Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
Just a numbered other
vecvechookattack,
Not wanting to labour a point that's been aired before, but the crew did not have the option to climb to SALT. The laughable icing clearance of this model was +4 DegC. By the information to hand with the crew, that would have meant 2500' max.
Below SALT.
It helps Wratten's case to give them another escape route that simply did not exist.
As others have said. We are quite able to accept that negligence may have been a couse of this crash. We simply require that negligence to be proven to the degree necessary according to the rules in force at the time.
Absolutely NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER.
Not wanting to labour a point that's been aired before, but the crew did not have the option to climb to SALT. The laughable icing clearance of this model was +4 DegC. By the information to hand with the crew, that would have meant 2500' max.
Below SALT.
It helps Wratten's case to give them another escape route that simply did not exist.
As others have said. We are quite able to accept that negligence may have been a couse of this crash. We simply require that negligence to be proven to the degree necessary according to the rules in force at the time.
Absolutely NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER.
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vecvechookattack,
I don't actually blame Mr Hoon. Despite him being in office for a number of years, he comes out with the same defence that his predecessors did - irrespective of political persuasion. It is obvious that they have all received the same briefing and simply regurgitate what they were told.
**update**
You may recall that I said that I had written to Mr Hoon, expressing concerns over the way in which conclusions were reached between the Chinook crash and another fatal accident some three months later. See page 102 of this thread if you can't remember.
Well, I recently received a reply from Adam Ingram MP which did little to progress these concerns.
Leaving out the patronising opening paragraph congratulating me on my persistence, Mr Ingram makes the following points:
You have, clearly, conducted a careful comparative analysis of the findings of the two Boards of Inquiry, and have highlighted, we can agree, some interesting points. You very validly observe that, in many respects, there is more certainty about what happened to the [second aircraft] in the [location] accident than to the Chinook at the Mull of Kintyre. There are, indeed, things about the flight on 2nd June 1994 about which we cannot be certain. But, Mr Ingram, you need absolutely no doubt whatsoever!
Mr Ingram then goes on to explain the rules behind finding aircrew negligent, by stating, That said, you share with a number of other people the erroneous belief that for a finding of negligence to made there must be no doubt about any aspect of the case at all; this is incorrect. For the finding of negligence to be made what is required is for the Board (and it should not be forgotten that the Reviewing Officers form part of the Board of Inquiry process) to be sure that the actions of the crew were a major factor in the accident, regardless of whether or not any other event took place. It remains the case that what the Air Marshals were certain about was that the flight crew of Chinook ZD 576 had put their aircraft into a position from where a crash had become a probable outcome, regardless of any other events.
Funny, I thought that AP 3207 stated that in order to find deceased aircrew guilty of negligence, there had to be absolutely no doubt whatsoever. It would appear that this precise rule is open to interpretetion.
With regards the comparisons I made between the two accidents Mr Ingram stated, I do not propose to answer your comparative analysis on a point-by-point basis. Although undoubtedly attractive to those who seek to use selected examples to illustrate a particular argument, it is not necessarily helpful to draw comparisons between individual cases. There may be differences in the cases beyond those that your careful analysis has revealed. It may, for instance, be considered that the flight crew of the Chinook owed a "duty of care" to the passengers for whom they were responsible. The crew of the [second aircraft], with a joint responsibility for the operation of the aircraft, shared a duty of care to each other. Clearly, the burden in the former case, and the need to exercise that care, is greater, leading, perhaps, to a greater need to consider whether negligence had occurred. Actually, I hadn't asked for differences between the accidents to be considered. I had asked how the differences in available evidence led to such completely opposing verdicts (lots of evidence = no positive conclusion as opposed to little evidence = absolutely no doubt whatsoever). It would also appear that the more passenges you carry, the greater your duty of care. Bizarre!
All in all, a very predictable letter which, as usual, fails to address any of the points raised, and offers no substance to support the findings of the Reviewing Officers.
Reply ready to go on 6th May!
My best to you all, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
I don't actually blame Mr Hoon. Despite him being in office for a number of years, he comes out with the same defence that his predecessors did - irrespective of political persuasion. It is obvious that they have all received the same briefing and simply regurgitate what they were told.
**update**
You may recall that I said that I had written to Mr Hoon, expressing concerns over the way in which conclusions were reached between the Chinook crash and another fatal accident some three months later. See page 102 of this thread if you can't remember.
Well, I recently received a reply from Adam Ingram MP which did little to progress these concerns.
Leaving out the patronising opening paragraph congratulating me on my persistence, Mr Ingram makes the following points:
You have, clearly, conducted a careful comparative analysis of the findings of the two Boards of Inquiry, and have highlighted, we can agree, some interesting points. You very validly observe that, in many respects, there is more certainty about what happened to the [second aircraft] in the [location] accident than to the Chinook at the Mull of Kintyre. There are, indeed, things about the flight on 2nd June 1994 about which we cannot be certain. But, Mr Ingram, you need absolutely no doubt whatsoever!
Mr Ingram then goes on to explain the rules behind finding aircrew negligent, by stating, That said, you share with a number of other people the erroneous belief that for a finding of negligence to made there must be no doubt about any aspect of the case at all; this is incorrect. For the finding of negligence to be made what is required is for the Board (and it should not be forgotten that the Reviewing Officers form part of the Board of Inquiry process) to be sure that the actions of the crew were a major factor in the accident, regardless of whether or not any other event took place. It remains the case that what the Air Marshals were certain about was that the flight crew of Chinook ZD 576 had put their aircraft into a position from where a crash had become a probable outcome, regardless of any other events.
Funny, I thought that AP 3207 stated that in order to find deceased aircrew guilty of negligence, there had to be absolutely no doubt whatsoever. It would appear that this precise rule is open to interpretetion.
With regards the comparisons I made between the two accidents Mr Ingram stated, I do not propose to answer your comparative analysis on a point-by-point basis. Although undoubtedly attractive to those who seek to use selected examples to illustrate a particular argument, it is not necessarily helpful to draw comparisons between individual cases. There may be differences in the cases beyond those that your careful analysis has revealed. It may, for instance, be considered that the flight crew of the Chinook owed a "duty of care" to the passengers for whom they were responsible. The crew of the [second aircraft], with a joint responsibility for the operation of the aircraft, shared a duty of care to each other. Clearly, the burden in the former case, and the need to exercise that care, is greater, leading, perhaps, to a greater need to consider whether negligence had occurred. Actually, I hadn't asked for differences between the accidents to be considered. I had asked how the differences in available evidence led to such completely opposing verdicts (lots of evidence = no positive conclusion as opposed to little evidence = absolutely no doubt whatsoever). It would also appear that the more passenges you carry, the greater your duty of care. Bizarre!
All in all, a very predictable letter which, as usual, fails to address any of the points raised, and offers no substance to support the findings of the Reviewing Officers.
Reply ready to go on 6th May!
My best to you all, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Just a numbered other
Well done Brian, your persistence is indeed admirable, in stark contrast to the persistent myopia of Hoon, Ingram et al.
At least an admission that it was the cargo which made the finding so necessary to deflect the blame from where it really lies.
So you can't kill yourself and crew by negligence, but you can kill others.
Indeed................bizarre
At least an admission that it was the cargo which made the finding so necessary to deflect the blame from where it really lies.
So you can't kill yourself and crew by negligence, but you can kill others.
Indeed................bizarre
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Arkroyal
<<At least an admission that it was the cargo which made the finding so necessary to deflect the blame from where it really lies.>>
Exactly, this seems to be the attitude of the powers that be in this case, which means the best way of clearing their names is to make every effort to get to the whole truth if the authorities are hiding something and blaming the pilots to close off public interest they are not going to back away from that position unless the campaign can point to a provable omission in the circumstances described or some other misrepresentation of the details of the flight.
<<At least an admission that it was the cargo which made the finding so necessary to deflect the blame from where it really lies.>>
Exactly, this seems to be the attitude of the powers that be in this case, which means the best way of clearing their names is to make every effort to get to the whole truth if the authorities are hiding something and blaming the pilots to close off public interest they are not going to back away from that position unless the campaign can point to a provable omission in the circumstances described or some other misrepresentation of the details of the flight.
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the crew did not have the option to climb to SALT
The Chinook Mk 1 was cleared in potential icing conditions down to -6 deg C, some tried even lower.
The Mk 2 was essentially the same as a Mk 1, but simply hadn't been trialled down to the same limits.
Notwithstanding any 'guidance' from senior management about limits, what would you do?
Last edited by Twinact; 19th Apr 2005 at 21:36.
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Sorry, Twinact, the Mk2 clearance was not essentially the same as the Mk1 at the time of the accident.
I didn't think a Release to Service was 'guidance' from senior management either.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
I didn't think a Release to Service was 'guidance' from senior management either.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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Ark Royal
1. YES IT DID !!!
2. In its report.
3. The Air Staff at
1. HQ 1 Gp
2. HQ STC
3. MOD
ALL agreed that a climb to SA was feasible within the parameters of the Wx forecast. YOU (of course) know better despite never having flown the aircraft: unlike those quoted above.
1. YES IT DID !!!
2. In its report.
3. The Air Staff at
1. HQ 1 Gp
2. HQ STC
3. MOD
ALL agreed that a climb to SA was feasible within the parameters of the Wx forecast. YOU (of course) know better despite never having flown the aircraft: unlike those quoted above.
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cazatou
I HAVE flown the aircraft.
Are you suggesting rafloo and Twinact have been/are Chinook pilots too?
Perhaps YOU are?
Arkroyal is a very experienced, ex-military helicopter pilot, with a wealth of relevant knowledge. What was your final comment meant to suggest?
Just to clarify, I seem to recall that based on the FORECAST a climb to SALT was 'feasible' in the vicinity of the Mull. But in the moments leading up to the accident, the crew didn't have to rely on the FORECAST air temperature, to judge whether a climb would have been legal.
Would you care to remind us what the OAT gauge in the cockpit would have been reading at the critical moment when any 'climb' option was assessed?
Twinact
You are incorrect to describe the Mk2 as "essentially the same as a Mk1".
Of course we know the reason the Mk2;
"simply hadn't been trialled down to the same (icing) limits."
was because test pilots at Boscombe Down had decided the aircraft was not safe to conduct such trials!
So; "what would you do?"
Can you tell us what the current Mk2 icing limit is?
bad dew dew from you fellas....bad
I HAVE flown the aircraft.
Are you suggesting rafloo and Twinact have been/are Chinook pilots too?
Perhaps YOU are?
Arkroyal is a very experienced, ex-military helicopter pilot, with a wealth of relevant knowledge. What was your final comment meant to suggest?
Just to clarify, I seem to recall that based on the FORECAST a climb to SALT was 'feasible' in the vicinity of the Mull. But in the moments leading up to the accident, the crew didn't have to rely on the FORECAST air temperature, to judge whether a climb would have been legal.
Would you care to remind us what the OAT gauge in the cockpit would have been reading at the critical moment when any 'climb' option was assessed?
Twinact
You are incorrect to describe the Mk2 as "essentially the same as a Mk1".
Of course we know the reason the Mk2;
"simply hadn't been trialled down to the same (icing) limits."
was because test pilots at Boscombe Down had decided the aircraft was not safe to conduct such trials!
So; "what would you do?"
Can you tell us what the current Mk2 icing limit is?
bad dew dew from you fellas....bad
Mk 2 " bad dew dew " indeed.
At the same time of the terrible Mull incident a new Mk2 was "operational" in the Falklands.
The aircraft suffered FADEC faults almost daily. (Faults which then could not be reproduced by the engineers) (Back in the UK it was reported that even a simple Tq meter gauge failure could cause wild fluctutations in the speeds of both engines)
The pilots down there had subsequently been briefed to land where they were if engine indications became unusual, even if the area was very remote. (There was "pressure" to order pilots to fly the machine back to Mount Pleasant in such cases as there was no other way to recover an unserviceable Chinook) That "pressure" was not passed onto the line pilots. Instead they were advised to operate the aircraft so that they could land VERY quickly if required.
If there was any negligence in the tragic Mull crash I suggest it was in the command decision to put all those special people in just one helicopter. (Of any type, let alone a "new" Mk2.)
At the same time of the terrible Mull incident a new Mk2 was "operational" in the Falklands.
The aircraft suffered FADEC faults almost daily. (Faults which then could not be reproduced by the engineers) (Back in the UK it was reported that even a simple Tq meter gauge failure could cause wild fluctutations in the speeds of both engines)
The pilots down there had subsequently been briefed to land where they were if engine indications became unusual, even if the area was very remote. (There was "pressure" to order pilots to fly the machine back to Mount Pleasant in such cases as there was no other way to recover an unserviceable Chinook) That "pressure" was not passed onto the line pilots. Instead they were advised to operate the aircraft so that they could land VERY quickly if required.
If there was any negligence in the tragic Mull crash I suggest it was in the command decision to put all those special people in just one helicopter. (Of any type, let alone a "new" Mk2.)
Last edited by Bertie Thruster; 22nd Apr 2005 at 09:12.
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You don't need to be an Air Marshal to realise that Absolutely No Doubt Whatsoever means Absolutely No Doubt Whatsoever.
No-one disagrees with your point rafloo. The Campaign's point is that you cannot say why they ended up where they did with absolutely no doubt whatsoever.
That is what we've been going on about for all these years!
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
No-one disagrees with your point rafloo. The Campaign's point is that you cannot say why they ended up where they did with absolutely no doubt whatsoever.
That is what we've been going on about for all these years!
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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rafloo said:
"You don't need to have flown a Chinnok (sic) to realise that flying in cloud, close to land is foolish."
In certain circumstances, your assertion would be correct. In other circumstances it would not.
Using ANY standard of proof, the link to "foolish" has been demonstrated (in very many INDEPENDENT inquiries, NOT TO MENTION the members of the original BoI) to be rather problematic to PROVE!
Due to the lack of RELIABLE evidence.
"You don't need to have flown a Chinnok (sic) to realise that flying in cloud, close to land is foolish."
In certain circumstances, your assertion would be correct. In other circumstances it would not.
Using ANY standard of proof, the link to "foolish" has been demonstrated (in very many INDEPENDENT inquiries, NOT TO MENTION the members of the original BoI) to be rather problematic to PROVE!
Due to the lack of RELIABLE evidence.
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rafloo
<<You don't need to have flown a Chinnok to realise that flying in cloud, close to land is foolish.>>
But they had not been flying in cloud and did not intend entering the mist.
The mist was localized actually on the landmass a common condition there.
The plan was to turn before but close to the landmass at low level and continue up the coast (a common practice).
Had they commenced their turn at the actual geographical position of waypoint A they would have completed it without entering the mist (and crashing) further, they would not have broken the rules as applicable to helicopters as they would have been in sight of the surface and clear in all directions other than towards the land whose shoreline they could have safely followed after having turned along it.
The question is why that turn was not made of the ideas put forward most fall into two groups:
Control problems;
Navigation/judgment.
The former requires a control problem that manifested itself for a short, but critical, period that prevented the crew from doing anything but carrying straight on (and yet allowing control at the last instant).
Regarding the latter, there are two possible candidates for the crew misjudging the time to start the turn:
Reliance upon visual judgment to a known feature(s);
An erroneous reading from their navigation systems that could have biased their visual judgment.
In the former case, ground detail would have been obscured and intermittent and it would indeed have been foolish to approach at that speed so close.
The latter is rather subtle; you can see the mist and you know it is right on the landmass so you can say that you can SEE the landmass OK but you are intending to turn, say, ½ a mile before it; its hard to accurately judge that distance visually at that closing speed BUT if some instrument was telling you that you were still ½ a mile away then your judgment may be biased. So what did they have? The SuperTANS was found to have been accurate in this case BUT this crew would not have relied upon this system to any degree of accuracy (they had said so). ZD576 did not have radar, so could there have been anything else that could have misled them? The squawk code found set in the wreck could suggest that they had been referring to a ground transponder however, the setting could have been disturbed in the final moments it is the confirmation of what code ZD576 was transponding earlier in the flight that I eagerly await.
<<You don't need to have flown a Chinnok to realise that flying in cloud, close to land is foolish.>>
But they had not been flying in cloud and did not intend entering the mist.
The mist was localized actually on the landmass a common condition there.
The plan was to turn before but close to the landmass at low level and continue up the coast (a common practice).
Had they commenced their turn at the actual geographical position of waypoint A they would have completed it without entering the mist (and crashing) further, they would not have broken the rules as applicable to helicopters as they would have been in sight of the surface and clear in all directions other than towards the land whose shoreline they could have safely followed after having turned along it.
The question is why that turn was not made of the ideas put forward most fall into two groups:
Control problems;
Navigation/judgment.
The former requires a control problem that manifested itself for a short, but critical, period that prevented the crew from doing anything but carrying straight on (and yet allowing control at the last instant).
Regarding the latter, there are two possible candidates for the crew misjudging the time to start the turn:
Reliance upon visual judgment to a known feature(s);
An erroneous reading from their navigation systems that could have biased their visual judgment.
In the former case, ground detail would have been obscured and intermittent and it would indeed have been foolish to approach at that speed so close.
The latter is rather subtle; you can see the mist and you know it is right on the landmass so you can say that you can SEE the landmass OK but you are intending to turn, say, ½ a mile before it; its hard to accurately judge that distance visually at that closing speed BUT if some instrument was telling you that you were still ½ a mile away then your judgment may be biased. So what did they have? The SuperTANS was found to have been accurate in this case BUT this crew would not have relied upon this system to any degree of accuracy (they had said so). ZD576 did not have radar, so could there have been anything else that could have misled them? The squawk code found set in the wreck could suggest that they had been referring to a ground transponder however, the setting could have been disturbed in the final moments it is the confirmation of what code ZD576 was transponding earlier in the flight that I eagerly await.
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Tandemrotor
I merely pointed out that the BOI (which included 2 experienced Chinook Pilots) concluded that a climb to Safety Altitude was practicable in the vicinity of the Mull.
The Airstaffs at HQ1Gp, HQSTC and at MOD (again including experienced Chinook Pilots) all concurred with this view.
I merely pointed out that the BOI (which included 2 experienced Chinook Pilots) concluded that a climb to Safety Altitude was practicable in the vicinity of the Mull.
The Airstaffs at HQ1Gp, HQSTC and at MOD (again including experienced Chinook Pilots) all concurred with this view.
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cazatou
I apologise if I read something into your post that was not there. I know both the 'experienced Chinook Pilots' on the BOI to whom you referred, having flown and socialised with both.
For the record I, and I suspect most of the other supporters of Rick and John, would agree wholeheartedly with THEIR findings. They took the evidence as far as it would go, but could not make a finding of negligence (even though it was their duty so to do!) because "it was impossible to recreate the sequence of events leading up to the accident."
Because I know some of the pressures they were put under at the time, I take my hat off to all three of the members, but especially Wg Cdr Pulford.
It is a constant blemish on the RAF and MOD that integrity was ejected from the process after that stage!
I apologise if I read something into your post that was not there. I know both the 'experienced Chinook Pilots' on the BOI to whom you referred, having flown and socialised with both.
For the record I, and I suspect most of the other supporters of Rick and John, would agree wholeheartedly with THEIR findings. They took the evidence as far as it would go, but could not make a finding of negligence (even though it was their duty so to do!) because "it was impossible to recreate the sequence of events leading up to the accident."
Because I know some of the pressures they were put under at the time, I take my hat off to all three of the members, but especially Wg Cdr Pulford.
It is a constant blemish on the RAF and MOD that integrity was ejected from the process after that stage!
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Completely agree with Tandemrotor.
From the Board's conclusions:
The Board was unable to positively determine the sequence of events leading up to the accident, and therefore concluded that although it is likely that Flt Lt Tapper made an Error of Judgement in the conduct of the attempted climb over the Mull of Kintyre, it would be incorrect to criticise him for human failings based on the available evidence.
and:
The Board concluded that there were no human failings with respect to Flt Lt Cook.
Seems clear enough to me - and follows the rule of Abslutely No Doubt Whatsoever.
I, too, must acknowledge the integrity of the three Board members for resisting the pressures of senior officers.
During cross examination by Lord Brennan of the House of Lords' Select Commitee, Mr Wratten admitted to sending the Board's Report back to the President. Lord Brennan asked, "There are three alternatives there[referring to why the Board did not use the word negligence]: attention to what they were doing was inadequate, or incompetent, and/or they did not have the guts to come to the conclusion that you did. Which do you think it is?
Mr Wratten replied, "I am not going to... Forgive me, it was a perogative that Air Vice Marshal Day and I had to send it back to the Board of Inquiry and to draw that to their attention and to say, "Come on, you have to be more positive than this." We did not do so because this was Wing Commander Pulford's first Board of Inquiry, this was the largest peacetime tragedy that the Royal Air Force had suffered. There was enormous loss of life. And I personally would not impose that judgement upon a young Wing Commander. That was the responsibility of senior commanders."
I doubt that exchange of opinion was made over a beer!
The Campaign continues.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
From the Board's conclusions:
The Board was unable to positively determine the sequence of events leading up to the accident, and therefore concluded that although it is likely that Flt Lt Tapper made an Error of Judgement in the conduct of the attempted climb over the Mull of Kintyre, it would be incorrect to criticise him for human failings based on the available evidence.
and:
The Board concluded that there were no human failings with respect to Flt Lt Cook.
Seems clear enough to me - and follows the rule of Abslutely No Doubt Whatsoever.
I, too, must acknowledge the integrity of the three Board members for resisting the pressures of senior officers.
During cross examination by Lord Brennan of the House of Lords' Select Commitee, Mr Wratten admitted to sending the Board's Report back to the President. Lord Brennan asked, "There are three alternatives there[referring to why the Board did not use the word negligence]: attention to what they were doing was inadequate, or incompetent, and/or they did not have the guts to come to the conclusion that you did. Which do you think it is?
Mr Wratten replied, "I am not going to... Forgive me, it was a perogative that Air Vice Marshal Day and I had to send it back to the Board of Inquiry and to draw that to their attention and to say, "Come on, you have to be more positive than this." We did not do so because this was Wing Commander Pulford's first Board of Inquiry, this was the largest peacetime tragedy that the Royal Air Force had suffered. There was enormous loss of life. And I personally would not impose that judgement upon a young Wing Commander. That was the responsibility of senior commanders."
I doubt that exchange of opinion was made over a beer!
The Campaign continues.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
