Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
Join Date: Jun 2007
Location: 119K East of SARDOT
Posts: 146
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Brown plans cabinet reshuffle as ministers told to cut short holiday.
Wise words.
Although (sourced from today's The Independent),
I will be very surprised if this appeal ends up with the mark of Des Browne on it; I think we are going to have to wait until the next S of S for Defence is in the chair, or 2010.
AA
Although (sourced from today's The Independent),
Gordon Brown is planning to reshuffle the Cabinet in the first week of September in an attempt to re-assert his authority over his divided government.
All ministers are being told by Downing Street to return from holiday early next month. David Miliband, the Foreign Secretary, has already cancelled a visit provisionally arranged for that time.
The Prime Minister's instruction to be in London signals that a wide-ranging ministerial reshuffle is likely as early as 1 or 2 September. It would be followed by a meeting of the Cabinet where the new ministers hammer out a series of policy initiatives designed to win back disillusioned voters.
All eyes will be on Mr Miliband's fate in the reshuffle after he infuriated Downing Street this week by implicitly staking his claim for the top job.
The Foreign Secretary will not be sacked in the next reshuffle and some advisers are urging the Prime Minister to "lock" Mr Miliband into his top team by making him Chancellor of the Exchequer. Alistair Darling, who has endured a torrid year in the post, could swap jobs with him and move to the Foreign Office. One party source said: "If David is so interested in the domestic agenda and attacking the Tories, then this is the perfect job for him."
Mr Brown is also considering creating a post of deputy prime minister with Alan Johnson, the Secretary of State for Health, another potential leadership rival, likely to be given the job.
The Prime Minister is planning to elevate a number of ministers of state to the cabinet table. Front-runners for promotion include Liam Byrne, the Immigration minister, Caroline Flint, the Housing minister, Jim Knight, the Schools minister, and Pat McFadden, the Employment Relations minister.
Current cabinet members who could be vulnerable include Des Browne, the Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, the Chief Whip, and Paul Murphy, the Welsh Secretary.
All ministers are being told by Downing Street to return from holiday early next month. David Miliband, the Foreign Secretary, has already cancelled a visit provisionally arranged for that time.
The Prime Minister's instruction to be in London signals that a wide-ranging ministerial reshuffle is likely as early as 1 or 2 September. It would be followed by a meeting of the Cabinet where the new ministers hammer out a series of policy initiatives designed to win back disillusioned voters.
All eyes will be on Mr Miliband's fate in the reshuffle after he infuriated Downing Street this week by implicitly staking his claim for the top job.
The Foreign Secretary will not be sacked in the next reshuffle and some advisers are urging the Prime Minister to "lock" Mr Miliband into his top team by making him Chancellor of the Exchequer. Alistair Darling, who has endured a torrid year in the post, could swap jobs with him and move to the Foreign Office. One party source said: "If David is so interested in the domestic agenda and attacking the Tories, then this is the perfect job for him."
Mr Brown is also considering creating a post of deputy prime minister with Alan Johnson, the Secretary of State for Health, another potential leadership rival, likely to be given the job.
The Prime Minister is planning to elevate a number of ministers of state to the cabinet table. Front-runners for promotion include Liam Byrne, the Immigration minister, Caroline Flint, the Housing minister, Jim Knight, the Schools minister, and Pat McFadden, the Employment Relations minister.
Current cabinet members who could be vulnerable include Des Browne, the Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, the Chief Whip, and Paul Murphy, the Welsh Secretary.
Des Browne
The Defence Secretary, who has struggled to make a mark in his current job, could fall victim to some Brownites' determination to reduce the number of Scots in the Cabinet in order to help win over voters in Middle England.
The Defence Secretary, who has struggled to make a mark in his current job, could fall victim to some Brownites' determination to reduce the number of Scots in the Cabinet in order to help win over voters in Middle England.
AA
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: wilts
Posts: 1,667
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Worse still, I hear that Des Browne hates his job as Sec State Def and wants to leave. He is being held back by greater political issues concerning PM.
I would place money that he is part of the reshuffle in September. This would set the cause back a long time.
Still think he is a decent man in the wrong job. He might respond to serious lobbying now. Respectfully suggest this is the way ahead. I would try myself, but me and Des have had our differences!
N
I would place money that he is part of the reshuffle in September. This would set the cause back a long time.
Still think he is a decent man in the wrong job. He might respond to serious lobbying now. Respectfully suggest this is the way ahead. I would try myself, but me and Des have had our differences!
N
Join Date: Sep 2003
Location: Perth, Western Australia
Posts: 786
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Noticed this on an obscure site - is this fresh news? Looks like a lot of money riding on outcome - interesting to see differences/errors in tech details/perceptions!
--------------------------------------------------------------
Intelligence, N. 63, 30 June 1997, p. 23
GREAT BRITAIN
CHINOOK CASE CRASHES IN THE COURT
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has paid almost œ8 million in
compensation to the relatives of 17 top intelligence officers
killed in the Chinook helicopter crash in Scotland, in June
1994. The information was revealed after Delyth Gregory-Smith,
the widow of an Army intelligence officer, accepted an
undisclosed out-of-court settlement (believed to be in excess
of œ500,000) on 16 June. Twelve of the 29 claims against the
MoD have still to be settled. If the present rate of
compensation is maintained, payments will eventually exceed œ14
million.
The twin-engine, recently-modified Chinook Mk2, with 25
passengers and four Royal Air Force (RAF) crew, had been
travelling from RAF Aldergrove, in Belfast, to a weekend
conference of intelligence and anti-terrorist experts at Fort
George, in Inverness, according to the MoD, when it failed to
clear the mist-covered, 240-meter high Torr Mor on the Mull of
Kintyre. Ten Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) Special Branch
members, nine senior Army intelligence officers and six MI5
agents attached to the Northern Ireland Office, as well as the
four RAF crew, died in the crash. An MoD/RAF board of inquiry
blamed the crash on the "gross negligence" of the pilot Flight
Lieutenant Jonathan Tapper, and his copilot, Flt. Lt. Richard
Cook. However, a Scottish Fatal Accident Inquiry later found
that there was no evidence of pilot error (INT, n. 34 1).
Mrs. Gregory-Smith sued the MoD claiming the helicopter had
been flying too low in poor visibility and had ascended to
rapidly in an attempt to clear the rocky outcrop when the crash
happened. The Chinook had been fitted with a computerized
automatic pilot, called a Mission Management System, which,
using a set of vectors and other flight data, allows pilots to
sit back and fly by computer.
Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Gregory-Smith, of the Army
Intelligence Corps based at Army Headquarters, in Lurgan,
County Armagh, could have expected to reach the rank of full
colonel by January 1996, and eventually brigadier. He was
posthumously awarded the Queen's Commendation for his covert
work in Northern Ireland. The agreement on compensation for
loss of earnings and bereavement was reached as the case was
about to be heard by the High Court in London. The MoD had not
contested the claim, but had failed to reach agreement on the
amount of damages. Later an MoD official, Ian Burnett, said
his department was satisfied with the outcome, especially as
Mrs. Gregory-Smith had not been required to take the witness
stand.
... -- Of course, the settlement also means that no MoD
officials were called to give evidence or face cross
examination and, as a result, the cause Chinook crash still has
not been properly explained. The MoD may have decided to avoid
a confrontation in court if it "got wind" of a recent U.S.
Department of Justice case against Boeing for providing
defective parts that caused two Chinook Ch-47D helicopters to
crash, one at Fort Meade, Maryland, and the other in Saudi
Arabia. The government claims Boeing knew that Chinook engine
transmissions, made by subcontractor Speco of Springfield,
Ohio, were faulty but nonetheless sold them to the U.S. Army.
The suit charges that for more than seven years Boeing
knowingly delivered helicopters with gears that did not meet
contract specifications. The RAF's Mk2 may well have been one
of those helicopters. Boeing has consistently refused to
answer questions concerning the Chinook involved in the Mull of
Kintyre crash.-------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------
Intelligence, N. 63, 30 June 1997, p. 23
GREAT BRITAIN
CHINOOK CASE CRASHES IN THE COURT
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has paid almost œ8 million in
compensation to the relatives of 17 top intelligence officers
killed in the Chinook helicopter crash in Scotland, in June
1994. The information was revealed after Delyth Gregory-Smith,
the widow of an Army intelligence officer, accepted an
undisclosed out-of-court settlement (believed to be in excess
of œ500,000) on 16 June. Twelve of the 29 claims against the
MoD have still to be settled. If the present rate of
compensation is maintained, payments will eventually exceed œ14
million.
The twin-engine, recently-modified Chinook Mk2, with 25
passengers and four Royal Air Force (RAF) crew, had been
travelling from RAF Aldergrove, in Belfast, to a weekend
conference of intelligence and anti-terrorist experts at Fort
George, in Inverness, according to the MoD, when it failed to
clear the mist-covered, 240-meter high Torr Mor on the Mull of
Kintyre. Ten Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) Special Branch
members, nine senior Army intelligence officers and six MI5
agents attached to the Northern Ireland Office, as well as the
four RAF crew, died in the crash. An MoD/RAF board of inquiry
blamed the crash on the "gross negligence" of the pilot Flight
Lieutenant Jonathan Tapper, and his copilot, Flt. Lt. Richard
Cook. However, a Scottish Fatal Accident Inquiry later found
that there was no evidence of pilot error (INT, n. 34 1).
Mrs. Gregory-Smith sued the MoD claiming the helicopter had
been flying too low in poor visibility and had ascended to
rapidly in an attempt to clear the rocky outcrop when the crash
happened. The Chinook had been fitted with a computerized
automatic pilot, called a Mission Management System, which,
using a set of vectors and other flight data, allows pilots to
sit back and fly by computer.
Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Gregory-Smith, of the Army
Intelligence Corps based at Army Headquarters, in Lurgan,
County Armagh, could have expected to reach the rank of full
colonel by January 1996, and eventually brigadier. He was
posthumously awarded the Queen's Commendation for his covert
work in Northern Ireland. The agreement on compensation for
loss of earnings and bereavement was reached as the case was
about to be heard by the High Court in London. The MoD had not
contested the claim, but had failed to reach agreement on the
amount of damages. Later an MoD official, Ian Burnett, said
his department was satisfied with the outcome, especially as
Mrs. Gregory-Smith had not been required to take the witness
stand.
... -- Of course, the settlement also means that no MoD
officials were called to give evidence or face cross
examination and, as a result, the cause Chinook crash still has
not been properly explained. The MoD may have decided to avoid
a confrontation in court if it "got wind" of a recent U.S.
Department of Justice case against Boeing for providing
defective parts that caused two Chinook Ch-47D helicopters to
crash, one at Fort Meade, Maryland, and the other in Saudi
Arabia. The government claims Boeing knew that Chinook engine
transmissions, made by subcontractor Speco of Springfield,
Ohio, were faulty but nonetheless sold them to the U.S. Army.
The suit charges that for more than seven years Boeing
knowingly delivered helicopters with gears that did not meet
contract specifications. The RAF's Mk2 may well have been one
of those helicopters. Boeing has consistently refused to
answer questions concerning the Chinook involved in the Mull of
Kintyre crash.-------------------------------------------------------------------
Join Date: May 2007
Location: Ireland
Posts: 25
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Good find Walter. I can see the MoD would like to use the two pilots as buffers against serious liability claims, but why cover up for Boeings' shortcomings if that is where the ultimate blame might be found?
Join Date: Sep 2003
Location: Perth, Western Australia
Posts: 786
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I just posted that for interest, esp re compo.
I do not see from analysis of this flight that there was any evidence of any kind of malfunction.
Everything points to a controlled flight as planned until something misled them re range from LZ.
Malpractice by someone on the ground - not malfunction of the a/c.
I do not see from analysis of this flight that there was any evidence of any kind of malfunction.
Everything points to a controlled flight as planned until something misled them re range from LZ.
Malpractice by someone on the ground - not malfunction of the a/c.
Avoid imitations
Join Date: Nov 2000
Location: Wandering the FIR and cyberspace often at highly unsociable times
Posts: 14,580
Received 438 Likes
on
231 Posts
Walter,
As I have pointed out to you on more than one occasion in the past, SH crew do NOT fly at high speed whilst searching for a landing site, either ground led or not. Especially in marginal weather. To approach at high speed goes against the very basis and logic of helicopter operations; either routine military, special ops, or civilian ops.
I don't think for one moment this is what they were trying to do. This one fact makes nonsense of your theory that the crew were trying to locate a point on the Mull and land and were led astray for reasons unknown, accidental or deliberate.
There are a number of other possibilities, as discussed here over many years.
The one thing I do agree with you about is that there was malpractice by persons on the ground. This was not by men in green or black, on the Mull, but by senior officers who recklessly insisted that the Mk2 was flown in any capacity on that fateful day. Especially in view of the concerns of the crew involved, other crews who had been required to operate it both in NI and in the Falkland Islands and most particularly by the Boscombe Down test pilots, who refused to fly the type any more (theoretically preventing its use by the RAF) until the issues over its safety had been resolved.
As I have pointed out to you on more than one occasion in the past, SH crew do NOT fly at high speed whilst searching for a landing site, either ground led or not. Especially in marginal weather. To approach at high speed goes against the very basis and logic of helicopter operations; either routine military, special ops, or civilian ops.
I don't think for one moment this is what they were trying to do. This one fact makes nonsense of your theory that the crew were trying to locate a point on the Mull and land and were led astray for reasons unknown, accidental or deliberate.
There are a number of other possibilities, as discussed here over many years.
The one thing I do agree with you about is that there was malpractice by persons on the ground. This was not by men in green or black, on the Mull, but by senior officers who recklessly insisted that the Mk2 was flown in any capacity on that fateful day. Especially in view of the concerns of the crew involved, other crews who had been required to operate it both in NI and in the Falkland Islands and most particularly by the Boscombe Down test pilots, who refused to fly the type any more (theoretically preventing its use by the RAF) until the issues over its safety had been resolved.
Join Date: May 2002
Location: On the keyboard
Posts: 73
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Boscombe Down "grounding"
ShyTorque,
As I've said on this thread before, as an ex-Boscombe Down tp myself, I find it simply mind-boggling that the flight was allowed to go ahead the day after Boscombe had declared the type unfit to fly, even for a flight test programme.
The reason for carrying out such programmes is to find faults in aircraft or their equipment which need to be fixed before the type or equipment can be cleared for Service use. It is all too common for quite alarming faults to be found. Usually, there are ways of working around problem areas pending a "fix" so that the programme is not brought to a standstill - with the inevitable delay then to the Service clearance.
As I have written here before, in all my years at Boscombe it was extremely rare for a whole trial to be halted because the aircraft type concerned was considered unsafe for flight - and unprecedented for the RAF/Navy/Army then to continue to operate the type. The importance of this particular mission simply emphasises the absurdity of the senior Commanders' decision to allow the flight to proceed. That decision is all the more absurd in the light of the crew's concerns, which you mention.
As I've said on this thread before, as an ex-Boscombe Down tp myself, I find it simply mind-boggling that the flight was allowed to go ahead the day after Boscombe had declared the type unfit to fly, even for a flight test programme.
The reason for carrying out such programmes is to find faults in aircraft or their equipment which need to be fixed before the type or equipment can be cleared for Service use. It is all too common for quite alarming faults to be found. Usually, there are ways of working around problem areas pending a "fix" so that the programme is not brought to a standstill - with the inevitable delay then to the Service clearance.
As I have written here before, in all my years at Boscombe it was extremely rare for a whole trial to be halted because the aircraft type concerned was considered unsafe for flight - and unprecedented for the RAF/Navy/Army then to continue to operate the type. The importance of this particular mission simply emphasises the absurdity of the senior Commanders' decision to allow the flight to proceed. That decision is all the more absurd in the light of the crew's concerns, which you mention.
Last edited by Vertico; 4th Aug 2008 at 13:47. Reason: Correction
Join Date: Sep 2003
Location: Perth, Western Australia
Posts: 786
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
ShyTorque
<<As I have pointed out to you on more than one occasion in the past, SH crew do NOT fly at high speed whilst searching for a landing site ...>>
And as I have gone to great efforts to point out:
the weather was typical and that the component of greatest significance was localised on the slopes;
they could have seen those slopes from NI coast;
at what speed do you approach a known position with a local aid giving you exact range in clear conditions?;
at what distance to go do you start to slow down? (The evidence according to Boeing's analysis was that they had already started to do so.);
what sort of distance do you need to slow down (smoothly even) from cruise to <80kts?;
if they had thought themesleves, say, ½ a mile further away from those misty slopes, would this have made sense?
.
You could have gone to the Mull in the last 14 summers to get familiar with these typical conditions – why not?
Flying in the clear over the sea but with visual cues to range obscurred on the landmass:
you wouldn't go fast that way unless there was something else you were relying upon – you would not have gone in at their speed as close as the position of waypoint change unless you had something else that you trusted more than the SuperTANS that was telling you that you had a bit more to go (as I have described in a recent post, you would have to have erred on the safe side regarding the SuperTANS and the position of waypoint change – according to the SuperTANS which was deemed to have been accurate over the time of interest by AAIB et al – was already so close in that a turn or other action would have been required before they dumped waypoint A.
.
<<I don't think for one moment this is what they were trying to do. This one fact makes nonsense of your theory that the crew were trying to locate a point on the Mull and land and were led astray for reasons unknown, accidental or deliberate.>>
“Trying to locate” is not the same as going for a known position – I am saying that it was a judgment of distance that screwed them – imagine how even in clear conditions a TACAN on the deck of a ship giving a wrong range reading would spoil your day – I cannot see why you are having such diifficulty understanding this concept - whether you agree with the whole scenario or not is irrelevent, it is a concept worth understanding, a possible case study that could help prevent other similar approaches going wrong.
As I have said before, they had started slowing down which at cruising speed would have had the engines at the lowest power setting for any flight profile - there was no room at that site for an overrun and their low power situation would not have left any significant thrust above that required to maintain altitude (except for the stored energy in the rotors which had been found to have reduced to about 90% normal rpm by impact) such that any significant turn away would have resulted in an immediate loss of height;
The engines being found at a matched power level indicated very little time to react so they were surprised in the last seconds – there had not been time to get the engines to start spooling up despite the full collective found (turbine lag/FADEC response time).
The only manouevre appropriate that offered a chance of slowing down significantly was a slew (takes no energy as twin rotors are unstable in this axis) – and that is what it looked like they had started – a recognised manoevre for Chinooks but one which was described in one of the inquiries as not being so.
<<As I have pointed out to you on more than one occasion in the past, SH crew do NOT fly at high speed whilst searching for a landing site ...>>
And as I have gone to great efforts to point out:
the weather was typical and that the component of greatest significance was localised on the slopes;
they could have seen those slopes from NI coast;
at what speed do you approach a known position with a local aid giving you exact range in clear conditions?;
at what distance to go do you start to slow down? (The evidence according to Boeing's analysis was that they had already started to do so.);
what sort of distance do you need to slow down (smoothly even) from cruise to <80kts?;
if they had thought themesleves, say, ½ a mile further away from those misty slopes, would this have made sense?
.
You could have gone to the Mull in the last 14 summers to get familiar with these typical conditions – why not?
Flying in the clear over the sea but with visual cues to range obscurred on the landmass:
you wouldn't go fast that way unless there was something else you were relying upon – you would not have gone in at their speed as close as the position of waypoint change unless you had something else that you trusted more than the SuperTANS that was telling you that you had a bit more to go (as I have described in a recent post, you would have to have erred on the safe side regarding the SuperTANS and the position of waypoint change – according to the SuperTANS which was deemed to have been accurate over the time of interest by AAIB et al – was already so close in that a turn or other action would have been required before they dumped waypoint A.
.
<<I don't think for one moment this is what they were trying to do. This one fact makes nonsense of your theory that the crew were trying to locate a point on the Mull and land and were led astray for reasons unknown, accidental or deliberate.>>
“Trying to locate” is not the same as going for a known position – I am saying that it was a judgment of distance that screwed them – imagine how even in clear conditions a TACAN on the deck of a ship giving a wrong range reading would spoil your day – I cannot see why you are having such diifficulty understanding this concept - whether you agree with the whole scenario or not is irrelevent, it is a concept worth understanding, a possible case study that could help prevent other similar approaches going wrong.
As I have said before, they had started slowing down which at cruising speed would have had the engines at the lowest power setting for any flight profile - there was no room at that site for an overrun and their low power situation would not have left any significant thrust above that required to maintain altitude (except for the stored energy in the rotors which had been found to have reduced to about 90% normal rpm by impact) such that any significant turn away would have resulted in an immediate loss of height;
The engines being found at a matched power level indicated very little time to react so they were surprised in the last seconds – there had not been time to get the engines to start spooling up despite the full collective found (turbine lag/FADEC response time).
The only manouevre appropriate that offered a chance of slowing down significantly was a slew (takes no energy as twin rotors are unstable in this axis) – and that is what it looked like they had started – a recognised manoevre for Chinooks but one which was described in one of the inquiries as not being so.
Avoid imitations
Join Date: Nov 2000
Location: Wandering the FIR and cyberspace often at highly unsociable times
Posts: 14,580
Received 438 Likes
on
231 Posts
Vertico, Yes I totally agree, you echo my point, exactly. I believe the MOD decided to protect a tragically flawed decision (somewhere in the command chain) to go against normal airworthiness procedures, which had been breached in the case of this aircraft. I believe this was because of a lack of airframes mainly caused by the unexpected and unprecedented problems experienced with the engine software. As aircrew we were always warned about "press-on-itis"; in this a case it was senior management suffering from that malaise, with respect to the too-hasty insistence that the type was ready for service.
Walter, Do you think in my 30 years of aviation, almost all of it at low level at the time of this accident, and some of it in the same operational theatre, I might not have encountered marginal weather such as this before and not found myself in a similar situation to this crew? To operate in similar weather conditions was (and is) far from unusual for RAF support helicopters, despite what the likes of Cazatou might try to put across here, because he can only relate from his own experience, to fixed wing operations above safety altitude in such weather.
I do not believe this crew were attempting a landing on or near the Mull. Whether "special" homing equipment was or was not fitted (and I have never seen evidence to suggest that it was), the final flight parameters of this aircraft simply do not fit in with a crew attempting a landing, especially in poor weather. Group Captain Pete Crawford (who I knew quite well) said exactly the same thing during the original investigation.
It is important to understand that the most critical thing about a field landing is that the crew are spatially orientated with their surroundings. The physical capability of the rate of slowing of the aircraft is secondary; a crew would never attempt to initially increase speed using maximum power to a high cruise speed and then use a maximum rate of slowing. This applies whether a DME of any sort is in use. That type of equipment would not be used as the primary navigation aid in low level operations to a field landing site, especially on unfamiliar, high ground in marginal weather.
Walter, Do you think in my 30 years of aviation, almost all of it at low level at the time of this accident, and some of it in the same operational theatre, I might not have encountered marginal weather such as this before and not found myself in a similar situation to this crew? To operate in similar weather conditions was (and is) far from unusual for RAF support helicopters, despite what the likes of Cazatou might try to put across here, because he can only relate from his own experience, to fixed wing operations above safety altitude in such weather.
I do not believe this crew were attempting a landing on or near the Mull. Whether "special" homing equipment was or was not fitted (and I have never seen evidence to suggest that it was), the final flight parameters of this aircraft simply do not fit in with a crew attempting a landing, especially in poor weather. Group Captain Pete Crawford (who I knew quite well) said exactly the same thing during the original investigation.
It is important to understand that the most critical thing about a field landing is that the crew are spatially orientated with their surroundings. The physical capability of the rate of slowing of the aircraft is secondary; a crew would never attempt to initially increase speed using maximum power to a high cruise speed and then use a maximum rate of slowing. This applies whether a DME of any sort is in use. That type of equipment would not be used as the primary navigation aid in low level operations to a field landing site, especially on unfamiliar, high ground in marginal weather.
Join Date: Sep 2003
Location: Perth, Western Australia
Posts: 786
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Shytorque
I do not understand why you are changing the parameters from those described – I would be grateful for answers to some of those questions that I put to you as you would surely be able to answer them off the top of your head with your experience.
.
<<the final flight parameters of this aircraft simply do not fit in with a crew attempting a landing ...>>
Baro Alt subscale appropriate QFE for altitude of LZ;
One RADALT warning set on minimum appropriate for imminent landing;
Deliberate turn to heading from position of waypoint change to LZ;
HP's course selector on that heading;
Slowing down;
Call sign appropriate for SAR exercise.
.
<< ... especially in poor weather.>>
But what about the localised weather that I described? I maintain that it was not poor at low level over the sea.
.
<<... a crew would never attempt to initially increase speed using maximum power to a high cruise speed and then use a maximum rate of slowing.>>
Where did that come from? - after a long leg at cruise speed they had started to slow down. As I asked you before, what distance would have been reasonable for a smooth slowing (thrust just balancing weight letting speed wash off with drag)?
Would they have been OK with ½ mile more?
.
<<That type of equipment would not be used as the primary navigation aid in low level operations to a field landing site>>
mmmh .... that is one of the main reasons it is intended for, surely? It is even used to mark local hazards to temp landing zones/ Forwrad Air Fields/ whatever you call them – in other NATO countries anyway. Have you ever used it or at least are you familiar with it?
Very useful tool for insertion/resupply/extraction etc etc..
.
<<... especially on unfamiliar, high ground in marginal weather. >>
It was not unfamiliar ground to mil helos who used to come over from NI to that site for training or rather perhaps drop off squaddies for training – Flt Lt Tapper had landed there before – it is quite spacious, the hazard being the very steeply rising ground ahead leaving no room for a wave off in that direction – at their angle of approach to the coast, a slight turn left would have kept them clear.
What do you know of the past use of this site? (You mention much time operating in the area.) - you'd hardly be causing a security problem now, would you?
.
You see, you say you have all that experience and as no one else contadicts that I have to believe your claim – but some of what you say is in conflict with what others have said (in aviation but not on this forum and in the avionics business and in the field of navigation systems) and with common sense and with local knowledge (some personal local knowledge and a lot of locals' knowledge). Reasonable rebuttals that make sense would be gladly accepted as it would have saved so much time but you (plural here) so often dismiss certain points in a way ... well why don't I give an example of one issue at the end of this post?.
.
There is no evidence whatsoever for an airworthiness problem if you analyse the flight in detail whereas everything that is known fits with an exercise (callsign) deliberately approaching a specific location that had been used by Chinooks before (waypoint A was the inner marker for it and they did a deliberate turn [course selector was same as track on final leg] towards it) being ready to land (alt s/scale per QFE, RADALT warning min, slowing down) and having a local reference of some kind in which they had more confidence than the SuperTANS (doesn't leave much, does it?).
.
EXAMPLE OF DEBATE
This is from memory just now.
Remember the squawk code and the radar issue?
I asked was there any significance to the sqawk code as found (7760).
Ans, NO – probably got there while they were changing 7000(?) to an emergency one or perhaps got there due to impact – 7760 had no significance.
Oh, I thought, that's a shame because it could have been an important clue as to what they were doing – I had been told by someone in a position to know at EuroControl (as I recall it was) that the UK at the time was short of codes for special exercises and may use a code from its domestic allocation where there is no confusion – and 7760 being a domestic one for use in the area of the Channel Islands (so no confusion), this seemed worth following up.
My misgivings as to the practice of changing code in an immediate emergency and my doubts as to whether impact could have got to that combination aside, I asked what it had been earlier in the flight.
Ans, various like Aldergrove had no secondary radar at the time and Tyree was out of range.
Then I mentioned a report in the press by a reputable journalist that someone had seen recordings of the flight at Prestwick – said that the track looked like they had gone straight in or something like that (ie there must have been enough/multiple returns that were plenty enough to get a definite track).
Ans, various strenuous denials that it could have been possible, people claiming to have been there and there was no record or rather that there was nothing on the recordings that they saw – even someone making the puerile remark that Prestwick aerodrome radar would not have got it (obviously).
I pressed the journalist who could not give me the identity of his source but was adamant that the person was senior, in a position to know, and had seen recordings.
Now here is the important bit – no one here had mentioned Lowther Hill!
Fancy that – the main site for the area of interest and no one mentioned it – Lowther Hill feeds to the control centre at Prestwick.
So I ran a propagation model that uses actual topographic data from the shuttle for the terrain – you actually have line of site down to their cruising altitude from the point where they got their feet wet up to close to the Mull – at the range from Lowther and with the Chinook presenting just about broadside you'd expect a strong return on primary radar, never mind secondary.
For it to have been otherwise would beg the question "how could this area not have had radar cover, between the NI coast and the mainland, right down to low level, in those times?".
I also dug out a story about the air ambulance that crashed into the sea a good deal further away (west of Mac runway) which, though presenting its tail end (presumably a smaller radar cross-section than the broadside of a Chinook) was held with consistency by the primary radar as well as the secondary.
One would have thought that at least a couple of secondary returns would have come back from the Chinook which would have confirmed the squawk code.
So in this example, it is important to realise the sequence of the rebuttals and the omissions – a simple, reasonable answer in the first place would have saved so much time.
Oh and we still don't know what it was.
I do not understand why you are changing the parameters from those described – I would be grateful for answers to some of those questions that I put to you as you would surely be able to answer them off the top of your head with your experience.
.
<<the final flight parameters of this aircraft simply do not fit in with a crew attempting a landing ...>>
Baro Alt subscale appropriate QFE for altitude of LZ;
One RADALT warning set on minimum appropriate for imminent landing;
Deliberate turn to heading from position of waypoint change to LZ;
HP's course selector on that heading;
Slowing down;
Call sign appropriate for SAR exercise.
.
<< ... especially in poor weather.>>
But what about the localised weather that I described? I maintain that it was not poor at low level over the sea.
.
<<... a crew would never attempt to initially increase speed using maximum power to a high cruise speed and then use a maximum rate of slowing.>>
Where did that come from? - after a long leg at cruise speed they had started to slow down. As I asked you before, what distance would have been reasonable for a smooth slowing (thrust just balancing weight letting speed wash off with drag)?
Would they have been OK with ½ mile more?
.
<<That type of equipment would not be used as the primary navigation aid in low level operations to a field landing site>>
mmmh .... that is one of the main reasons it is intended for, surely? It is even used to mark local hazards to temp landing zones/ Forwrad Air Fields/ whatever you call them – in other NATO countries anyway. Have you ever used it or at least are you familiar with it?
Very useful tool for insertion/resupply/extraction etc etc..
.
<<... especially on unfamiliar, high ground in marginal weather. >>
It was not unfamiliar ground to mil helos who used to come over from NI to that site for training or rather perhaps drop off squaddies for training – Flt Lt Tapper had landed there before – it is quite spacious, the hazard being the very steeply rising ground ahead leaving no room for a wave off in that direction – at their angle of approach to the coast, a slight turn left would have kept them clear.
What do you know of the past use of this site? (You mention much time operating in the area.) - you'd hardly be causing a security problem now, would you?
.
You see, you say you have all that experience and as no one else contadicts that I have to believe your claim – but some of what you say is in conflict with what others have said (in aviation but not on this forum and in the avionics business and in the field of navigation systems) and with common sense and with local knowledge (some personal local knowledge and a lot of locals' knowledge). Reasonable rebuttals that make sense would be gladly accepted as it would have saved so much time but you (plural here) so often dismiss certain points in a way ... well why don't I give an example of one issue at the end of this post?.
.
There is no evidence whatsoever for an airworthiness problem if you analyse the flight in detail whereas everything that is known fits with an exercise (callsign) deliberately approaching a specific location that had been used by Chinooks before (waypoint A was the inner marker for it and they did a deliberate turn [course selector was same as track on final leg] towards it) being ready to land (alt s/scale per QFE, RADALT warning min, slowing down) and having a local reference of some kind in which they had more confidence than the SuperTANS (doesn't leave much, does it?).
.
EXAMPLE OF DEBATE
This is from memory just now.
Remember the squawk code and the radar issue?
I asked was there any significance to the sqawk code as found (7760).
Ans, NO – probably got there while they were changing 7000(?) to an emergency one or perhaps got there due to impact – 7760 had no significance.
Oh, I thought, that's a shame because it could have been an important clue as to what they were doing – I had been told by someone in a position to know at EuroControl (as I recall it was) that the UK at the time was short of codes for special exercises and may use a code from its domestic allocation where there is no confusion – and 7760 being a domestic one for use in the area of the Channel Islands (so no confusion), this seemed worth following up.
My misgivings as to the practice of changing code in an immediate emergency and my doubts as to whether impact could have got to that combination aside, I asked what it had been earlier in the flight.
Ans, various like Aldergrove had no secondary radar at the time and Tyree was out of range.
Then I mentioned a report in the press by a reputable journalist that someone had seen recordings of the flight at Prestwick – said that the track looked like they had gone straight in or something like that (ie there must have been enough/multiple returns that were plenty enough to get a definite track).
Ans, various strenuous denials that it could have been possible, people claiming to have been there and there was no record or rather that there was nothing on the recordings that they saw – even someone making the puerile remark that Prestwick aerodrome radar would not have got it (obviously).
I pressed the journalist who could not give me the identity of his source but was adamant that the person was senior, in a position to know, and had seen recordings.
Now here is the important bit – no one here had mentioned Lowther Hill!
Fancy that – the main site for the area of interest and no one mentioned it – Lowther Hill feeds to the control centre at Prestwick.
So I ran a propagation model that uses actual topographic data from the shuttle for the terrain – you actually have line of site down to their cruising altitude from the point where they got their feet wet up to close to the Mull – at the range from Lowther and with the Chinook presenting just about broadside you'd expect a strong return on primary radar, never mind secondary.
For it to have been otherwise would beg the question "how could this area not have had radar cover, between the NI coast and the mainland, right down to low level, in those times?".
I also dug out a story about the air ambulance that crashed into the sea a good deal further away (west of Mac runway) which, though presenting its tail end (presumably a smaller radar cross-section than the broadside of a Chinook) was held with consistency by the primary radar as well as the secondary.
One would have thought that at least a couple of secondary returns would have come back from the Chinook which would have confirmed the squawk code.
So in this example, it is important to realise the sequence of the rebuttals and the omissions – a simple, reasonable answer in the first place would have saved so much time.
Oh and we still don't know what it was.
Avoid imitations
Join Date: Nov 2000
Location: Wandering the FIR and cyberspace often at highly unsociable times
Posts: 14,580
Received 438 Likes
on
231 Posts
Walter, from this post and many others, you still seem to think there is a conspiracy amongst us to keep "the truth" from coming out. You obviously believe you have found the answer and have put in a huge amount of work to prove yourself correct. Unfortunately, many military and ex-military folk here have tried to tell you that this equipment was NOT fitted to this aircraft. Certainly, it was not in use in the RAF to the best of my knowledge at the time of the accident (and never had been).
I was an SH pilot from 1979 and an Operational Conversion Unit instructor from 1984. From 1979 the original TANS came into service. It was widely publicised because we had to learn how to use it and how to teach others to use it. It was certainly no secret, although it revolutionised helicopter navigation. Why would another piece of equipment, effectively a mobile DME and far from revolutionary, be kept secret from crews likely to have to use it or to teach others to do so? It defies logic.
I'm afraid if you want any of the other more detailed questions answering by myself you will now have to begin your own thread on the subject, as I've asked you to do many times before.
I was an SH pilot from 1979 and an Operational Conversion Unit instructor from 1984. From 1979 the original TANS came into service. It was widely publicised because we had to learn how to use it and how to teach others to use it. It was certainly no secret, although it revolutionised helicopter navigation. Why would another piece of equipment, effectively a mobile DME and far from revolutionary, be kept secret from crews likely to have to use it or to teach others to do so? It defies logic.
I'm afraid if you want any of the other more detailed questions answering by myself you will now have to begin your own thread on the subject, as I've asked you to do many times before.
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: Liverpool based Geordie, so calm down, calm down kidda!!
Age: 60
Posts: 2,051
Likes: 0
Received 17 Likes
on
6 Posts
If you had to carry out an emergency Tans or RNS252 approach in poor weather, you certainly kept the speed to an absolute minimum during the approach whilst IMC and near to the ground. I stated years ago, try and drive down the motorway at 70mph with your eyes shut and that equates to flying low level/high speed/IMC. You just don't do it. In other words, even if they did have special kit fitted (they didn't), this would not have been the approach profile. If it was special trial kit, you would certainly back everything up on the RNS252 to x-refer, but they didn't, because they were not doing it. When will you understand Walt?? I was in the planning room with the crew and in the crewroom pre-flight. I even remember jealously looking at their planned route and particularly at the golf clubs ready to be loaded. It was a thinly disguised golf jolly for a bunch of senior officials who deserved the break. Some of them were missing body parts thanks to the IRA. Should the crew have launched?? Debatable for a MK2, certainly with a MK1. They were told to get on with it, even after trying to cancel. We all knew the chinooks were grounded at Boscombe, we talked about it!! Would you carry out such a risky approach in an aircraft you didn't fully trust?? If you knew Jon Tapper, you wouldn't even suggest it!! Walter, you make me very very very sad with your rambling. Cover up????? If there was a cover up, I would fight to make it public!! 
Join Date: Sep 2003
Location: Perth, Western Australia
Posts: 786
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
ShyTorque
<<Unfortunately, many military and ex-military folk here have tried to tell you that this equipment was NOT fitted to this aircraft. Certainly, it was not in use in the RAF to the best of my knowledge at the time of the accident (and never had been).>>
Unfortunately someone in a position to know has told me otherwise on both points - better update yourself.
And what is the big deal about answering those simple questions? - just do it.
Jayteeto
Still don't understand the weather? - you've never approached a misty headland at low level over sea? They were in the clear until just before impact - simple - do you believe that they were in IMC at low level? - you're not giving them much credit.
.
The pair of you are just time wasters, eh?
<<Unfortunately, many military and ex-military folk here have tried to tell you that this equipment was NOT fitted to this aircraft. Certainly, it was not in use in the RAF to the best of my knowledge at the time of the accident (and never had been).>>
Unfortunately someone in a position to know has told me otherwise on both points - better update yourself.
And what is the big deal about answering those simple questions? - just do it.
Jayteeto
Still don't understand the weather? - you've never approached a misty headland at low level over sea? They were in the clear until just before impact - simple - do you believe that they were in IMC at low level? - you're not giving them much credit.
.
The pair of you are just time wasters, eh?
Avoid imitations
Join Date: Nov 2000
Location: Wandering the FIR and cyberspace often at highly unsociable times
Posts: 14,580
Received 438 Likes
on
231 Posts
So you must resort to insults yet again because folk will not go along with you.
Take off your blinkers. Just open another thread.
And what is the big deal about answering those simple questions? - just do it.
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Oxon
Age: 66
Posts: 1,942
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"The pair of you are just time wasters, eh?"
Pretty obnoxious even by your standards Walter. You ask questions and when you do not like the answers you simply throw insults and stamp your petty little feet.........that'll give credibility to your non argument.
You have the thoughts of an experienced SH pilot of 30 years standing and the written observations of another SH pilot who was actually there as the crew were auth'd on that fateful day and you dismiss them as time wasters
Not sure about the identity of Shy but I flew with with JT on numerous occasions during my NI days and would trust what he has to say implicitly, so take notice you ar@e
Considering some of the recent posts on here I am reasonably certain where your "Unfortunately someone in a position to know has told me otherwise on both points" has come from and if your whole theory now hangs on that....................................
Pretty obnoxious even by your standards Walter. You ask questions and when you do not like the answers you simply throw insults and stamp your petty little feet.........that'll give credibility to your non argument.
You have the thoughts of an experienced SH pilot of 30 years standing and the written observations of another SH pilot who was actually there as the crew were auth'd on that fateful day and you dismiss them as time wasters
Not sure about the identity of Shy but I flew with with JT on numerous occasions during my NI days and would trust what he has to say implicitly, so take notice you ar@e
Considering some of the recent posts on here I am reasonably certain where your "Unfortunately someone in a position to know has told me otherwise on both points" has come from and if your whole theory now hangs on that....................................
Join Date: Jul 2004
Location: Longton, Lancs, UK
Age: 80
Posts: 1,527
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
Walter K
I don't know why I'm wasting bandwidth on you, but can I tell you that if you had any remaining credibility on here, you have just expended it with your insulting and unwarranted remarks in your last post. We almost met up in London during your last visit to the UK, at your request - it's as well that we didn't.
I don't know why I'm wasting bandwidth on you, but can I tell you that if you had any remaining credibility on here, you have just expended it with your insulting and unwarranted remarks in your last post. We almost met up in London during your last visit to the UK, at your request - it's as well that we didn't.
A really irritating PPRuNer
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: Just popping my head back up above the parapet
Posts: 903
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Walter,
why don't you simply write to the MoD and use the Freedom of Information Act? Ask them all about whether ZD576 was fitted with and/or carrying any additional equipment.
That should give you the answers you seek. If they write back and refuse to confirm/deny, then that will have to be dealt with at the time.
I hope this can remain the dignified campaign it was meant to be.
Good luck with your questions.
Kind regards,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
why don't you simply write to the MoD and use the Freedom of Information Act? Ask them all about whether ZD576 was fitted with and/or carrying any additional equipment.
That should give you the answers you seek. If they write back and refuse to confirm/deny, then that will have to be dealt with at the time.
I hope this can remain the dignified campaign it was meant to be.
Good luck with your questions.
Kind regards,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: Liverpool based Geordie, so calm down, calm down kidda!!
Age: 60
Posts: 2,051
Likes: 0
Received 17 Likes
on
6 Posts
I wrote a long reply but then decided not to press submit, so here is the short version. If I have wasted peoples time by telling the facts that I know from that day, then I am truly sorry and apologise to you all. The facts obviously don't matter. I believe a time waster is someone who clouds the truth with wild theories and lies, ie they waste your valuable time..... hmmmmmm.......