New Zealand and his own employers. Justice Mahon also said that, “after all the evidence was concluded counsel for Air New Zealand, in their lengthy final submissions did not attempt to support the Chief Inspector’s opinion as to causation.
Justice Mahon criticised the Regulator, the police and the airline. Finally, “the Mahon Report put the blame squarely on the airline.”
Justice Mahon also ordered the airline to pay $150,000 as a contribution to the public cost of the inquiry. The company had failed to ‘put all its cards on the table’, he said. It had denied every allegation of fault and had counter-attacked by ascribing total culpability to the crew, against whom it made the untenable allegations that there were no less than 13 separate varieties of pilot error.
Justice Mahon went on to say (in a video) that, “in this case the palpably false sections of evidence which I heard could not be the result of mistake, or faulty recollection. They originated, I am compelled to say, in a pre-determined plan of deception. They were clearly part of an attempt to conceal a series of disastrous administrative blunders and so, in regard to particular items of evidence to which I have referred, I am forced reluctantly to say that I had to listen to an orchestrated litany of lies.”
Also, “That type of situation always makes an enquiry complex where some disaster or scandal involving some Government agency and the procedure adopted by some Governments, the United Kingdom in particular, is to set up such an enquiry, then wait to see what the findings are. If the findings are in favour of the government, it warmly supports the report, if on the other hand the findings implicate some government agency, then the tendency is for the government of the day to reject the report and they will say that it is wrong. This does not happen in Australia of course, but in England and New Zealand, such an approach is in accordance with the hallowed traditions of the Westminster style of government.”
Excerpt from 'Civil Aviation; Civil War' by Christine Standing
“When will they ever learn?” words from a 60s protest song.
"You don't need to be an Air Marshal to realise that Absolutely No Doubt Whatsoever means Absolutely No Doubt Whatsoever."
and
"The Campaign's point is that you cannot say why they ended up where they did with absolutely no doubt whatsoever."
I am left with a political view:
The Mount Erebus disaster occurred in 1979 and supplied new thinking on how correct investigations could lead to higher standards of safety. The general statement given to the press following most disasters gave ‘pilot error’ as the cause.
A Commission was set up to assuage public uneasiness and the rising anger felt by the airline pilots investigating team and next-of-kin of the crew members. The Inquiry under the auspices of Justice Mahon, and assisted by barristers, David Baragwanath and Gary Harrison, was meant to ‘rubberstamp’ this view. This case changed that. They found the ‘probable cause’ theory untenable.
The Chief Inspector of Air Accidents had left no room for manoeuvre. His verdict was pilot error. However, evidence pointed to a computer error programmed into the system. (A mistake that continues to be made.) However, the Chief Inspector, who had no expertise in the piloting or navigation of sophisticated jet airlines, relied on verbal hearsay. He kept his own view that the “probable cause” was due to flying in cloud, and pilot error. The airline received virtually no criticism.
Captain Gordon Vette put on one side the Chief Inspector’s “honest but misconceived opinion.” He sought to find the scientific evidence behind the disaster. Thus it was that Vette started out on the quest which is described so vividly in his book, Impact Erebus, and which was to make him so unpopular with the Chief Inspector and with the Company Management.
During the enquiry the Chief Inspector’s views gradually came to be discarded by everyone except Air New Zealand and his own employers. Justice Mahon also said that, “after all the evidence was concluded counsel for Air New Zealand, in their lengthy final submissions did not attempt to support the Chief Inspector’s opinion as to causation.
Justice Mahon criticised the Regulator, the police and the airline. Finally, “the Mahon Report put the blame squarely on the airline.”
Justice Mahon also ordered the airline to pay $150,000 as a contribution to the public cost of the inquiry. The company had failed to ‘put all its cards on the table’, he said. It had denied every allegation of fault and had counter-attacked by ascribing total culpability to the crew, against whom it made the untenable allegations that there were no less than 13 separate varieties of pilot error.
Justice Mahon went on to say (in a video) that, “in this case the palpably false sections of evidence which I heard could not be the result of mistake, or faulty recollection. They originated, I am compelled to say, in a pre-determined plan of deception. They were clearly part of an attempt to conceal a series of disastrous administrative blunders and so, in regard to particular items of evidence to which I have referred, I am forced reluctantly to say that I had to listen to an orchestrated litany of lies.”
Also, “That type of situation always makes an enquiry complex where some disaster or scandal involving some Government agency and the procedure adopted by some Governments, the United Kingdom in particular, is to set up such an enquiry, then wait to see what the findings are. If the findings are in favour of the government, it warmly supports the report, if on the other hand the findings implicate some government agency, then the tendency is for the government of the day to reject the report and they will say that it is wrong. This does not happen in Australia of course, but in England and New Zealand, such an approach is in accordance with the hallowed traditions of the Westminster style of government.”
Excerpt from 'Civil Aviation; Civil War' by Christine Standing
“When will they ever learn?” words from a 60s protest song.