Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
It really is saddening to see that we are still having to debate this tragic event so long after it happened. It doesn't say much for the rules of law or the evidence. And the gimps that perpetrated this injustice are still roaming around like lords and masters. A sad, sad disgrace.
I really hope this campaign eventually pulls the rug out from under the smug bastards. I can only applaud the perseverance and courage of those willing to undertake it.
I really hope this campaign eventually pulls the rug out from under the smug bastards. I can only applaud the perseverance and courage of those willing to undertake it.
More bang for your buck
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the urls below are some of the debates on the select commitee report I'm sure there are others but seeking them out is somewhat time consuming those who wish to look further goto this site and use the advanced search using the apropriate key words such as "chinook crash mull etc" Note they are not in cronilogical order sorry
http://www.publications.parliament.u...105-20_spnew10
http://www.publications.parliament.u...1105-19_spnew6
http://www.publications.parliament.u...1105-18_spnew0
http://www.publications.parliament.u...1105-20_spnew5
http://www.publications.parliament.u...1105-18_spnew9
http://www.publications.parliament.u...105-21_spnew12
http://www.publications.parliament.u...105-20_spnew10
http://www.publications.parliament.u...1105-19_spnew6
http://www.publications.parliament.u...1105-18_spnew0
http://www.publications.parliament.u...1105-20_spnew5
http://www.publications.parliament.u...1105-18_spnew9
http://www.publications.parliament.u...105-21_spnew12
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cazatou
We witnessed it approach at high speed from the same general direction as ZD576 had come from and it turned tightly to go up along the coast – over the land but not far up the slope – it passed just about overhead and we were standing a bit below ½ way between the lighthouse and the crash site, where the mist started that day – we did not see anything “overfly the Mull”.
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Whatever detachment, would not a helo doing a ferry flight from Aldergrove to Ft Geo (with or without an icing limitation in the conditions of the day) prefer the low level VFR option if conditions allowed? If it was planning in advance to go high, why would it not already have done so over the (boring bit) sea?
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I can hardly believe that the argument is still going on regarding whether it was intending to turn and continue at low level or not.
We witnessed it approach at high speed from the same general direction as ZD576 had come from and it turned tightly to go up along the coast – over the land but not far up the slope – it passed just about overhead and we were standing a bit below ½ way between the lighthouse and the crash site, where the mist started that day – we did not see anything “overfly the Mull”.
.
Whatever detachment, would not a helo doing a ferry flight from Aldergrove to Ft Geo (with or without an icing limitation in the conditions of the day) prefer the low level VFR option if conditions allowed? If it was planning in advance to go high, why would it not already have done so over the (boring bit) sea?
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I can hardly believe that the argument is still going on regarding whether it was intending to turn and continue at low level or not.
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cazatou
In your post 2557 of 15 August 06 you refer to the position of the lighthouse being 'misplotted'. Could you explain what you mean by this - on which chart was it misplotted? What is the significance of this?
In your post 2557 of 15 August 06 you refer to the position of the lighthouse being 'misplotted'. Could you explain what you mean by this - on which chart was it misplotted? What is the significance of this?
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Arthur Rowe
The coordinates for the lighthouse (Waypoint A) were incorrectly entered as a Waypoint into the SuperTans giving a position error of 1-200 metres. As the Pilots changed the SuperTans to Waypoint B (Corran) with 0.81 NM to go to Waypoint A they no longer had a direct range and bearing to Waypoint A displayed. The course of the aircraft did not, however, change and they continued towards the misplotted Waypoint.
If you are worried about potential errors on charts you need not be; it was a simple transcription error.
The coordinates for the lighthouse (Waypoint A) were incorrectly entered as a Waypoint into the SuperTans giving a position error of 1-200 metres. As the Pilots changed the SuperTans to Waypoint B (Corran) with 0.81 NM to go to Waypoint A they no longer had a direct range and bearing to Waypoint A displayed. The course of the aircraft did not, however, change and they continued towards the misplotted Waypoint.
If you are worried about potential errors on charts you need not be; it was a simple transcription error.
Last edited by cazatou; 21st Aug 2006 at 19:27.
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Walter,
Given the Political situation, as well as the Terrorist threat, at that time; I agree that any aircraft Captain with such a Passenger list would wish to depart NI airspace with the greatest dispatch, coupled with the minimum exposure to potential hostile action. I know of no person who has suggested otherwise. Given the Wx conditions at Aldergrove that evening a high speed low level departure was totally appropriate. Whether it was appropriate to continue with that course of action as they approached the fog enshrouded Mull is another matter.
Given the Political situation, as well as the Terrorist threat, at that time; I agree that any aircraft Captain with such a Passenger list would wish to depart NI airspace with the greatest dispatch, coupled with the minimum exposure to potential hostile action. I know of no person who has suggested otherwise. Given the Wx conditions at Aldergrove that evening a high speed low level departure was totally appropriate. Whether it was appropriate to continue with that course of action as they approached the fog enshrouded Mull is another matter.
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Arthur Rowe
<< cazatou
In your post 2557 of 15 August 06 you refer to the position of the lighthouse being 'misplotted'. Could you explain what you mean by this - on which chart was it misplotted? What is the significance of this?>>
When I stood with the lighthouse keeper and observed a helo come from the sea and turn (almost overhead) to continue at low level up the coast, he said “they do that all the time” and he pointed to a prominent rock which he explained was where they always crossed before doing their turn up the coast – it was just a bit south of the light house and the turning point was just a bit inland of the lighthouse.
As the lighthouse was residential at that time, it may be that there was consideration of the residents in not beating up the lighthouse by turning right over it – seems reasonable?
To my reckoning, this usual turning point would have had the same coordinates as waypoint A – plot waypoint A on a 1:50,000 OS map and you will see what I mean.
Therefore I say that they were not slack in entering the lighthouse coordinates but that they had entered a regular turning point for that location – and why was this suggestion that they had made an error left unchallenged for so long when someone else must have done this leg before? Seems to fit a pattern of painting them as slack, reckless, etc..
<< cazatou
In your post 2557 of 15 August 06 you refer to the position of the lighthouse being 'misplotted'. Could you explain what you mean by this - on which chart was it misplotted? What is the significance of this?>>
When I stood with the lighthouse keeper and observed a helo come from the sea and turn (almost overhead) to continue at low level up the coast, he said “they do that all the time” and he pointed to a prominent rock which he explained was where they always crossed before doing their turn up the coast – it was just a bit south of the light house and the turning point was just a bit inland of the lighthouse.
As the lighthouse was residential at that time, it may be that there was consideration of the residents in not beating up the lighthouse by turning right over it – seems reasonable?
To my reckoning, this usual turning point would have had the same coordinates as waypoint A – plot waypoint A on a 1:50,000 OS map and you will see what I mean.
Therefore I say that they were not slack in entering the lighthouse coordinates but that they had entered a regular turning point for that location – and why was this suggestion that they had made an error left unchallenged for so long when someone else must have done this leg before? Seems to fit a pattern of painting them as slack, reckless, etc..
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cazatou (K52)
I genuinely would appreciate an answer to my question posted earlier in this thread:
Please.
I genuinely would appreciate an answer to my question posted earlier in this thread:
Cazatou (K52)
Notwithstanding any 'statement' by the MOD. Would you please direct me to the evidence that would support an allegation that:
Quote:
at waypoint change the Chinook was in cloud and the pilots were not flying in accordance with VFR
I put it to you, such factual evidence simply does not exist.
Prove me wrong. PLEASE!
Notwithstanding any 'statement' by the MOD. Would you please direct me to the evidence that would support an allegation that:
Quote:
at waypoint change the Chinook was in cloud and the pilots were not flying in accordance with VFR
I put it to you, such factual evidence simply does not exist.
Prove me wrong. PLEASE!
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It seems on reading this thread, a huge amount of detail is present. But doesn’t this whole argument of crew negligence fall apart due to one simple fact?
Does anyone know exactly what happened on that flight? The answer is no.
Therefore how can you blame the crew?
Does anyone know exactly what happened on that flight? The answer is no.
Therefore how can you blame the crew?
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Cazatou
<<… with the greatest dispatch, coupled with the minimum exposure to potential hostile action. I know of no person who has suggested otherwise >>
Actually, many years ago I had suggested that it would have been for such tactical considerations that they would have been approaching the landmass fast and low (the hills muffling their approach) and turning so as to go along the coast very close to the mist (which was to be expected on the landmass slopes and which would prevent anyone on the land from seeing them coming for more than a fleeting moment so that they could not be targetted).
You said:<< I know of no person who has suggested otherwise >> Guess what? – this suggestion was ridiculed strongly by many – I am glad that you at least now appreciate the possibility.
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Further, this was, I believe, a routine tactic for any mil helo coming over from NI when the local mist conditions afforded this protection – I and the lighthouse keeper witnessed one do it in near identical conditions and he told me that they did that all the time.. This contrasts with your view: << Whether it was appropriate to continue with that course of action as they approached the fog enshrouded Mull is another matter.>> - I say it was a more likely course of action when there was the common ground hugging mist there.
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If they were relying upon visual judgment only for their distance off that mist, they would have to have been prudent – the ground detail of the general slopes would have been blurred to say the least – I cannot imagine that an experienced crew like them would have carried on at (cruising) speed, as I have explained so many times before, without either clear sight of a familiar feature (in which case they would have turned in time) or were referring to something else for their range to go.
Confusion between the fog signal station and the lighthouse has been suggested: however, if you plot their approach track, the lighthouse, and the fog signal station on a 1:50,000 OS map, you will see that, at their (very oblique) approach angle, such a confusion would have only put them tens of metres to the right – not hundreds as suggested.
There was no pressing need, for the above mentioned tactical considerations, for them to approach the mist at a precise point if they had no clear visual reference – as an experienced pilot familiar with the area posted here some time ago, they merely had to start turning gradually left to line up with the shoreline/ edge of mist in the distance when they were feeling uncomfortable with their judgment of proximity or, I add, when they had reached close in according to their SuperTANS (with a margin for error). That they did not suggests some specific reason for approaching more closely and this is reinforced with the steer to the RIGHT at waypoint change.
<<… with the greatest dispatch, coupled with the minimum exposure to potential hostile action. I know of no person who has suggested otherwise >>
Actually, many years ago I had suggested that it would have been for such tactical considerations that they would have been approaching the landmass fast and low (the hills muffling their approach) and turning so as to go along the coast very close to the mist (which was to be expected on the landmass slopes and which would prevent anyone on the land from seeing them coming for more than a fleeting moment so that they could not be targetted).
You said:<< I know of no person who has suggested otherwise >> Guess what? – this suggestion was ridiculed strongly by many – I am glad that you at least now appreciate the possibility.
.
Further, this was, I believe, a routine tactic for any mil helo coming over from NI when the local mist conditions afforded this protection – I and the lighthouse keeper witnessed one do it in near identical conditions and he told me that they did that all the time.. This contrasts with your view: << Whether it was appropriate to continue with that course of action as they approached the fog enshrouded Mull is another matter.>> - I say it was a more likely course of action when there was the common ground hugging mist there.
.
If they were relying upon visual judgment only for their distance off that mist, they would have to have been prudent – the ground detail of the general slopes would have been blurred to say the least – I cannot imagine that an experienced crew like them would have carried on at (cruising) speed, as I have explained so many times before, without either clear sight of a familiar feature (in which case they would have turned in time) or were referring to something else for their range to go.
Confusion between the fog signal station and the lighthouse has been suggested: however, if you plot their approach track, the lighthouse, and the fog signal station on a 1:50,000 OS map, you will see that, at their (very oblique) approach angle, such a confusion would have only put them tens of metres to the right – not hundreds as suggested.
There was no pressing need, for the above mentioned tactical considerations, for them to approach the mist at a precise point if they had no clear visual reference – as an experienced pilot familiar with the area posted here some time ago, they merely had to start turning gradually left to line up with the shoreline/ edge of mist in the distance when they were feeling uncomfortable with their judgment of proximity or, I add, when they had reached close in according to their SuperTANS (with a margin for error). That they did not suggests some specific reason for approaching more closely and this is reinforced with the steer to the RIGHT at waypoint change.
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Andy Nicholls
No everyone arguing the details is blaming the crew – after 12 years, the tactic of just saying “nothing can be known” etc has not worked – how much longer do you want to give it?
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If you follow recent arguments about cruise climb, I think you’ll agree that the BOI assumption of their intending to overfly the Mull was unfounded – does this not open up the opportunity to push for a review?
No everyone arguing the details is blaming the crew – after 12 years, the tactic of just saying “nothing can be known” etc has not worked – how much longer do you want to give it?
.
If you follow recent arguments about cruise climb, I think you’ll agree that the BOI assumption of their intending to overfly the Mull was unfounded – does this not open up the opportunity to push for a review?
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Walter,
When I mentioned "exposure" I was referring to NI where there was a known potential threat. If you are talking about the Mull as a possible site for such action then what evidence (not speculation) can you offer to support such a claim?
When I mentioned "exposure" I was referring to NI where there was a known potential threat. If you are talking about the Mull as a possible site for such action then what evidence (not speculation) can you offer to support such a claim?
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Cazatou
Birmingham pubs, Horse Guards, Canary Wharf, Brighton, etc, etc..
Seriously, I think exposure existed beyond NI.
I know firsthand Scots police were concerned about possibility of terrs moving materiel along remote roads in the NW as far back as mid 70’s.
Besides, I was not saying there was, only that it would have been a reasonable tactic - don't outfits practice?train?
Birmingham pubs, Horse Guards, Canary Wharf, Brighton, etc, etc..
Seriously, I think exposure existed beyond NI.
I know firsthand Scots police were concerned about possibility of terrs moving materiel along remote roads in the NW as far back as mid 70’s.
Besides, I was not saying there was, only that it would have been a reasonable tactic - don't outfits practice?train?
Last edited by walter kennedy; 21st Aug 2006 at 23:09. Reason: addition
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Andy Nicholls,
You are quite right, there has been a lot of speculation regarding this accident. To some it quite clear that the entire Crew are innocent and to others that the the Pilots (for there has never been any suggestion that the Cabin Crew had any influence over the Pilots decisions) were negligent.
The Flight was authorised to be conducted at low level under Visual Flight Rules. The aircraft, however, crashed into a fog enshrouded hillside in conditions that bore no resemblance to "Visual Flight Rules". The words "visual" and "fog" do not gel well together. Incidentaly, the Lighthouse Keeper is a qualified Met Observer.
Those are the salient facts regarding the evidence of the accident as provided by the Board of Inquiry. There was no Distress Call - neither was the Transponder selected to Emergency. NB Either of these actions would have triggered a response from SARSAT and alerted the Accident And Emergency Cell at West Drayton.
The people at the Lighthouse on the Mull were in ABSOLUTELY NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER about the weather conditions. The Deputy Lighthouse Keeper was driving back down the Hill when the Chinook exploded on the hillside behind him - he heard, but never saw, the aircraft.
There was no evidence of Hostile Action, Explosion, Structural Failure, Crew Incapacitation, Birdstrike or failure of Navigation Equipment.
This was one of the 764 Accidents that occurred during my time in the RAF - and I do not recall anybody standing up and saying "Its a fair Cop guv"
You are quite right, there has been a lot of speculation regarding this accident. To some it quite clear that the entire Crew are innocent and to others that the the Pilots (for there has never been any suggestion that the Cabin Crew had any influence over the Pilots decisions) were negligent.
The Flight was authorised to be conducted at low level under Visual Flight Rules. The aircraft, however, crashed into a fog enshrouded hillside in conditions that bore no resemblance to "Visual Flight Rules". The words "visual" and "fog" do not gel well together. Incidentaly, the Lighthouse Keeper is a qualified Met Observer.
Those are the salient facts regarding the evidence of the accident as provided by the Board of Inquiry. There was no Distress Call - neither was the Transponder selected to Emergency. NB Either of these actions would have triggered a response from SARSAT and alerted the Accident And Emergency Cell at West Drayton.
The people at the Lighthouse on the Mull were in ABSOLUTELY NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER about the weather conditions. The Deputy Lighthouse Keeper was driving back down the Hill when the Chinook exploded on the hillside behind him - he heard, but never saw, the aircraft.
There was no evidence of Hostile Action, Explosion, Structural Failure, Crew Incapacitation, Birdstrike or failure of Navigation Equipment.
This was one of the 764 Accidents that occurred during my time in the RAF - and I do not recall anybody standing up and saying "Its a fair Cop guv"
Andy Nicholls,
Please do not be deceived by cazatou's usual wild and selective distortion of the facts:.
He fails to mention the majority of pprune campaigners who simply say that there is insufficient evidence for a verdict of gross negligence "with absolutely no doubt whatsoever".
There was certainly evidence of structural failure which experts witnesses could not say did not occur before impact. And there was evidence of a previous occurrence on this particular airframe. Please read John Blakeley's report which you can find on http://chinook-justice.org/
Please also note that cazatou often fails to justify his wild statements e.g. he has refused to answer Tandemrotor's challenge to produce evidence of his claim that they were in cloud at waypoint change.
I think that he is trying to outdo Brian Dixon's claim to be an "irritating sod".
cazatou,
I think that, until you can justify these statements with evidence you are completely discredited and should keep quiet.
Please do not be deceived by cazatou's usual wild and selective distortion of the facts:.
To some it quite clear that the entire Crew are innocent and to others that the the Pilots....
There was no evidence of Hostile Action, Explosion, Structural Failure,
Please also note that cazatou often fails to justify his wild statements e.g. he has refused to answer Tandemrotor's challenge to produce evidence of his claim that they were in cloud at waypoint change.
I think that he is trying to outdo Brian Dixon's claim to be an "irritating sod".
cazatou,
I think that, until you can justify these statements with evidence you are completely discredited and should keep quiet.
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Pulse 1,
What I said was that the BOI believed the aircraft was in cloud at waypoint change, a point made in a briefing to the AOC. The same point is made in Para 8 of Section 2 of MOD's final submission to the HOL Committee.
The HOL Committee accepted that the waypoint change to Corran, which required 3 deliberate acts by the pilots, showed that the crew were undoubtedly in control of the aircraft. The Reviewing Officers stated that negligence had occurred by the time the pilots made the waypoint change.
What I said was that the BOI believed the aircraft was in cloud at waypoint change, a point made in a briefing to the AOC. The same point is made in Para 8 of Section 2 of MOD's final submission to the HOL Committee.
The HOL Committee accepted that the waypoint change to Corran, which required 3 deliberate acts by the pilots, showed that the crew were undoubtedly in control of the aircraft. The Reviewing Officers stated that negligence had occurred by the time the pilots made the waypoint change.
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cazatou
I think you are misinterpreting a very sound low-level navigation technique.
Select your intended waypoint close to a feature of vertical extent. That way you can use the feature without actually having to fly over the top of it. Better tactically and to maintain MSD. I therefore do not think we can necessarily say that the waypoint was misplotted.
I think you are misinterpreting a very sound low-level navigation technique.
Select your intended waypoint close to a feature of vertical extent. That way you can use the feature without actually having to fly over the top of it. Better tactically and to maintain MSD. I therefore do not think we can necessarily say that the waypoint was misplotted.
A really irritating PPRuNer
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Andy,
welcome to the debate.
For the record - the whole point of the Campaign is to state that the burden of proof in place at the time of the accident - Absolutely No Doubt Whatsoever - has not been achieved by the known, available, factual evidence.
The MoD can't say what the cloud cover looked like from the cockpit, they cannot say at what time the waypoint change was made, they cannot say exactly where the waypoint change was made, they cannot say whether both pilots agreed with the course of action taken, they cannot say that the aircraft was fully serviceable throughout the short flight and it would appear that not all witnesses were located and debriefed . It's only fair to point out that I can't answer the questions either, but you would think that someone with absolutely no doubt whatsoever would be in a position to do so. Unfortunatley, no one alive can.
As I have said before, if someone can provide me with firm evidence, which proves Jon and Rick guilty of negligence, with absolutely no doubt whatsoever, I will happly make a public apology, shut up and go away forever.
The MoD have not, and cannot, prove their case to the required burden of proof and it is an absolute disgrace that they continue to stick to the same discredited mantra for the past 12 years.
That is why the Campaign exists.
Caz, get yer own catchphrase! -
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
welcome to the debate.
For the record - the whole point of the Campaign is to state that the burden of proof in place at the time of the accident - Absolutely No Doubt Whatsoever - has not been achieved by the known, available, factual evidence.
The MoD can't say what the cloud cover looked like from the cockpit, they cannot say at what time the waypoint change was made, they cannot say exactly where the waypoint change was made, they cannot say whether both pilots agreed with the course of action taken, they cannot say that the aircraft was fully serviceable throughout the short flight and it would appear that not all witnesses were located and debriefed . It's only fair to point out that I can't answer the questions either, but you would think that someone with absolutely no doubt whatsoever would be in a position to do so. Unfortunatley, no one alive can.
As I have said before, if someone can provide me with firm evidence, which proves Jon and Rick guilty of negligence, with absolutely no doubt whatsoever, I will happly make a public apology, shut up and go away forever.
The MoD have not, and cannot, prove their case to the required burden of proof and it is an absolute disgrace that they continue to stick to the same discredited mantra for the past 12 years.
That is why the Campaign exists.
Caz, get yer own catchphrase! -
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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Arthur Rowe,
It was not I who said that the Waypoint was misplotted, it was the BOI . My understanding was that the person who did the planning for that sortie, and a copy of whose map was left for the Duty Auth, agreed that the Waypoint had been misplotted. The BOI were also quite certain that the waypoint had been misplotted. The discrepancy was perhaps 2-3 secs flying time. The person who did the planning for that sortie could agree that the waypoint was misplotted because neither he nor his crew were involved in the fatal sortie.
This, not withstanding claims made by at least 3 different contributors that "they were there when JT did the planning for this sortie" - none of them mention the others who claimed to be there; they were (each and every one of them) alone in the Planning room with him. Now, with this para firmly in mind - start reading again from the beginning of para 1.
A minor misplot is not uncommon and, in the normal course of low level flight in VFR would give no cause for concern. In the circumstances of the accident however,there is no evidence that the weather conditions at the Mull even remotely approached conditions whereby it would have been safe to drive one's car at permitted max limits for the road; let alone fly a helicopter at low level at the IAS pertaining at impact. Given that the Lighthouse Keeper and his Deputy were Qualified Met Observers we can be reasonably sure that the weather model for the Mull used by the BOI was as correct as could be. They were also the people closest to the actual impact.
It was not I who said that the Waypoint was misplotted, it was the BOI . My understanding was that the person who did the planning for that sortie, and a copy of whose map was left for the Duty Auth, agreed that the Waypoint had been misplotted. The BOI were also quite certain that the waypoint had been misplotted. The discrepancy was perhaps 2-3 secs flying time. The person who did the planning for that sortie could agree that the waypoint was misplotted because neither he nor his crew were involved in the fatal sortie.
This, not withstanding claims made by at least 3 different contributors that "they were there when JT did the planning for this sortie" - none of them mention the others who claimed to be there; they were (each and every one of them) alone in the Planning room with him. Now, with this para firmly in mind - start reading again from the beginning of para 1.
A minor misplot is not uncommon and, in the normal course of low level flight in VFR would give no cause for concern. In the circumstances of the accident however,there is no evidence that the weather conditions at the Mull even remotely approached conditions whereby it would have been safe to drive one's car at permitted max limits for the road; let alone fly a helicopter at low level at the IAS pertaining at impact. Given that the Lighthouse Keeper and his Deputy were Qualified Met Observers we can be reasonably sure that the weather model for the Mull used by the BOI was as correct as could be. They were also the people closest to the actual impact.