Future Carrier (Including Costs)
yes - this thread has been a bit quiet since a land war broke out in Europe..............
Never mind the Stuoid Thoughts, please remind us what the carriers are for?
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General Atomics EMALS, AAG Systems on CVN 78 Reach 10,000 ‘Cats and Traps’ Milestone 13 Jul 2022 https://seapowermagazine.org/general...aps-milestone/
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Not available when the assessment was done, nor when the QE was finally commissioned - and still not reliable….
A January 2021 DOT&E Report stated: "During the 3,975 catapult launches [...] EMALS demonstrated an achieved reliability of 181 mean cycles between operational mission failure (MCBOMF) [...] This reliability is well below the requirement of 4,166 MCBOMF."[31]
A January 2021 DOT&E Report stated: "During the 3,975 catapult launches [...] EMALS demonstrated an achieved reliability of 181 mean cycles between operational mission failure (MCBOMF) [...] This reliability is well below the requirement of 4,166 MCBOMF."[31]
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Not available when the assessment was done, nor when the QE was finally commissioned - and still not reliable….
A January 2021 DOT&E Report stated: "During the 3,975 catapult launches [...] EMALS demonstrated an achieved reliability of 181 mean cycles between operational mission failure (MCBOMF) [...] This reliability is well below the requirement of 4,166 MCBOMF."[31]
A January 2021 DOT&E Report stated: "During the 3,975 catapult launches [...] EMALS demonstrated an achieved reliability of 181 mean cycles between operational mission failure (MCBOMF) [...] This reliability is well below the requirement of 4,166 MCBOMF."[31]
Admiral on EMALS and AAG Programs: ‘It Works’ 04 Apr 2022
https://seapowermagazine.org/admiral...rams-it-works/
"A Navy admiral says that despite reports to the contrary, the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System and Advanced Arresting Gear systems aboard the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) are working just fine. Rear Adm. Shane G. Gahagan, program executive officer for tactical aircraft programs (PEO-T) at Naval Air Systems Command, said Monday, April 4 at Sea-Air-Space that the system had achieved 8,500 “cats and traps” on the Ford over the past two years. The EMALS system has struggled with reliability issues over the years, but Gahagan insisted that it is performing well today. “It works,” Gahagan said. “I read in the press … that it doesn’t work. It works day in and day out with cats and traps, and now it’s like every other program: How are we going to sustain it for the fight we need?” He said the EMALS and AAG systems have a “lot of great capability” and that Sailors “love it.”"
Last edited by SpazSinbad; 17th Jul 2022 at 18:17. Reason: +txt
Pretty damning article regarding the decision to abandon cat and traps in 2012 by former RN officer and author Lewis Page in the Telegraph today.
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business...raft-carriers/
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business...raft-carriers/
Thread Starter
Sea control ceased to be seen as a priority during the era when assumptions were made that state versus state competition was a thing of the past and that the maritime and air environments would never been contested. State competition is very much on the rise, with Russia, Iran, and China in a loose alliance that opposes the West and the rules based system. China is trying to build blue water capabilities to rival the Americans, but Russia and Iran are more interested in sea denial, that is the ability to disrupt or prevent seaborne commerce, the movement of military reinforcements in time of crisis, and the freedom to use the maritime space for things such as amphibious operations.
The carrier, in conjunction with other units, is ideal for sea control, as it allows a maritime force to launch fighters that can intercept and engage hostile aircraft at much longer range than a shipborne missile system, and before they are in range to fire anti ship missiles. This is down in conjunction with AEW capabilities and anti air warfare warships such as the Type 45 destroyer which provide control as well as another layer of defence. The carrier's fixed wing aircraft may also take the fight to enemy warships, or airfields and missile sites. In the anti submarine warfare role, a carrier can carry multiple ASW helicopters to allow constant operations, and there dipping sonar provides an accurate means of detecting submarines. The ASW helicopters work in conjunction with surface warships, particularly ones with modern towed array sonars such as the Type 23 frigate, which provide long range detection and cuing. They also work with our own submarines and MPA, something that the carrier can coordinate.
Power projection does not just mean attacking or being able to attack targets ashore, it also means things such as amphibious operations which need sea control and contribute to it - for example by controlling islands and parts of coastline.
Anyway - going back to the 1960s, the loss of the big carriers was down to a number of reasons, but a major reason was the carrier related staff work used minor wars in the Far East as justification for building new carriers. At the time NATO was our main commitment, including carriers. This was a massive screw up which should be a salutatory lesson.
The increasing Soviet submarine threat meant that the RN needed platforms for multiple ASW Sea Kings. At the same time the Soviets were fitting anti ship missiles to a number of their submarines. These were long range weapons which dependent on targeting information from Soviet Naval Aviation - mostly Bears. The need for a fighter to intercept and deal with the Bear was real, and in many ways part of the ASW mission. There was no slight of hand - these capabilities were needed for our NATO role. The CVS was capable of constant ASW as part of a task group, with constant ASW helicopter sorties and being able of constantly put Sea Harriers up to deal with the Bears trying to send targeting information to an SSGN. However their limited size (due to politics) limited the number of aircraft that could be carried, limited their future flexibility, and limited their ability to fly in poor conditions. All lessons that have been remembered fortunately.
With a new Cold War/era of Violent Peace, the West must once again look to protect its sea lines of communication. Much has been written about carriers and their value to NATO, but this ARRSE thread is especially to the point as it discusses little else: Late 1970s US Congress Report - The US Sea Control Mission (carriers needed in the Atlantic for Air Defence and ASW - both then and today)
As well as many historical documents such as the declassified 1980s naval strategy documents and US congressional studies, it features many shortly articles as well talks by the likes of Dr John Lehman, US Secretary of the Navy from 1981 to 1987, and the late Professor Eric Grove, and comments by a Cold War US Navy carrier aviator:
...the primary mission for the CV/CVN in the North Atlantic was not ASW (it was an additional role) but rather AAW to prevent the Backfire/Bears from attacking the convoys. The A-6/A-7s were the organic tankers to push the F-4/F-14 CAP stations out to a range to shoot the archer, not the arrows. Obviously, those roles swapped a bit when you started facing a surface threat or got close enough to land to start contemplating strikes against those Soviet Naval Air Arm airfields.
Here is a talk by the late Professor Eric Grove:
Professor Grove mentions carriers a lot, in terms of protecting shipping and amphibious forces. At 50:15 he suggests that the thing hostile submarine captains dread most of all is the dipping sonar - and that an airborne radar flooding an area will keep the hostile submarines down. He then describes witnessing an ASW exercise in which a number of NATO submarines transmitted Soviet levels of noise, and everyone was covered by either an ASW helicopter or an MPA. Then they turned off the extra noise...
We could also listen to Dr Lehman:
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 21st Jul 2022 at 10:40.
Pretty damning article regarding the decision to abandon cat and traps in 2012 by former RN officer and author Lewis Page in the Telegraph today.
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business...raft-carriers/
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business...raft-carriers/
I'm sure you mean the requirement endorsed by Joint services. Even a cursory look at the EP also suggests minimal- if any - impact on other services. But the myth lives on because "bigger than CVS, innit".
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What were they thinking?
For the record I apologise for going a bit hard regarding the new carriers and aircraft, and I thank contributors for being gracious enough to not kick sh1t out of me.
I think part of my stance is driven by my recent reading / re-reading of at least four books on the handling / mishandling of air assets 40 years ago, and the recurring theme of inter-service rivalry and jealousy described.
I can only hope that Purple works better these days.
I think part of my stance is driven by my recent reading / re-reading of at least four books on the handling / mishandling of air assets 40 years ago, and the recurring theme of inter-service rivalry and jealousy described.
I can only hope that Purple works better these days.
I'm sure I've read somewhere the thinking was that the Treasury were only going to fund two carriers, irrespective of how big they were or weren't.
Sir Humphrey in ThePinstripedLine
https://tinyurl.com/4vxmzx4j
Challenging the Stuoid Thoughts on Lewis Page’s Latest Drivel
https://tinyurl.com/4vxmzx4j
Challenging the Stuoid Thoughts on Lewis Page’s Latest Drivel
It is possible (indeed likely) that a range of options and designs were looked at in this period for the CVF which included conventional take off and landing (CTOL) variants, and also versions which could operate the F18 too.
Which meant you either brought three CVS and took two to any significant party, or two larger ships of which you could make a useful contribution with a single one.
After that, you're into relative costs, including infrastructure and manpower. Bigger decks require less chockhead effort - less respotting and fewer
fewer movements, plus two crews vice three. If the availability could be made to work - it has - then you get more bang for buck.
But the size increase over CVS confused a lot of people, leading to many letters to Tellywelly from retired Pongoes who assumed that bigger equals much more expensive.
The earliest public domain paper was by a couple of Naval Constructors in 1997/8.
Thread Starter
For the sake of completeness, and to offer some defence of those criticised by those with the benefit of forty years of hindsight:
From Chapter 4 - 'South to Ascension' - of One Hundred Days by Admiral Sandy Woodward..
Basically, it was necessary to work the campaign out backwards, starting with the chilling thought that the Task Group would be falling apart by mid to late June without proper maintenance and with winter setting in. This did not allow for enemy action, since reinforcements and replacements from the UK should cover that. So we were obliged to make a crucial assumption - that the land battle would be over by the end of June, and preferably a good two weeks before that. The retaking of Port Stanley was obviously the 'critical path' for military planning, whatever the politicians might decide. On that basis, therefore, if the land forces were to be given reasonable time to do their stuff, we had to put them on the beaches by 25 May. That would give them about a month to establish the beach head, break out, march to the likely main positions around Stanley and defeat the Argentinians on the ground. During this time we would provide then with all the artillery and air support we could; hopefully enough for their needs. And throughout the operation we had to keep the sea and sky sufficiently clear to allow reasonably safe passage to and from the beach head, with stores, people, ammunition, food and fuel - by ship and by helicopter.
I duly pinned my cardboard dates on the overall calendar. It was a mobile 'bar chart' of the kind dearly loved by all planners. We continued to work backwards: we must be here by X, there by Y, have established an airstrip by Z. In the end I remember one piece of cardboard proving to be the key to most of our problems. Upon this was written the name 'Intrepid', the sister ship to Fearless. We had to have her in the South Atlantic as a standby amphibious headquarters ship, just in case Fearless, should be sunk. The problem was that in late March, Intrepid had been 'destored' and put in reserve, as an early step in Mr Nott's grand plan for reductions in the Navy. To get her South, we had to reverse this complicated process. As far as we could estimate, there was no way she could get down to the Falklands, properly prepared, before 16 May. She would be the last ship to arrive, the last piece in the jigsaw, so all the timings depended on her.
There will still unknowns like the weather, enemy action, accidents, political initiatives and settlements. But here was a hard plan, give or take about ten days. It was a military plan from which there could be no political diversions if we were to fight and win. The 'landing window' extended from 16 May (the first day Intrepid could arrive) until 25 May. Inside that time we had to have most of land forces ashore. And, to be in good shape by mid May, we were going to have to get the Special Forces ashore for reconnaissance very soon. It was now 17 April, and the bar chart showed us we could enter the Exclusion Zone by 1 May if we pressed on hard. South Georgia should be clear by then, and sixteen days should suffice for the reconnaissance phase.
The amphibians would be able to wait behind, stay in hard training at Ascension, re-stow their equipment in better order, and set off ten days from now, prepared to go ashore any time after arrival, wherever reece suggested was the best place. This part of the plan had the added merit of allowing the Battle Group the option of entering the Exclusion Zone without the encumbrance of the amphibious ships. The thought of taking on the Argentinian with a large convoy of amphibians and merchant ships requiring simultaneous protection - all wallowing about at twelve knots - had ben a considerable source of worry to me. Now we had the option to fight without one hand tied between our backs, which was a good idea, really. Rather better than going all that ways as escorts to a large convoy.
In other words, the plan was to fight the Argentines to establish sea control and enough air superiority for an amphibious assault, before the amphibious ships and ground forces got there. Similarly NATO war planning routed most transatlantic reinforcement and resupply convoys on a Southern latitude which would take them from the Caribbean to near the coast of Portugal, while NATO naval forces, including the carriers, fought in the region of the GIUK gap and the Norwegian Sea, to stop a break out and attacks en masse. Although I cannot understand his opposition to the F-35 (all versions), at least Sharkey Ward has never denied the importance of a balanced surface fleet, unlike duty idiots like Lewis Page.This is from Sea Harrier Over The Falklands:
There were essentially three elements of naval warfare which had to be controlled and directed from the Ops Room: Above the Surface (Air), On the Surface, and Under the Surface (Anti submarine). These were very much interbred and interdependent, thanks to the variety of modem weapons available to the fleet and the sophistication of the modern threat. It was therefore no easy task to collect and collate the information from all the ship's sensor (including aircraft sensors and information from other platforms) and present them to the Command in an easily digestible fashion. All friendly units in each element had to be continuously plotted and information from the separate levels of defence recorded, so that in extremitis the Command could judge priority and take the appropriate action.
Defence in depth had become the war fighting philosophy of the day. Against the air threat, the outer layer of defence could be air to air and surface to air systems provided by a third party and deployed some point between the source of the threat and the fleet at sea. In the South Atlantic there was no such layer available and the Task Group had to rely on its organic defensive weapon platforms.
The out layer of air and surface defence was the Sea Harrier on Combat Air Patrol. Whenever the threat assessment made air attack highly possible, or probable, then CAP aircraft would be stationed up threat to deter and/or engage the attackers. (Should a surface attack be predicted then the SHAR would be dispatched over the horizon to search for the enemy units.) Air defence radar pickets (warships fitted with suitable sensors and weapon systems) would also be stationed up threat, but inside the CAP stations, to provide information to the CAP and the Carrier Group itself. These pickets would be armed with a variety of surface to air weapons and represented a second line of defence. The next layer of defence was the the medium or long range surface to air ship borne missile system. Sea Dart fulfilled this role for the Group. Attackers or their air to surface missiles that managed to penetrate through the outer layers of defence would then face the next designer system - the Short Range or Point Defence Missile Systems such as Sea Wolf. And, as a last ditch defence (on the hard kill side), high rate of fire, radar directed guns such as Phalanx fitted bill. Soft kill options, such as jamming and chaff were also an important integral part of the air defence in depth scenario.
If one analyses the probabilities of engagement and kill of each of the layers of defence, and calculates the overall probabilities of engagement and kill of the cumulative system, it is easy to demonstrate mathematically and in practice that money spent on defence in depth is far better than spending the same amount on a single 'all singing, all dancing' weapon system. The latter can never be perfect or 100% efficient and if it has weaknesses, which it surely will, the threat will be certain to capitalise on these deficiencies and circumvent the system. The separate layers of defence in depth each act as a deterrent to an enemy, and each are capable of causing attrition to attacking forces.
It is the Commander Task Group's job to ensure that where possible he does not place his force in a position that denies that force the full benefit of its defence in depth systems, whether by geographical location or by misuse of a particular asset or layer.
The under surface threat had to be approached in the same manner as the air threat, using third party resources, long range sensors such as Towed Array Sonar, ASW frigates as a screen between the threat and the group, anti submarine helicopters on the screen and at other locations around the group, and last but not least sonars fitted to the ships in the main body. Each of the anti submarine platforms must be capable of not only locating the threat submarine but also of prosecuting it with appropriate weapons. And with the submarine threat being ever present and very difficult to detect, the various level of defence have to be working at 100 per cent efficiency for twenty four hours a day when in a threat zone*.
There were, of course, no third parties of any description providing defence for the Task Force in the South Atlantic; no Nimrods, no air defence fighter barriers, and no shore based Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft#.
*Technological developments since 1982 have changed things and increased the range at which submarines can be detected, with the advent of things such as low frequency active sonar. The longer range comes at the expense of resolution, which is where the helicopter with dipping sonar really comes into its own.
#The Sea Harrier, and the CVS, was expected to operate in the GIUK Gap and Norwegian Sea, with Tomcats from USN carriers and two squadrons of RAF Phantoms (dedicated to maritime air defence) providing the bulk of the air defence, supported by AEW. The Nimrods sent South in 1982 were mostly used to ASuW roles.
As for naval helicopters versus submarines, these pages are about the engagement of the ARA Santa Fe:
I am not sure why these have turned out so small. Some highlights:
Parry describes the role of an ASW helicopter Observer:'Essentially you are there to navigate the aircraft, to plan tactics, and to operate the weapon systems. There are other things of course, such as communications with ships and other helicopters....'
It sounds like what US Navy Naval Flight Officers do in fixed wing aircraft! The Tactical Coordinator in the US Navy's S-3 Viking did that, so why not someone in the back of the MH-60R as that has taken over as the main USN shipborne ASW aircraft?
As for the value of radar: I suggested to Ian that we should Switch on the radar for a single one second sweep, One was all I could make - any more would have told an enemy skipper that he was under surveillance from the air and he could plot his course and speed.I illuminated and immediately picked up five or six traces in the area ahead and out to sea. I was expecting this because I had been marking on my chart several icebergs which we had been plotting for several days and which all had their individual names - Fred, Charlie and so forth. But there was just one blip - about files miles due North of Barff Point - which showed up where it shouldn't have been. It was faint, but I instinctively felt it was our submarine. I reported it to Ian and give him the range and bearing. Shortly afterwards, in a very cool time, he reported 'submarine ahead'.
Yet the USN SH-3 had no radar. The Royal Navy though that radar was essential for the ASW role - as was the Observer to coordinate and control things.
Dipping sonar as a deterrent: Stanley the went into a hover whilst Fitzgerald dunked the sonar transceiver. With signals already being received in the helicopter it would be much easier to keep track of his movements is the submarine commander did decide to submerge. The Wessex continued the sonar watch until Parry heard that the second helicopter had arrived over the target.
As for the tactical coordination role: Chris Parry had not been able to talk by radio to the two Endurance Wasps, but he had been coordinating the movements of the two Lynx from HMS Brilliant and the Wasp from HMS Plymouth.
HMS Brilliant, with her modern sonar systems, had only just arrived in the area and it was unlikely that the Santa Fe would have been in her sonar range. The older sonars fitted to Antrim and Plymouth would have been pretty short ranged, so it was a helicopter only affair. Later on in the conflict, prolonged ASW hunts took place with frigates, including the two Type 22s, acting in conjunction with ASW Sea Kings from Hermes and Invincible.That was how Cold War ASW would be, with friendly submarines and MPA also contributing. The development of modern towed array sonars gives the surface force a considerably greater range of detection now, and potentially means that you can cope with less ASW helicopters, however the role of the dipping sonar in conjunction with the towed array is essential.
From Chapter 4 - 'South to Ascension' - of One Hundred Days by Admiral Sandy Woodward..
Basically, it was necessary to work the campaign out backwards, starting with the chilling thought that the Task Group would be falling apart by mid to late June without proper maintenance and with winter setting in. This did not allow for enemy action, since reinforcements and replacements from the UK should cover that. So we were obliged to make a crucial assumption - that the land battle would be over by the end of June, and preferably a good two weeks before that. The retaking of Port Stanley was obviously the 'critical path' for military planning, whatever the politicians might decide. On that basis, therefore, if the land forces were to be given reasonable time to do their stuff, we had to put them on the beaches by 25 May. That would give them about a month to establish the beach head, break out, march to the likely main positions around Stanley and defeat the Argentinians on the ground. During this time we would provide then with all the artillery and air support we could; hopefully enough for their needs. And throughout the operation we had to keep the sea and sky sufficiently clear to allow reasonably safe passage to and from the beach head, with stores, people, ammunition, food and fuel - by ship and by helicopter.
I duly pinned my cardboard dates on the overall calendar. It was a mobile 'bar chart' of the kind dearly loved by all planners. We continued to work backwards: we must be here by X, there by Y, have established an airstrip by Z. In the end I remember one piece of cardboard proving to be the key to most of our problems. Upon this was written the name 'Intrepid', the sister ship to Fearless. We had to have her in the South Atlantic as a standby amphibious headquarters ship, just in case Fearless, should be sunk. The problem was that in late March, Intrepid had been 'destored' and put in reserve, as an early step in Mr Nott's grand plan for reductions in the Navy. To get her South, we had to reverse this complicated process. As far as we could estimate, there was no way she could get down to the Falklands, properly prepared, before 16 May. She would be the last ship to arrive, the last piece in the jigsaw, so all the timings depended on her.
There will still unknowns like the weather, enemy action, accidents, political initiatives and settlements. But here was a hard plan, give or take about ten days. It was a military plan from which there could be no political diversions if we were to fight and win. The 'landing window' extended from 16 May (the first day Intrepid could arrive) until 25 May. Inside that time we had to have most of land forces ashore. And, to be in good shape by mid May, we were going to have to get the Special Forces ashore for reconnaissance very soon. It was now 17 April, and the bar chart showed us we could enter the Exclusion Zone by 1 May if we pressed on hard. South Georgia should be clear by then, and sixteen days should suffice for the reconnaissance phase.
The amphibians would be able to wait behind, stay in hard training at Ascension, re-stow their equipment in better order, and set off ten days from now, prepared to go ashore any time after arrival, wherever reece suggested was the best place. This part of the plan had the added merit of allowing the Battle Group the option of entering the Exclusion Zone without the encumbrance of the amphibious ships. The thought of taking on the Argentinian with a large convoy of amphibians and merchant ships requiring simultaneous protection - all wallowing about at twelve knots - had ben a considerable source of worry to me. Now we had the option to fight without one hand tied between our backs, which was a good idea, really. Rather better than going all that ways as escorts to a large convoy.
In other words, the plan was to fight the Argentines to establish sea control and enough air superiority for an amphibious assault, before the amphibious ships and ground forces got there. Similarly NATO war planning routed most transatlantic reinforcement and resupply convoys on a Southern latitude which would take them from the Caribbean to near the coast of Portugal, while NATO naval forces, including the carriers, fought in the region of the GIUK gap and the Norwegian Sea, to stop a break out and attacks en masse. Although I cannot understand his opposition to the F-35 (all versions), at least Sharkey Ward has never denied the importance of a balanced surface fleet, unlike duty idiots like Lewis Page.This is from Sea Harrier Over The Falklands:
There were essentially three elements of naval warfare which had to be controlled and directed from the Ops Room: Above the Surface (Air), On the Surface, and Under the Surface (Anti submarine). These were very much interbred and interdependent, thanks to the variety of modem weapons available to the fleet and the sophistication of the modern threat. It was therefore no easy task to collect and collate the information from all the ship's sensor (including aircraft sensors and information from other platforms) and present them to the Command in an easily digestible fashion. All friendly units in each element had to be continuously plotted and information from the separate levels of defence recorded, so that in extremitis the Command could judge priority and take the appropriate action.
Defence in depth had become the war fighting philosophy of the day. Against the air threat, the outer layer of defence could be air to air and surface to air systems provided by a third party and deployed some point between the source of the threat and the fleet at sea. In the South Atlantic there was no such layer available and the Task Group had to rely on its organic defensive weapon platforms.
The out layer of air and surface defence was the Sea Harrier on Combat Air Patrol. Whenever the threat assessment made air attack highly possible, or probable, then CAP aircraft would be stationed up threat to deter and/or engage the attackers. (Should a surface attack be predicted then the SHAR would be dispatched over the horizon to search for the enemy units.) Air defence radar pickets (warships fitted with suitable sensors and weapon systems) would also be stationed up threat, but inside the CAP stations, to provide information to the CAP and the Carrier Group itself. These pickets would be armed with a variety of surface to air weapons and represented a second line of defence. The next layer of defence was the the medium or long range surface to air ship borne missile system. Sea Dart fulfilled this role for the Group. Attackers or their air to surface missiles that managed to penetrate through the outer layers of defence would then face the next designer system - the Short Range or Point Defence Missile Systems such as Sea Wolf. And, as a last ditch defence (on the hard kill side), high rate of fire, radar directed guns such as Phalanx fitted bill. Soft kill options, such as jamming and chaff were also an important integral part of the air defence in depth scenario.
If one analyses the probabilities of engagement and kill of each of the layers of defence, and calculates the overall probabilities of engagement and kill of the cumulative system, it is easy to demonstrate mathematically and in practice that money spent on defence in depth is far better than spending the same amount on a single 'all singing, all dancing' weapon system. The latter can never be perfect or 100% efficient and if it has weaknesses, which it surely will, the threat will be certain to capitalise on these deficiencies and circumvent the system. The separate layers of defence in depth each act as a deterrent to an enemy, and each are capable of causing attrition to attacking forces.
It is the Commander Task Group's job to ensure that where possible he does not place his force in a position that denies that force the full benefit of its defence in depth systems, whether by geographical location or by misuse of a particular asset or layer.
The under surface threat had to be approached in the same manner as the air threat, using third party resources, long range sensors such as Towed Array Sonar, ASW frigates as a screen between the threat and the group, anti submarine helicopters on the screen and at other locations around the group, and last but not least sonars fitted to the ships in the main body. Each of the anti submarine platforms must be capable of not only locating the threat submarine but also of prosecuting it with appropriate weapons. And with the submarine threat being ever present and very difficult to detect, the various level of defence have to be working at 100 per cent efficiency for twenty four hours a day when in a threat zone*.
There were, of course, no third parties of any description providing defence for the Task Force in the South Atlantic; no Nimrods, no air defence fighter barriers, and no shore based Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft#.
*Technological developments since 1982 have changed things and increased the range at which submarines can be detected, with the advent of things such as low frequency active sonar. The longer range comes at the expense of resolution, which is where the helicopter with dipping sonar really comes into its own.
#The Sea Harrier, and the CVS, was expected to operate in the GIUK Gap and Norwegian Sea, with Tomcats from USN carriers and two squadrons of RAF Phantoms (dedicated to maritime air defence) providing the bulk of the air defence, supported by AEW. The Nimrods sent South in 1982 were mostly used to ASuW roles.
As for naval helicopters versus submarines, these pages are about the engagement of the ARA Santa Fe:
I am not sure why these have turned out so small. Some highlights:
Parry describes the role of an ASW helicopter Observer:'Essentially you are there to navigate the aircraft, to plan tactics, and to operate the weapon systems. There are other things of course, such as communications with ships and other helicopters....'
It sounds like what US Navy Naval Flight Officers do in fixed wing aircraft! The Tactical Coordinator in the US Navy's S-3 Viking did that, so why not someone in the back of the MH-60R as that has taken over as the main USN shipborne ASW aircraft?
As for the value of radar: I suggested to Ian that we should Switch on the radar for a single one second sweep, One was all I could make - any more would have told an enemy skipper that he was under surveillance from the air and he could plot his course and speed.I illuminated and immediately picked up five or six traces in the area ahead and out to sea. I was expecting this because I had been marking on my chart several icebergs which we had been plotting for several days and which all had their individual names - Fred, Charlie and so forth. But there was just one blip - about files miles due North of Barff Point - which showed up where it shouldn't have been. It was faint, but I instinctively felt it was our submarine. I reported it to Ian and give him the range and bearing. Shortly afterwards, in a very cool time, he reported 'submarine ahead'.
Yet the USN SH-3 had no radar. The Royal Navy though that radar was essential for the ASW role - as was the Observer to coordinate and control things.
Dipping sonar as a deterrent: Stanley the went into a hover whilst Fitzgerald dunked the sonar transceiver. With signals already being received in the helicopter it would be much easier to keep track of his movements is the submarine commander did decide to submerge. The Wessex continued the sonar watch until Parry heard that the second helicopter had arrived over the target.
As for the tactical coordination role: Chris Parry had not been able to talk by radio to the two Endurance Wasps, but he had been coordinating the movements of the two Lynx from HMS Brilliant and the Wasp from HMS Plymouth.
HMS Brilliant, with her modern sonar systems, had only just arrived in the area and it was unlikely that the Santa Fe would have been in her sonar range. The older sonars fitted to Antrim and Plymouth would have been pretty short ranged, so it was a helicopter only affair. Later on in the conflict, prolonged ASW hunts took place with frigates, including the two Type 22s, acting in conjunction with ASW Sea Kings from Hermes and Invincible.That was how Cold War ASW would be, with friendly submarines and MPA also contributing. The development of modern towed array sonars gives the surface force a considerably greater range of detection now, and potentially means that you can cope with less ASW helicopters, however the role of the dipping sonar in conjunction with the towed array is essential.
For the sake of completeness, and to offer some defence of those criticised by those with the benefit of forty years of hindsight:
From Chapter 4 - 'South to Ascension' - of One Hundred Days by Admiral Sandy Woodward..
Basically, it was necessary to work the campaign out backwards, starting with the chilling thought that the Task Group would be falling apart by mid to late June without proper maintenance and with winter setting in. This did not allow for enemy action, since reinforcements and replacements from the UK should cover that. So we were obliged to make a crucial assumption - that the land battle would be over by the end of June, and preferably a good two weeks before that. The retaking of Port Stanley was obviously the 'critical path' for military planning, whatever the politicians might decide. On that basis, therefore, if the land forces were to be given reasonable time to do their stuff, we had to put them on the beaches by 25 May. That would give them about a month to establish the beach head, break out, march to the likely main positions around Stanley and defeat the Argentinians on the ground. During this time we would provide then with all the artillery and air support we could; hopefully enough for their needs. And throughout the operation we had to keep the sea and sky sufficiently clear to allow reasonably safe passage to and from the beach head, with stores, people, ammunition, food and fuel - by ship and by helicopter.
I duly pinned my cardboard dates on the overall calendar. It was a mobile 'bar chart' of the kind dearly loved by all planners. We continued to work backwards: we must be here by X, there by Y, have established an airstrip by Z. In the end I remember one piece of cardboard proving to be the key to most of our problems. Upon this was written the name 'Intrepid', the sister ship to Fearless. We had to have her in the South Atlantic as a standby amphibious headquarters ship, just in case Fearless, should be sunk. The problem was that in late March, Intrepid had been 'destored' and put in reserve, as an early step in Mr Nott's grand plan for reductions in the Navy. To get her South, we had to reverse this complicated process. As far as we could estimate, there was no way she could get down to the Falklands, properly prepared, before 16 May. She would be the last ship to arrive, the last piece in the jigsaw, so all the timings depended on her.
There will still unknowns like the weather, enemy action, accidents, political initiatives and settlements. But here was a hard plan, give or take about ten days. It was a military plan from which there could be no political diversions if we were to fight and win. The 'landing window' extended from 16 May (the first day Intrepid could arrive) until 25 May. Inside that time we had to have most of land forces ashore. And, to be in good shape by mid May, we were going to have to get the Special Forces ashore for reconnaissance very soon. It was now 17 April, and the bar chart showed us we could enter the Exclusion Zone by 1 May if we pressed on hard. South Georgia should be clear by then, and sixteen days should suffice for the reconnaissance phase.
The amphibians would be able to wait behind, stay in hard training at Ascension, re-stow their equipment in better order, and set off ten days from now, prepared to go ashore any time after arrival, wherever reece suggested was the best place. This part of the plan had the added merit of allowing the Battle Group the option of entering the Exclusion Zone without the encumbrance of the amphibious ships. The thought of taking on the Argentinian with a large convoy of amphibians and merchant ships requiring simultaneous protection - all wallowing about at twelve knots - had ben a considerable source of worry to me. Now we had the option to fight without one hand tied between our backs, which was a good idea, really. Rather better than going all that ways as escorts to a large convoy.
In other words, the plan was to fight the Argentines to establish sea control and enough air superiority for an amphibious assault, before the amphibious ships and ground forces got there. Similarly NATO war planning routed most transatlantic reinforcement and resupply convoys on a Southern latitude which would take them from the Caribbean to near the coast of Portugal, while NATO naval forces, including the carriers, fought in the region of the GIUK gap and the Norwegian Sea, to stop a break out and attacks en masse. Although I cannot understand his opposition to the F-35 (all versions), at least Sharkey Ward has never denied the importance of a balanced surface fleet, unlike duty idiots like Lewis Page.This is from Sea Harrier Over The Falklands:
There were essentially three elements of naval warfare which had to be controlled and directed from the Ops Room: Above the Surface (Air), On the Surface, and Under the Surface (Anti submarine). These were very much interbred and interdependent, thanks to the variety of modem weapons available to the fleet and the sophistication of the modern threat. It was therefore no easy task to collect and collate the information from all the ship's sensor (including aircraft sensors and information from other platforms) and present them to the Command in an easily digestible fashion. All friendly units in each element had to be continuously plotted and information from the separate levels of defence recorded, so that in extremitis the Command could judge priority and take the appropriate action.
Defence in depth had become the war fighting philosophy of the day. Against the air threat, the outer layer of defence could be air to air and surface to air systems provided by a third party and deployed some point between the source of the threat and the fleet at sea. In the South Atlantic there was no such layer available and the Task Group had to rely on its organic defensive weapon platforms.
The out layer of air and surface defence was the Sea Harrier on Combat Air Patrol. Whenever the threat assessment made air attack highly possible, or probable, then CAP aircraft would be stationed up threat to deter and/or engage the attackers. (Should a surface attack be predicted then the SHAR would be dispatched over the horizon to search for the enemy units.) Air defence radar pickets (warships fitted with suitable sensors and weapon systems) would also be stationed up threat, but inside the CAP stations, to provide information to the CAP and the Carrier Group itself. These pickets would be armed with a variety of surface to air weapons and represented a second line of defence. The next layer of defence was the the medium or long range surface to air ship borne missile system. Sea Dart fulfilled this role for the Group. Attackers or their air to surface missiles that managed to penetrate through the outer layers of defence would then face the next designer system - the Short Range or Point Defence Missile Systems such as Sea Wolf. And, as a last ditch defence (on the hard kill side), high rate of fire, radar directed guns such as Phalanx fitted bill. Soft kill options, such as jamming and chaff were also an important integral part of the air defence in depth scenario.
If one analyses the probabilities of engagement and kill of each of the layers of defence, and calculates the overall probabilities of engagement and kill of the cumulative system, it is easy to demonstrate mathematically and in practice that money spent on defence in depth is far better than spending the same amount on a single 'all singing, all dancing' weapon system. The latter can never be perfect or 100% efficient and if it has weaknesses, which it surely will, the threat will be certain to capitalise on these deficiencies and circumvent the system. The separate layers of defence in depth each act as a deterrent to an enemy, and each are capable of causing attrition to attacking forces.
It is the Commander Task Group's job to ensure that where possible he does not place his force in a position that denies that force the full benefit of its defence in depth systems, whether by geographical location or by misuse of a particular asset or layer.
The under surface threat had to be approached in the same manner as the air threat, using third party resources, long range sensors such as Towed Array Sonar, ASW frigates as a screen between the threat and the group, anti submarine helicopters on the screen and at other locations around the group, and last but not least sonars fitted to the ships in the main body. Each of the anti submarine platforms must be capable of not only locating the threat submarine but also of prosecuting it with appropriate weapons. And with the submarine threat being ever present and very difficult to detect, the various level of defence have to be working at 100 per cent efficiency for twenty four hours a day when in a threat zone*.
There were, of course, no third parties of any description providing defence for the Task Force in the South Atlantic; no Nimrods, no air defence fighter barriers, and no shore based Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft#.
*Technological developments since 1982 have changed things and increased the range at which submarines can be detected, with the advent of things such as low frequency active sonar. The longer range comes at the expense of resolution, which is where the helicopter with dipping sonar really comes into its own.
#The Sea Harrier, and the CVS, was expected to operate in the GIUK Gap and Norwegian Sea, with Tomcats from USN carriers and two squadrons of RAF Phantoms (dedicated to maritime air defence) providing the bulk of the air defence, supported by AEW. The Nimrods sent South in 1982 were mostly used to ASuW roles.
As for naval helicopters versus submarines, these pages are about the engagement of the ARA Santa Fe:
I am not sure why these have turned out so small. Some highlights:
Parry describes the role of an ASW helicopter Observer:'Essentially you are there to navigate the aircraft, to plan tactics, and to operate the weapon systems. There are other things of course, such as communications with ships and other helicopters....'
It sounds like what US Navy Naval Flight Officers do in fixed wing aircraft! The Tactical Coordinator in the US Navy's S-3 Viking did that, so why not someone in the back of the MH-60R as that has taken over as the main USN shipborne ASW aircraft?
As for the value of radar: I suggested to Ian that we should Switch on the radar for a single one second sweep, One was all I could make - any more would have told an enemy skipper that he was under surveillance from the air and he could plot his course and speed.I illuminated and immediately picked up five or six traces in the area ahead and out to sea. I was expecting this because I had been marking on my chart several icebergs which we had been plotting for several days and which all had their individual names - Fred, Charlie and so forth. But there was just one blip - about files miles due North of Barff Point - which showed up where it shouldn't have been. It was faint, but I instinctively felt it was our submarine. I reported it to Ian and give him the range and bearing. Shortly afterwards, in a very cool time, he reported 'submarine ahead'.
Yet the USN SH-3 had no radar. The Royal Navy though that radar was essential for the ASW role - as was the Observer to coordinate and control things.
Dipping sonar as a deterrent: Stanley the went into a hover whilst Fitzgerald dunked the sonar transceiver. With signals already being received in the helicopter it would be much easier to keep track of his movements is the submarine commander did decide to submerge. The Wessex continued the sonar watch until Parry heard that the second helicopter had arrived over the target.
As for the tactical coordination role: Chris Parry had not been able to talk by radio to the two Endurance Wasps, but he had been coordinating the movements of the two Lynx from HMS Brilliant and the Wasp from HMS Plymouth.
HMS Brilliant, with her modern sonar systems, had only just arrived in the area and it was unlikely that the Santa Fe would have been in her sonar range. The older sonars fitted to Antrim and Plymouth would have been pretty short ranged, so it was a helicopter only affair. Later on in the conflict, prolonged ASW hunts took place with frigates, including the two Type 22s, acting in conjunction with ASW Sea Kings from Hermes and Invincible.That was how Cold War ASW would be, with friendly submarines and MPA also contributing. The development of modern towed array sonars gives the surface force a considerably greater range of detection now, and potentially means that you can cope with less ASW helicopters, however the role of the dipping sonar in conjunction with the towed array is essential.
From Chapter 4 - 'South to Ascension' - of One Hundred Days by Admiral Sandy Woodward..
Basically, it was necessary to work the campaign out backwards, starting with the chilling thought that the Task Group would be falling apart by mid to late June without proper maintenance and with winter setting in. This did not allow for enemy action, since reinforcements and replacements from the UK should cover that. So we were obliged to make a crucial assumption - that the land battle would be over by the end of June, and preferably a good two weeks before that. The retaking of Port Stanley was obviously the 'critical path' for military planning, whatever the politicians might decide. On that basis, therefore, if the land forces were to be given reasonable time to do their stuff, we had to put them on the beaches by 25 May. That would give them about a month to establish the beach head, break out, march to the likely main positions around Stanley and defeat the Argentinians on the ground. During this time we would provide then with all the artillery and air support we could; hopefully enough for their needs. And throughout the operation we had to keep the sea and sky sufficiently clear to allow reasonably safe passage to and from the beach head, with stores, people, ammunition, food and fuel - by ship and by helicopter.
I duly pinned my cardboard dates on the overall calendar. It was a mobile 'bar chart' of the kind dearly loved by all planners. We continued to work backwards: we must be here by X, there by Y, have established an airstrip by Z. In the end I remember one piece of cardboard proving to be the key to most of our problems. Upon this was written the name 'Intrepid', the sister ship to Fearless. We had to have her in the South Atlantic as a standby amphibious headquarters ship, just in case Fearless, should be sunk. The problem was that in late March, Intrepid had been 'destored' and put in reserve, as an early step in Mr Nott's grand plan for reductions in the Navy. To get her South, we had to reverse this complicated process. As far as we could estimate, there was no way she could get down to the Falklands, properly prepared, before 16 May. She would be the last ship to arrive, the last piece in the jigsaw, so all the timings depended on her.
There will still unknowns like the weather, enemy action, accidents, political initiatives and settlements. But here was a hard plan, give or take about ten days. It was a military plan from which there could be no political diversions if we were to fight and win. The 'landing window' extended from 16 May (the first day Intrepid could arrive) until 25 May. Inside that time we had to have most of land forces ashore. And, to be in good shape by mid May, we were going to have to get the Special Forces ashore for reconnaissance very soon. It was now 17 April, and the bar chart showed us we could enter the Exclusion Zone by 1 May if we pressed on hard. South Georgia should be clear by then, and sixteen days should suffice for the reconnaissance phase.
The amphibians would be able to wait behind, stay in hard training at Ascension, re-stow their equipment in better order, and set off ten days from now, prepared to go ashore any time after arrival, wherever reece suggested was the best place. This part of the plan had the added merit of allowing the Battle Group the option of entering the Exclusion Zone without the encumbrance of the amphibious ships. The thought of taking on the Argentinian with a large convoy of amphibians and merchant ships requiring simultaneous protection - all wallowing about at twelve knots - had ben a considerable source of worry to me. Now we had the option to fight without one hand tied between our backs, which was a good idea, really. Rather better than going all that ways as escorts to a large convoy.
In other words, the plan was to fight the Argentines to establish sea control and enough air superiority for an amphibious assault, before the amphibious ships and ground forces got there. Similarly NATO war planning routed most transatlantic reinforcement and resupply convoys on a Southern latitude which would take them from the Caribbean to near the coast of Portugal, while NATO naval forces, including the carriers, fought in the region of the GIUK gap and the Norwegian Sea, to stop a break out and attacks en masse. Although I cannot understand his opposition to the F-35 (all versions), at least Sharkey Ward has never denied the importance of a balanced surface fleet, unlike duty idiots like Lewis Page.This is from Sea Harrier Over The Falklands:
There were essentially three elements of naval warfare which had to be controlled and directed from the Ops Room: Above the Surface (Air), On the Surface, and Under the Surface (Anti submarine). These were very much interbred and interdependent, thanks to the variety of modem weapons available to the fleet and the sophistication of the modern threat. It was therefore no easy task to collect and collate the information from all the ship's sensor (including aircraft sensors and information from other platforms) and present them to the Command in an easily digestible fashion. All friendly units in each element had to be continuously plotted and information from the separate levels of defence recorded, so that in extremitis the Command could judge priority and take the appropriate action.
Defence in depth had become the war fighting philosophy of the day. Against the air threat, the outer layer of defence could be air to air and surface to air systems provided by a third party and deployed some point between the source of the threat and the fleet at sea. In the South Atlantic there was no such layer available and the Task Group had to rely on its organic defensive weapon platforms.
The out layer of air and surface defence was the Sea Harrier on Combat Air Patrol. Whenever the threat assessment made air attack highly possible, or probable, then CAP aircraft would be stationed up threat to deter and/or engage the attackers. (Should a surface attack be predicted then the SHAR would be dispatched over the horizon to search for the enemy units.) Air defence radar pickets (warships fitted with suitable sensors and weapon systems) would also be stationed up threat, but inside the CAP stations, to provide information to the CAP and the Carrier Group itself. These pickets would be armed with a variety of surface to air weapons and represented a second line of defence. The next layer of defence was the the medium or long range surface to air ship borne missile system. Sea Dart fulfilled this role for the Group. Attackers or their air to surface missiles that managed to penetrate through the outer layers of defence would then face the next designer system - the Short Range or Point Defence Missile Systems such as Sea Wolf. And, as a last ditch defence (on the hard kill side), high rate of fire, radar directed guns such as Phalanx fitted bill. Soft kill options, such as jamming and chaff were also an important integral part of the air defence in depth scenario.
If one analyses the probabilities of engagement and kill of each of the layers of defence, and calculates the overall probabilities of engagement and kill of the cumulative system, it is easy to demonstrate mathematically and in practice that money spent on defence in depth is far better than spending the same amount on a single 'all singing, all dancing' weapon system. The latter can never be perfect or 100% efficient and if it has weaknesses, which it surely will, the threat will be certain to capitalise on these deficiencies and circumvent the system. The separate layers of defence in depth each act as a deterrent to an enemy, and each are capable of causing attrition to attacking forces.
It is the Commander Task Group's job to ensure that where possible he does not place his force in a position that denies that force the full benefit of its defence in depth systems, whether by geographical location or by misuse of a particular asset or layer.
The under surface threat had to be approached in the same manner as the air threat, using third party resources, long range sensors such as Towed Array Sonar, ASW frigates as a screen between the threat and the group, anti submarine helicopters on the screen and at other locations around the group, and last but not least sonars fitted to the ships in the main body. Each of the anti submarine platforms must be capable of not only locating the threat submarine but also of prosecuting it with appropriate weapons. And with the submarine threat being ever present and very difficult to detect, the various level of defence have to be working at 100 per cent efficiency for twenty four hours a day when in a threat zone*.
There were, of course, no third parties of any description providing defence for the Task Force in the South Atlantic; no Nimrods, no air defence fighter barriers, and no shore based Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft#.
*Technological developments since 1982 have changed things and increased the range at which submarines can be detected, with the advent of things such as low frequency active sonar. The longer range comes at the expense of resolution, which is where the helicopter with dipping sonar really comes into its own.
#The Sea Harrier, and the CVS, was expected to operate in the GIUK Gap and Norwegian Sea, with Tomcats from USN carriers and two squadrons of RAF Phantoms (dedicated to maritime air defence) providing the bulk of the air defence, supported by AEW. The Nimrods sent South in 1982 were mostly used to ASuW roles.
As for naval helicopters versus submarines, these pages are about the engagement of the ARA Santa Fe:
I am not sure why these have turned out so small. Some highlights:
Parry describes the role of an ASW helicopter Observer:'Essentially you are there to navigate the aircraft, to plan tactics, and to operate the weapon systems. There are other things of course, such as communications with ships and other helicopters....'
It sounds like what US Navy Naval Flight Officers do in fixed wing aircraft! The Tactical Coordinator in the US Navy's S-3 Viking did that, so why not someone in the back of the MH-60R as that has taken over as the main USN shipborne ASW aircraft?
As for the value of radar: I suggested to Ian that we should Switch on the radar for a single one second sweep, One was all I could make - any more would have told an enemy skipper that he was under surveillance from the air and he could plot his course and speed.I illuminated and immediately picked up five or six traces in the area ahead and out to sea. I was expecting this because I had been marking on my chart several icebergs which we had been plotting for several days and which all had their individual names - Fred, Charlie and so forth. But there was just one blip - about files miles due North of Barff Point - which showed up where it shouldn't have been. It was faint, but I instinctively felt it was our submarine. I reported it to Ian and give him the range and bearing. Shortly afterwards, in a very cool time, he reported 'submarine ahead'.
Yet the USN SH-3 had no radar. The Royal Navy though that radar was essential for the ASW role - as was the Observer to coordinate and control things.
Dipping sonar as a deterrent: Stanley the went into a hover whilst Fitzgerald dunked the sonar transceiver. With signals already being received in the helicopter it would be much easier to keep track of his movements is the submarine commander did decide to submerge. The Wessex continued the sonar watch until Parry heard that the second helicopter had arrived over the target.
As for the tactical coordination role: Chris Parry had not been able to talk by radio to the two Endurance Wasps, but he had been coordinating the movements of the two Lynx from HMS Brilliant and the Wasp from HMS Plymouth.
HMS Brilliant, with her modern sonar systems, had only just arrived in the area and it was unlikely that the Santa Fe would have been in her sonar range. The older sonars fitted to Antrim and Plymouth would have been pretty short ranged, so it was a helicopter only affair. Later on in the conflict, prolonged ASW hunts took place with frigates, including the two Type 22s, acting in conjunction with ASW Sea Kings from Hermes and Invincible.That was how Cold War ASW would be, with friendly submarines and MPA also contributing. The development of modern towed array sonars gives the surface force a considerably greater range of detection now, and potentially means that you can cope with less ASW helicopters, however the role of the dipping sonar in conjunction with the towed array is essential.
All very interesting WEBF, but as all of this concerns events of 40 (yes FORTY) years ago surely your post should be in "Aviation History and Nostalgia?"