Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Arkroyal
Regarding several points you made in your post #2623:
<< The aircraft was flying legally in VMC and obeying VFR until… >> agreed.
.
<< Why it then went into IMC and crashed, we also don't know. >>
BUT we can assume from their actions that they did not intend entering IMC when they did – their final flare was clearly a manouevre to slow down while turning away and gaining height in response to an emergency – and the timing of the start of this manouevre would seem to coincide with when they could have seen the land beneath them, the RADALT warning sounding, and their entry into the mist – if they were intending entering the mist and knew of their position with respect to the land, why the panic?
They were taken by surprise by their proximity – they were not expecting to have got there at that time. The big question is what made them so sure that they had some way to go in those conditions.
.
<< The lighthouse keeper, whatever his quals, was driving down the hill in cloud, so has no idea how far below his position it extended.>>
The lighthouse keeper I spoke to at the site (in what I believe to have been near identical conditions) seemed confident that a starting point for the mist part way up the slope (clear at the shoreline and a bit beyond) was typical and common – and so, I expect that an accurate description of the local conditions that day could have been got with either the right questions asked of the right person or someone having the wit to move down the slope to the shoreline and looking back – as I did when I was there – too easy. Did the Sea King pilot not come in on their approach heading to get an idea what the ZD576 crew saw? – no one thought of doing this basic exercise?
While you gave Cazatou a hard time for pointing out that not all potential witnesses had been questioned in this regard, I put it to you all that not enough was done that could have been done had the will been there to reconstruct the flight in detail.
.
<<. At no stage during the planning or execution of this task is it likely that overflight of the W/P (lighthouse) or the land mass was contemplated.>>
Are you still maintaining that the waypoint was the lighthouse and not the landing pad? Anyway, indeed we do not know for sure – all I know is that it was common practice to do so at that location.
.
<<Why the aircraft entered a 'cruise climb', deviated to the right slightly, and flew into the mull WILL NEVER BE KNOWN TO THE STANDARD OF PROOF REQUIRED>>
BUT cruise climb would have been selected deliberately and the steer demand to the right was deliberate (see Boeing’s “Analysis of Available Data” – section 4.3 ” This turn should not be considered as being the consequence of allowing the flight path to drift, as there was a clear aircraft heading change made, and the heading change was into the wind, rather than with the wind, which would have been more likely if the turn was purely due to drift. Consequently, the real issue that should be addressed with respect to the aircraft horizontal flight path is why this right turn was made.”) and as such are important clues as to what were their intentions – and I cannot understand why you would want to devalue their significance. Neither of these actions fits with the description of a VFR approach to a waypoint that you have given.
It is of interest that the author of the Boeing document (to which I referred above) went on to speculate as to the reason for that turn to the right; he suggested a possible reason was the intention to use the MAC TACAN subsequently in an IMC flight because of its approximate bearing and that the a/c’s TACAN CU was set accordingly. The relevance of this is that a highly qualified analyst at Boeing thought that there had to be a reason for this deliberate manouevre and to him a beacon seemed a possibility.
My view is that they thought they were ½ - 1 mile further out and that their cruise climb would have got them to an altitude where they could have gotten a range from the MAC TACAN when they were near to waypoint A (for a second opinion, if you like) – there is only one candidate for a beacon which they could have worked with at their low altitude at the critical stage of their approach and which could have misled them as to their range to go that would have been regarded with such confidence as to override their other estimates and I believe that that was a PRC112 that was supposed to have been at the landing pad but which may have been further up the slope for whatever reason.
Regarding several points you made in your post #2623:
<< The aircraft was flying legally in VMC and obeying VFR until… >> agreed.
.
<< Why it then went into IMC and crashed, we also don't know. >>
BUT we can assume from their actions that they did not intend entering IMC when they did – their final flare was clearly a manouevre to slow down while turning away and gaining height in response to an emergency – and the timing of the start of this manouevre would seem to coincide with when they could have seen the land beneath them, the RADALT warning sounding, and their entry into the mist – if they were intending entering the mist and knew of their position with respect to the land, why the panic?
They were taken by surprise by their proximity – they were not expecting to have got there at that time. The big question is what made them so sure that they had some way to go in those conditions.
.
<< The lighthouse keeper, whatever his quals, was driving down the hill in cloud, so has no idea how far below his position it extended.>>
The lighthouse keeper I spoke to at the site (in what I believe to have been near identical conditions) seemed confident that a starting point for the mist part way up the slope (clear at the shoreline and a bit beyond) was typical and common – and so, I expect that an accurate description of the local conditions that day could have been got with either the right questions asked of the right person or someone having the wit to move down the slope to the shoreline and looking back – as I did when I was there – too easy. Did the Sea King pilot not come in on their approach heading to get an idea what the ZD576 crew saw? – no one thought of doing this basic exercise?
While you gave Cazatou a hard time for pointing out that not all potential witnesses had been questioned in this regard, I put it to you all that not enough was done that could have been done had the will been there to reconstruct the flight in detail.
.
<<. At no stage during the planning or execution of this task is it likely that overflight of the W/P (lighthouse) or the land mass was contemplated.>>
Are you still maintaining that the waypoint was the lighthouse and not the landing pad? Anyway, indeed we do not know for sure – all I know is that it was common practice to do so at that location.
.
<<Why the aircraft entered a 'cruise climb', deviated to the right slightly, and flew into the mull WILL NEVER BE KNOWN TO THE STANDARD OF PROOF REQUIRED>>
BUT cruise climb would have been selected deliberately and the steer demand to the right was deliberate (see Boeing’s “Analysis of Available Data” – section 4.3 ” This turn should not be considered as being the consequence of allowing the flight path to drift, as there was a clear aircraft heading change made, and the heading change was into the wind, rather than with the wind, which would have been more likely if the turn was purely due to drift. Consequently, the real issue that should be addressed with respect to the aircraft horizontal flight path is why this right turn was made.”) and as such are important clues as to what were their intentions – and I cannot understand why you would want to devalue their significance. Neither of these actions fits with the description of a VFR approach to a waypoint that you have given.
It is of interest that the author of the Boeing document (to which I referred above) went on to speculate as to the reason for that turn to the right; he suggested a possible reason was the intention to use the MAC TACAN subsequently in an IMC flight because of its approximate bearing and that the a/c’s TACAN CU was set accordingly. The relevance of this is that a highly qualified analyst at Boeing thought that there had to be a reason for this deliberate manouevre and to him a beacon seemed a possibility.
My view is that they thought they were ½ - 1 mile further out and that their cruise climb would have got them to an altitude where they could have gotten a range from the MAC TACAN when they were near to waypoint A (for a second opinion, if you like) – there is only one candidate for a beacon which they could have worked with at their low altitude at the critical stage of their approach and which could have misled them as to their range to go that would have been regarded with such confidence as to override their other estimates and I believe that that was a PRC112 that was supposed to have been at the landing pad but which may have been further up the slope for whatever reason.
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Wally,
Why is you just can't get it
Yours is the 2633rd post in this thread and in all that time you have not had one single reply giving an ounce of credibility to your pathetic claim........do you not think it is time give in and accept that your ridiculous version of events are just the dribbling meanderings of one who is slowly but surely losing his marbles
SEEK HELP BEFORE IT'S TOO LATE
all spelling mistakes are "df" alcohol induced
Why is you just can't get it
Yours is the 2633rd post in this thread and in all that time you have not had one single reply giving an ounce of credibility to your pathetic claim........do you not think it is time give in and accept that your ridiculous version of events are just the dribbling meanderings of one who is slowly but surely losing his marbles
SEEK HELP BEFORE IT'S TOO LATE
all spelling mistakes are "df" alcohol induced
Originally Posted by walter kennedy
BUT we can assume ...
Originally Posted by walter kennedy
their final flare was clearly a manouevre to slow down while turning away and gaining height in response to an emergency – and the timing of the start of this manouevre would seem to coincide with when they could have seen the land beneath them, the RADALT warning sounding, and their entry into the mist – if they were intending entering the mist and knew of their position with respect to the land, why the panic?
They were taken by surprise by their proximity – they were not expecting to have got there at that time. The big question is what made them so sure that they had some way to go in those conditions.
They were taken by surprise by their proximity – they were not expecting to have got there at that time. The big question is what made them so sure that they had some way to go in those conditions.
I assume you are a
, thats one thing we don't need proof of.
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An Assumption
I had a very minor connection with this incident 12 years ago. But firstly let me say I am not a Pilot and I know absolutely nothing about the Chinook nav system. However, at the time I did have my own guess of what could have happened. (emphasis on MY guess)
You guys obviously know the NAV fit of the Chinook in question, but what I do know is that the aircraft had a GPS fitted. My thought was simply that the crew may have put too much faith in the GPS system and were flying using the GPS nav solution. The actions of the crew indicated that they thought they were further to the west, and most agree it was CFIT.
If there had been a small time error or position error in just one of the satellite signals, then this would have given a small nav error, which the crew would not have detected if cross-referencing to the INS. The error were considering here is commensurate with INS drift if the flight had been airborne 30 minutes or so (can't remember the flight time, but assuming a 0.8 nautical mile system and 30 min flight time)
This would also be virtually undetectable, unless a base station was logging the satellite data of the visible satellites in the region. It also fits in with no technical faults in the aircraft were found.
And if you think that your GPS solution is 100% reliable then maybe today it's close to that figure, but in 94 it certainly was not. If you were to run a base station logging sat data 24/7 during the 90's you would have seen some invalid NAV solutions for some periods of time as the ephemeris data of a satellite degraded with time or was uploaded in error. I remember one day a GPS solution was in error by a few hundred miles for a considerably period of time (maybe 1 hour or more). These occasions were rare, but they happened.
You guys obviously know the NAV fit of the Chinook in question, but what I do know is that the aircraft had a GPS fitted. My thought was simply that the crew may have put too much faith in the GPS system and were flying using the GPS nav solution. The actions of the crew indicated that they thought they were further to the west, and most agree it was CFIT.
If there had been a small time error or position error in just one of the satellite signals, then this would have given a small nav error, which the crew would not have detected if cross-referencing to the INS. The error were considering here is commensurate with INS drift if the flight had been airborne 30 minutes or so (can't remember the flight time, but assuming a 0.8 nautical mile system and 30 min flight time)
This would also be virtually undetectable, unless a base station was logging the satellite data of the visible satellites in the region. It also fits in with no technical faults in the aircraft were found.
And if you think that your GPS solution is 100% reliable then maybe today it's close to that figure, but in 94 it certainly was not. If you were to run a base station logging sat data 24/7 during the 90's you would have seen some invalid NAV solutions for some periods of time as the ephemeris data of a satellite degraded with time or was uploaded in error. I remember one day a GPS solution was in error by a few hundred miles for a considerably period of time (maybe 1 hour or more). These occasions were rare, but they happened.
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JP1
Very many thanks for your contribution. I hope this doesn't sound too harsh, but I would respectfully suggest you read a few more of the postings on this thread, and visit the campaign website.
Your suggestion that; "The actions of the crew indicated that they thought they were further to the west, and most agree it was CFIT." suggest to me that you haven't read too much here.
I am interested to know however, if you are well acquainted with GPS systems, and their incorporation in aircraft nav systems.
Cheers.
Very many thanks for your contribution. I hope this doesn't sound too harsh, but I would respectfully suggest you read a few more of the postings on this thread, and visit the campaign website.
Your suggestion that; "The actions of the crew indicated that they thought they were further to the west, and most agree it was CFIT." suggest to me that you haven't read too much here.
I am interested to know however, if you are well acquainted with GPS systems, and their incorporation in aircraft nav systems.
Cheers.
JP1
Like most, I know little of the Nav System fitted to ZD576. What you describe is plausible, although refuted by the MoD who place 100% reliance on the unrepresentative, unvalidated and unverified post-accident testing of the SuperTANS, the alleged accuracy of which they use as absolute “proof” that the complete Nav System, including GPS, Radar Altimeter, Doppler, Air Data Computer, Gyro Magnetic Compass, Vertical Gyro and Height Encoding Altimeter, was serviceable and accurate. If you know anything about engineering, you’ll know how nonsensical this is.
From Racal report, “The (TANS) system will use Radar altitude if available”. MoD state (a) the complete nav system was serviceable and accurate (as above), yet (b) acknowledge faults in the Radar Altimeter. Please note the contradiction. In my opinion, this ridiculous position simply highlights the fact (acknowledged in far more recent, open source, BOI reports and other papers) that they often pay little or no attention to systems integration.
The GPS + base station system you describe is similar to Differential GPS. Boscombe got it that year, in a different aircraft, but I have no knowledge of it being fitted in-service. I may be wrong. Implementation was, in part, via a carry-on laptop (in lieu of an on-board data capture device) which would have to be subject to a Service Deviation – but a Chinook would have no need for this particular use of DGPS (which was to establish the precise position of the aircraft post-flight, for comparison with indicated position). I agree with your summary of the typical (and gross) errors sometimes experienced with GPS – they have been mentioned before on the thread by others. GPS is a timing system – positional data is simply a product – and it became apparent shortly after the accident that, with hindsight, GPS manufacturers had wrongly interpreted and implemented a Bit Timing Requirement in a GPS spec. Without going into detail (and I do not pretend to understand it all, especially as applied to the Mk2 nav system) this error of interpretation resulted in cumulative timing errors. Perhaps someone with detailed knowledge could say how this would affect Mk2.
Beyond all doubt? Don’t think so.
Like most, I know little of the Nav System fitted to ZD576. What you describe is plausible, although refuted by the MoD who place 100% reliance on the unrepresentative, unvalidated and unverified post-accident testing of the SuperTANS, the alleged accuracy of which they use as absolute “proof” that the complete Nav System, including GPS, Radar Altimeter, Doppler, Air Data Computer, Gyro Magnetic Compass, Vertical Gyro and Height Encoding Altimeter, was serviceable and accurate. If you know anything about engineering, you’ll know how nonsensical this is.
From Racal report, “The (TANS) system will use Radar altitude if available”. MoD state (a) the complete nav system was serviceable and accurate (as above), yet (b) acknowledge faults in the Radar Altimeter. Please note the contradiction. In my opinion, this ridiculous position simply highlights the fact (acknowledged in far more recent, open source, BOI reports and other papers) that they often pay little or no attention to systems integration.
The GPS + base station system you describe is similar to Differential GPS. Boscombe got it that year, in a different aircraft, but I have no knowledge of it being fitted in-service. I may be wrong. Implementation was, in part, via a carry-on laptop (in lieu of an on-board data capture device) which would have to be subject to a Service Deviation – but a Chinook would have no need for this particular use of DGPS (which was to establish the precise position of the aircraft post-flight, for comparison with indicated position). I agree with your summary of the typical (and gross) errors sometimes experienced with GPS – they have been mentioned before on the thread by others. GPS is a timing system – positional data is simply a product – and it became apparent shortly after the accident that, with hindsight, GPS manufacturers had wrongly interpreted and implemented a Bit Timing Requirement in a GPS spec. Without going into detail (and I do not pretend to understand it all, especially as applied to the Mk2 nav system) this error of interpretation resulted in cumulative timing errors. Perhaps someone with detailed knowledge could say how this would affect Mk2.
Beyond all doubt? Don’t think so.
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GPS
Although it seems very unlikely that the crew would have been relying on GPS at the time of the WP change it is interesting that the comments on the accuracy (or possibly lack of accuracy) of the GPS are a bold warning in the CA Interim Release Annex O where 2.2 says:
TNL 8000 GPS GPS has not yet been declared operational(at IOC) by the US DoD and accuracy is therefore not guaranteed at any level. Even when GPS is declared operational by the US, accuracy of the TNL 8000 SPS GPS could degrade substantially without any indications to the crew. For this reason SPS GPS should not be used as the sole navigation aid.
The crew would have known this and presumably would not have been relying on GPS - but is is another indication of the fitness for purpose and the overall airworthiness of the Chinook Mk 2 at that time.
JB
TNL 8000 GPS GPS has not yet been declared operational(at IOC) by the US DoD and accuracy is therefore not guaranteed at any level. Even when GPS is declared operational by the US, accuracy of the TNL 8000 SPS GPS could degrade substantially without any indications to the crew. For this reason SPS GPS should not be used as the sole navigation aid.
The crew would have known this and presumably would not have been relying on GPS - but is is another indication of the fitness for purpose and the overall airworthiness of the Chinook Mk 2 at that time.
JB
John
The CA Release words are valid, but how would the crew know how much reliance the SuperTANS algorithm was placing on the GPS input? It is transparent to them; all they see is the indicated output. Agree about airworthiness – in my opinion it wasn’t.
The CA Release words are valid, but how would the crew know how much reliance the SuperTANS algorithm was placing on the GPS input? It is transparent to them; all they see is the indicated output. Agree about airworthiness – in my opinion it wasn’t.
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GPS
Tandemrotor, I don't think your comments are too harsh, as I stated in the caveat, I had a minor connection with the incident, and have not followed the case since. I was aware of the political aspects of the accident but was surprised to see that 12 years later there was a very active thread on this board regarding the subject.
My involvement with GPS is that I spent 10 years working on integrated navigation for the MOD, mainly involved with algorithm design, Kalman filters etc. The basic theory is that GPS and INS are complementary data sources. The INS provides short term smoothing of the GPS data, and the GPS provides long term correction to the INS drift. With kalman filtering calibration of the INS can be performed and hence you end up with a closed loop integrated NAV system.
But when I started working in this field in the very early 90's there was no integrated NAV system as described above. At that time the INS was used to rate aid the GPS receiver to provide better tracking of GPS signal in high rate turns, and research concentrated on the fast jet environment.
In 94 the GPS on board the Chinook was almost certainly used as a stand alone system, it would not have had its data blended with other kit via kalman filtering etc.
I was suggesting a possible scenario that maybe (and who knows) the crew were flying in VMC and were confident that the GPS system was providing an accurate solution (but in error as discussed earlier by a few hundred meters maybe 500m ?? (again just an assumption). However, all the visual clues, the INS solution etc gave confidence that their position was known accurately, (isn't there a term for this in the psychological world when events/actions/ etc support an incorrect situation).
Anyway my post was merely to point out that GPS was not as accurate and reliable as many might have thought and it possible that the INS drift was in the same direction as any GPS error (if there was any) and an incorrect indication of the aircrafts position was provided to the crew.
My involvement with GPS is that I spent 10 years working on integrated navigation for the MOD, mainly involved with algorithm design, Kalman filters etc. The basic theory is that GPS and INS are complementary data sources. The INS provides short term smoothing of the GPS data, and the GPS provides long term correction to the INS drift. With kalman filtering calibration of the INS can be performed and hence you end up with a closed loop integrated NAV system.
But when I started working in this field in the very early 90's there was no integrated NAV system as described above. At that time the INS was used to rate aid the GPS receiver to provide better tracking of GPS signal in high rate turns, and research concentrated on the fast jet environment.
In 94 the GPS on board the Chinook was almost certainly used as a stand alone system, it would not have had its data blended with other kit via kalman filtering etc.
I was suggesting a possible scenario that maybe (and who knows) the crew were flying in VMC and were confident that the GPS system was providing an accurate solution (but in error as discussed earlier by a few hundred meters maybe 500m ?? (again just an assumption). However, all the visual clues, the INS solution etc gave confidence that their position was known accurately, (isn't there a term for this in the psychological world when events/actions/ etc support an incorrect situation).
Anyway my post was merely to point out that GPS was not as accurate and reliable as many might have thought and it possible that the INS drift was in the same direction as any GPS error (if there was any) and an incorrect indication of the aircrafts position was provided to the crew.
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Tandemrotor,
Your #2632:
"Which has been assessed by numerous 'independent bodies' to be unsupportable to the standard required".
I take it you mean "independent SELF APPOINTED bodies"?
Best Wishes
Caz
Your #2632:
"Which has been assessed by numerous 'independent bodies' to be unsupportable to the standard required".
I take it you mean "independent SELF APPOINTED bodies"?
Best Wishes
Caz
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Self Appointed - Please Explain
Caz,
I am reluctant to argue with you, but just what do you mean by self-appointed - is a Sheriff or a Law Lord who has reached the top of the tree any more self appointed than an Air Marshal who has reached the top of his?
Please explain your comment.
JB
I am reluctant to argue with you, but just what do you mean by self-appointed - is a Sheriff or a Law Lord who has reached the top of the tree any more self appointed than an Air Marshal who has reached the top of his?
Please explain your comment.
JB
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cazatou (K52)
I actually don't think the Fatal Accident Inquiry system can be regarded as 'self appointed'!
Fatal Accident Inquiries are held under the Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1976. An inquiry must be held in cases of death in custody or as a result of an accident at work. An inquiry may be held in other cases of sudden, suspicious or unexplained death, or death in circumstances that give rise to serious public concern. Decisions on whether these discretionary inquiries are held are made by the Lord Advocate.
Procurators Fiscal investigate around 14,000 sudden deaths each year. There are usually around 50 or 60 Fatal Accident Inquiries in Scotland each year.
So yet again we find your contribution lacking in factual accuracy. Do try to get a grip man!
JP1
Once again thanks for your contribution. The reason I asked about your relevant experience is (and I'm sure Brian Dixon will correct me) I don't believe anyone with relevant experience has reviewed the navigation data recovered from the wreckage, and analysed by the equipment manufacturer.
It is by nature, rather technical, and I wouldn't be too surprised if an 'expert' were able to discover something interesting buried within.
How would you feel about looking at it?
Cheers
I actually don't think the Fatal Accident Inquiry system can be regarded as 'self appointed'!
Fatal Accident Inquiries are held under the Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1976. An inquiry must be held in cases of death in custody or as a result of an accident at work. An inquiry may be held in other cases of sudden, suspicious or unexplained death, or death in circumstances that give rise to serious public concern. Decisions on whether these discretionary inquiries are held are made by the Lord Advocate.
Procurators Fiscal investigate around 14,000 sudden deaths each year. There are usually around 50 or 60 Fatal Accident Inquiries in Scotland each year.
So yet again we find your contribution lacking in factual accuracy. Do try to get a grip man!
JP1
Once again thanks for your contribution. The reason I asked about your relevant experience is (and I'm sure Brian Dixon will correct me) I don't believe anyone with relevant experience has reviewed the navigation data recovered from the wreckage, and analysed by the equipment manufacturer.
It is by nature, rather technical, and I wouldn't be too surprised if an 'expert' were able to discover something interesting buried within.
How would you feel about looking at it?
Cheers
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JP1
You wrote:
<<In 94 the GPS on board the Chinook was almost certainly used as a stand alone system, it would not have had its data blended with other kit via kalman filtering etc.>>
ZD576 was an HC2 Chinook with the SuperTANS (as opposed to previous TANS as in Mk1 Chinook) which did indeed blend the data and the presentation did not allow the separate components to be viewed.
The components “blended” were Doppler radar and GPS.
The Doppler radar sends a continuous chain of pulses ahead and to the side of the a/c track so as to get from the Doppler shift of the returns from the ground longitudinal and lateral velocity vectors (hence “Doppler”).
The Kalman filters gave greater weighting to the Doppler components than the GPS – the idea being that the almost continuous and accurate (?!!) ground speed vectors:
interpolated between GPS data points;
modified (to an extent depending upon the filter coefficients) the latest GPS spot position;
and (a tactical consideration in the presence of jamming of the GPS) in the absence of GPS input allowed the nav computer to dead reckon using the ground velocity vector data.
Of course, the great weakness of Doppler navigation radar is that over water either a flat surface gave rise to specular reflection (giving no decent reflected signal back to the a/c) or when the surface was rough the many velocity components of the waves played havoc with it – after a water crossing such as ZD576 had just done, irrespective of the other potential shortcomings mentioned by others, the SuperTANS could be out by ½ a mile or more and this was to be expected.
.
Flt Lt Jon Tapper was well aware of this limitation and had warned other members of his flight.
He would not have relied upon it for an accurate range to go to the Mull – indeed, if relying upon the SuperTANS alone, he would have factored in a safety margin.
The relevance of the SuperTANS in this incident is that had it been in contradiction with another reference, the SuperTANS would have been thought to be in error and therefore could be ignored – and is this not what happened?
Did they not switch to the next route waypoint (thereby dismissing the SuperTANS), make a small corrective steer to the right (into danger), and continue on?
Flt Lt Tapper was very familiar with this area and had landed a helo on the Mull lighthouse landing pad on previous occasions – he would have known the danger of getting too close too fast to the landmass in that location.
As an aside, do you not find it amazing that this officer was accused of being slack in entering the lighthouse coordinates wrongly when the coordinates he had entered are exactly those of the landing pad?
AND EVEN MORE AMAZING THAT IN 12 YEARS NOT ONE PERSON CHALLENGED THIS RIDICULOUS ASSUMPTION OF THE BOI?
I believe that the landing pad was a well used reference/ turning/ way point for exercises and transits in this area – AND I BELIEVE THAT THE LANDING PAD WAS THE INTENDED TURNING POINT/ RV ON THIS FLIGHT AND THAT THE COORDS WERE ENTERED CORRECTLY.
.
And another aside: the setting on one of the altimeters was found to be wrong for transit and it was suggested that the setting was the QFE for Aldergrove –
Here is an extract from a post by Cazatou back in 8 Jan 2001 which summarises this well:
<< One of the first things that is taught in Flying Training is that if you are flying below Transition Altitude then you set the regional QNH on the subscale of your altimeter unless you are on approach to an airfield when you set the Airfield QNH or QFE as directed. The AAIB investigation into the crash of ZD576 showed that the Right Hand altimeter was so set but the left hand altimeter was some 10mb lower. There was no evidence that this setting had been altered by the crash. The BOI speculated that it could have been set on Aldergrove QFE.>>
did anyone check if it would have been a suitable value for QFE at the Mull lighthouse landing pad at the time of their journey?
.
Looks to me like they were intending to get close, if not actually land, at the landing pad.
Now before you start honking again, get yourselves a map and mark the position of waypoint A;
Imagine walking up the hill ½ a mile or so, say along the road for a bit and then off a bit just beyond the edge of a little cliff, and plonking yourself down – mark it on the map;
From the approximate estimated position of waypoint change (use the Boeing doc “Anal of Avail Data” – the drawings are useful) to your spot up the hill, draw a line;
Sort of ties up with that steer demand right after waypoint change doesn’t it?
You see, if you were a stooge holding a PRC112 and you were supposed to be at the landing pad BUT were actually up the hill, any unfortunate pilot undertaking an exercise with you would have thought that he had ½ a mile more to go to get to the landing pad.
In their normal use, this equipment is very accurate (effectively, a portable DME); it also gives approximate azimuth bearing and added confidence is had in its use as the pilot can be talking to the person on the ground who can vector the helo in (the handling pilot’s intercom was found set to the appropriate UHF channel).
DME systems are used widely by helo pilots and are trusted – it is the one system that could override the pilots’ confidence in other systems or the pilots’ visual judgment in marginal forward visibility.
It is a pity that SH pilots who have used this system operationally have not been canvassed for comment or described their experiences with it themselves on the forum.
.
You may say that this is wild speculation, but absolutely everything that can be deduced from the available data fits this scenario.
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The equipment in operational use in HC2 Chinooks by 1995 was designed for easy transfer between such Chinooks – easy to fit and easy to remove – as I cannot see there being any significant changes between the first operational HC2 Chinook (ZD576) and those in 1995, I believe that it was possible to fit such equipment at the last minute and retrieve it from the wreckage without leaving much evidence as to its ever having been there – how handy if there was a cock up one wanted to hide.
It remains for someone to come forward who knew of its fitting before the flight.
You wrote:
<<In 94 the GPS on board the Chinook was almost certainly used as a stand alone system, it would not have had its data blended with other kit via kalman filtering etc.>>
ZD576 was an HC2 Chinook with the SuperTANS (as opposed to previous TANS as in Mk1 Chinook) which did indeed blend the data and the presentation did not allow the separate components to be viewed.
The components “blended” were Doppler radar and GPS.
The Doppler radar sends a continuous chain of pulses ahead and to the side of the a/c track so as to get from the Doppler shift of the returns from the ground longitudinal and lateral velocity vectors (hence “Doppler”).
The Kalman filters gave greater weighting to the Doppler components than the GPS – the idea being that the almost continuous and accurate (?!!) ground speed vectors:
interpolated between GPS data points;
modified (to an extent depending upon the filter coefficients) the latest GPS spot position;
and (a tactical consideration in the presence of jamming of the GPS) in the absence of GPS input allowed the nav computer to dead reckon using the ground velocity vector data.
Of course, the great weakness of Doppler navigation radar is that over water either a flat surface gave rise to specular reflection (giving no decent reflected signal back to the a/c) or when the surface was rough the many velocity components of the waves played havoc with it – after a water crossing such as ZD576 had just done, irrespective of the other potential shortcomings mentioned by others, the SuperTANS could be out by ½ a mile or more and this was to be expected.
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Flt Lt Jon Tapper was well aware of this limitation and had warned other members of his flight.
He would not have relied upon it for an accurate range to go to the Mull – indeed, if relying upon the SuperTANS alone, he would have factored in a safety margin.
The relevance of the SuperTANS in this incident is that had it been in contradiction with another reference, the SuperTANS would have been thought to be in error and therefore could be ignored – and is this not what happened?
Did they not switch to the next route waypoint (thereby dismissing the SuperTANS), make a small corrective steer to the right (into danger), and continue on?
Flt Lt Tapper was very familiar with this area and had landed a helo on the Mull lighthouse landing pad on previous occasions – he would have known the danger of getting too close too fast to the landmass in that location.
As an aside, do you not find it amazing that this officer was accused of being slack in entering the lighthouse coordinates wrongly when the coordinates he had entered are exactly those of the landing pad?
AND EVEN MORE AMAZING THAT IN 12 YEARS NOT ONE PERSON CHALLENGED THIS RIDICULOUS ASSUMPTION OF THE BOI?
I believe that the landing pad was a well used reference/ turning/ way point for exercises and transits in this area – AND I BELIEVE THAT THE LANDING PAD WAS THE INTENDED TURNING POINT/ RV ON THIS FLIGHT AND THAT THE COORDS WERE ENTERED CORRECTLY.
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And another aside: the setting on one of the altimeters was found to be wrong for transit and it was suggested that the setting was the QFE for Aldergrove –
Here is an extract from a post by Cazatou back in 8 Jan 2001 which summarises this well:
<< One of the first things that is taught in Flying Training is that if you are flying below Transition Altitude then you set the regional QNH on the subscale of your altimeter unless you are on approach to an airfield when you set the Airfield QNH or QFE as directed. The AAIB investigation into the crash of ZD576 showed that the Right Hand altimeter was so set but the left hand altimeter was some 10mb lower. There was no evidence that this setting had been altered by the crash. The BOI speculated that it could have been set on Aldergrove QFE.>>
did anyone check if it would have been a suitable value for QFE at the Mull lighthouse landing pad at the time of their journey?
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Looks to me like they were intending to get close, if not actually land, at the landing pad.
Now before you start honking again, get yourselves a map and mark the position of waypoint A;
Imagine walking up the hill ½ a mile or so, say along the road for a bit and then off a bit just beyond the edge of a little cliff, and plonking yourself down – mark it on the map;
From the approximate estimated position of waypoint change (use the Boeing doc “Anal of Avail Data” – the drawings are useful) to your spot up the hill, draw a line;
Sort of ties up with that steer demand right after waypoint change doesn’t it?
You see, if you were a stooge holding a PRC112 and you were supposed to be at the landing pad BUT were actually up the hill, any unfortunate pilot undertaking an exercise with you would have thought that he had ½ a mile more to go to get to the landing pad.
In their normal use, this equipment is very accurate (effectively, a portable DME); it also gives approximate azimuth bearing and added confidence is had in its use as the pilot can be talking to the person on the ground who can vector the helo in (the handling pilot’s intercom was found set to the appropriate UHF channel).
DME systems are used widely by helo pilots and are trusted – it is the one system that could override the pilots’ confidence in other systems or the pilots’ visual judgment in marginal forward visibility.
It is a pity that SH pilots who have used this system operationally have not been canvassed for comment or described their experiences with it themselves on the forum.
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You may say that this is wild speculation, but absolutely everything that can be deduced from the available data fits this scenario.
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The equipment in operational use in HC2 Chinooks by 1995 was designed for easy transfer between such Chinooks – easy to fit and easy to remove – as I cannot see there being any significant changes between the first operational HC2 Chinook (ZD576) and those in 1995, I believe that it was possible to fit such equipment at the last minute and retrieve it from the wreckage without leaving much evidence as to its ever having been there – how handy if there was a cock up one wanted to hide.
It remains for someone to come forward who knew of its fitting before the flight.
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SuoerTANS
I am not sure what relevance the navigation errors of the SuperTANS might have had on a VFR flight where it would appear that the crew had changed waypoints based on visual identification, but taking JP1’s point the following information may be relevant.
The CA Release words for the RNS 252 say:
The RNS 252 system requires the input of the relevant aircraft compass deviations to minimise Doppler/GM9 errors.
(a) RNS GPS (Ext) Position. In addition to paragraph 2.2 above, (the GPS words I put on post 2639) the GPS is highly susceptible to jamming of which the only crew indication is loss of GPS. There is no perceptible difference in accuracy between 2D and 3D navigation. The "Err" figure displayed, which has conventionally been taken as a measure of GPS performance, is meaningless and so no indication of the accuracy of the GPS is available to the user. The RNS 252 suffers from an average two second processing delay on the displayed GPS position. There is no significant degradation of the GPS with manoeuvres up to +/- 60 degrees roll and up to +/- 20 degrees pitch. In "Ext" position, Doppler reversion should be selected to minimise navigational errors during GPS outages.
(b) RNS252 Doppler/GM9 Position. The RNS 252 Doppler/Compass 95 percentile radial error on trial was 2.35% of distance travelled using an RNS 252 with aircraft compass deviations entered. Improved aerial alignment on all other fleet aircraft (presumably including ZD576) should result in a reduced error.
(c) RNS 252 Doppler/INS Position. The accuracy of the Doppler/INS navigation system on trial was 2.81% of distance travelled, overland, with a recently harmonised INS.
The initial AAIB finding, given below was that the RNS252 could have been off at the time of impact, but the Racal report showed that this was not the case:
The unit was recovered from the cockpit wreckage area slightly fire scorched but with little apparent impact damage (Fig 16.1). The ON/OFF switch was found at OFF, and an absence of substantial damage to the lift-toggle type switch, including its ramp mechanism, together with ground fire sooting patterns suggested that this had been the setting at impact. However, subsequent examination and memory read-out by the manufacturer, Racal Avionics Ltd, reportedly clearly showed that unit had been operating until impact and it appeared that the switch position had in fact been altered by the effects of the crash. The detailed investigation of the unit was covered in a Racal Report.
The Racal report shows that at the time of impact the differences in the system were:
Crash Site: N 55 18 67 W 005 47 65 (It is not clear if this is the initial impact point or the centre of wreckage distribution, but I assume power down and the initial impact would have been simultaneous given the catastrophic break up of the aircraft)
GPS at power down: N 55 18 61 W 005 47 80 (GPS was the selected mode)
Doppler at power down: N 55 18 65 W 005 47 49 (The Racal report calculates the Doppler position to be approximately 330 M east of the GPS position.)
The Racal report says that at power loss the SuperTANS display page would have been showing “TacB” (Tactical steer to waypoint B), with a steer command left 10 degrees HTS (Heading to Steer) = 025 degrees magnetic, Dis: 85.7NM (distance from aircraft position to WPB) and TTG 32.0 (Time to go in minutes to intercept waypoint B)
So, apart from an explanation as to how the gated switch got to "off" without leaving any damage or trace, the system errors would, to my unskilled mind, appear to be OK, and well with the expected RTS parameters - but we do not know what they were at the time of the waypoint change, or, indeed, at any other point in the flight. We also do not know what reliance the crew were placing on SuperTANS at that instant, but the WP change had been made at least 0.95 NM before impact and the display page would immediately have been demanding a left turn as would their visual identification and their route planning. It seems to me that this is the point where, as always, we move to the realm of “we shall never know”! However, instead of assuming aircrew gross negligence at this point why not think of what might have gone wrong with the aircraft from the list of known problems with the Chinook Mk 2 and ZD576 in particular. Sadly the BoI never did this, although the Stn Cdr Odiham did go some way down this road.
The CA Release words for the RNS 252 say:
The RNS 252 system requires the input of the relevant aircraft compass deviations to minimise Doppler/GM9 errors.
(a) RNS GPS (Ext) Position. In addition to paragraph 2.2 above, (the GPS words I put on post 2639) the GPS is highly susceptible to jamming of which the only crew indication is loss of GPS. There is no perceptible difference in accuracy between 2D and 3D navigation. The "Err" figure displayed, which has conventionally been taken as a measure of GPS performance, is meaningless and so no indication of the accuracy of the GPS is available to the user. The RNS 252 suffers from an average two second processing delay on the displayed GPS position. There is no significant degradation of the GPS with manoeuvres up to +/- 60 degrees roll and up to +/- 20 degrees pitch. In "Ext" position, Doppler reversion should be selected to minimise navigational errors during GPS outages.
(b) RNS252 Doppler/GM9 Position. The RNS 252 Doppler/Compass 95 percentile radial error on trial was 2.35% of distance travelled using an RNS 252 with aircraft compass deviations entered. Improved aerial alignment on all other fleet aircraft (presumably including ZD576) should result in a reduced error.
(c) RNS 252 Doppler/INS Position. The accuracy of the Doppler/INS navigation system on trial was 2.81% of distance travelled, overland, with a recently harmonised INS.
The initial AAIB finding, given below was that the RNS252 could have been off at the time of impact, but the Racal report showed that this was not the case:
The unit was recovered from the cockpit wreckage area slightly fire scorched but with little apparent impact damage (Fig 16.1). The ON/OFF switch was found at OFF, and an absence of substantial damage to the lift-toggle type switch, including its ramp mechanism, together with ground fire sooting patterns suggested that this had been the setting at impact. However, subsequent examination and memory read-out by the manufacturer, Racal Avionics Ltd, reportedly clearly showed that unit had been operating until impact and it appeared that the switch position had in fact been altered by the effects of the crash. The detailed investigation of the unit was covered in a Racal Report.
The Racal report shows that at the time of impact the differences in the system were:
Crash Site: N 55 18 67 W 005 47 65 (It is not clear if this is the initial impact point or the centre of wreckage distribution, but I assume power down and the initial impact would have been simultaneous given the catastrophic break up of the aircraft)
GPS at power down: N 55 18 61 W 005 47 80 (GPS was the selected mode)
Doppler at power down: N 55 18 65 W 005 47 49 (The Racal report calculates the Doppler position to be approximately 330 M east of the GPS position.)
The Racal report says that at power loss the SuperTANS display page would have been showing “TacB” (Tactical steer to waypoint B), with a steer command left 10 degrees HTS (Heading to Steer) = 025 degrees magnetic, Dis: 85.7NM (distance from aircraft position to WPB) and TTG 32.0 (Time to go in minutes to intercept waypoint B)
So, apart from an explanation as to how the gated switch got to "off" without leaving any damage or trace, the system errors would, to my unskilled mind, appear to be OK, and well with the expected RTS parameters - but we do not know what they were at the time of the waypoint change, or, indeed, at any other point in the flight. We also do not know what reliance the crew were placing on SuperTANS at that instant, but the WP change had been made at least 0.95 NM before impact and the display page would immediately have been demanding a left turn as would their visual identification and their route planning. It seems to me that this is the point where, as always, we move to the realm of “we shall never know”! However, instead of assuming aircrew gross negligence at this point why not think of what might have gone wrong with the aircraft from the list of known problems with the Chinook Mk 2 and ZD576 in particular. Sadly the BoI never did this, although the Stn Cdr Odiham did go some way down this road.
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JB
Thank you once again for your most comprehensive, and pertinent post. All I would say is this: The RNS252 Supertans, and the accuracy of it's sensor inputs are crucial to this case, not just because the crew may, or may not have been relying on the system for navigation, (for the very reasons you have stated) but far more importantly, because the Air Marshalls relied on this system as a 'rudimentary flight data recorder' upon which to hang their case. Information from this system, was even 'blended' with the Boeing flight simulation to provide their modelling parameters.
The navigation system, and it's ability to provide accurate historical data,(for which it was never designed) is I would very respectfully suggest, absolutely vital to the Air Marshalls case.
I have always felt a little uncomfortable with the fact that, as far as I am aware, the only people to have interpreted the 'raw' information from this system were the people responsible for it's manufacture. It should be scrutinised with the very finest of 'toothcombs', lest new evidence were to suggest the information relied upon was less than accurate.
Regards
Thank you once again for your most comprehensive, and pertinent post. All I would say is this: The RNS252 Supertans, and the accuracy of it's sensor inputs are crucial to this case, not just because the crew may, or may not have been relying on the system for navigation, (for the very reasons you have stated) but far more importantly, because the Air Marshalls relied on this system as a 'rudimentary flight data recorder' upon which to hang their case. Information from this system, was even 'blended' with the Boeing flight simulation to provide their modelling parameters.
The navigation system, and it's ability to provide accurate historical data,(for which it was never designed) is I would very respectfully suggest, absolutely vital to the Air Marshalls case.
I have always felt a little uncomfortable with the fact that, as far as I am aware, the only people to have interpreted the 'raw' information from this system were the people responsible for it's manufacture. It should be scrutinised with the very finest of 'toothcombs', lest new evidence were to suggest the information relied upon was less than accurate.
Regards
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John Blakeley,
The first person I had in mind was the originator of the entire thread who had left the RAF and was just starting his career in broadcasting - his first programme being one on the Chinook Crash. His final contribution was, if I remember correctly, to justify his actions immediately before his aircraft was shot down in GW1 (although his explanation seemed to me to be at variance with the explanation in the book he co-authored with his then pilot).
At the other end of the scale we had the HOL Committee who failed to obtain the services of anyone with Aviation or Military Experience to serve with them. Let us not forget that the Lord who spoke so forcefully against the amendment in the HOL was someone who had risen from being an Army and British Airways Helicopter Pilot to the most senior Executive in European Helicopter Operations; as well as having a World Wide role under UN auspices.
Prior to penning this I looked at the petition on the campaign website to see if the person mentioned in the first para had
penned his name - but I failed to spot it. What I did spot was that what appeared to be "Family Groups" had signed without any indication of the age of the children - moreover in the case of the family at No's 701 - 704 the Male at 702 appears to also have signed at 693.
I am afraid that I did not consider then, nor do I now, that the person mentioned in para 1 was acting in an entirely altruistic manner. With regard to the HOL Committee my own view is that Lord Chalfont, as a leading protagonist of the Campaign, should have stood aside from the Committee so that it could be perceived by all to be completely independant.
The first person I had in mind was the originator of the entire thread who had left the RAF and was just starting his career in broadcasting - his first programme being one on the Chinook Crash. His final contribution was, if I remember correctly, to justify his actions immediately before his aircraft was shot down in GW1 (although his explanation seemed to me to be at variance with the explanation in the book he co-authored with his then pilot).
At the other end of the scale we had the HOL Committee who failed to obtain the services of anyone with Aviation or Military Experience to serve with them. Let us not forget that the Lord who spoke so forcefully against the amendment in the HOL was someone who had risen from being an Army and British Airways Helicopter Pilot to the most senior Executive in European Helicopter Operations; as well as having a World Wide role under UN auspices.
Prior to penning this I looked at the petition on the campaign website to see if the person mentioned in the first para had
penned his name - but I failed to spot it. What I did spot was that what appeared to be "Family Groups" had signed without any indication of the age of the children - moreover in the case of the family at No's 701 - 704 the Male at 702 appears to also have signed at 693.
I am afraid that I did not consider then, nor do I now, that the person mentioned in para 1 was acting in an entirely altruistic manner. With regard to the HOL Committee my own view is that Lord Chalfont, as a leading protagonist of the Campaign, should have stood aside from the Committee so that it could be perceived by all to be completely independant.
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cazatou (K52)
As someone who actually took part in the TV programme you mentioned, I have little hesitation in agreeing with much of what you have written about it.
Undoubtedly it had an agenda, and the individual who presented it may well have had his own. It did not at any stage purport to be 'independent', it was simply a piece of (IMHO) responsible journalistic work, by a HIGHLY respected journalist (not the presenter) to bring to the public's attention the finding of the FAI, whose findings, we all know, are at significant variance to those of the 2 Air Marshalls.
To that extent, the programme has served it's purpose well, and was never one of the 'independent' bodies to which I, nor I suspect JB referred.
I notice you have made no reference to the Fatal Accident Inquiry. May I ask why?
As someone who actually took part in the TV programme you mentioned, I have little hesitation in agreeing with much of what you have written about it.
Undoubtedly it had an agenda, and the individual who presented it may well have had his own. It did not at any stage purport to be 'independent', it was simply a piece of (IMHO) responsible journalistic work, by a HIGHLY respected journalist (not the presenter) to bring to the public's attention the finding of the FAI, whose findings, we all know, are at significant variance to those of the 2 Air Marshalls.
To that extent, the programme has served it's purpose well, and was never one of the 'independent' bodies to which I, nor I suspect JB referred.
I notice you have made no reference to the Fatal Accident Inquiry. May I ask why?
A really irritating PPRuNer
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Cazatou,
Lord Chalfont was the Chair of the Campaign group during our time in the House of Lords. He was best placed to advise and guide us whilst we were doing business there. Following the HoL Select Committee, he stepped down in favour of James Arbuthnot, due to our return to the House of Commons, but had to step down due to him being the chair of the Defence Select Committee. Our current Chair is Lord O'Neill.
With regards to independent bodies, what about EDS Scicon? Weren't they appointed to examine the FADEC software - concluding that there were over 400 code anomalies?
If you want an independent opinion why not, as agreed by Michael Howard said when Leader of the Opposition, that all available documentary evidence be placed before a High Court Judge. Strangely, the Government and MoD appear somewhat reluctant to pursue this route.
Thank you, also, for pointing out the duplication on the petition. I can assure you that it is an oversight which I will amend as soon as I am able. No attempt to 'inflate' the total. Many have been invited to sign, but it is personal choice whether or not to do so. I don't see why the lack of any individual's name is important (as a single issue).
With kind regards, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Lord Chalfont was the Chair of the Campaign group during our time in the House of Lords. He was best placed to advise and guide us whilst we were doing business there. Following the HoL Select Committee, he stepped down in favour of James Arbuthnot, due to our return to the House of Commons, but had to step down due to him being the chair of the Defence Select Committee. Our current Chair is Lord O'Neill.
With regards to independent bodies, what about EDS Scicon? Weren't they appointed to examine the FADEC software - concluding that there were over 400 code anomalies?
If you want an independent opinion why not, as agreed by Michael Howard said when Leader of the Opposition, that all available documentary evidence be placed before a High Court Judge. Strangely, the Government and MoD appear somewhat reluctant to pursue this route.
Thank you, also, for pointing out the duplication on the petition. I can assure you that it is an oversight which I will amend as soon as I am able. No attempt to 'inflate' the total. Many have been invited to sign, but it is personal choice whether or not to do so. I don't see why the lack of any individual's name is important (as a single issue).
With kind regards, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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Cazatou
The "person mentioned in para 1" is well known to us all as John Nichol. He has posted on here under his real name, so I am sure he would not object to you using it.
You are, of course, entitled to your view of his motives, and of his journalism.
No, I am not he.
Regards
Ginseng
You are, of course, entitled to your view of his motives, and of his journalism.
No, I am not he.
Regards
Ginseng
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Wrong Facts Again
Caz,
There was no shortage of aviation expertise at the H of L Inquiry – they actually took the evidence of more Chinook experts than the BoI did. Four members of the Committee were distinguished lawyers, including a Law Lord, Lord Jauncey who chaired the Select Committee, a former chairman of the Bar council, Lord Brennan, a QC, Lord Hooson, and Lord Bowness, a solicitor. The fifth member, Lord Tombs was Chairman of Rolls Royce and a distinguished engineer. None were “self appointed” and all were independent of the Mull Group. Contrary to your comments Lord Chalfont was not a member of the Committee.
Even today I have recently heard an ACM make the outrageous comment that neither the H of L Committee members nor the Sherrif understood aviation, presumably in an attempt to justify the MOD position. However, I suggest that they were very well used to the accurate analysis of evidence placed before them, and they certainly knew a hell of a lot more about justice than MOD did.
For me this speech by Lord Brennan says it all:
Hansard 5 November 2002
Lord Brennan: My Lords, the Royal Air Force is the youngest of our services, but it quickly excited in all of us an admiration equal to that for the other services. The reason is clear, is it not? In peacetime or in war, air crew risk their lives in a particularly dramatic way. When things go wrong in an aeroplane, sudden death is often the outcome. Air crew, and pilots in particular, who run that risk and suffer death can surely expect two things of their country. The first is that the widow they might leave behind and their children, without a father, should not be left in need. The second is that their reputation should be protected. Those two expectations call for a system that provides a proper basis upon which to assess the presence or absence of negligence when the dead pilot cannot defend himself.
It was surely for that reason that the government of the day agreed that when such negligence might fall to be investigated, the standard of proof should be to the very high standard: "absolutely no doubt whatsoever". That is not legally complicated. It can be readily paraphrased: evidence as a result of which there is the conclusion of negligence or otherwise "completely without doubt of any kind". If that is the test, we should remember not only its nature but its objective: to do justice to dead servicemen.
That test is at the heart of this inquiry. It is not legal jargon. It is a concept of fairness and justice. It is with regard to that test that this House should consider our report and the conclusions that it chooses to draw from it.
I turn to the report. The five members of the committee all took the view that this was probably the most onerous committee task that any of us had undertaken in this House. We undertook it in a quasi-judicial manner. We examined all the evidence objectively as it existed at the time of the RAF's conclusion and as it exists now, after our further inquiry.
I stand by our unanimous conclusions. I have carefully considered the Government's response. Being a mere lawyer, and not enjoying the skills of my noble friend Lord Tombs, I am reminded of Mark Twain's response in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn:
"The more you explain it, the more I don't understand it".
The facts were limited; the suppositions to be conceived were fragile. Our conclusion reflected that state of affairs; namely, that we were not of the view that the air marshals were justified, on the facts and suppositions that arose, in concluding that there was absolutely no doubt whatever about the negligence of the two pilots.
I propose to say no more about the detail of our report. This debate is surely complementary to it and not in substitution for it. What is significant to me are the concerns which arise, I hope, to fair-minded people from the investigation that we carried out—concerns of whose substance I gave prior notice to my noble friend the Minister. I shall deal with them briefly.
I understand that the investigation process within the RAF does not reflect the practice of the other two services. It was criticised in the Tench report years ago and has not been adequately reformed. It needs reform. It is a process designed to establish truth—in so far as that is feasible—to protect the dead and, if necessary, to find negligence if proven. That process demands standards higher than those that I found in the RAF system.
I turn to the search for evidence. Twenty-nine people died in the Chinook crash; it was a terrible disaster. We would expect, first, that simulations would be kept within their proper intellectual limits. Based on thin facts and fragile suppositions, they cannot be any stronger in suggesting what might have happened than the material that circumscribes their value. Secondly, why was the civilian investigating arm in air crashes not fully and completely involved in a military inquiry into an RAF crash in peacetime? I can see no reason why not, but I have formed the view—which, I readily concede, may be mistaken—that the Air Accident Investigation Branch, which is expert in the field, took a subservient role in the investigation by the RAF.
I was also concerned about the range of evidence pursued in the RAF inquiry. As a layman, I could not understand why the investigating officers had not consulted expert flyers who were used to the Chinook helicopter, who had experience of it and who could give their views about what may or may not have happened. One, soldier A, gave us his views. I have the leave of my noble friend Lord Hooson, who is absent, to confirm his view, which I share, that this was a most compelling and convincing witness: a serving soldier experienced with such aircraft who was sure that negligence had not been proven. In my view, the search for evidence was inadequate.
I turn to the role of the manufacturer and supplier. The use of—in this case, the sole reliance on—the expertise of those who provided the equipment that may have been at fault is surely unacceptable. It would not be acceptable in commercial life. There, outside experts would be used. They can and should be used in this form of military inquiry. That they were not may reflect an inevitable and perfectly understandable bureaucratic process within the Ministry of Defence, which is accustomed to long-term and regular dealings with its manufacturers and suppliers. That may be give great benefits, but when 29 people die, something more is required. To argue that there is no practical alternative—as I hope will not be argued—is to demean the aeronautical expertise in this country that produced the jet and radar.
I turn to the concept of the chain of command. That concept is essential to military efficiency. I see no basis for its involvement in a system of military justice. It is difficult to accept that, when the original board and the initial reviewing officers found no negligence under the test to be applied, the air marshals could simply reverse that conclusion—with integrity, I accept, and on their honest review of the evidence, but not having heard any of it and unable, presumably because of the weight of their duties, to give it the same degree of attention as had the board itself.
I am reminded that many military men need conclusions—they look for them—but I remind them of Thomas Huxley's version of scientific rigour. He said:
"My business is to teach my aspirations to confirm themselves to fact, not to try and make facts harmonize with my aspirations".
That is a good lesson.
I turn to the role of the Ministry of Defence. Perhaps it was inevitable, as I fear may have been the case, that after eight years, with Minister after Minister and batteries of civil servants being sucked into the debate, some of them lost objectivity. They became so embroiled in the matter and its political ramifications that a mind set and fixed views may well have set in. Surely, if we are discussing military justice, the Ministry of Defence must deal with matters strictly at arms' length.
Why are all those considerations so important? Because our services depend on the morale of our serving men and on their sense of justice in the military arm of their services. On page 38 of the committee's evidence, soldier A, who is a senior officer, states:
"Those who have read the aircraft accident summary I would consider to feel a sense of injustice and those who have read the full Board of Inquiry most definitely a sense of outrage, and that is the feeling, as far as my perception goes, of the grass-roots level".
We Peers and generals are not today debating a technical matter; we are debating matters that affect the morale of our serving men.
Lastly, I turn to the use of a committee of this kind. I voted against it, but when I was asked to serve on it, I agreed. I voted against it for three reasons. First, I found it difficult to envisage a role for a committee of this House investigating a specific factual problem. I wondered whether that was within our compass and whether we were properly equipped to do that. Secondly, it struck me—this remains so—that it was a semi-judicial exercise. Therefore, thirdly, I was concerned that when we reported, our conclusions should not become the subject of political debate of a level that did not reflect the gravity of the matter. I fear that we may have achieved that result.
It remains my considered view that, should the House consider such a committee to be appropriate in future, it should be in only the most exceptional circumstances, in the most clearly prescribed way and on the basis that the House will treat the conclusions of that committee with the greatest respect, if it has done its work properly.
Twenty-nine people died. Every reasonable person thinks to himself that there must be an explanation—either people were negligent or there was aircraft failure or a mixture of the two. We search for a conclusion. However, to the inquiring, objective mind, a doubting investigation and a willingness to indulge in scrutiny ensures a fair result. Such an approach may mean that, because of the state of the facts, we simply cannot say what happened. We cannot find the pilots negligent; we cannot condemn the equipment. I regard that not as a failure of the inquiring mind but as a compliment to its integrity, if the evidence is inadequate to reach a conclusion that meets the test: absolutely no doubt whatsoever.
JB
There was no shortage of aviation expertise at the H of L Inquiry – they actually took the evidence of more Chinook experts than the BoI did. Four members of the Committee were distinguished lawyers, including a Law Lord, Lord Jauncey who chaired the Select Committee, a former chairman of the Bar council, Lord Brennan, a QC, Lord Hooson, and Lord Bowness, a solicitor. The fifth member, Lord Tombs was Chairman of Rolls Royce and a distinguished engineer. None were “self appointed” and all were independent of the Mull Group. Contrary to your comments Lord Chalfont was not a member of the Committee.
Even today I have recently heard an ACM make the outrageous comment that neither the H of L Committee members nor the Sherrif understood aviation, presumably in an attempt to justify the MOD position. However, I suggest that they were very well used to the accurate analysis of evidence placed before them, and they certainly knew a hell of a lot more about justice than MOD did.
For me this speech by Lord Brennan says it all:
Hansard 5 November 2002
Lord Brennan: My Lords, the Royal Air Force is the youngest of our services, but it quickly excited in all of us an admiration equal to that for the other services. The reason is clear, is it not? In peacetime or in war, air crew risk their lives in a particularly dramatic way. When things go wrong in an aeroplane, sudden death is often the outcome. Air crew, and pilots in particular, who run that risk and suffer death can surely expect two things of their country. The first is that the widow they might leave behind and their children, without a father, should not be left in need. The second is that their reputation should be protected. Those two expectations call for a system that provides a proper basis upon which to assess the presence or absence of negligence when the dead pilot cannot defend himself.
It was surely for that reason that the government of the day agreed that when such negligence might fall to be investigated, the standard of proof should be to the very high standard: "absolutely no doubt whatsoever". That is not legally complicated. It can be readily paraphrased: evidence as a result of which there is the conclusion of negligence or otherwise "completely without doubt of any kind". If that is the test, we should remember not only its nature but its objective: to do justice to dead servicemen.
That test is at the heart of this inquiry. It is not legal jargon. It is a concept of fairness and justice. It is with regard to that test that this House should consider our report and the conclusions that it chooses to draw from it.
I turn to the report. The five members of the committee all took the view that this was probably the most onerous committee task that any of us had undertaken in this House. We undertook it in a quasi-judicial manner. We examined all the evidence objectively as it existed at the time of the RAF's conclusion and as it exists now, after our further inquiry.
I stand by our unanimous conclusions. I have carefully considered the Government's response. Being a mere lawyer, and not enjoying the skills of my noble friend Lord Tombs, I am reminded of Mark Twain's response in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn:
"The more you explain it, the more I don't understand it".
The facts were limited; the suppositions to be conceived were fragile. Our conclusion reflected that state of affairs; namely, that we were not of the view that the air marshals were justified, on the facts and suppositions that arose, in concluding that there was absolutely no doubt whatever about the negligence of the two pilots.
I propose to say no more about the detail of our report. This debate is surely complementary to it and not in substitution for it. What is significant to me are the concerns which arise, I hope, to fair-minded people from the investigation that we carried out—concerns of whose substance I gave prior notice to my noble friend the Minister. I shall deal with them briefly.
I understand that the investigation process within the RAF does not reflect the practice of the other two services. It was criticised in the Tench report years ago and has not been adequately reformed. It needs reform. It is a process designed to establish truth—in so far as that is feasible—to protect the dead and, if necessary, to find negligence if proven. That process demands standards higher than those that I found in the RAF system.
I turn to the search for evidence. Twenty-nine people died in the Chinook crash; it was a terrible disaster. We would expect, first, that simulations would be kept within their proper intellectual limits. Based on thin facts and fragile suppositions, they cannot be any stronger in suggesting what might have happened than the material that circumscribes their value. Secondly, why was the civilian investigating arm in air crashes not fully and completely involved in a military inquiry into an RAF crash in peacetime? I can see no reason why not, but I have formed the view—which, I readily concede, may be mistaken—that the Air Accident Investigation Branch, which is expert in the field, took a subservient role in the investigation by the RAF.
I was also concerned about the range of evidence pursued in the RAF inquiry. As a layman, I could not understand why the investigating officers had not consulted expert flyers who were used to the Chinook helicopter, who had experience of it and who could give their views about what may or may not have happened. One, soldier A, gave us his views. I have the leave of my noble friend Lord Hooson, who is absent, to confirm his view, which I share, that this was a most compelling and convincing witness: a serving soldier experienced with such aircraft who was sure that negligence had not been proven. In my view, the search for evidence was inadequate.
I turn to the role of the manufacturer and supplier. The use of—in this case, the sole reliance on—the expertise of those who provided the equipment that may have been at fault is surely unacceptable. It would not be acceptable in commercial life. There, outside experts would be used. They can and should be used in this form of military inquiry. That they were not may reflect an inevitable and perfectly understandable bureaucratic process within the Ministry of Defence, which is accustomed to long-term and regular dealings with its manufacturers and suppliers. That may be give great benefits, but when 29 people die, something more is required. To argue that there is no practical alternative—as I hope will not be argued—is to demean the aeronautical expertise in this country that produced the jet and radar.
I turn to the concept of the chain of command. That concept is essential to military efficiency. I see no basis for its involvement in a system of military justice. It is difficult to accept that, when the original board and the initial reviewing officers found no negligence under the test to be applied, the air marshals could simply reverse that conclusion—with integrity, I accept, and on their honest review of the evidence, but not having heard any of it and unable, presumably because of the weight of their duties, to give it the same degree of attention as had the board itself.
I am reminded that many military men need conclusions—they look for them—but I remind them of Thomas Huxley's version of scientific rigour. He said:
"My business is to teach my aspirations to confirm themselves to fact, not to try and make facts harmonize with my aspirations".
That is a good lesson.
I turn to the role of the Ministry of Defence. Perhaps it was inevitable, as I fear may have been the case, that after eight years, with Minister after Minister and batteries of civil servants being sucked into the debate, some of them lost objectivity. They became so embroiled in the matter and its political ramifications that a mind set and fixed views may well have set in. Surely, if we are discussing military justice, the Ministry of Defence must deal with matters strictly at arms' length.
Why are all those considerations so important? Because our services depend on the morale of our serving men and on their sense of justice in the military arm of their services. On page 38 of the committee's evidence, soldier A, who is a senior officer, states:
"Those who have read the aircraft accident summary I would consider to feel a sense of injustice and those who have read the full Board of Inquiry most definitely a sense of outrage, and that is the feeling, as far as my perception goes, of the grass-roots level".
We Peers and generals are not today debating a technical matter; we are debating matters that affect the morale of our serving men.
Lastly, I turn to the use of a committee of this kind. I voted against it, but when I was asked to serve on it, I agreed. I voted against it for three reasons. First, I found it difficult to envisage a role for a committee of this House investigating a specific factual problem. I wondered whether that was within our compass and whether we were properly equipped to do that. Secondly, it struck me—this remains so—that it was a semi-judicial exercise. Therefore, thirdly, I was concerned that when we reported, our conclusions should not become the subject of political debate of a level that did not reflect the gravity of the matter. I fear that we may have achieved that result.
It remains my considered view that, should the House consider such a committee to be appropriate in future, it should be in only the most exceptional circumstances, in the most clearly prescribed way and on the basis that the House will treat the conclusions of that committee with the greatest respect, if it has done its work properly.
Twenty-nine people died. Every reasonable person thinks to himself that there must be an explanation—either people were negligent or there was aircraft failure or a mixture of the two. We search for a conclusion. However, to the inquiring, objective mind, a doubting investigation and a willingness to indulge in scrutiny ensures a fair result. Such an approach may mean that, because of the state of the facts, we simply cannot say what happened. We cannot find the pilots negligent; we cannot condemn the equipment. I regard that not as a failure of the inquiring mind but as a compliment to its integrity, if the evidence is inadequate to reach a conclusion that meets the test: absolutely no doubt whatsoever.
JB
Last edited by John Blakeley; 30th Aug 2006 at 19:30.