Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
Just a numbered other
caz:
That'll be the helicopter seen beneath cloud flying towards a clearly visible coastline respecting VFR for the type and its speed.
Since we have no idea why the aorcraft subsequently climbed into cloud and impacted the Mull, why, pray do you assume it to be a negligent act of folly, beyond any doubt whatsoever?
Of course it could have done, but that then leaves us with an aircraft flying at 160kts + directly at fog enshrouded high ground which it subsequently hit.
What act of folly,in your book, do you have to commit before it becomes negligence?
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Weather
John Purdey,
Nobody needs to allege anything - what Mr Holbrook said was as follows:
Weather
63. The state of the weather was crucial to the conclusions of the investigating board and of the two Air Marshals. Two witnesses gave oral evidence to the Board as to weather. First Mr Murchie, a keeper at the lighthouse, spoke of visibility there being some 15-20 metres, but 400-500 metres to the north. The Board asked him no further questions about weather. The second was Mr Holbrook, the yachtsman, whose initial statement to the Strathclyde Police contained an expression of opinion "that the helicopter pilot would have been in a position to clearly see the local land mass". In his statement to the Board Mr Holbrook said that the aircraft was well below cloud level and visibility was about a mile limited by haze. At the time he was about two nautical miles south west of the lighthouse. He was asked three questions by the Board of which one was relevant to weather, namely whether he could see the physical features of the cliff on the Mull. To this he replied "no".
64. When he gave evidence at the FAI Mr Holbrook expressed the opinion that the pilot could have seen "the location of the Mull lighthouse" and described the low cloud as "hugging the Mull" (Sheriff's determination, p 110 of HL Paper 25(ii)). He was criticised by the Ministry of Defence for having given different versions of his account to the Board and the FAI. In these circumstances we invited him to give evidence, an invitation which he willingly accepted.
65. Mr Holbrook's evidence to us began with a statement which he had asked leave to make (Q 594). He explained that the low cloud clung to the contours of the high ground so that the location of the Mull massif itself was not in doubt from sea level. He considered that the crew of the aircraft when he saw it could determine without ambiguity where the Mull was and could see the cliffs, beach and lower perimeter walls of the lighthouse complex.
66. Mr Holbrook reaffirmed that when he saw the aircraft he could not see the physical features of the Mull but he went on to explain that he was able to see the location of the lighthouse complex because the buildings and the white perimeter wall showed up as a colour change against the background of the land mass (QQ 594, 602). The top of the lighthouse was in cloud as the cloud level moved up and down (Q 606). Mr Holbrook went on to explain that the cloud was following the contours of the land and was very localised (Q 615). He also remarked, as he had done before the Board, that the helicopter was in sunlight as it passed (Q 619). At that time the aircraft was about two miles to the south west of the lighthouse. He expressed the opinion that the aircraft was flying at a height of between 200 and 400 ft and that the crew would have been better able to see the position of the lighthouse than he was at sea level with a certain amount of spray (QQ 610-13). He estimated the speed of the aircraft to be 60-80 knots but did not feel confident enough to be dogmatic as he had not previously seen a Chinook in flight. However, it was his impression that the aircraft was travelling sufficiently slowly to be involved in a search and rescue operation (Q 639).
67. We do not consider that Mr Holbrook changed his evidence between his appearances before the Board and the FAI, rather that when he was subjected to professional examination and cross-examination at the FAI and to our questioning he was able to expand upon the rather brief evidence which he had given to the Board. We had no hesitation in accepting him as a reliable and convincing witness.
68. In his statement to the police and in his evidence to us Mr Holbrook referred to the fact that the trawlers round which he was manoeuvring appeared to be Scottish as one of them had St Andrew's cross painted on the superstructure (Q 630). When Wing Commander (now Group Captain) Pulford gave evidence to us he was asked whether the Board sought evidence from any of the fishing vessels referred to by Mr Holbrook. He replied that they had tracked down the fishing vessels to Northern Ireland and the RUC could neither find anybody who had seen the aircraft nor trace some of the boats (Q 11).
69. It is perhaps surprising in view of Mr Holbrook's statement to the Strathclyde Police about the trawler with St Andrew's cross on the superstructure that that force were not asked to pursue the matter. It is perhaps even more surprising that the Board asked Mr Holbrook only one question in relation to weather and used the answer as a component in the construction of a theory as to the probable course adopted by the pilots.
70. Mr Holbrook explained to us that he had repeatedly but unsuccessfully asked to see photographs of a Chinook at different heights and ranges, in order the better to estimate the height and speed of the aircraft when he saw it. He clearly felt that he would have been in a better position to assist the Board had he been furnished with such information. We do not know why the Board did not accede to his request or afford him the opportunity of seeing a Chinook in flight.
71. The statements taken by Strathclyde Police which dealt with weather were all from persons on the Mull at or above the height of the lighthouse and did not therefore throw light on the extent to which the land mass could be seen from an aircraft approaching from seaward. These persons all spoke of being enveloped in cloud to a greater or lesser degree.
Perhaps you would care to put some energy into thinking about why the BoI did not do a proper investigation in this area!
JB
Nobody needs to allege anything - what Mr Holbrook said was as follows:
Weather
63. The state of the weather was crucial to the conclusions of the investigating board and of the two Air Marshals. Two witnesses gave oral evidence to the Board as to weather. First Mr Murchie, a keeper at the lighthouse, spoke of visibility there being some 15-20 metres, but 400-500 metres to the north. The Board asked him no further questions about weather. The second was Mr Holbrook, the yachtsman, whose initial statement to the Strathclyde Police contained an expression of opinion "that the helicopter pilot would have been in a position to clearly see the local land mass". In his statement to the Board Mr Holbrook said that the aircraft was well below cloud level and visibility was about a mile limited by haze. At the time he was about two nautical miles south west of the lighthouse. He was asked three questions by the Board of which one was relevant to weather, namely whether he could see the physical features of the cliff on the Mull. To this he replied "no".
64. When he gave evidence at the FAI Mr Holbrook expressed the opinion that the pilot could have seen "the location of the Mull lighthouse" and described the low cloud as "hugging the Mull" (Sheriff's determination, p 110 of HL Paper 25(ii)). He was criticised by the Ministry of Defence for having given different versions of his account to the Board and the FAI. In these circumstances we invited him to give evidence, an invitation which he willingly accepted.
65. Mr Holbrook's evidence to us began with a statement which he had asked leave to make (Q 594). He explained that the low cloud clung to the contours of the high ground so that the location of the Mull massif itself was not in doubt from sea level. He considered that the crew of the aircraft when he saw it could determine without ambiguity where the Mull was and could see the cliffs, beach and lower perimeter walls of the lighthouse complex.
66. Mr Holbrook reaffirmed that when he saw the aircraft he could not see the physical features of the Mull but he went on to explain that he was able to see the location of the lighthouse complex because the buildings and the white perimeter wall showed up as a colour change against the background of the land mass (QQ 594, 602). The top of the lighthouse was in cloud as the cloud level moved up and down (Q 606). Mr Holbrook went on to explain that the cloud was following the contours of the land and was very localised (Q 615). He also remarked, as he had done before the Board, that the helicopter was in sunlight as it passed (Q 619). At that time the aircraft was about two miles to the south west of the lighthouse. He expressed the opinion that the aircraft was flying at a height of between 200 and 400 ft and that the crew would have been better able to see the position of the lighthouse than he was at sea level with a certain amount of spray (QQ 610-13). He estimated the speed of the aircraft to be 60-80 knots but did not feel confident enough to be dogmatic as he had not previously seen a Chinook in flight. However, it was his impression that the aircraft was travelling sufficiently slowly to be involved in a search and rescue operation (Q 639).
67. We do not consider that Mr Holbrook changed his evidence between his appearances before the Board and the FAI, rather that when he was subjected to professional examination and cross-examination at the FAI and to our questioning he was able to expand upon the rather brief evidence which he had given to the Board. We had no hesitation in accepting him as a reliable and convincing witness.
68. In his statement to the police and in his evidence to us Mr Holbrook referred to the fact that the trawlers round which he was manoeuvring appeared to be Scottish as one of them had St Andrew's cross painted on the superstructure (Q 630). When Wing Commander (now Group Captain) Pulford gave evidence to us he was asked whether the Board sought evidence from any of the fishing vessels referred to by Mr Holbrook. He replied that they had tracked down the fishing vessels to Northern Ireland and the RUC could neither find anybody who had seen the aircraft nor trace some of the boats (Q 11).
69. It is perhaps surprising in view of Mr Holbrook's statement to the Strathclyde Police about the trawler with St Andrew's cross on the superstructure that that force were not asked to pursue the matter. It is perhaps even more surprising that the Board asked Mr Holbrook only one question in relation to weather and used the answer as a component in the construction of a theory as to the probable course adopted by the pilots.
70. Mr Holbrook explained to us that he had repeatedly but unsuccessfully asked to see photographs of a Chinook at different heights and ranges, in order the better to estimate the height and speed of the aircraft when he saw it. He clearly felt that he would have been in a better position to assist the Board had he been furnished with such information. We do not know why the Board did not accede to his request or afford him the opportunity of seeing a Chinook in flight.
71. The statements taken by Strathclyde Police which dealt with weather were all from persons on the Mull at or above the height of the lighthouse and did not therefore throw light on the extent to which the land mass could be seen from an aircraft approaching from seaward. These persons all spoke of being enveloped in cloud to a greater or lesser degree.
Perhaps you would care to put some energy into thinking about why the BoI did not do a proper investigation in this area!
JB
A really irritating PPRuNer
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Hi everyone.
There has been quite a bit of 'thread creep' lately, and for that I apologise. I belive it may have occurred because of the relative silence from the Campaign Group - and again, please accept my apologies for that too.
Although we have been fairly quiet on the public platform, there has been quite a bit going on in the background. I can tell you that I am currently waiting for a response from the MoD to two letters submitted, by me, to them on 4 February 2006 and 11 June 2006. In total, the letters contained a list of some 22 documents that are of interest to me, and included a total of ten questions that I sought answers to.
I had also written to the then Sec of State for Defence, Dr Reid, who replied to me in a letter, dated 17 April 2006. In that letter Dr Reid advised me that the MoD would, indeed, be replying to me.
Having heard nothing at all from the MoD, I took the unusual step, on 4 June 2006, of telephoning the MoD to enquire as to why I had heard nothing at all from them. Not even an acknowledgement letter! I was advised that "We have been busy, you know!", but assured that I would hear from them in approximately one week.
Still nothing.
Well, today a letter should have arrived in the MoD asking for an update on the progress of my six, and two, month old document requests. The outcome of this latest request will determine my next course of action. Rest assured I won't be waiting for a further six months.
Once I have received a reply, I shall post an update.
Thank you all for your continued support and for your patience.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
There has been quite a bit of 'thread creep' lately, and for that I apologise. I belive it may have occurred because of the relative silence from the Campaign Group - and again, please accept my apologies for that too.
Although we have been fairly quiet on the public platform, there has been quite a bit going on in the background. I can tell you that I am currently waiting for a response from the MoD to two letters submitted, by me, to them on 4 February 2006 and 11 June 2006. In total, the letters contained a list of some 22 documents that are of interest to me, and included a total of ten questions that I sought answers to.
I had also written to the then Sec of State for Defence, Dr Reid, who replied to me in a letter, dated 17 April 2006. In that letter Dr Reid advised me that the MoD would, indeed, be replying to me.
Having heard nothing at all from the MoD, I took the unusual step, on 4 June 2006, of telephoning the MoD to enquire as to why I had heard nothing at all from them. Not even an acknowledgement letter! I was advised that "We have been busy, you know!", but assured that I would hear from them in approximately one week.
Still nothing.
Well, today a letter should have arrived in the MoD asking for an update on the progress of my six, and two, month old document requests. The outcome of this latest request will determine my next course of action. Rest assured I won't be waiting for a further six months.
Once I have received a reply, I shall post an update.
Thank you all for your continued support and for your patience.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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Arkroyal,
Apologies for the delay in replying, its the time of year when we get lots of visitors.
The HOL Commitee accepted that, when the crew selected the waypoint change at a computed 0.81NM from the (misplotted) lighthouse (and 0.95NM from impact), they were not experiencing any significant difficulty in handling the aircraft in view of the fact that such a change required 3 seperate, and deliberate, actions by the pilots. The pilots failed, however, to make the relatively small course correction of some 7 degrees demanded by their navigation equipment.
The average groundspeed from the ATC fix on leaving the Aldergrove CTZ at 16:46:24 to initial impact power-down time of 16:59:36 was 158 kts. AAIB concluded that groundspeed at impact was "of the order of 150 kts". The assessment by Boeing, using the last steering command 0.75 secs before impact, gave an aircraft groundspeed of 162.8 kts. Finally the "distance to go"(86.63nm) and "time to go"(32.8 min) to the selected waypoint of Corran gives a groundspeed of 158.5 kts towards that point.
All of these calculations show a remarkable similarity, the slightly lower speed assessment at impact by AAIB being attributable to the final desperate flare.
IF there was a control problem after waypoint change, why was there no "emergency squawk" or distress call? Waypoint change was some 21 seconds before impact. If there was no control problem at waypoint change, then why did they continue towards the cloud covered high ground at high speed instead of making the small course change demanded?
Apologies for the delay in replying, its the time of year when we get lots of visitors.
The HOL Commitee accepted that, when the crew selected the waypoint change at a computed 0.81NM from the (misplotted) lighthouse (and 0.95NM from impact), they were not experiencing any significant difficulty in handling the aircraft in view of the fact that such a change required 3 seperate, and deliberate, actions by the pilots. The pilots failed, however, to make the relatively small course correction of some 7 degrees demanded by their navigation equipment.
The average groundspeed from the ATC fix on leaving the Aldergrove CTZ at 16:46:24 to initial impact power-down time of 16:59:36 was 158 kts. AAIB concluded that groundspeed at impact was "of the order of 150 kts". The assessment by Boeing, using the last steering command 0.75 secs before impact, gave an aircraft groundspeed of 162.8 kts. Finally the "distance to go"(86.63nm) and "time to go"(32.8 min) to the selected waypoint of Corran gives a groundspeed of 158.5 kts towards that point.
All of these calculations show a remarkable similarity, the slightly lower speed assessment at impact by AAIB being attributable to the final desperate flare.
IF there was a control problem after waypoint change, why was there no "emergency squawk" or distress call? Waypoint change was some 21 seconds before impact. If there was no control problem at waypoint change, then why did they continue towards the cloud covered high ground at high speed instead of making the small course change demanded?
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We will never know
Cazatou,
Your last sentence is the reason for this thread's existence - if your question could be answered we could all go home - but it can't and because it can't they should never have been found guilty of the equivalent of culpable homicide. There are any number of things that could have gone wrong - some even written up in the RTS - why do you never consider what the effect of these might have been rather than assuming that the crew effectively committed suicide by flying towards high ground instead of making a small and easily achievable, in the time and distance, left turn on to the new course?
How do you know they did not try to transmit an emergency call? As I recall the IFF squawk was 7760 - close to the emergency one of 7700 - was it being changed at the point of impact or was this the last squawk requested by Belfast? In my limited basic flying training I was always told that the first thing to do in any emergency was to fly the aircraft (assuming it to be flyable at that point) and not to worry about the radio etc until afterwards, and in two real Pan calls later in a Lightning and Tornado that was exactly what happened - with no emergency call from the captain until the offending engine had been shut down, the emergency FRCs had been checked and we knew what we were doing.
Why not start by assuming the pilots knew what they were doing, had a good flight plan and were following the rules and procedures to the letter, and then look at the options for something else going wrong with the aircraft, and see what you might come up with! At least then you will have done something the BoI patently failed to do.
BTW - just to remind you, the AAIB report effectively covered all options as far as mechanical flight control systems malfunctions were concerned - see below:
43. Almost all parts of the flight control mechanical systems were identified, with no evidence of pre-impact failure or malfunction, although the possibility of control system jam could not be positively dismissed.
44. Most attachment inserts on both flight control system pallets had detached, including the collective balance spring bracket that had previously detached from ZD576’s thrust/yaw pallet, with little evidence available to eliminate the possibility of pre-impact detachment.
JB
Your last sentence is the reason for this thread's existence - if your question could be answered we could all go home - but it can't and because it can't they should never have been found guilty of the equivalent of culpable homicide. There are any number of things that could have gone wrong - some even written up in the RTS - why do you never consider what the effect of these might have been rather than assuming that the crew effectively committed suicide by flying towards high ground instead of making a small and easily achievable, in the time and distance, left turn on to the new course?
How do you know they did not try to transmit an emergency call? As I recall the IFF squawk was 7760 - close to the emergency one of 7700 - was it being changed at the point of impact or was this the last squawk requested by Belfast? In my limited basic flying training I was always told that the first thing to do in any emergency was to fly the aircraft (assuming it to be flyable at that point) and not to worry about the radio etc until afterwards, and in two real Pan calls later in a Lightning and Tornado that was exactly what happened - with no emergency call from the captain until the offending engine had been shut down, the emergency FRCs had been checked and we knew what we were doing.
Why not start by assuming the pilots knew what they were doing, had a good flight plan and were following the rules and procedures to the letter, and then look at the options for something else going wrong with the aircraft, and see what you might come up with! At least then you will have done something the BoI patently failed to do.
BTW - just to remind you, the AAIB report effectively covered all options as far as mechanical flight control systems malfunctions were concerned - see below:
43. Almost all parts of the flight control mechanical systems were identified, with no evidence of pre-impact failure or malfunction, although the possibility of control system jam could not be positively dismissed.
44. Most attachment inserts on both flight control system pallets had detached, including the collective balance spring bracket that had previously detached from ZD576’s thrust/yaw pallet, with little evidence available to eliminate the possibility of pre-impact detachment.
JB
Just a numbered other
JP:
Well, the crew were somewhat closer to it, so would have had a better view
caz:
I don't know. Neither do you or anyone else beyond any doubt whatsoever.
I refer you both to John Blakely's excellent replies. Thank you sir.
Please read what the 'lone yachtsman' said. The features on the coast were certainly not clearly visible
caz:
If there was no control problem at waypoint change, then why did they continue towards the cloud covered high ground at high speed
I refer you both to John Blakely's excellent replies. Thank you sir.
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Cazatou
<<All of these calculations show a remarkable similarity …>>
You post is an excellent summary of the data that is available on the speed and makes this point clear – the picture is that they flew on with no change to their speed until the last moment - I would say until they realized how close they had got. I also add that they not only did not make the left turn as indicated was required by their SuperTANS (for the next distant waypoint on their route) on waypoint change but made a small steer demand to the right at that point.
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Arkroyal
<<Since we have no idea why the aorcraft subsequently climbed into cloud and impacted the Mull …>>
BUT it did not climb into cloud.
The cloud base was about 1000ft (as I recall off the top of my head – correct me if I’m wrong) – and that was well above the height at impact.
The mist on the slope did merge into the cloud higher up but the first fuzz they entered would surely have been the mist itself.
Had they climbed high enough to reach the cloud base a little while before impact they would have been high enough to have got a reading from the MAC TACAN (or DME, whichever it was at the time) to which their TACAN CU was set. If you do a transaction from the TACAN or the DME site to their track on the last part of this approach you will see that they would have been able to get it just below the cloud base that day.
And perhaps would have realized just how close they were getting.
It has been my suggestion that they had started a cruise climb for the very purpose of getting a “second opinion” from the MAC TACAN but they had already got too close ( you know, this is quite upsetting – if my theory of the ill fated test is correct, they were actually displaying prudence and, in the circumstances, good airmanship by this manoeuvre – this precautionary climb actually almost saved them giving them that extra bit of height before their realization of the situation and their subsequent flare, only another 50 feet or so and they would have cleared the small cliff that their rrrss end clipped in their final flare – and yet they got all that scheet heaped on their names).
.
<<Quote:
Please read what the 'lone yachtsman' said. The features on the coast were certainly not clearly visible
Well, the crew were somewhat closer to it, so would have had a better view>>
It is surely very reasonable to assume that the “view” would have been very common conditions there – ground detail indistinct – you could see it but not judge distance off well – especially approaching at speed. This is what it is so often like in that area at that time of day, at that time of year, with that wind. One of the things that you could be sure about would be the view of the Mull they had out of the windscreen – you could have predicted it the previous day with a typical met forecast for the area.
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John Blakeley
<<How do you know they did not try to transmit an emergency call? As I recall the IFF squawk was 7760 - close to the emergency one of 7700 - was it being changed at the point of impact or was this the last squawk requested by Belfast? In my limited basic flying training I was always told that the first thing to do in any emergency was to fly the aircraft (assuming it to be flyable at that point) and not to worry about the radio etc until afterwards, and in two real Pan calls later in a Lightning and Tornado that was exactly what happened - with no emergency call from the captain until the offending engine had been shut down, the emergency FRCs had been checked and we knew what we were doing.>>
And this is exactly the point I made some time ago that it was not recommended to change SSR code in the immediate emergency (I got this from ATC sources); the other option for it being meaningless is that it got like that from the impact – this would have required just the middle two wheels to have been disturbed, one by 1 position and the other by 2 – highly improbable, in my opinion; as I have said in previous posts, get yourself a bean bag and sit in an old airframe with the same kind of selectors and try to get that result – good luck!
It just happens that in some systems the “anomalous” 7760 is compatible with the exercise callsign F4J40 used by ZD576 in this flight.
.
<<Why not start by assuming the pilots knew what they were doing, had a good flight plan and were following the rules and procedures to the letter …>>
Well if they had a good flight plan they certainly did not leave a copy – the excuse for a flight plan that was found (that would have been impossible to follow in the HC2) and that it was not able to be definitely ascribed to them is ridiculous – either there was a major neglect of procedure or the actual flight plan went missing along with any recollection a usual outbrief – I do not believe that these particular pilots would have been slack in this respect and so I believe the latter.
<<All of these calculations show a remarkable similarity …>>
You post is an excellent summary of the data that is available on the speed and makes this point clear – the picture is that they flew on with no change to their speed until the last moment - I would say until they realized how close they had got. I also add that they not only did not make the left turn as indicated was required by their SuperTANS (for the next distant waypoint on their route) on waypoint change but made a small steer demand to the right at that point.
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Arkroyal
<<Since we have no idea why the aorcraft subsequently climbed into cloud and impacted the Mull …>>
BUT it did not climb into cloud.
The cloud base was about 1000ft (as I recall off the top of my head – correct me if I’m wrong) – and that was well above the height at impact.
The mist on the slope did merge into the cloud higher up but the first fuzz they entered would surely have been the mist itself.
Had they climbed high enough to reach the cloud base a little while before impact they would have been high enough to have got a reading from the MAC TACAN (or DME, whichever it was at the time) to which their TACAN CU was set. If you do a transaction from the TACAN or the DME site to their track on the last part of this approach you will see that they would have been able to get it just below the cloud base that day.
And perhaps would have realized just how close they were getting.
It has been my suggestion that they had started a cruise climb for the very purpose of getting a “second opinion” from the MAC TACAN but they had already got too close ( you know, this is quite upsetting – if my theory of the ill fated test is correct, they were actually displaying prudence and, in the circumstances, good airmanship by this manoeuvre – this precautionary climb actually almost saved them giving them that extra bit of height before their realization of the situation and their subsequent flare, only another 50 feet or so and they would have cleared the small cliff that their rrrss end clipped in their final flare – and yet they got all that scheet heaped on their names).
.
<<Quote:
Please read what the 'lone yachtsman' said. The features on the coast were certainly not clearly visible
Well, the crew were somewhat closer to it, so would have had a better view>>
It is surely very reasonable to assume that the “view” would have been very common conditions there – ground detail indistinct – you could see it but not judge distance off well – especially approaching at speed. This is what it is so often like in that area at that time of day, at that time of year, with that wind. One of the things that you could be sure about would be the view of the Mull they had out of the windscreen – you could have predicted it the previous day with a typical met forecast for the area.
.
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John Blakeley
<<How do you know they did not try to transmit an emergency call? As I recall the IFF squawk was 7760 - close to the emergency one of 7700 - was it being changed at the point of impact or was this the last squawk requested by Belfast? In my limited basic flying training I was always told that the first thing to do in any emergency was to fly the aircraft (assuming it to be flyable at that point) and not to worry about the radio etc until afterwards, and in two real Pan calls later in a Lightning and Tornado that was exactly what happened - with no emergency call from the captain until the offending engine had been shut down, the emergency FRCs had been checked and we knew what we were doing.>>
And this is exactly the point I made some time ago that it was not recommended to change SSR code in the immediate emergency (I got this from ATC sources); the other option for it being meaningless is that it got like that from the impact – this would have required just the middle two wheels to have been disturbed, one by 1 position and the other by 2 – highly improbable, in my opinion; as I have said in previous posts, get yourself a bean bag and sit in an old airframe with the same kind of selectors and try to get that result – good luck!
It just happens that in some systems the “anomalous” 7760 is compatible with the exercise callsign F4J40 used by ZD576 in this flight.
.
<<Why not start by assuming the pilots knew what they were doing, had a good flight plan and were following the rules and procedures to the letter …>>
Well if they had a good flight plan they certainly did not leave a copy – the excuse for a flight plan that was found (that would have been impossible to follow in the HC2) and that it was not able to be definitely ascribed to them is ridiculous – either there was a major neglect of procedure or the actual flight plan went missing along with any recollection a usual outbrief – I do not believe that these particular pilots would have been slack in this respect and so I believe the latter.
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Flight Planning
Walter,
Could you tell us what you base your last comment on please as it is totally incompatible with the findings of the BoI - to remind you:
Para 67b. Flight Planning
The Board considered that the decision to fly the entire sortie to Inverness as a low level VFR flight in the forecast weather conditions was reasonable, however, consideration of the actions required on encountering weather below VFR limits would have been needed. The evidence of Flt Lt Tapper's preparation and flight planning for the sortie to Inverness indicates that it was carried out in a thorough and professional manner. The planning was completed in good time and was updated with the latest weather and navigation information prior to departure. Flt Lt Tapper had correctly dismissed the possibility of flying an IFR transit to Inverness. .....
Para 43a. Route Planning
The actual crew maps used on the sortie were not recovered and the Board was restricted, in considering the crew's route planning, to the map left by Flt Lt Tapper in SHFNI Operations, and to the evidence of Lt Kingston's crew. From this the Board concludes that the sortie was well planned, and that the chosen route was logical and sound for a low level VFR flight. The Board therefore concluded that route planning was not a factor in the accident.
You may also recall the opening remarks of the Odiham Stn Cdr which were:
1. The Board have conducted a very thorough and detailed investigation into the circumstances surrounding this accident and in my view, they have considered all the factors that could have conceivably have had a bearing upon it. In trying to determine the cause they have worked "backwards" from the point of impact. By using a combination of the last SuperTANS calculation and the Boeing computer simulation of the final flight path they have determined that at 15 to 18 seconds before impact the aircraft was climbing at 1000ft per min at 150kts IAS. Given the high level of confidence in both the raw data and the analysis, I accept that. The Board then opine, in making this profile dovetail with other evidence, that the crew, faced with the expected deteriorating weather, consciously elected to make a climb on track over high ground and in doing so used a speed and power combination that is unrecognisable as a Chinook technique. I find this difficult to believe; such actions would go against all the crew’s instincts and training. Moreover it is the very antithesis of the professionalism and careful planning that had gone before. Even taking into account the factors which the Board feel could have deceived the crew into believing a high speed cruise climb would have given them sufficient clearance over the Mull I, and the few, senior Chinook operators that I felt able to consult, find this suggestion incredible.
It is good to hear on the news today that the victims of another gross miscarriage of justice in WW1 are finally to have their names cleared - let us hope that we do not have to wait that long! MOD should never forget that justice will out.
JB
Could you tell us what you base your last comment on please as it is totally incompatible with the findings of the BoI - to remind you:
Para 67b. Flight Planning
The Board considered that the decision to fly the entire sortie to Inverness as a low level VFR flight in the forecast weather conditions was reasonable, however, consideration of the actions required on encountering weather below VFR limits would have been needed. The evidence of Flt Lt Tapper's preparation and flight planning for the sortie to Inverness indicates that it was carried out in a thorough and professional manner. The planning was completed in good time and was updated with the latest weather and navigation information prior to departure. Flt Lt Tapper had correctly dismissed the possibility of flying an IFR transit to Inverness. .....
Para 43a. Route Planning
The actual crew maps used on the sortie were not recovered and the Board was restricted, in considering the crew's route planning, to the map left by Flt Lt Tapper in SHFNI Operations, and to the evidence of Lt Kingston's crew. From this the Board concludes that the sortie was well planned, and that the chosen route was logical and sound for a low level VFR flight. The Board therefore concluded that route planning was not a factor in the accident.
You may also recall the opening remarks of the Odiham Stn Cdr which were:
1. The Board have conducted a very thorough and detailed investigation into the circumstances surrounding this accident and in my view, they have considered all the factors that could have conceivably have had a bearing upon it. In trying to determine the cause they have worked "backwards" from the point of impact. By using a combination of the last SuperTANS calculation and the Boeing computer simulation of the final flight path they have determined that at 15 to 18 seconds before impact the aircraft was climbing at 1000ft per min at 150kts IAS. Given the high level of confidence in both the raw data and the analysis, I accept that. The Board then opine, in making this profile dovetail with other evidence, that the crew, faced with the expected deteriorating weather, consciously elected to make a climb on track over high ground and in doing so used a speed and power combination that is unrecognisable as a Chinook technique. I find this difficult to believe; such actions would go against all the crew’s instincts and training. Moreover it is the very antithesis of the professionalism and careful planning that had gone before. Even taking into account the factors which the Board feel could have deceived the crew into believing a high speed cruise climb would have given them sufficient clearance over the Mull I, and the few, senior Chinook operators that I felt able to consult, find this suggestion incredible.
It is good to hear on the news today that the victims of another gross miscarriage of justice in WW1 are finally to have their names cleared - let us hope that we do not have to wait that long! MOD should never forget that justice will out.
JB
A really irritating PPRuNer
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Good news, indeed John.
I have written to Des Browne to congratulate him on the compassion now shown to those shot at dawn. I have asked that he shows the same compassion to Jon Tapper and Rick Cook - especially as there are areas of doubt surrounding the accident.
Might I ask our wonderful supporters if they would also consider dropping Mr Brown a letter asking him to do the same?
Updates, as and when.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
I have written to Des Browne to congratulate him on the compassion now shown to those shot at dawn. I have asked that he shows the same compassion to Jon Tapper and Rick Cook - especially as there are areas of doubt surrounding the accident.
Might I ask our wonderful supporters if they would also consider dropping Mr Brown a letter asking him to do the same?
Updates, as and when.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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John Blakeley
Thanks for the extracts – I had not gone back through it all when I posted last but made this comment from my memory’s impression that the plan left had shown a high level transit at some stage which the HC2 should not have done – I seem to recall (again without going through everything) that it was said that the plan had been for a different a/c.
Am I wrong or is it still the case that a copy of the actual flight plan was not left? – in which case how is this correct procedure? – and is my comment (at the end of the last post) still valid? I recall much debate on this thread some time ago that showed great confusion as to their actual intentions, and regarding what you quoted:
<< The actual crew maps used on the sortie were not recovered and the Board was restricted, in considering the crew's route planning, to the map left by Flt Lt Tapper in SHFNI Operations, and to the evidence of Lt Kingston's crew. From this the Board concludes that the sortie was well planned, and that the chosen route was logical and sound for a low level VFR flight...>>
the detail of their intentions in the leg approaching the Mull has not been made public, has it? And the conclusion:
<<. The Board therefore concluded that route planning was not a factor in the accident >>
seems open to dispute.
<< Could you tell us what you base your last comment on please as it is totally incompatible with the findings of the BoI >>
It does not worry me that some of my views are incompatible with the BOI – in this respect at least, I may have some company on this thread.
.
I would like to address some points made (in your quote) by the Odiham Stn Cdr – I realize that you were making the point that the Stn Cdr disagreed with the BOI findings here on the grounds that he regarded the crew as too professional planning wise, etc to have done what the BOI concluded and I take your point – I am using this text to draw attention to some major differences of opinion in one particular regard that are well illustrated in it:
<<. By using a combination of the last SuperTANS calculation and the Boeing computer simulation of the final flight path they have determined that at 15 to 18 seconds before impact the aircraft was climbing at 1000ft per min at 150kts IAS. Given the high level of confidence in both the raw data and the analysis, I accept that. >>
For what it’s worth, so do I – in this period it was in a cruise climb whereby the climb rate was optimum for the use of the surplus power without reducing forward speed – let me put this again, it was a selected steady optimum climb without reducing speed and in no way at all an immediate response to, say, deteriorating conditions. Prior to this period, over the long leg, this was the order of speed that the a/c had been cruising at in level flight – well within the cruising speed range with ample power in reserve according to the manufacturers data (for weight, alt, amb temp etc) and as evidenced by the subsequent cruise climb – it was an optimum cruise speed for getting a trip done and should not have been described as high as it so often has been so as to infer the crew were in a hurry.
.
In view of the description of cruise climb above, how does this bit sound?:
<< The Board then opine … that the crew, faced with the expected deteriorating weather, consciously elected to make a climb on track over high ground and in doing so used a speed and power combination that is unrecognisable as a Chinook technique. >>
BUT it should have been recognized by them as a Chinook technique – that it was patently not the right one for climbing over the Mull should have led them to deliberations as to what they were actually doing with it.
While the Stn Cdr recognizes it as a cruise climb he missed the opportunity of strongly emphasizing it – while he did so strongly disagree with the board’s view in this regard, he missed the opportunity of making a clear specific point that they would not have used cruise climb to gain altitude for crossing the Mull as close in as they were and for which they had not planned which is, IMHO, the nub of the matter.
If you do the sums, to have reached SALT over the Mull using cruise climb at their speed, they would have had to have selected it SEVERAL MILES earlier- so it was not just a little error of judgment – it would have been completely wrong and not a credible scenario given their training and professionalism in planning as the Stn Cdr said so strongly in so many words.
Given this line by him:
<<. Even taking into account the factors which the Board feel could have deceived the crew into believing a high speed cruise climb would have given them sufficient clearance over the Mull I, and the few, senior Chinook operators that I felt able to consult, find this suggestion incredible.>>
It is a great pity that he did not have the courage of his convictions and investigate whatever else they could have been doing - he would have had the position, standing, contacts, etc etc etc.
.
Justice Delayed is Justice Denied
Thanks for the extracts – I had not gone back through it all when I posted last but made this comment from my memory’s impression that the plan left had shown a high level transit at some stage which the HC2 should not have done – I seem to recall (again without going through everything) that it was said that the plan had been for a different a/c.
Am I wrong or is it still the case that a copy of the actual flight plan was not left? – in which case how is this correct procedure? – and is my comment (at the end of the last post) still valid? I recall much debate on this thread some time ago that showed great confusion as to their actual intentions, and regarding what you quoted:
<< The actual crew maps used on the sortie were not recovered and the Board was restricted, in considering the crew's route planning, to the map left by Flt Lt Tapper in SHFNI Operations, and to the evidence of Lt Kingston's crew. From this the Board concludes that the sortie was well planned, and that the chosen route was logical and sound for a low level VFR flight...>>
the detail of their intentions in the leg approaching the Mull has not been made public, has it? And the conclusion:
<<. The Board therefore concluded that route planning was not a factor in the accident >>
seems open to dispute.
<< Could you tell us what you base your last comment on please as it is totally incompatible with the findings of the BoI >>
It does not worry me that some of my views are incompatible with the BOI – in this respect at least, I may have some company on this thread.
.
I would like to address some points made (in your quote) by the Odiham Stn Cdr – I realize that you were making the point that the Stn Cdr disagreed with the BOI findings here on the grounds that he regarded the crew as too professional planning wise, etc to have done what the BOI concluded and I take your point – I am using this text to draw attention to some major differences of opinion in one particular regard that are well illustrated in it:
<<. By using a combination of the last SuperTANS calculation and the Boeing computer simulation of the final flight path they have determined that at 15 to 18 seconds before impact the aircraft was climbing at 1000ft per min at 150kts IAS. Given the high level of confidence in both the raw data and the analysis, I accept that. >>
For what it’s worth, so do I – in this period it was in a cruise climb whereby the climb rate was optimum for the use of the surplus power without reducing forward speed – let me put this again, it was a selected steady optimum climb without reducing speed and in no way at all an immediate response to, say, deteriorating conditions. Prior to this period, over the long leg, this was the order of speed that the a/c had been cruising at in level flight – well within the cruising speed range with ample power in reserve according to the manufacturers data (for weight, alt, amb temp etc) and as evidenced by the subsequent cruise climb – it was an optimum cruise speed for getting a trip done and should not have been described as high as it so often has been so as to infer the crew were in a hurry.
.
In view of the description of cruise climb above, how does this bit sound?:
<< The Board then opine … that the crew, faced with the expected deteriorating weather, consciously elected to make a climb on track over high ground and in doing so used a speed and power combination that is unrecognisable as a Chinook technique. >>
BUT it should have been recognized by them as a Chinook technique – that it was patently not the right one for climbing over the Mull should have led them to deliberations as to what they were actually doing with it.
While the Stn Cdr recognizes it as a cruise climb he missed the opportunity of strongly emphasizing it – while he did so strongly disagree with the board’s view in this regard, he missed the opportunity of making a clear specific point that they would not have used cruise climb to gain altitude for crossing the Mull as close in as they were and for which they had not planned which is, IMHO, the nub of the matter.
If you do the sums, to have reached SALT over the Mull using cruise climb at their speed, they would have had to have selected it SEVERAL MILES earlier- so it was not just a little error of judgment – it would have been completely wrong and not a credible scenario given their training and professionalism in planning as the Stn Cdr said so strongly in so many words.
Given this line by him:
<<. Even taking into account the factors which the Board feel could have deceived the crew into believing a high speed cruise climb would have given them sufficient clearance over the Mull I, and the few, senior Chinook operators that I felt able to consult, find this suggestion incredible.>>
It is a great pity that he did not have the courage of his convictions and investigate whatever else they could have been doing - he would have had the position, standing, contacts, etc etc etc.
.
Justice Delayed is Justice Denied
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Unbelieveable!!!!! I take it that some very recent posters have not operated in the military environment. 1. Yes, you would have to cruise climb many miles before to get to height, that POSSIBLY means they didn't plan to climb, POSSIBLY they screwed up and didn't abort properly, POSSIBLY they were distracted, POSSIBLY etc etc (some doubt there?? mmmmmm) 2. Flight plans are not required, so why would they leave one? 3. The Chinook WAS cleared to fly the trip at height and weather permitting, WOULD have flown it at height. The IMC bit was the problem, not the height. 4. I can only remember a few trips in 15 years when I flew the exact line on my map. In poor weather you work your backside off to go around weather, single or dual pilot. 5. You only left a copy of your route in case they had to come looking for you, it WAS NOT THE LAW!!
Now this does not make me unprofessional, it means I was flexible. I would also like to say that most people did leave maps with the auth, but they didn't have to.
When we all look at how other people do things, we see what we percieve as errors in practices. That is why the military world post people around, fresh faces can cross pollinate good ideas. However, some things are done because although they are not best practice, they work well in the environment and are sufficient. If you want to hang this crew out, fair enough. But do it for the right reasons and do not try to bring them down with excuses that are not actually illegal or incorrect. Think before you post, the boys are not here to defend themselves, you are talking about REAL people who died for gods sake!! Forget ego's and keep this on the track, please.
Now this does not make me unprofessional, it means I was flexible. I would also like to say that most people did leave maps with the auth, but they didn't have to.
When we all look at how other people do things, we see what we percieve as errors in practices. That is why the military world post people around, fresh faces can cross pollinate good ideas. However, some things are done because although they are not best practice, they work well in the environment and are sufficient. If you want to hang this crew out, fair enough. But do it for the right reasons and do not try to bring them down with excuses that are not actually illegal or incorrect. Think before you post, the boys are not here to defend themselves, you are talking about REAL people who died for gods sake!! Forget ego's and keep this on the track, please.
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John Blakeley,
My apologies for the tardy reply. The usual excuse of "House Guests" applies - as it does many times each Summer.
The descriptions you gave of emergencies in a Tornado and a Jaguar do not surprise me. What you described is a QFI dealing singlehandedly with an emergency when the occupant of the other seat is not qualified on type. A totally different scenario from an aircraft flown by 2 fully qualified Pilots carrying a large number of Military and Civilian Passengers on a routine transit between 2 Airfields.
It would have been March 1995 when I first read the BOI, and I can still remember the sense of disbelief at the findings of the Investigative Board. To read that, according to the Board, at waypoint change the Chinook was in cloud and the pilots were not flying in accordance with VFR; and that they then "selected an inappropriate rate of climb to clear the Mull" was bad enough. To then read that, having made that finding, the BOI were unable venture an opinion with regard to "Human Failings" beggared belief.
The BOI did find, however, that "Crew Duty Time" was not a factor as the crew were still inside the twice extended Crew Duty limits when they crashed. No comment was made as to whether sufficient crew duty time remained to complete the task and return to Aldergrove.
It was OC RAF Odiham who made the point that the Passengers were owed a duty of care by the crew, and he reluctantly concluded that Flt Lt Tapper had failed in that duty.
"Want of proper care" is the OED definition of negligence.
My apologies for the tardy reply. The usual excuse of "House Guests" applies - as it does many times each Summer.
The descriptions you gave of emergencies in a Tornado and a Jaguar do not surprise me. What you described is a QFI dealing singlehandedly with an emergency when the occupant of the other seat is not qualified on type. A totally different scenario from an aircraft flown by 2 fully qualified Pilots carrying a large number of Military and Civilian Passengers on a routine transit between 2 Airfields.
It would have been March 1995 when I first read the BOI, and I can still remember the sense of disbelief at the findings of the Investigative Board. To read that, according to the Board, at waypoint change the Chinook was in cloud and the pilots were not flying in accordance with VFR; and that they then "selected an inappropriate rate of climb to clear the Mull" was bad enough. To then read that, having made that finding, the BOI were unable venture an opinion with regard to "Human Failings" beggared belief.
The BOI did find, however, that "Crew Duty Time" was not a factor as the crew were still inside the twice extended Crew Duty limits when they crashed. No comment was made as to whether sufficient crew duty time remained to complete the task and return to Aldergrove.
It was OC RAF Odiham who made the point that the Passengers were owed a duty of care by the crew, and he reluctantly concluded that Flt Lt Tapper had failed in that duty.
"Want of proper care" is the OED definition of negligence.
cazatou,
I've just read the BOI for the nth time and cannot find where it says that "at waypoint change the Chinook was in cloud and the pilots were not flying in accordance with VFR"
Unless this is yet another of your wild statements, please elaborate. p1
I've just read the BOI for the nth time and cannot find where it says that "at waypoint change the Chinook was in cloud and the pilots were not flying in accordance with VFR"
Unless this is yet another of your wild statements, please elaborate. p1
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Jayteeto
I f you read my previous post properly I think that you will find that the main point I was making was that the cruise climb was so patently wrong that it was obviously not meant to be the start of a climb to SALT for overflying the Mull – it should never have been assumed as such – and yet was this not one of the points on which they were judged negligent?
I was agreeing with the Stn Cdr’s view <<Even taking into account the factors which the Board feel could have deceived the crew into believing a high speed cruise climb would have given them sufficient clearance over the Mull I, and the few, senior Chinook operators that I felt able to consult, find this suggestion incredible.>>.
I was criticizing the Stn Cdr for not (publicly at least) making more of this (in my opinion very important) issue.
If you remove from the argument the cruise climb as an indicator of their intention to climb OVER the Mull, you are left simply with an aircraft that was surprised by its proximity to the Mull in the last few seconds before impact.
.
I believe that they were intending to turn LEFT up the coast at low level as was a common practice in that area.
I believe that the turning point on this occasion was a precise location as evidenced by their steering demand to the RIGHT after waypoint change, when already very close in.
I have explained in detail previously exactly what I think they were doing and why they were deceived as to their distance to go to that turning point – and I have made the point repeatedly that they could not be held responsible for a test that a third party messed up.
.
If your last paragraph was aimed at me I think you should retract it.
Regarding some of your other points:
(3) <<3. The Chinook WAS cleared to fly the trip at height and weather permitting, WOULD have flown it at height. The IMC bit was the problem, not the height.>>
What about the icing limitation? – given the met forecast, would this not have been a crucial limitation AT THE PLANNING STAGE?
.
(2) <<2. Flight plans are not required, so why would they leave one?>>
Well, if ever you were going to leave one I think that it would have been before that flight for, say, the following reasons:
New beaut a/c;
a/c about which they crew had serious concerns – including nav equipment;
large number of VIPs across sea and possibly rugged, remote terrain.
Also these men had an excellent reputation and it would surely have been their habit – perhaps someone who knew them could quantify in what percentage of similar flights they had left copies of flight plans?
.
There is, as I put in my previous post, a much more acceptable reason for the lack of a copy of the flight plan – it was removed. Now, if there was a test/ demo of the nature that I suggested, it would have been essential to have produced a plan with detail in the vicinity of the Mull (eg precise turning point/ RV, ETA, altitude at that point, etc) that would have made their intended actions unambiguous. If it went wrong and you wanted to avoid a whole load of problems and embarrassment, you would not want this actual flight plan in the public gaze, would you?
.
Now using another contributor’s points as an example, I would like to make a general point regarding criticism of anyone digging into detail in this case – if we look back at some points cazatou made concerning breakfast, briefing, etc, is it not usual for, say, a policeman investigating a tragedy to ask if there was any unusual behaviour (and in this case, unusual also = non routine) just prior to the event on the part of those involved? There are reasons for collating all the information that is there for the getting no matter how trivial a singular thing may seem. For example, if someone has not been seen to have breakfast and this is a requirement that is usually seen to have been complied with, then it has been noticed that he was somewhere else (a bit too subtle?).
I f you read my previous post properly I think that you will find that the main point I was making was that the cruise climb was so patently wrong that it was obviously not meant to be the start of a climb to SALT for overflying the Mull – it should never have been assumed as such – and yet was this not one of the points on which they were judged negligent?
I was agreeing with the Stn Cdr’s view <<Even taking into account the factors which the Board feel could have deceived the crew into believing a high speed cruise climb would have given them sufficient clearance over the Mull I, and the few, senior Chinook operators that I felt able to consult, find this suggestion incredible.>>.
I was criticizing the Stn Cdr for not (publicly at least) making more of this (in my opinion very important) issue.
If you remove from the argument the cruise climb as an indicator of their intention to climb OVER the Mull, you are left simply with an aircraft that was surprised by its proximity to the Mull in the last few seconds before impact.
.
I believe that they were intending to turn LEFT up the coast at low level as was a common practice in that area.
I believe that the turning point on this occasion was a precise location as evidenced by their steering demand to the RIGHT after waypoint change, when already very close in.
I have explained in detail previously exactly what I think they were doing and why they were deceived as to their distance to go to that turning point – and I have made the point repeatedly that they could not be held responsible for a test that a third party messed up.
.
If your last paragraph was aimed at me I think you should retract it.
Regarding some of your other points:
(3) <<3. The Chinook WAS cleared to fly the trip at height and weather permitting, WOULD have flown it at height. The IMC bit was the problem, not the height.>>
What about the icing limitation? – given the met forecast, would this not have been a crucial limitation AT THE PLANNING STAGE?
.
(2) <<2. Flight plans are not required, so why would they leave one?>>
Well, if ever you were going to leave one I think that it would have been before that flight for, say, the following reasons:
New beaut a/c;
a/c about which they crew had serious concerns – including nav equipment;
large number of VIPs across sea and possibly rugged, remote terrain.
Also these men had an excellent reputation and it would surely have been their habit – perhaps someone who knew them could quantify in what percentage of similar flights they had left copies of flight plans?
.
There is, as I put in my previous post, a much more acceptable reason for the lack of a copy of the flight plan – it was removed. Now, if there was a test/ demo of the nature that I suggested, it would have been essential to have produced a plan with detail in the vicinity of the Mull (eg precise turning point/ RV, ETA, altitude at that point, etc) that would have made their intended actions unambiguous. If it went wrong and you wanted to avoid a whole load of problems and embarrassment, you would not want this actual flight plan in the public gaze, would you?
.
Now using another contributor’s points as an example, I would like to make a general point regarding criticism of anyone digging into detail in this case – if we look back at some points cazatou made concerning breakfast, briefing, etc, is it not usual for, say, a policeman investigating a tragedy to ask if there was any unusual behaviour (and in this case, unusual also = non routine) just prior to the event on the part of those involved? There are reasons for collating all the information that is there for the getting no matter how trivial a singular thing may seem. For example, if someone has not been seen to have breakfast and this is a requirement that is usually seen to have been complied with, then it has been noticed that he was somewhere else (a bit too subtle?).
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No withdrawal, you show your ignorance further. Icing needs water, basic physics. You can fly VMC in minus twenty if you want to, IMC = water usually. Water + cold = ice. So yes, they would have flown at height if the weather was better and yes you would plan that way, this gives you an option of using the map on a different day when it is sunny 
THERE WAS AND STILL IS NO NEED TO DO A FLIGHT PLAN. In the UK we are not like a lot of europe, there is no requirement on a VFR transit. In 6 years service in Ireland I only ever did 2 Flight Plans and that was for airways trips which was mandatory. So I repeat, THERE WAS AND STILL IS NO NEED TO DO A FLIGHT PLAN.
When you say flight plan, do you mean copies of the maps? That is not what a flight plan is old chap. Now..... the maps removed because of a test/demo..... give me strength..... are you really this thick?? Man, I was there, so were others, it just is not true!!!! Even if there was a map that was removed, the duty auth would have been a bog standard Puma pilot and that information almost certainly would have come out. Unless of course he was threatened with deathzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz zzzzz
THERE WAS AND STILL IS NO NEED TO DO A FLIGHT PLAN. In the UK we are not like a lot of europe, there is no requirement on a VFR transit. In 6 years service in Ireland I only ever did 2 Flight Plans and that was for airways trips which was mandatory. So I repeat, THERE WAS AND STILL IS NO NEED TO DO A FLIGHT PLAN.
When you say flight plan, do you mean copies of the maps? That is not what a flight plan is old chap. Now..... the maps removed because of a test/demo..... give me strength..... are you really this thick?? Man, I was there, so were others, it just is not true!!!! Even if there was a map that was removed, the duty auth would have been a bog standard Puma pilot and that information almost certainly would have come out. Unless of course he was threatened with deathzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz zzzzz
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Jayteeto
RE flightplans/ copies of maps whatever means was used to record intentions, for the want of a better word let’s call them a mudmap herein – so you are saying that there was a mudmap left for a high route that required good weather but no mudmap when the met forecast indicated a significant icing limitation for the HC2 Chinook?
I must be thick as I find that illogical …
.
If you were there, you were presumably familiar with the route to the Mull and the turn up the coast … Great Glen, etc at low level – was this not the usual and expected route for such a ferry flight and it would not have been the case, as you say, that “ … they would have flown at height if the weather was better …”?
RE flightplans/ copies of maps whatever means was used to record intentions, for the want of a better word let’s call them a mudmap herein – so you are saying that there was a mudmap left for a high route that required good weather but no mudmap when the met forecast indicated a significant icing limitation for the HC2 Chinook?
I must be thick as I find that illogical …
.
If you were there, you were presumably familiar with the route to the Mull and the turn up the coast … Great Glen, etc at low level – was this not the usual and expected route for such a ferry flight and it would not have been the case, as you say, that “ … they would have flown at height if the weather was better …”?
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John,
I think it well past the time where this idiot is simply ignored. I have tried on numerous occasions to get the twerp to tell us all in here just how his idiotic plan was actually put into place and he has simply been unable to give any sort of credible answer, hence my assertion that the man is a bl@@dy fool
Hope life is treating you well, life Lyneham is busy but has it's moments, just started a TAC course which I am way toooo old for but it is bl@@dy good fun! I hope to make the Puma reunion this year so if you can get there I will let you buy me a beer with your ill gotten gains
all spelling mistakes are "df" alcohol induced
I think it well past the time where this idiot is simply ignored. I have tried on numerous occasions to get the twerp to tell us all in here just how his idiotic plan was actually put into place and he has simply been unable to give any sort of credible answer, hence my assertion that the man is a bl@@dy fool
Hope life is treating you well, life Lyneham is busy but has it's moments, just started a TAC course which I am way toooo old for but it is bl@@dy good fun! I hope to make the Puma reunion this year so if you can get there I will let you buy me a beer with your ill gotten gains
all spelling mistakes are "df" alcohol induced
Join Date: Sep 2003
Location: Perth, Western Australia
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ABIW
By exploring this theory, many contradictions and flaws in the assumptions by the BOI and others have been brought into focus. Basic conditions and parameters pertaining to this flight have been established. Limitations of equipment made clear. Most of all, a picture has emerged of the last leg of this flight which is clear, understandable, and reasonable which at the very least reduces any blame on the pilots to a judgment error as opposed to their having been in breach of flying regulations taking an incomprehensible course of action.
Whether the theory turns out to be correct or not does not detract from its being a framework for analysis and debate – thus far it has done well in this respect.
While not yet proven, some detractors so far have either used erroneous or inapplicable arguments or have shown some misunderstanding of conditions or systems; some have made statements that, at face value, should have ended it but have not backed those statements up with background information that would make them convincing, especially when the person making such statements has said something else previously with equal confidence that has proven to be wrong.
An intriguing aspect is that the system suggested by the theory seems to be a taboo subject here with very little coming back on the open forum – with the advances made in such systems, it is hard to imagine 12 years on why it should be still such a great secret especially when there is so much information on it overseas – so many of you seem to be sticking your heads in the sand – this theory is unpalatable but so far it remains to have been a possibility and the ramifications of its being correct are so very serious that surely every stone should be unturned in exploring it – it also clears the pilots’ names and perhaps could lead to real justice.
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If this is what a fool has been doing, what have you contributed in these last 12 years? – in anticipation of the answer, what does that make you?
By exploring this theory, many contradictions and flaws in the assumptions by the BOI and others have been brought into focus. Basic conditions and parameters pertaining to this flight have been established. Limitations of equipment made clear. Most of all, a picture has emerged of the last leg of this flight which is clear, understandable, and reasonable which at the very least reduces any blame on the pilots to a judgment error as opposed to their having been in breach of flying regulations taking an incomprehensible course of action.
Whether the theory turns out to be correct or not does not detract from its being a framework for analysis and debate – thus far it has done well in this respect.
While not yet proven, some detractors so far have either used erroneous or inapplicable arguments or have shown some misunderstanding of conditions or systems; some have made statements that, at face value, should have ended it but have not backed those statements up with background information that would make them convincing, especially when the person making such statements has said something else previously with equal confidence that has proven to be wrong.
An intriguing aspect is that the system suggested by the theory seems to be a taboo subject here with very little coming back on the open forum – with the advances made in such systems, it is hard to imagine 12 years on why it should be still such a great secret especially when there is so much information on it overseas – so many of you seem to be sticking your heads in the sand – this theory is unpalatable but so far it remains to have been a possibility and the ramifications of its being correct are so very serious that surely every stone should be unturned in exploring it – it also clears the pilots’ names and perhaps could lead to real justice.
.
If this is what a fool has been doing, what have you contributed in these last 12 years? – in anticipation of the answer, what does that make you?
Join Date: Jul 2004
Location: Longton, Lancs, UK
Age: 80
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Brian,
I don't know how you would do it, but maybe you might give some consideration to the creation of another thread that concentrates on the campaign and its ultimate goal. IMHO, I feel that this particular, worthy and long-standing thread has of late become somewhat worthless in achievement of the aim. The posts are boring and repetitive, allow retired 'experts' to endlessly postulate their theories, and do nothing to persuade MoD to re-examine the issues. Those within the estabishment will surely be wringing their hands with glee over the never-ending and diversionary arguments that we see on a daily basis. I'm mindful of free speech et al et al, but have we not reached the point, that as far as the campaign is concerned, this thread is becoming counter-productive? Sorry to sound negative, but I think we're not moving forward of late.
I don't know how you would do it, but maybe you might give some consideration to the creation of another thread that concentrates on the campaign and its ultimate goal. IMHO, I feel that this particular, worthy and long-standing thread has of late become somewhat worthless in achievement of the aim. The posts are boring and repetitive, allow retired 'experts' to endlessly postulate their theories, and do nothing to persuade MoD to re-examine the issues. Those within the estabishment will surely be wringing their hands with glee over the never-ending and diversionary arguments that we see on a daily basis. I'm mindful of free speech et al et al, but have we not reached the point, that as far as the campaign is concerned, this thread is becoming counter-productive? Sorry to sound negative, but I think we're not moving forward of late.