Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
A really irritating PPRuNer
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Saga Lout,
Which 'He' do you refer to? There were two pilots. Did the other pilot just sit there and watch? You suggest that you are also SH - did you know the crew? I did, and I would say that they scored fairly low in the 'Gung-Ho' exam.
So what, if (in your opinion) the AM is a good bloke. I, and many others, happen to believe he made a wrong decision. Doesn't necessarily make him a bad person - just wrong. Good luck with your promotion.
The whole issue is that in order to find deceased aircrew guilty of negligence (or in this case - Gross Negligence) there must be absolutely no doubt whatsoever. There are areas of doubt, so the verdict is unsafe. Had you read the previous 37 pages (this is the 38th), you would have seen this.
That said, it's your opinion, and I have no problem with that. I just happen to disagree.
Merry Xmas to all.
Regards
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Which 'He' do you refer to? There were two pilots. Did the other pilot just sit there and watch? You suggest that you are also SH - did you know the crew? I did, and I would say that they scored fairly low in the 'Gung-Ho' exam.
So what, if (in your opinion) the AM is a good bloke. I, and many others, happen to believe he made a wrong decision. Doesn't necessarily make him a bad person - just wrong. Good luck with your promotion.
The whole issue is that in order to find deceased aircrew guilty of negligence (or in this case - Gross Negligence) there must be absolutely no doubt whatsoever. There are areas of doubt, so the verdict is unsafe. Had you read the previous 37 pages (this is the 38th), you would have seen this.
That said, it's your opinion, and I have no problem with that. I just happen to disagree.
Merry Xmas to all.
Regards
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Just a numbered other
What an appropriate time of year to find myself in partial agreement with K52!
Sagalout............. You would do well to study the foregoing argument before committing to the keyboard.
Merry Christmas to all (on both sides of the fence).
Let the fight continue in 2003
Sagalout............. You would do well to study the foregoing argument before committing to the keyboard.
Merry Christmas to all (on both sides of the fence).
Let the fight continue in 2003
Sorry to come into this so late, although I have watched this thread with interest, but TheAerosCo has just asked one question that seems to have been conveniently forgotten - the relevance of Macrihanish.
As one who was operating in NI at the time we were used to going up to Mac to do IF training, and so were used to talking to Mac Approach at best some 20 miles out (range v.poor due to terrain masking), although we didn't like going up until in r/t contact. Machrihanish was on run down prior to closing (if not already 'officially' closed), and had pulled the plug on radar and other approach services a few days earlier - we had only found out the hard way when no one answered. The only other means of radar service (of any sort) in that area would have been Prestwick (too far away at their initial height), Glasgow or Scottish. That would have meant a climb to an indeterminate height to get comms, into a possible icing regime they did not have a clearance to enter (Zero degree at 3000' if my memory serves me correct for the day).
Incidentally, no one has mentioned the previous Mull of Kintyre accident, admittedly some 25+ years previously. A Shack carrying out ASW training also hit the Mull at low level, albeit at night but in good vis. No mention of negligence - gross or otherwise - was pointed at the driver or captain at the time.
PS - Mac would have been open at the time of the flight a week earlier!
As one who was operating in NI at the time we were used to going up to Mac to do IF training, and so were used to talking to Mac Approach at best some 20 miles out (range v.poor due to terrain masking), although we didn't like going up until in r/t contact. Machrihanish was on run down prior to closing (if not already 'officially' closed), and had pulled the plug on radar and other approach services a few days earlier - we had only found out the hard way when no one answered. The only other means of radar service (of any sort) in that area would have been Prestwick (too far away at their initial height), Glasgow or Scottish. That would have meant a climb to an indeterminate height to get comms, into a possible icing regime they did not have a clearance to enter (Zero degree at 3000' if my memory serves me correct for the day).
Incidentally, no one has mentioned the previous Mull of Kintyre accident, admittedly some 25+ years previously. A Shack carrying out ASW training also hit the Mull at low level, albeit at night but in good vis. No mention of negligence - gross or otherwise - was pointed at the driver or captain at the time.
PS - Mac would have been open at the time of the flight a week earlier!
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CHINOOK
Back in the circuit, and very surprised to see this discussion continuing. Like SAGA LOUT, I am puzzled that we seem unable to accept that the crew goofed? (Qtr of a mile to stbd of intended tk, IMC, cloud-covered hill ahead at over 800ft instead of the expected 300ft, and so on). No technical failure can explain the crash, unless you believe that about 20 secs before impact, the flying controls simultaneously locked solid in all three axes, the power controls locked at the same time, the radio failed so that not a squeak could be transmitted, and the crew had to sit there helplessly as they flew on into the hillside. Come off it fellers.
Like Shackman, I recall the Shackleton crash all those years ago. Is my memory failing me, or were there TWO very experienced Wg Cdr Navigators on board when it flew straight into the hillside?
Like Shackman, I recall the Shackleton crash all those years ago. Is my memory failing me, or were there TWO very experienced Wg Cdr Navigators on board when it flew straight into the hillside?
Just a numbered other
JP
You really are an uncharitable sort, aren't you.
The pilots were not found guilty of having 'goofed', which I would suppose you might equate with pilot error.
No one on this forum has suggested that this is impossible.
They were found to have been 'Grossly negligent' which is an enormous leap from error. Such an enormous leap that the RAF's own rules stated that it must be proved beyond any doubt whatsoever.
What is it that you find so difficult with the concept.
Proof positive that something happened is not the same as no proof that something else occurred.
You really are an uncharitable sort, aren't you.
The pilots were not found guilty of having 'goofed', which I would suppose you might equate with pilot error.
No one on this forum has suggested that this is impossible.
They were found to have been 'Grossly negligent' which is an enormous leap from error. Such an enormous leap that the RAF's own rules stated that it must be proved beyond any doubt whatsoever.
What is it that you find so difficult with the concept.
Proof positive that something happened is not the same as no proof that something else occurred.
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CHINOOK
Arkroyal. I'm afraid this is not about charity, it is about professional airmanship. There is little point in going into the matter of definitions yet again, the fact is that the crew had a duty of care towards the unfortunate passengers and they grossly neglected that duty. Simple crew error is not enough.
I do not know of course what your background is (perhaps you would be good enough to tell us), but if you are, as I suppose, a professional aviator, then please do not try to persaude me that you would have taken any risk -of any kind whatever - in flying even remotely near that teacherous terrain and those forbidding hillsides at low level and in very doubtful (to put it mildly) weather conditions
The actions of the crew were not merely a minor and transitory blip, such as misreading an instrument let us say; their actions could only have been a deliberate decision to press on, in circumstances that would have made the hairs stand up rigidly on the back of this old but not very bold aviator. I have made clear in earlier contributions just what those circumstances were, so I will not weary you with the facts yet again.
Meanwhile, a happy new year and safe flying to you.
I do not know of course what your background is (perhaps you would be good enough to tell us), but if you are, as I suppose, a professional aviator, then please do not try to persaude me that you would have taken any risk -of any kind whatever - in flying even remotely near that teacherous terrain and those forbidding hillsides at low level and in very doubtful (to put it mildly) weather conditions
The actions of the crew were not merely a minor and transitory blip, such as misreading an instrument let us say; their actions could only have been a deliberate decision to press on, in circumstances that would have made the hairs stand up rigidly on the back of this old but not very bold aviator. I have made clear in earlier contributions just what those circumstances were, so I will not weary you with the facts yet again.
Meanwhile, a happy new year and safe flying to you.
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JP
Hmmm - I have seen nothing which suggests anybody knows what the intended track was at that point.
Qtr of a mile to stbd of intended tk, IMC, cloud-covered hill ahead at over 800ft instead of the expected 300ft, and so on
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Chinook
Intended track was to the lighthouse waypoint, no-one else has - as far as I know - suggested otherwise. The thing that has constantly surprised me about this long-running discussion is that its path is strewn with quibbles and nitpicks, including no fewer than nine NINE! possible technical failures, when the cause was clearly crew error. Very sad but true. Regards 
Just a numbered other
I do not know of course what your background is (perhaps you would be good enough to tell us)
My career has included many thousands of hours in support helicopters, operating in the kind of conditions faced by the crew of ZD576. Perhaps I am better qualified to understand the environment than you, JP.
but if you are, as I suppose, a professional aviator, then please do not try to persaude me that you would have taken any risk -of any kind whatever - in flying even remotely near that teacherous terrain and those forbidding hillsides at low level and in very doubtful (to put it mildly) weather conditions
Why so many important people were in ZD576 is a question yet to be answered by those who found it more convenient to blame Rick and Jon for the mishap than to expand on that crass decision.
There is little point in going into the matter of definitions yet again
Until you can prove beyond any doubt whatsoever that negligence was the cause, then the finding is plain wrong.
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JP
I do not think anybody doubts that the intended track was towards the lighthouse prior to waypoint change. But why, then, did the aircraft then make a course change to the right, rather than towards the next waypoint? I don't know - do you? Quibbles and nitpicks yes, but of course - the whole subject is strewn with unknowns, inconsistencies and conjecture peddled as fact. Nobody knows what happened - that's the point.
I do not think anybody doubts that the intended track was towards the lighthouse prior to waypoint change. But why, then, did the aircraft then make a course change to the right, rather than towards the next waypoint? I don't know - do you? Quibbles and nitpicks yes, but of course - the whole subject is strewn with unknowns, inconsistencies and conjecture peddled as fact. Nobody knows what happened - that's the point.
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Arkroyal & The Aero Co
Thanks for the imput. As a matter of fact, I did give my background a couple of monthe ago; but briefly it includes about 4000 hrs piston and jet, mainly the latter and mostly at very low level. several hundred hrs night low level including vll over terrain in Scotland, Norway, the Alps; QFI piston and jet, wpns instr, Master Green - is that enough?
As to the original subject, we are going round the same bouys yet again. Let me have one more try. There can be only two possible explanations for the fact that the crew did not turn away from the hills - which were partly or totally covered in cloud (I accept an earlier point you made, Arkroyal, that icing conditions might have prevented a climb to safety altitude). First is that somewhere just before or at waypoint change, the flying controls locked in all three axes, at around the same time the power controls also locked and almost simultaneously the RT failed so that no distress call could be made. The machine then flew on into the hillside with the crew sitting helplessly at their useless controls. The second explanation is that the crew flew on from waypoint change expecting to breast a hillside about 300 feet high, but because they were a quarter of a mile to stbd of intended tk, they came up against a hillside that was over 800 ft high. Now, once and for all, will you say whuch of these two explanations you accept?
With all good wishes, and please don't think I actually enjoy pinning this one on the crew, but facts are facts.
ArkRoyal. Sorry, I meant to comment on your remark about the number of IPs being carried in that one helo. I do not know why, but I agree with you that someone should answer for that. It seems on the face of it inconceivable that all those people should have been taken in one lift to a conference; there was no operational urgency. Regards.
Thanks for the imput. As a matter of fact, I did give my background a couple of monthe ago; but briefly it includes about 4000 hrs piston and jet, mainly the latter and mostly at very low level. several hundred hrs night low level including vll over terrain in Scotland, Norway, the Alps; QFI piston and jet, wpns instr, Master Green - is that enough?
As to the original subject, we are going round the same bouys yet again. Let me have one more try. There can be only two possible explanations for the fact that the crew did not turn away from the hills - which were partly or totally covered in cloud (I accept an earlier point you made, Arkroyal, that icing conditions might have prevented a climb to safety altitude). First is that somewhere just before or at waypoint change, the flying controls locked in all three axes, at around the same time the power controls also locked and almost simultaneously the RT failed so that no distress call could be made. The machine then flew on into the hillside with the crew sitting helplessly at their useless controls. The second explanation is that the crew flew on from waypoint change expecting to breast a hillside about 300 feet high, but because they were a quarter of a mile to stbd of intended tk, they came up against a hillside that was over 800 ft high. Now, once and for all, will you say whuch of these two explanations you accept?
With all good wishes, and please don't think I actually enjoy pinning this one on the crew, but facts are facts.
ArkRoyal. Sorry, I meant to comment on your remark about the number of IPs being carried in that one helo. I do not know why, but I agree with you that someone should answer for that. It seems on the face of it inconceivable that all those people should have been taken in one lift to a conference; there was no operational urgency. Regards.
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Ark Royal. Nor did I take up your point about risk, which I will do now. Of course you were a professional risk taker, and no doubt you have groped your way about in some exteremely marginal conditions. I was wrongly using shorthand when I asked the question earlier about whether you would have flown towards those grim hills; what I should have asked was whether you would have done so in the conditions faced by this crew , ie at low level, in cloud, at speed and without any references on the ground? I very much doubt it! Regards JP
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Mr Purdey, forgive me but you stated the following:
Just how do you know they are facts. You surmise that they are yet no-one else seems to know the facts. You were not there so you must be making assumptions. Frankly, it surprises me that a man with your experience would make such utterings, yet you vehmently do so.
And, if I may say so, most of your other posts appear to ignore, for reasons best known to yourself, that there are so many intangibles and possibilities that it borders on the criminal to state 'facts' which are altogether unknown, and then totally push aside the real FACT. That there has to be "no doubt whatsoever" before gross negligence can avowed.
With all good wishes, and please don't think I actually enjoy pinning this one on the crew, but facts are facts.
And, if I may say so, most of your other posts appear to ignore, for reasons best known to yourself, that there are so many intangibles and possibilities that it borders on the criminal to state 'facts' which are altogether unknown, and then totally push aside the real FACT. That there has to be "no doubt whatsoever" before gross negligence can avowed.
Well said Ark Royal - the SH/Junglie and AAC fraternity are accustomed to operating at low level in all sorts of weather that the fixed wing fraternity would have pulled out from long before - but then almost without exception THEY have icing clearances, good rates of climb and relatively stable IF platforms to work with. You do learn very quickly the requirements of risk against mission success, which is again tempered by the theatre of operations.
PS - For JP the Shackleton accident I'm referring to was an MR aircraft doing night ASW exercise to the west of the Mull, and after two turns close to or over the shore he finally hit the hills. Following on from this accident it became mandatory for the (1)radar operator to call the nav and pilot when land came within four miles of track. This SOP was one of many maritime ones rejected when 8 Sqn (AEW) was formed, as the (3) radar operators would now be too busy, and besides which it wasn't done on Gannets! 10 years later the Sqn Cdr, Nav Ldr, OC Ops Lossie and the rest of the crew were killed when the aircraft flew into a 900ft hill near Benbecula in cloud. I think this is the accident you remember - the only one (and one too many) for the AEW fleet. However, I do not remember any finding of culpable negligence in this case
PS - For JP the Shackleton accident I'm referring to was an MR aircraft doing night ASW exercise to the west of the Mull, and after two turns close to or over the shore he finally hit the hills. Following on from this accident it became mandatory for the (1)radar operator to call the nav and pilot when land came within four miles of track. This SOP was one of many maritime ones rejected when 8 Sqn (AEW) was formed, as the (3) radar operators would now be too busy, and besides which it wasn't done on Gannets! 10 years later the Sqn Cdr, Nav Ldr, OC Ops Lossie and the rest of the crew were killed when the aircraft flew into a 900ft hill near Benbecula in cloud. I think this is the accident you remember - the only one (and one too many) for the AEW fleet. However, I do not remember any finding of culpable negligence in this case
A really irritating PPRuNer
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Hi Mr Purdey,
Happy New Year to you, and also to everyone else on the thread.
Do you not think that in the worst peacetime RAF accident one should (in your words) quibble and nitpick? Especially as the burdon of proof required is absolutely no doubt whatsoever.
Each and every item of evidence should be looked at for what information it actually provides - as opposed to what it might imply. An assumption or speculation is not a fact. A best guess is not good enough either, I'm afraid.
I won't go on at length, covering all the issues I have bored people with for the last eight years, other than to say that in my opinion there are far too many unanswered questions for the verdict to remain. Plain and simple!
I may not agree with you, but you are entitled to form your own opinion, and I respect that opinion. However, go beyond the crash and look at the limited available factual evidence and the heavy burdon of proof required to prove negligence. It falls way, way short.
My regards, as always
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Happy New Year to you, and also to everyone else on the thread.
Do you not think that in the worst peacetime RAF accident one should (in your words) quibble and nitpick? Especially as the burdon of proof required is absolutely no doubt whatsoever.
Each and every item of evidence should be looked at for what information it actually provides - as opposed to what it might imply. An assumption or speculation is not a fact. A best guess is not good enough either, I'm afraid.
I won't go on at length, covering all the issues I have bored people with for the last eight years, other than to say that in my opinion there are far too many unanswered questions for the verdict to remain. Plain and simple!
I may not agree with you, but you are entitled to form your own opinion, and I respect that opinion. However, go beyond the crash and look at the limited available factual evidence and the heavy burdon of proof required to prove negligence. It falls way, way short.
My regards, as always
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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CaptainFillosan. I think you may not have read all the earlier postings, but whether you have or not, please answer the question I put in my posting of 9 Jan at 1232. Or if not, then please offer some other explanation, assuming, that is, we can all accept that the Chinook was under control at least up to Waypoint change - which I do not think has ever been challenged.
Shackman. My memory is uncertain: I was in distant parts at the time, but there was, as far as I recall after all these years, no allegation of negligence, simply one of aircrew error. (And by the way, there was a great deal of that in the 70s, 60s and especially the 50s!). Nevertheless, it killed them all in that Chinook.
And of course it is true that the fast-jet fraternity jocks could pull-up in such a situation; but the helo fratenity lads have the ADDITIONAL option of slowing down or of even going into a hover to sort things out. Why then did this crew press on, and at speed? My answer; because THEY WERE NOT WHERE THEY THOUGHT THEY WERE. No-one has yet answered this crucial argument.
Regards. JP.
Brian Dixon.
Thanks for the courteous coment. Yes, of course there are many unanswered questions in this most unhappy affair, but it really is difficult to avoid the key facts that we have at our disposal.
I will not of course rehearse them all again here, but it has always seemed to me that those many uncertainties do not contradict the central issues. For example, we will never know what went on in the cockpit, but we certainly know what the sad consequences of what went on actually were. Does that kind of uncertainty negate our assessment? I think not. Please see my question at 12.37, and tell me what you think. All the best, and would it not be a great satisfaction to find some other explanation for this tragedy? Regards.. JP.
Shackman. My memory is uncertain: I was in distant parts at the time, but there was, as far as I recall after all these years, no allegation of negligence, simply one of aircrew error. (And by the way, there was a great deal of that in the 70s, 60s and especially the 50s!). Nevertheless, it killed them all in that Chinook.
And of course it is true that the fast-jet fraternity jocks could pull-up in such a situation; but the helo fratenity lads have the ADDITIONAL option of slowing down or of even going into a hover to sort things out. Why then did this crew press on, and at speed? My answer; because THEY WERE NOT WHERE THEY THOUGHT THEY WERE. No-one has yet answered this crucial argument.
Regards. JP.
Brian Dixon.
Thanks for the courteous coment. Yes, of course there are many unanswered questions in this most unhappy affair, but it really is difficult to avoid the key facts that we have at our disposal.
I will not of course rehearse them all again here, but it has always seemed to me that those many uncertainties do not contradict the central issues. For example, we will never know what went on in the cockpit, but we certainly know what the sad consequences of what went on actually were. Does that kind of uncertainty negate our assessment? I think not. Please see my question at 12.37, and tell me what you think. All the best, and would it not be a great satisfaction to find some other explanation for this tragedy? Regards.. JP.
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JP,
I also say there are so many unanswered questions that the MOD verdict is not justified due to a lack of real EVIDENCE.
You think that coming to a hover in marginal conditions is a safe thing to try? As someone completely unqualified to fly helicopters you wouldn't understand that attempting that could be a very dangerous thing indeed.
Slow down, certainly. It appears that they did. The yachtsman witness said he thought the Chinook he saw was involved in a search due to its low speed.
You appear to accept that there was quite possibly a problem which required them to "sort things out", then? I remind you of the known history of flying control (pallet detaching) problems, in addition to engine control (runaway up) problems. FACT. The accident aircraft also had a previously recorded TANS problem. FACT. There was BOI evidence that it may have had an intercomm failure just before the accident. FACT.
If there WAS sufficient PROOF, instead of hypotheses, to support the gross negligence label, then no problem at all, everyone might have accepted it and got quietly on with their lives and learned a flight safety lesson from the accident. As it was, the only thing RAF crews learned was that if something goes wrong and an accident occurs, resulting in their inability to give evidence, they may well get stitched up with a manslaughter charge by their so-called leaders who perhaps prefer to protect their own positions.
As things stand, I still suspect there is a lot more to this than meets the eye. The MOD has pushed a verdict that piles the blame in a convenient corner. Politically far easier than do that than to accept that major management mistakes were made over the premature introduction into service of the Mk 2 Chinook when it was judged not airworthy by that MOD department actually tasked with bringing it into service?
I for one, will never accept the verdict on the evidence found.
Ex RAF A2 QHI, SH, served my time in NI. Also ex RAF QFI.
I also say there are so many unanswered questions that the MOD verdict is not justified due to a lack of real EVIDENCE.
You think that coming to a hover in marginal conditions is a safe thing to try? As someone completely unqualified to fly helicopters you wouldn't understand that attempting that could be a very dangerous thing indeed.
Slow down, certainly. It appears that they did. The yachtsman witness said he thought the Chinook he saw was involved in a search due to its low speed.
You appear to accept that there was quite possibly a problem which required them to "sort things out", then? I remind you of the known history of flying control (pallet detaching) problems, in addition to engine control (runaway up) problems. FACT. The accident aircraft also had a previously recorded TANS problem. FACT. There was BOI evidence that it may have had an intercomm failure just before the accident. FACT.
If there WAS sufficient PROOF, instead of hypotheses, to support the gross negligence label, then no problem at all, everyone might have accepted it and got quietly on with their lives and learned a flight safety lesson from the accident. As it was, the only thing RAF crews learned was that if something goes wrong and an accident occurs, resulting in their inability to give evidence, they may well get stitched up with a manslaughter charge by their so-called leaders who perhaps prefer to protect their own positions.
As things stand, I still suspect there is a lot more to this than meets the eye. The MOD has pushed a verdict that piles the blame in a convenient corner. Politically far easier than do that than to accept that major management mistakes were made over the premature introduction into service of the Mk 2 Chinook when it was judged not airworthy by that MOD department actually tasked with bringing it into service?
I for one, will never accept the verdict on the evidence found.
Ex RAF A2 QHI, SH, served my time in NI. Also ex RAF QFI.
Last edited by ShyTorque; 9th Jan 2003 at 23:21.