Flight Planning
Walter,
Could you tell us what you base your last comment on please as it is totally incompatible with the findings of the BoI - to remind you:
Para 67b. Flight Planning
The Board considered that the decision to fly the entire sortie to Inverness as a low level VFR flight in the forecast weather conditions was reasonable, however, consideration of the actions required on encountering weather below VFR limits would have been needed. The evidence of Flt Lt Tapper's preparation and flight planning for the sortie to Inverness indicates that it was carried out in a thorough and professional manner. The planning was completed in good time and was updated with the latest weather and navigation information prior to departure. Flt Lt Tapper had correctly dismissed the possibility of flying an IFR transit to Inverness. .....
Para 43a. Route Planning
The actual crew maps used on the sortie were not recovered and the Board was restricted, in considering the crew's route planning, to the map left by Flt Lt Tapper in SHFNI Operations, and to the evidence of Lt Kingston's crew. From this the Board concludes that the sortie was well planned, and that the chosen route was logical and sound for a low level VFR flight. The Board therefore concluded that route planning was not a factor in the accident.
You may also recall the opening remarks of the Odiham Stn Cdr which were:
1. The Board have conducted a very thorough and detailed investigation into the circumstances surrounding this accident and in my view, they have considered all the factors that could have conceivably have had a bearing upon it. In trying to determine the cause they have worked "backwards" from the point of impact. By using a combination of the last SuperTANS calculation and the Boeing computer simulation of the final flight path they have determined that at 15 to 18 seconds before impact the aircraft was climbing at 1000ft per min at 150kts IAS. Given the high level of confidence in both the raw data and the analysis, I accept that. The Board then opine, in making this profile dovetail with other evidence, that the crew, faced with the expected deteriorating weather, consciously elected to make a climb on track over high ground and in doing so used a speed and power combination that is unrecognisable as a Chinook technique. I find this difficult to believe; such actions would go against all the crew’s instincts and training. Moreover it is the very antithesis of the professionalism and careful planning that had gone before. Even taking into account the factors which the Board feel could have deceived the crew into believing a high speed cruise climb would have given them sufficient clearance over the Mull I, and the few, senior Chinook operators that I felt able to consult, find this suggestion incredible.
It is good to hear on the news today that the victims of another gross miscarriage of justice in WW1 are finally to have their names cleared - let us hope that we do not have to wait that long! MOD should never forget that justice will out.
JB