Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

[walter kennedy]

John Blakeley
Thanks for the extracts – I had not gone back through it all when I posted last but made this comment from my memory’s impression that the plan left had shown a high level transit at some stage which the HC2 should not have done – I seem to recall (again without going through everything) that it was said that the plan had been for a different a/c.
Am I wrong or is it still the case that a copy of the actual flight plan was not left? – in which case how is this correct procedure? – and is my comment (at the end of the last post) still valid? I recall much debate on this thread some time ago that showed great confusion as to their actual intentions, and regarding what you quoted:
<< The actual crew maps used on the sortie were not recovered and the Board was restricted, in considering the crew's route planning, to the map left by Flt Lt Tapper in SHFNI Operations, and to the evidence of Lt Kingston's crew. From this the Board concludes that the sortie was well planned, and that the chosen route was logical and sound for a low level VFR flight...>>
the detail of their intentions in the leg approaching the Mull has not been made public, has it? And the conclusion:
<<. The Board therefore concluded that route planning was not a factor in the accident >>
seems open to dispute.
<< Could you tell us what you base your last comment on please as it is totally incompatible with the findings of the BoI >>
It does not worry me that some of my views are incompatible with the BOI – in this respect at least, I may have some company on this thread.
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I would like to address some points made (in your quote) by the Odiham Stn Cdr – I realize that you were making the point that the Stn Cdr disagreed with the BOI findings here on the grounds that he regarded the crew as too professional planning wise, etc to have done what the BOI concluded and I take your point – I am using this text to draw attention to some major differences of opinion in one particular regard that are well illustrated in it:
<<. By using a combination of the last SuperTANS calculation and the Boeing computer simulation of the final flight path they have determined that at 15 to 18 seconds before impact the aircraft was climbing at 1000ft per min at 150kts IAS. Given the high level of confidence in both the raw data and the analysis, I accept that. >>
For what it’s worth, so do I – in this period it was in a cruise climb whereby the climb rate was optimum for the use of the surplus power without reducing forward speed – let me put this again, it was a selected steady optimum climb without reducing speed and in no way at all an immediate response to, say, deteriorating conditions. Prior to this period, over the long leg, this was the order of speed that the a/c had been cruising at in level flight – well within the cruising speed range with ample power in reserve according to the manufacturers data (for weight, alt, amb temp etc) and as evidenced by the subsequent cruise climb – it was an optimum cruise speed for getting a trip done and should not have been described as high as it so often has been so as to infer the crew were in a hurry.
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In view of the description of cruise climb above, how does this bit sound?:
<< The Board then opine … that the crew, faced with the expected deteriorating weather, consciously elected to make a climb on track over high ground and in doing so used a speed and power combination that is unrecognisable as a Chinook technique. >>
BUT it should have been recognized by them as a Chinook technique – that it was patently not the right one for climbing over the Mull should have led them to deliberations as to what they were actually doing with it.
While the Stn Cdr recognizes it as a cruise climb he missed the opportunity of strongly emphasizing it – while he did so strongly disagree with the board’s view in this regard, he missed the opportunity of making a clear specific point that they would not have used cruise climb to gain altitude for crossing the Mull as close in as they were and for which they had not planned which is, IMHO, the nub of the matter.
If you do the sums, to have reached SALT over the Mull using cruise climb at their speed, they would have had to have selected it SEVERAL MILES earlier- so it was not just a little error of judgment – it would have been completely wrong and not a credible scenario given their training and professionalism in planning as the Stn Cdr said so strongly in so many words.
Given this line by him:
<<. Even taking into account the factors which the Board feel could have deceived the crew into believing a high speed cruise climb would have given them sufficient clearance over the Mull I, and the few, senior Chinook operators that I felt able to consult, find this suggestion incredible.>>
It is a great pity that he did not have the courage of his convictions and investigate whatever else they could have been doing - he would have had the position, standing, contacts, etc etc etc.
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Justice Delayed is Justice Denied