Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Twinact et al,
You are ALL quite correct. IF, and only IF, the crew considered the possibility of the Accident. It is, however, unlikely that it was a major factor in their decision making process. NO CREW CONTEMPLATES THE SCENARIO OF THEIR FATAL ACCIDENT AT THE PLANNING STAGE OF A SORTIE- UNLESS THEY ARE TEST PILOTS.
For example:- the crew were content to utilise a planing chart drawn up by a different crew for the fatal sortie. Some may say that this chart (of which a photocopy was left behind) was not the chart used by the crew. What then was the purpose of leaving behind the photocopy. Was it to deliberately deceive?
In addition, what were their plans if they ran out of crew duty time?
These questions have been brushed aside for the last few years, but they are of fundamental importance if we are to understand the Accident.
You are ALL quite correct. IF, and only IF, the crew considered the possibility of the Accident. It is, however, unlikely that it was a major factor in their decision making process. NO CREW CONTEMPLATES THE SCENARIO OF THEIR FATAL ACCIDENT AT THE PLANNING STAGE OF A SORTIE- UNLESS THEY ARE TEST PILOTS.
For example:- the crew were content to utilise a planing chart drawn up by a different crew for the fatal sortie. Some may say that this chart (of which a photocopy was left behind) was not the chart used by the crew. What then was the purpose of leaving behind the photocopy. Was it to deliberately deceive?
In addition, what were their plans if they ran out of crew duty time?
These questions have been brushed aside for the last few years, but they are of fundamental importance if we are to understand the Accident.
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Good legal ploy, chaps, when in doubt discredit the witness.
I would not argue that this is hindsight although I understand why you want it to be portrayed as such. I have heard many experienced crews discussing exceeding their icing limits in the event of encountering bad weather, done it myself in a number of theatres. I accept you can't preplan a fatal accident!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
I would not argue that this is hindsight although I understand why you want it to be portrayed as such. I have heard many experienced crews discussing exceeding their icing limits in the event of encountering bad weather, done it myself in a number of theatres. I accept you can't preplan a fatal accident!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
A really irritating PPRuNer
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If you look at all the records - discrediting people is exactly what Messrs Wratten and Day have done all along to those who don't subscribe to their best guess opinion.
Those in the campaign are interested only in provable facts. Hindsight is useful in preventing future accidents. Sadly, both these opportunities were ignored by the Reviewing Officers.
Twinact - No one can say categorically that Jon and Rick weren't negligent. What most agree with is, taking into account the RAF's own rules at the time of the accident, you cannot say what caused the accident with absolutely no doubt whatsoever. Would you agree with that point?
Do you believe that they were guilty of goss negligence? If so, on what facts do you base your opinion?
Regards, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Those in the campaign are interested only in provable facts. Hindsight is useful in preventing future accidents. Sadly, both these opportunities were ignored by the Reviewing Officers.
Twinact - No one can say categorically that Jon and Rick weren't negligent. What most agree with is, taking into account the RAF's own rules at the time of the accident, you cannot say what caused the accident with absolutely no doubt whatsoever. Would you agree with that point?
Do you believe that they were guilty of goss negligence? If so, on what facts do you base your opinion?
Regards, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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cazatou
I agree with your comments:
<<For example … In addition, what were their plans if they ran out of crew duty time?
These questions have been brushed aside for the last few years, but they are of fundamental importance if we are to understand the Accident.>>
In particular, I was present at the FAI when the issue of duty time came up – it was stated there that to be planning on exceeding the duty time would only have required a request being put in for approval BUT this was not done AND on no previous occasion had such time been exceeded without asking for it – the impression I got was that it would have been unusual for them to have been intending to exceed the time without having requested it – as they would not have exceeded their time with a stopover at Macrihanish, I believe that they probably were going to stop there as the team on board had done the previous year when they had a security meeting at Mac.
Further on your point on understanding the accident, as a result of research and consequent discussions, I believe that the conditions of the flight have been clarified sufficiently to reduce the problem to that
//the aircraft did not make a turn in sufficient time (for whatever reason)//.
Compare this to all the nonsense talked about weather conditions, VFR in IMC, and failure to select an appropriate rate of climb, to name a few:
They were never intending to fly over the Mull but to turn close in and handrail up the coast to Macrihanish – a common practice;
They would not have exceeded their flying hours for that day if they had stopped at Macrihanish (as the passengers on board had done on previous occasions);
They were not in breach of flying regulations to be planning to turn at low level as close in as waypoint A in a helicopter in the prevailing conditions;
They were in clear air below the cloud base;
They were rapidly approaching a fixed topological feature, which was obscured in a local mist (as opposed to a body of mist or low cloud of indeterminate position) – common conditions in that area;
The SuperTANS was not adequate (after a sea crossing) as an accurate guide to the turning point (at least in that crews opinion – and that is what counts here);
Had they been under pressure to get close for tactical reasons (perceived or suggested threat) it would have been far from a clear cut maneuver and even if no other system fault can be blamed and pilot error is assumed,
//surely it is not grossly negligent to misjudge such a turn?//.
This is my point here: this scenario could have been put together some years ago had the main thrust of the Campaign not been so strongly along two avenues, i.e. towards an aircraft fault and (most harmfully in my opinion) that nothing could be known beyond reasonable doubt.
In my view, the latter was an obstacle to constructive debate on analysis of the flight.
Of course my personal interest goes beyond clearing the pilots’ names; it was necessary to get to the detail to be able to start looking into the possibility of sabotage. Clearly, a case of sabotage clears the pilots’ names and could lead to real justice for them and their families – simply getting their names cleared does not, indeed it would probably close the matter for most interested parties.
I agree with your comments:
<<For example … In addition, what were their plans if they ran out of crew duty time?
These questions have been brushed aside for the last few years, but they are of fundamental importance if we are to understand the Accident.>>
In particular, I was present at the FAI when the issue of duty time came up – it was stated there that to be planning on exceeding the duty time would only have required a request being put in for approval BUT this was not done AND on no previous occasion had such time been exceeded without asking for it – the impression I got was that it would have been unusual for them to have been intending to exceed the time without having requested it – as they would not have exceeded their time with a stopover at Macrihanish, I believe that they probably were going to stop there as the team on board had done the previous year when they had a security meeting at Mac.
Further on your point on understanding the accident, as a result of research and consequent discussions, I believe that the conditions of the flight have been clarified sufficiently to reduce the problem to that
//the aircraft did not make a turn in sufficient time (for whatever reason)//.
Compare this to all the nonsense talked about weather conditions, VFR in IMC, and failure to select an appropriate rate of climb, to name a few:
They were never intending to fly over the Mull but to turn close in and handrail up the coast to Macrihanish – a common practice;
They would not have exceeded their flying hours for that day if they had stopped at Macrihanish (as the passengers on board had done on previous occasions);
They were not in breach of flying regulations to be planning to turn at low level as close in as waypoint A in a helicopter in the prevailing conditions;
They were in clear air below the cloud base;
They were rapidly approaching a fixed topological feature, which was obscured in a local mist (as opposed to a body of mist or low cloud of indeterminate position) – common conditions in that area;
The SuperTANS was not adequate (after a sea crossing) as an accurate guide to the turning point (at least in that crews opinion – and that is what counts here);
Had they been under pressure to get close for tactical reasons (perceived or suggested threat) it would have been far from a clear cut maneuver and even if no other system fault can be blamed and pilot error is assumed,
//surely it is not grossly negligent to misjudge such a turn?//.
This is my point here: this scenario could have been put together some years ago had the main thrust of the Campaign not been so strongly along two avenues, i.e. towards an aircraft fault and (most harmfully in my opinion) that nothing could be known beyond reasonable doubt.
In my view, the latter was an obstacle to constructive debate on analysis of the flight.
Of course my personal interest goes beyond clearing the pilots’ names; it was necessary to get to the detail to be able to start looking into the possibility of sabotage. Clearly, a case of sabotage clears the pilots’ names and could lead to real justice for them and their families – simply getting their names cleared does not, indeed it would probably close the matter for most interested parties.
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walter kennedy,
I will put this as simply and courteously as I can. THEY WERE NOT(REPEAT NOT) GOING TO MACHRIHANISH !!!. To have returned there again would have breached every security rule in the book. Furthermore, there would have been no need to have gone via the Mull. They could have gone straight to an extended FINAL and been vectored in by Radar.
You, I understand from your posts, are awaiting confirmation from someone who possibly observed a radar track at about the time of the accident so that you can then state what transponder code was being used by that track and interpolate that information into an assumption that the aircraft was using the sortie to carry out unauthorised trials, in IMC, on equipment that had not been adopted for Service use. That would not be negligence - it would be Manslaughter!!!!
MAY I POINT OUT THAT, IF YOU DO GET A TRANSPONDER CODE FROM THAT SOURCE, THE INFORMATION WOULD BE A MEMORY OF A FLEETING INCIDENT THAT HAPPENED SOME FOUR THOUSAND DAYS AGO INVOLVING AN AIRCRAFT THAT WAS NOT UNDER THE CONTROL OF WHICHEVER ATC UNIT THAT PERSON WAS INVOLVED WITH - IF,INDEED,THEY WERE INVOLVED.
I was involved in the aftermath of this accident within 30 minutes of its occurrence. In addition, I had to fly some of the grieving relations to their loved ones funerals. After that I was involved with the BOI at HQ1 Gp.
This was, irrespective of ones point of view as to the cause of the accident, a human tragedy of immense proportions.
I will put this as simply and courteously as I can. THEY WERE NOT(REPEAT NOT) GOING TO MACHRIHANISH !!!. To have returned there again would have breached every security rule in the book. Furthermore, there would have been no need to have gone via the Mull. They could have gone straight to an extended FINAL and been vectored in by Radar.
You, I understand from your posts, are awaiting confirmation from someone who possibly observed a radar track at about the time of the accident so that you can then state what transponder code was being used by that track and interpolate that information into an assumption that the aircraft was using the sortie to carry out unauthorised trials, in IMC, on equipment that had not been adopted for Service use. That would not be negligence - it would be Manslaughter!!!!
MAY I POINT OUT THAT, IF YOU DO GET A TRANSPONDER CODE FROM THAT SOURCE, THE INFORMATION WOULD BE A MEMORY OF A FLEETING INCIDENT THAT HAPPENED SOME FOUR THOUSAND DAYS AGO INVOLVING AN AIRCRAFT THAT WAS NOT UNDER THE CONTROL OF WHICHEVER ATC UNIT THAT PERSON WAS INVOLVED WITH - IF,INDEED,THEY WERE INVOLVED.
I was involved in the aftermath of this accident within 30 minutes of its occurrence. In addition, I had to fly some of the grieving relations to their loved ones funerals. After that I was involved with the BOI at HQ1 Gp.
This was, irrespective of ones point of view as to the cause of the accident, a human tragedy of immense proportions.
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Cazatou, months back, I used to get annoyed at walters posts until someone explained how to set up the 'ignore this persons posts'. It works a treat and I never feel tempted to peek!! I, like you was involved and I know that he is talking garbage and damaging the real argument we raise. He has read a spy book some time in his life. I have just deleted my last line because I called him a rude name. 
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MAY I POINT OUT THAT, IF YOU DO GET A TRANSPONDER CODE FROM THAT SOURCE, THE INFORMATION WOULD BE A MEMORY OF A FLEETING INCIDENT THAT HAPPENED SOME FOUR THOUSAND DAYS AGO INVOLVING AN AIRCRAFT THAT WAS NOT UNDER THE CONTROL OF WHICHEVER ATC UNIT THAT PERSON WAS INVOLVED WITH - IF,INDEED,THEY WERE INVOLVED.
Now, whether the authorities will do so is another matter. The tapes are the property of NATS which is run as a private company, perhaps not covered by the Freedom of Information Act ?
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Pprune Radar
It has been established that ZD576 was not allocated a squawk on departure from Aldergrove and that Aldergrove had no SSR display on its radar.
Also, for topographical reasons, it seems most unlikely that Prestwick Radar might have had radar contact or been able to receive the IFF response. It's likely that the BoI will have already asked for and seen the Prestwick, Aldergrove, Machrahanish and AWACS tapes. If an unusual squawk had been seen on reviewing these tapes, doubtless mention would have been made of it in the original BoI report (remember, the Chairman of the BoI refused to accede to the unreasonable request of their Airships to change his conclusion, so it is most unlikely that he would have agreed to edit out any information about an IFF code!).
I daresay NATS would be prepared to review the appropriate tape again, but this really isn't necessary.
It has been established that ZD576 was not allocated a squawk on departure from Aldergrove and that Aldergrove had no SSR display on its radar.
Also, for topographical reasons, it seems most unlikely that Prestwick Radar might have had radar contact or been able to receive the IFF response. It's likely that the BoI will have already asked for and seen the Prestwick, Aldergrove, Machrahanish and AWACS tapes. If an unusual squawk had been seen on reviewing these tapes, doubtless mention would have been made of it in the original BoI report (remember, the Chairman of the BoI refused to accede to the unreasonable request of their Airships to change his conclusion, so it is most unlikely that he would have agreed to edit out any information about an IFF code!).
I daresay NATS would be prepared to review the appropriate tape again, but this really isn't necessary.
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cazatou
<<THEY WERE NOT(REPEAT NOT) GOING TO MACHRIHANISH !!!. To have returned there again would have breached every security rule in the book.>>
I genuinely do not understand this comment and would be interested in the reasoning.
<<Furthermore, there would have been no need to have gone via the Mull.>>
Which, presumably, could also have applied on their route to Curran? Regarding coming in to that turning point close to the Mull lighthouse, I was told (by someone who would have known, while I was standing at the site observing a helo do the turn) that helos crossing from NI did that “all the time” – it was also mentioned as a practice in one of the inquiries – funny how none of you regulars out there can accept this.
<<They could have gone straight to an extended FINAL and been vectored in by Radar.>>
Is this necessary if they are under the cloud base in VFR conditions? There is also the question of where exactly they may have intended landing – one local told me that helos had in the past landed on the golf course itself.
<< You, I understand from your posts, are awaiting confirmation from someone who possibly observed a radar track at about the time of the accident…>>
I was indeed waiting (patiently) but was moved by Captain Cook’s passing – I cannot imagine a worse situation for a man to be in than where his son is wrongfully blamed in such circumstances – and it is a further tragedy that, in my humble opinion, he could have been cleared in time with the information we already have (hence my previous post – that without buying into “conspiracy”, a clarification of the intended flight path, conditions, applicable regulations, and operational pressures could have resulted in the recognition that the cause of the crash could have been the misjudgment of a difficult turn (for whatever reason) that may not fall into the area of negligence at all). I think if any of you look back, then almost every aspect of this crash has been kept vague and ambiguous – and some statements have been downright misleading.
<< so that you can then state what transponder code was being used by that track and interpolate that information into an assumption…>>
Not so! It would be confirmation, the final piece of the puzzle if you like, of what the a/c was doing based upon analysis of the information available.
The confirmation of the transponder code, if it was indeed as found at the crash, would at the very least give the Campaign fresh grounds for a new investigation as in a previous inquiry this code was said to have been “meaningless”, that it may have got that way as a result of the impact or some attempted change by the crew – and there were several questions asked on this matter by those presiding which would have allowed correction at the time – and so this may lead to the conclusion that the inquiry was misled.
Anyway, why not get the actual code as seen earlier just for completion of the set of known parameters – just for the record, if you like? I always thought it amazing that it was not the starting point for the (lengthy) discussions on it at the inquiry.
<<… that the aircraft was using the sortie to carry out unauthorised trials, … >>
It was referred to as a training flight by one witness at one of the inquiries – when horror was expressed by those present that any sort of training would have been carried out with such VIP passengers, the witness went into damage control by saying something like all such flights were training flights to some extent.
<<… in IMC, …>>
I think that this point has been made and answered several times now – they would not have entered IMC if they had not misjudged the starting point of their turn and would have remained outside IMC (just, for helos) on completion of their turn.
One possible reason for misjudging the turn (if this was the case) could, I suggest, have been their reference to a portable personnel locator for precision– such equipment acts like a local DME and gives an approximate bearing (a UHF radio direction finder system is part of the module in the aircraft, it having two aerials inbuilt)– remember the slight steer to starboard as they passed the waypoint according to the SuperTANS? This crew would not have regarded the SuperTANS as accurate after a sea crossing and so would not have been alarmed at a considerable discrepancy between it and point reference – if another system that they believed to be intrinsically more reliable (what, in most pilots view, would be more trustworthy than a DME system? –civvy helicopter pilots in particular rely on them greatly) was telling them they still had, say, half a mile to go before starting their turn then they would believe that more than the SuperTANS.
A clear readout from an intrinsically accurate system could have influenced their visual judgment from that fuzzy landmass – especially if they had been pressured to rely upon it for a close approach having been fed with a false threat.
<<… on equipment that had not been adopted for Service use.>>
True, only adopted a year later on Chinooks – ever bought a car without a test drive? I have asked this question before: anyone out there want to tell us when such equipment was first tested? – and in what sort of flights (dedicated or during other operations)? The aircraft side of this equipment just plugged in – easy to put it into an HC2 – and easy to remove if you know what you’re looking for. The particular section of US personnel who were just about first at the crash site would have been thoroughly familiar with the equipment – what was it they said when challenged? Was it something like “… looking for our equipment …”?
<< That would not be negligence - it would be Manslaughter!!!! >>
While I agree that it would not be negligence by the pilots – it would not be manslaughter by those who could have set this up - it would be murder or treason. It should be something to bear in mind that those obstructing analysis of this crash may not be just protecting a beleaguered RAF from a technical stuff up that may have impacted badly on its future programs and caused great embarrassment – rather they may unwittingly be acting as accessories after the act in something much worse.
meadowbank
<<Also, for topographical reasons, it seems most unlikely that Prestwick Radar might have had radar contact or been able to receive the IFF response.>>
I thought I had answered this recently (post 7 May) – here it is again:
<<And when I said "Prestwick", I meant the centre covering the Scottish Sector (Atlantic House?) located at Prestwick which receives data from several remote radar sites, military and civil, mainly secondary, including NI and the Western Isles let alone those on the mainland.>> I was not referring to, say, the local aerodrome radar at Prestwick!
<< It's likely that the BoI will have already asked for and seen the Prestwick, Aldergrove, Machrahanish and AWACS tapes. If an unusual squawk had been seen on reviewing these tapes, doubtless mention would have been made of it>>
I do not share your confidence – look at the obfuscation over the flight path, actual local weather conditions, applicable Flying Regulations for a helo in those conditions, etc..
Besides, they may not have seen the significance of it; yet again, they may not have wanted to “complicate matters” - what a can of worms would have been opened if it had indeed been set before impact and this had been made public – let us give them some slack – how could they possibly have handled it? Cynics may say, exactly as they have done …
<<THEY WERE NOT(REPEAT NOT) GOING TO MACHRIHANISH !!!. To have returned there again would have breached every security rule in the book.>>
I genuinely do not understand this comment and would be interested in the reasoning.
<<Furthermore, there would have been no need to have gone via the Mull.>>
Which, presumably, could also have applied on their route to Curran? Regarding coming in to that turning point close to the Mull lighthouse, I was told (by someone who would have known, while I was standing at the site observing a helo do the turn) that helos crossing from NI did that “all the time” – it was also mentioned as a practice in one of the inquiries – funny how none of you regulars out there can accept this.
<<They could have gone straight to an extended FINAL and been vectored in by Radar.>>
Is this necessary if they are under the cloud base in VFR conditions? There is also the question of where exactly they may have intended landing – one local told me that helos had in the past landed on the golf course itself.
<< You, I understand from your posts, are awaiting confirmation from someone who possibly observed a radar track at about the time of the accident…>>
I was indeed waiting (patiently) but was moved by Captain Cook’s passing – I cannot imagine a worse situation for a man to be in than where his son is wrongfully blamed in such circumstances – and it is a further tragedy that, in my humble opinion, he could have been cleared in time with the information we already have (hence my previous post – that without buying into “conspiracy”, a clarification of the intended flight path, conditions, applicable regulations, and operational pressures could have resulted in the recognition that the cause of the crash could have been the misjudgment of a difficult turn (for whatever reason) that may not fall into the area of negligence at all). I think if any of you look back, then almost every aspect of this crash has been kept vague and ambiguous – and some statements have been downright misleading.
<< so that you can then state what transponder code was being used by that track and interpolate that information into an assumption…>>
Not so! It would be confirmation, the final piece of the puzzle if you like, of what the a/c was doing based upon analysis of the information available.
The confirmation of the transponder code, if it was indeed as found at the crash, would at the very least give the Campaign fresh grounds for a new investigation as in a previous inquiry this code was said to have been “meaningless”, that it may have got that way as a result of the impact or some attempted change by the crew – and there were several questions asked on this matter by those presiding which would have allowed correction at the time – and so this may lead to the conclusion that the inquiry was misled.
Anyway, why not get the actual code as seen earlier just for completion of the set of known parameters – just for the record, if you like? I always thought it amazing that it was not the starting point for the (lengthy) discussions on it at the inquiry.
<<… that the aircraft was using the sortie to carry out unauthorised trials, … >>
It was referred to as a training flight by one witness at one of the inquiries – when horror was expressed by those present that any sort of training would have been carried out with such VIP passengers, the witness went into damage control by saying something like all such flights were training flights to some extent.
<<… in IMC, …>>
I think that this point has been made and answered several times now – they would not have entered IMC if they had not misjudged the starting point of their turn and would have remained outside IMC (just, for helos) on completion of their turn.
One possible reason for misjudging the turn (if this was the case) could, I suggest, have been their reference to a portable personnel locator for precision– such equipment acts like a local DME and gives an approximate bearing (a UHF radio direction finder system is part of the module in the aircraft, it having two aerials inbuilt)– remember the slight steer to starboard as they passed the waypoint according to the SuperTANS? This crew would not have regarded the SuperTANS as accurate after a sea crossing and so would not have been alarmed at a considerable discrepancy between it and point reference – if another system that they believed to be intrinsically more reliable (what, in most pilots view, would be more trustworthy than a DME system? –civvy helicopter pilots in particular rely on them greatly) was telling them they still had, say, half a mile to go before starting their turn then they would believe that more than the SuperTANS.
A clear readout from an intrinsically accurate system could have influenced their visual judgment from that fuzzy landmass – especially if they had been pressured to rely upon it for a close approach having been fed with a false threat.
<<… on equipment that had not been adopted for Service use.>>
True, only adopted a year later on Chinooks – ever bought a car without a test drive? I have asked this question before: anyone out there want to tell us when such equipment was first tested? – and in what sort of flights (dedicated or during other operations)? The aircraft side of this equipment just plugged in – easy to put it into an HC2 – and easy to remove if you know what you’re looking for. The particular section of US personnel who were just about first at the crash site would have been thoroughly familiar with the equipment – what was it they said when challenged? Was it something like “… looking for our equipment …”?
<< That would not be negligence - it would be Manslaughter!!!! >>
While I agree that it would not be negligence by the pilots – it would not be manslaughter by those who could have set this up - it would be murder or treason. It should be something to bear in mind that those obstructing analysis of this crash may not be just protecting a beleaguered RAF from a technical stuff up that may have impacted badly on its future programs and caused great embarrassment – rather they may unwittingly be acting as accessories after the act in something much worse.
meadowbank
<<Also, for topographical reasons, it seems most unlikely that Prestwick Radar might have had radar contact or been able to receive the IFF response.>>
I thought I had answered this recently (post 7 May) – here it is again:
<<And when I said "Prestwick", I meant the centre covering the Scottish Sector (Atlantic House?) located at Prestwick which receives data from several remote radar sites, military and civil, mainly secondary, including NI and the Western Isles let alone those on the mainland.>> I was not referring to, say, the local aerodrome radar at Prestwick!
<< It's likely that the BoI will have already asked for and seen the Prestwick, Aldergrove, Machrahanish and AWACS tapes. If an unusual squawk had been seen on reviewing these tapes, doubtless mention would have been made of it>>
I do not share your confidence – look at the obfuscation over the flight path, actual local weather conditions, applicable Flying Regulations for a helo in those conditions, etc..
Besides, they may not have seen the significance of it; yet again, they may not have wanted to “complicate matters” - what a can of worms would have been opened if it had indeed been set before impact and this had been made public – let us give them some slack – how could they possibly have handled it? Cynics may say, exactly as they have done …
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It has been established that ZD576 was not allocated a squawk on departure from Aldergrove and that Aldergrove had no SSR display on its radar.
Also, for topographical reasons, it seems most unlikely that Prestwick Radar might have had radar contact or been able to receive the IFF response.
It's likely that the BoI will have already asked for and seen the Prestwick, Aldergrove, Machrahanish and AWACS tapes.
If an unusual squawk had been seen on reviewing these tapes, doubtless mention would have been made of it in the original BoI report (remember, the Chairman of the BoI refused to accede to the unreasonable request of their Airships to change his conclusion, so it is most unlikely that he would have agreed to edit out any information about an IFF code!).
I daresay NATS would be prepared to review the appropriate tape again, but this really isn't necessary.
I am not one to buy the conspiracy theories, but if there is data which can be revisited easily to knock such theories on the head, then I am all for it. Even if the possibility of the data bringing something up is slim.
A really irritating PPRuNer
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11 years ago today.
A tragedy, overshadowed only by the terrible injustice inflicted on Flt Lt Jonathan Tapper and Flt Lt Richard Cook.
The Campaign continues...
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/4601557.stm
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
A tragedy, overshadowed only by the terrible injustice inflicted on Flt Lt Jonathan Tapper and Flt Lt Richard Cook.
The Campaign continues...
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/4601557.stm
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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Brian,
As you say, a day of respect and remembrance of those who so tragically lost their lives that fatal day.
They were at the forefront of the fight to defend democracy from terror and intimidation.
May they "Rest in Peace"
As you say, a day of respect and remembrance of those who so tragically lost their lives that fatal day.
They were at the forefront of the fight to defend democracy from terror and intimidation.
May they "Rest in Peace"
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walter kennedy,
May I humbly suggest that you delve into the archives of this thread, and its predecessors, where you will see that most of the points that you are raising have already been dealt with.
The aircraft was not going to Machrihanish because the "Conference" had been held there on a previous occasion, a fact that was widely known.
We can be quite sure of the destination because the person who did the planning (and whose handwriting was on the map of which a copy was left behind) was the Captain of the other Chinook crew.
May I humbly suggest that you delve into the archives of this thread, and its predecessors, where you will see that most of the points that you are raising have already been dealt with.
The aircraft was not going to Machrihanish because the "Conference" had been held there on a previous occasion, a fact that was widely known.
We can be quite sure of the destination because the person who did the planning (and whose handwriting was on the map of which a copy was left behind) was the Captain of the other Chinook crew.
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Walter
You can speculate and drag up irrelevant technical points until you are blue in the face. There is only one open matter from this tragedy which requires to be resolved.
Was there sufficient evidence to prove that the pilots were grossly negligent beyond any doubt whatsoever?
All official and unofficial enquiries bar one have concluded that there was not sufficient evidence. Only Wratten and Day, neither of whom can be classed as dispassionate observers, found that there was sufficient evidence, and OC RAF Odiham concluded that Flt Lt Tapper failed in his duty to ensure the safety of the aircraft, crew and pax.
The point of the campaign is that Wratten and Day's finding is speculation of itself. The debate is not assisted by yet more speculation on dreary, irrelevant technical points.
The basic question is: Do speculative conclusions by Wratten and Day constitute incontrovertible fact? Or, since Wratten was such a martinet and had made his own opinion clear before Day (and possibly OC RAF Odiham) had penned their conclusions: Do speculative conclusions by Wratten constitute incontovertible fact? I know from experience that no-one at the time in STC dared do anything unless they knew in advance that it would meet with Wratten's approval.
Most people feel that, however haughty the opiner, opinion is opinion. On the available evidence, nothing can be proved beyond any doubt whatsoever.
The only matter more shameful than the original conclusion is that the MoD appear now to be requiring the families to produce new evidence to warrant overturning a finding which everyone else agrees is unsafe precisely because there is, was and forever shall be insufficient evidence to warrant the finding in the first place!
Either Franz Kafka's great-great grandson or Joseph Heller's grandson, or both, are working in the MoD to have thought this one up!
You can speculate and drag up irrelevant technical points until you are blue in the face. There is only one open matter from this tragedy which requires to be resolved.
Was there sufficient evidence to prove that the pilots were grossly negligent beyond any doubt whatsoever?
All official and unofficial enquiries bar one have concluded that there was not sufficient evidence. Only Wratten and Day, neither of whom can be classed as dispassionate observers, found that there was sufficient evidence, and OC RAF Odiham concluded that Flt Lt Tapper failed in his duty to ensure the safety of the aircraft, crew and pax.
The point of the campaign is that Wratten and Day's finding is speculation of itself. The debate is not assisted by yet more speculation on dreary, irrelevant technical points.
The basic question is: Do speculative conclusions by Wratten and Day constitute incontrovertible fact? Or, since Wratten was such a martinet and had made his own opinion clear before Day (and possibly OC RAF Odiham) had penned their conclusions: Do speculative conclusions by Wratten constitute incontovertible fact? I know from experience that no-one at the time in STC dared do anything unless they knew in advance that it would meet with Wratten's approval.
Most people feel that, however haughty the opiner, opinion is opinion. On the available evidence, nothing can be proved beyond any doubt whatsoever.
The only matter more shameful than the original conclusion is that the MoD appear now to be requiring the families to produce new evidence to warrant overturning a finding which everyone else agrees is unsafe precisely because there is, was and forever shall be insufficient evidence to warrant the finding in the first place!
Either Franz Kafka's great-great grandson or Joseph Heller's grandson, or both, are working in the MoD to have thought this one up!
Last edited by An Teallach; 3rd Jun 2005 at 18:33.
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walter kennedy,
I'm sorry for this, but I really do feel the need to ask this Question - "Are you from the Planet ZOG ???" You are obviously on a different wavelength than the rest of us poor mortals.
I have been concerned for sometime about the infiltation of people from your Planet into the Military. In the early 90's I was left a briefing note by another Pilot, to be read on arrival in Riyadh, that "Parking in the shade for the aircraft was available overnight!!!" Perhaps that was you in a different guise.?
Your total disregard for anything said by the professionals, who were actually involved at the time of this tragic accident, also shows your complete ignorance of the factors involved. You obviously have your own agenda and will ignore any information which does not support your pre-conceived ideas.
I,for one, will no longer respond to your inanities - this you will doubtless take as confirmation that you are correct in your conspiracy theories.
I'm sorry for this, but I really do feel the need to ask this Question - "Are you from the Planet ZOG ???" You are obviously on a different wavelength than the rest of us poor mortals.
I have been concerned for sometime about the infiltation of people from your Planet into the Military. In the early 90's I was left a briefing note by another Pilot, to be read on arrival in Riyadh, that "Parking in the shade for the aircraft was available overnight!!!" Perhaps that was you in a different guise.?
Your total disregard for anything said by the professionals, who were actually involved at the time of this tragic accident, also shows your complete ignorance of the factors involved. You obviously have your own agenda and will ignore any information which does not support your pre-conceived ideas.
I,for one, will no longer respond to your inanities - this you will doubtless take as confirmation that you are correct in your conspiracy theories.
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jindabyne
Thanks for that.
I must admit that I am tempted but we do live in a society that permits free speech - even if we consider the opinions expressed to be fatuous.
"I DISAGREE WITH WHAT YOU SAY - BUT I WILL DEFEND TO THE DEATH YOUR RIGHT TO SAY IT."
Is that not why you are, and I was, someone prepared to put their lives on the line to defend free speech and democracy.
I am, however, prepared to admit that W.K. is someone who tests that resolve to its limits.
We just have to accept that he is a person who is utilising this thread to bolster his own self esteem and persue his own personal interests. From his point of view he is the one person who KNOWS what the cause of this accident was, so any viewpoint that does not coincide with his is an irrelevant distraction.
Thanks for that.
I must admit that I am tempted but we do live in a society that permits free speech - even if we consider the opinions expressed to be fatuous.
"I DISAGREE WITH WHAT YOU SAY - BUT I WILL DEFEND TO THE DEATH YOUR RIGHT TO SAY IT."
Is that not why you are, and I was, someone prepared to put their lives on the line to defend free speech and democracy.
I am, however, prepared to admit that W.K. is someone who tests that resolve to its limits.
We just have to accept that he is a person who is utilising this thread to bolster his own self esteem and persue his own personal interests. From his point of view he is the one person who KNOWS what the cause of this accident was, so any viewpoint that does not coincide with his is an irrelevant distraction.
Avoid imitations
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I propose that Walter starts his own thread to continue this conspiracy agenda elsewhere, as I seriously believe his ramblings are irrelevant and have been really quite counterproductive to the campaign.
A seconder?
A seconder?