Jayteeto
I f you read my previous post properly I think that you will find that the main point I was making was that the cruise climb was so patently wrong that it was obviously not meant to be the start of a climb to SALT for overflying the Mull – it should never have been assumed as such – and yet was this not one of the points on which they were judged negligent?
I was agreeing with the Stn Cdr’s view <<Even taking into account the factors which the Board feel could have deceived the crew into believing a high speed cruise climb would have given them sufficient clearance over the Mull I, and the few, senior Chinook operators that I felt able to consult, find this suggestion incredible.>>.
I was criticizing the Stn Cdr for not (publicly at least) making more of this (in my opinion very important) issue.
If you remove from the argument the cruise climb as an indicator of their intention to climb OVER the Mull, you are left simply with an aircraft that was surprised by its proximity to the Mull in the last few seconds before impact.
.
I believe that they were intending to turn LEFT up the coast at low level as was a common practice in that area.
I believe that the turning point on this occasion was a precise location as evidenced by their steering demand to the RIGHT after waypoint change, when already very close in.
I have explained in detail previously exactly what I think they were doing and why they were deceived as to their distance to go to that turning point – and I have made the point repeatedly that they could not be held responsible for a test that a third party messed up.
.
If your last paragraph was aimed at me I think you should retract it.
Regarding some of your other points:
(3) <<3. The Chinook WAS cleared to fly the trip at height and weather permitting, WOULD have flown it at height. The IMC bit was the problem, not the height.>>
What about the icing limitation? – given the met forecast, would this not have been a crucial limitation AT THE PLANNING STAGE?
.
(2) <<2. Flight plans are not required, so why would they leave one?>>
Well, if ever you were going to leave one I think that it would have been before that flight for, say, the following reasons:
New beaut a/c;
a/c about which they crew had serious concerns – including nav equipment;
large number of VIPs across sea and possibly rugged, remote terrain.
Also these men had an excellent reputation and it would surely have been their habit – perhaps someone who knew them could quantify in what percentage of similar flights they had left copies of flight plans?
.
There is, as I put in my previous post, a much more acceptable reason for the lack of a copy of the flight plan – it was removed. Now, if there was a test/ demo of the nature that I suggested, it would have been essential to have produced a plan with detail in the vicinity of the Mull (eg precise turning point/ RV, ETA, altitude at that point, etc) that would have made their intended actions unambiguous. If it went wrong and you wanted to avoid a whole load of problems and embarrassment, you would not want this actual flight plan in the public gaze, would you?
.
Now using another contributor’s points as an example, I would like to make a general point regarding criticism of anyone digging into detail in this case – if we look back at some points cazatou made concerning breakfast, briefing, etc, is it not usual for, say, a policeman investigating a tragedy to ask if there was any unusual behaviour (and in this case, unusual also = non routine) just prior to the event on the part of those involved? There are reasons for collating all the information that is there for the getting no matter how trivial a singular thing may seem. For example, if someone has not been seen to have breakfast and this is a requirement that is usually seen to have been complied with, then it has been noticed that he was somewhere else (a bit too subtle?).