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AF447 wreckage found

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AF447 wreckage found

Old 2nd Aug 2011, 13:58
  #2441 (permalink)  
bearfoil
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BOAC

Agreed, emphatically. The NOSE lowered (to 6?). Was that all the further it would drop? Or did the STALL warning frighten the PF into a reprise of hie "approach to STALL recovery" in vogue at the time?

I am not agreed that this 'approach' (to Low altitude STALL) is completely unwise. From cruise, any STALL WARN (if correct) means controlling power and velocity (NOSE DOWN, keep power as selected?). Just gently.

I don't feel a go to DIRECT is wise. And certainly not with a touchy a/c. Absolutely not with a trimmed state other than cruise, the elevators are plenty for recovery.

I am trying to understand still how it is acceptable for the THS to go 13 NU withn or without the PF' knowledge. Then to remain there with a new control added to the scan and the control mix, and that a slow one.

I still do not understand the Pilots' behaviour. Perhaps never. Surprise? Distraction? Ergonomic? Fatigued? A Battle of "wills"?

It is not logical to consider more training here, though it would always be well advised and have a safety payoff.

Why? Because the engineers do what is asked of them, and some questions are not asked. The trend is toward more and better automation.
BEA have spoken, they have a great deal "invested" in the state of the discussion at present.

1. The accident was caused directly by a poorly known event, one that requires high level performance, and quickly.

2. How was the cause addressed prior to its first fatal entry? Badly.

3. From the outset, any act that had been properly addressed by those responsible, would likely have had a good result.

a. New Probes
b. High level manuevering skills
c. Restricted cockpit, Sterile? (For conditions)
d. Addition of kit.

KIT: Airbus has an RTLU. Rudder Control Limiter. Speed sensitive, it prevents damage to the Rudder from overdeflection.

THSTLU. Speed and Altitude sensitive, it might prevent damage to the people? Do we care about control loads management at cruise? It does save money, there's the Rub.

Good memories, at low speed and with a hobbled Rudder(RTLU), top foot may not have been helpful. With ROLL oscillations, the NOSE may have bobbed down a degree or two, but from the way the PF was piloting, he may have been trying to PREVENT the NOSE from dropping. Hence the "STOP the lateral movements" from PNF. A Tunnel test of 447's attitude would be interesting. At her AoA, the spill from the fuse and HS/elevators may have been flowing up and into the Rudder causing reverse action.

Last edited by bearfoil; 2nd Aug 2011 at 14:10.
 
Old 2nd Aug 2011, 15:00
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Originally Posted by Rananim
It helps in a Boeing/MD as PNF can see and feel inputs of PF on the stick.
I say *again*, it didn't help the Birgenair 757 crew (PNF could see and feel the Captain's input and seemed to know it was inappropriate, but was unable/unwilling to take control).
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Old 2nd Aug 2011, 16:01
  #2443 (permalink)  
 
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Transparent HAL

(sebaska):
IMHO, what is conceivable now, not in some distant, undefined future, is making "staged" (or "preanounced") AP disconnect in some (but not all!) situations. I.E. have two thresholds for various parameters. When first threshold (let's call it warning threshold) is crossed there is a warning that AP "feels uneasy" about particular parametr(s) (which crossed that threshold). And the second threshold is exactly what is now AP disconnect threshold and causes the very same effect - disconnects AP.

That would not change current AP logic at all, it would add another system with logic similar the one which rules AP disconnection, but with lower preprogrammed thresholds.And that would help that guys and gals in front to bring themselves fully into the loop before airplane is handed to them.
My comment from a long-ago thread was a bit different - I think the a/p software should actively monitor trends, project the a/c state x seconds into the future, and thus warn the crew x seconds before disconnect. Being a big fan of situational awareness, as that prediction began to suggest bad things were in the future, I would have it clearly enunciate its concerns to an as-yet alarm-free cockpit.

Software complexity might be vaguely comparable to TCAS, although given the large number of parameters that might be an underestimation. And the counter-argument might be that many/most disconnects come from a sudden exceedance, not a slow degradation.

Off-topic here in any case.
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Old 2nd Aug 2011, 18:40
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I have the fortune of having my own Pitts (together with a couple of friends). Others, just take some spare time in the local aero club. But most think its just a waste of time. I would advise them to think again...and get back to basics.
This is exactly what I mean by burden shifting.

In response to my comment about stall warning logic several posters claimed that the situation AF447 found itself in was a set of facts that simply couldn't have been anticipated prior to this accident. But part of the job description of engineers and designers in all fields is to use their imagination, not just their reason. It's not a defense to say "We failed to anticipate" when part of your professional and ethical duty is to anticipate.

AF447 shouldn't have crashed. It did. The men who are responsible wear white shirts, trim their fingernails, shave their facial air. All of them have some type of advanced training and most of them have professional degrees. If there is a poster child for "white collar manslaughter" AF447 is it.

It is not logical to consider more training here, though it would always be well advised and have a safety payoff.

Why? Because the engineers do what is asked of them, and some questions are not asked. The trend is toward more and better automation.
In the big picture I support this trend towards more and better automation. But it comes at a cost, not just for pilots but for engineers and designers. With greater authority comes greater responsibility. If you want the power to fly the aircraft from a cubicle (via software) you have to be willing to accept the responsibility when it crashes. No dodging the ball of blame when it comes your way.
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Old 2nd Aug 2011, 19:07
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Cool

Hi,

Vol Paris-Rio : le rapport d'enquête a été caviardé

Reportedly, a recommendation on the stall alarm of the Airbus provided for in the final report almost BEA, 48 hours before its publication, is not the official version. Air France took the European Aviation Safety.

The controversy over the crash of the AF 447 Paris-Rio is not going to go out. The shadows glide on the third progress report of the Investigation Bureau Investigation Analysis (BEA) released on Friday pointed to the responsibility of the pilot of the Airbus A330-200.

According to several sources, a recommendation on stall warning device, which was in a near-final version of the report 48 hours before its official publication, has not been published. Envisaged under the precautionary principle, this recommendation was to immediately begin a process of analysis and reassessment of the logic of operation of such alarms.

When asked by The Tribune, the BEA said "he did not comment on the steps that led to a recommendation or not." BEA internally, some did not appreciate and even threaten to resign.

According to our sources, Air France has sent a letter to the EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency) requesting that the matter be reviewed quickly. When questioned, Air France has confirmed that he took the EASA on August 1 about the failures of the stall warning.

For pilots and Air France, these problems have played a major role, since "the multiple activations and stops unwanted and misleading, contrary to the state of the aircraft, have greatly contributed to the difficulty for the crew to analyze the situation, "stated the airline in a statement released Friday in response to the report of the BEA.

Between 2:11 minutes and 45 seconds, the night of the accident on 1 June 2009, and the crash, the alarm has reactivated a dozen times with durations ranging from 2 to 8 seconds. The reactivation of the alarm the longest took place when the crew goes into action to restore the unit to a normal position. Clearly, the alarm can stop when the aircraft stalled and recur if recovery of a valid speed. Experts speak of a "case of reverse operation of the alarm."

Indeed, it stops when the speed is less than 60 knots, because it was considered that there was no reason why the aircraft can be found at this speed. But every time the driver gave the order to bite (the correct order) and ironed it on top of 60 knots (rearing, its speed had slowed considerably), the alarm goes off, making believe that his action was wrong.

They therefore had no comprehensio the actual situation of the aircraft. This explains why the actions of the pilots of flight Rio-Paris appeared incomprehensible by their colleagues.
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Old 2nd Aug 2011, 19:08
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@moutain bear

I think it is over simplification to say it is the engineers fault.
IMHO there are plenty of areas for improvement i.e. training, systems, QRH and procedures, CRM, weather data, weather avoidance policy, satellite comms for emergency, FDR and visual recording.
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Old 2nd Aug 2011, 19:34
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Hello all,
AF is a company where operational culture is supposed to be much better than in any other airline... Well, french people tends to beleive so, as well as many, if not all, AF pilots.
This is another story, but french pilots will certainly understand what I’m trying to point here…
Anyway, here is what upsets me :
Some of you try to explain the crash buy many factors but pilots’ responsability. Ok, why not.
But who can seriously here say that AF447’s PF did his job during the final 3’’30’ of the flight ? Didn’t he receive a partial instrument panel training during his instrument rating ? Every pilot here knows (and has to know !!) how to deal with an airspeed loss during IMC : keep thing staight an level, move the levers with extreme care (especially on high altitude flights) and focus on the altimeter and ADI trying to keep what was good before failure…
Anyway, aren’t we paid for applying strict procedures during failures in flight ? Does anyone here can say that this PF ever called for the appropriate procedure ? NO, never.
Now try to imagine, you have 3 minutes to answer this question: the aircraft is 15° nose up, with a VSI of -10000ft/min (confirmed by the altimeter) ; in wich configuration do you think your aircraft is ?
Who the hell was this PF ?? What did he do in this passenger aircraft ?? Who or what allowed him to be able to fly this aircraft ?
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Old 2nd Aug 2011, 20:10
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Does anyone here see how the THS was broken?
Frankly, no, I don't. From the FDR trace it looks like it functioned exactly as designed.
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Old 2nd Aug 2011, 20:34
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Regarding jcjeant's leak from the press:

If it's legit, I'd tend to agree with the Air France position that the stall warning system is found to be unhelpful in a particular condition.

It's a problem, and a design decision that makes me scratch my head.

Air France must face the training and operations question on why the pitch and power response to UAS didn't take place very early in the event.

Mountain Bear: the part of the team in white shirts you might want to add is those who fund and establish, and then execute, pilot training requirements.

It makes my heart ache to put myself in the position of the PNF, with the PF chasing/fighting the aircraft pitch and roll once in alternate law ... he seems never to have been in a position where PJ2's "do nothing" guidance (really, fly level and then methodically work one's way through the UAS procedures, memory then checklist) could be applied to its conclusion.

Ergonomics question: if you have flown both tapes and circle gauges, who besides me wonders if the unwinding of the altimeter, or the needle pegged down in the VSI, might have provided a different cue to the scans of PF and PNF. (OK, call me a luddite, I know that people crashed on steam gauges too ... )

When speeds went quickly bad, it appears that the pilots identified airspeed going bad, but what isn't recorded is whether or no UAS procedure was called for. For the moment, absence is evidence that they never got that far.

Training issue?
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Old 2nd Aug 2011, 20:40
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@bearfoil

If the THS was broken how do you explain no errors from its feedback control. If there is a mismatch between motor control to move it and its position then an error is generated. How do explain the abscense of errors? Also the a/c appeared to respond to the flight controls correctly (see the theoretical vs actual lines in charts in report #3). Also when the a/c nose down the attitude responded demonstrating elevator authority over THS.

One could argue that the SS was broken with a nose up bias. However the PF explicitly stated that he had be giving it stick back the whole time. Clearly this is more consistant with him thinking overspeed (nose up, deploy spoilers).
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Old 2nd Aug 2011, 20:44
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I think it is over simplification to say it is the engineers fault.
Yes, that is what I said in my post #2404. I understand quite clearly that this is complicated matter with many different players involved. My post was primarily directed at the specific person I quoted who seemed to imply that the best solution was simply to have pilots practice more in their own free time, a simplistic solution itself.

I think we all agree that turning off a stall warning as the stall gets worse is not really a good thing. But was it a main factor? Wasn't the bigger problem probably not that the stall warning stopped, but that there had been no proper reaction to it for nearly a minute before?
I'm sorry I missed this comment in my first read through of recent posts because I think it is an excellent question.

In order to understand the importance of the stall warning logic in this case we need to understand the way human beings responded to accidents. When faced with changing circumstances the mind forms a mental picture or mental model of what is happening to it. This mental model is predictive in the sense that it takes not only the data it knows but fills in the gaps with guesses about data it doesn't know. The mind's response is also a process in the sense that the mind is constantly taking in new data and, if necessary, changing its mental model of events as it gets new data.

In this situation there are two separate and distinct questions. The first question is why did the pilots form a wrong mental model of events to begin with. To answer this question it's wise to look at things like training, CRM, etc. The second question in this case is why did the crew maintain that wrong mental model right up until the plane went into the ocean. It is possible that the stall warning logic was a key factor in why the crew maintained the wrong mental model for so long.

I hope the distinction between a person making a mistake and a person continuing to make a mistake is clear. I don't think that the stall warning logic had anything to do with the initial mistake the crew made; I think it's possible it had something to do with why they persisted in their error for so long.

Now some people will take the position that the real focus should be on the initial mistake but I think that a robust system cannot be predicated on the fact that a human being is going to be perfect every time. There has to be more than one line of defense.

Other people will claim that even if the stall warning had operated differently it still would not have made any difference in this specific situation. That's no defense either because (a) that's hindsight bias (b) whose to say it won't make a difference in some future accident.

So do I think that the stall warning logic was "the main factor"? No. But that doesn't mean it's not a real area of concern.
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Old 2nd Aug 2011, 20:53
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Originally Posted by carlosgustavo
STALL WARNING MUST ALWAYS WORK. Its unveliable that on the Airbus with that pitot probe on icing condicions doesnt.

Its funny for me how people blame the pilots because the stall warning sound for 57sg and they didint recognize the stall. Dont you understand that when the stall warning stops means NOT STALL, but the aircraft wad actual stalling.

Originally Posted by MountainBear
This is exactly what I mean by burden shifting.

In response to my comment about stall warning logic several posters claimed that the situation AF447 found itself in was a set of facts that simply couldn't have been anticipated prior to this accident. But part of the job description of engineers and designers in all fields is to use their imagination, not just their reason. It's not a defense to say "We failed to anticipate" when part of your professional and ethical duty is to anticipate.
If you'd like to have a look at this post in the other thread, courtesy of thermalsniffer. This post does not (IMO) have the definitive translation from the French, but it is the first I've seen that syncs the CVR details up with the facts in the BEA note released in June :

http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/45687...ml#post6614845

Then please check your prejudice at the door and listen carefully.

The Stall Warning sounded initially, at 2:10:10.4 and at 2:10:13. This was in response to the drop in IAS caused by the blockage of the pitot tubes. This is likely a false warning and stops. I would suspect (though I have no proof as my notes don't go into the required detail) that the IAS component of the stall warning logic is disabled when an ADR DISAGREE status is in effect - at least, if I was designing the logic, that is how I'd have it work.

(Note, this is not how the software is actually written, being instead generated from a graphical representation of the logic paths, but I hope it will suffice for demonstrative purposes)

Code:
if (STALL WARNING && ADR DISAGREE)
then
   STALL WARNING INPUT PARAMS = AoA ONLY

else 
   STALL WARNING INPUT PARAMS = AoA AND IAS
The reason for this is because it was discovered from the Birgenair and Aeroperu crashes (and it had been suspected but impossible to prove from as far back as BEA548 at Staines in 1972) that aural warnings can be filtered out by the human brain under stress conditions - therefore it is prudent to determine which of the aural warnings is valid and only present those.

I don't believe that IAS would be considered a valid input to stall warning for the sake of it, as stall warning is purely a function of AoA, which is the way stall warnings have been implemented for a very long time. The only logical reason I can see for introducing an IAS parameter would be to filter out false warnings.

Now, back to the transcript. The second time the stall warning starts is at 2:10:51, which as I understand it was around the point of the apogee of the zoom climb and the point at which the aircraft approached and then began to fall into the stall regime. This stall warning is the real thing, and it continues for just under a minute. During this time the nose-up inputs are aggressively maintained and the aircraft starts bleeding off even more airspeed. If I've understood correctly, for at least the first 10 seconds the real stall warning was sounding, if not slightly longer, all the pilots had to do was push the sidestick forward and the aircraft would have come out of the stall. They were, however, not trained in this escape maneouvre, having only been trained on the approach to stall.

The stall warning stops at 2:11:45, and during this time the stall warning has been sounding for almost a minute, during which time the inputs have been almost universally nose-up (i.e. incorrect and making the situation worse). Also during this time, the pitots have become unblocked and crucially the speeds are once again valid and ADR DISAGREE is not longer in effect. What this means is:
  • Stall warning is inhibited due to a *genuine* IAS reading of less than 60kts
  • At this point the aircraft is falling at or near terminal velocity and is unrecoverable

Therefore, while with 20/20 hindsight, the Stall Warning logic should be reviewed (potentially by adding air/ground mode detection as an input to the logic if this is not the case already*), the inhibition of Stall Warning at 60kts and below had no causative effect on this accident, because by the time the aircraft had reached this point it was already too late. That the initial false Stall warning triggered (and was quickly silenced) at the same time as the PF made his initial (and only significant) nose-down input was an unfortunate coincidence, but the fact remains that the stall warning system was doing it's job correctly from the point at which the actual stall began to the point at which the aircraft was way outside the flight envelope, nearly a whole minute later.

I apologise for the bluntness of this post, but I wanted to make it as crystal-clear as I could.

[* - after all, you don't want a stall warning blaring at you during initial takeoff roll and landing rollout... ]
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Old 2nd Aug 2011, 20:55
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Why is a pilot more worried about overspeed than stall? (I am going out on a limb, presuming more than a problem with body sense of speed.

Is that due to high speed buffet/stall at the fast end of the "coffin corner" triangle's legs being a severe event (and potential damage to airframe?)

I am at sea on this one.

Can someone who flies heavies explain this? There may be more to what the PF was worried about, in re high speeds, based on the conventional wisdom of that specific detail of the occupation.

Is FOQA (worry about being written up for an overspeed) a contributor to bias in this regard?

Think about this, and about how rules influence people: "You must not overspeed because ... (____ fill in the blanks for reasons not to overspeed)"

Davies: "If you have a choice between stall and somehthing else, try something else."

Was PF predisposed to be worried about overspeed?
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Old 2nd Aug 2011, 21:12
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Originally Posted by Lonewolf_50
Why is a pilot more worried about overspeed than stall? (I am going out on a limb, presuming more than a problem with body sense of speed.
...
Is FOQA (worry about being written up for an overspeed) a contributor to bias in this regard?
...
Think about this, and about how rules influence people: "You must not overspeed because ... (____ fill in the blanks for reasons not to overspeed)"
...
Was PF predisposed to be worried about overspeed?
This is something of a conundrum - I think I might have read somewhere in the Tech Log thread that the PF was also a glider pilot. I don't think the fear of overspeed was due to fear of a write-up, so much as an overspeed can and will cause structural damage (and thus potentially render the aircraft unrecoverable) if allowed to persist, whereas with a stall you should have plenty of warning as you approach stall speed and perform the corrective actions (which at the time were effectively maintain altitude and increase thrust).

The conundrum then becomes "If he knew enough about aerodynamics that overspeed concerned him so much, why then did he then fail to realise he had stalled the aircraft based on what was being displayed in front of him (unresponsive lateral control, rapidly unwinding altitude, nose-high attitude, TOGA power, stall warning sounding)?". We're *well* into the realm of the hypothetical here, but could confirmation bias have played a part? It's generally accepted that the Birgenair PF remained fixated on overspeed because that was the first warning he got. It would appear that the AF447 PF was concerned about overspeed without any prompting whatsoever, but is it possible he was still focused on worrying about overspeed to the detriment of his scan and situational awareness?
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Old 2nd Aug 2011, 21:26
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Originally posted by DozyWannabe ...

The Stall Warning sounded initially, at 2:10:10.4 and at 2:10:13. This was in response to the drop in IAS caused by the blockage of the pitot tubes. This is likely a false warning and stops. I would suspect (though I have no proof as my notes don't go into the required detail) that the IAS component of the stall warning logic is disabled when an ADR DISAGREE status is in effect - at least, if I was designing the logic, that is how I'd have it work.
The SW sounded because the allowable AoA had been exceeded - see:-

Post #1160 - AF447 Thread No.5

It was in response to the initial pitch-up, and nothing to do with IAS.
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Old 2nd Aug 2011, 21:32
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Originally Posted by mm43
The SW sounded because the allowable AoA had been exceeded - see:-

It was in response to the initial pitch-up, and nothing to do with IAS.
Cool beans, thanks for the correction. I'm pretty sure that it doesn't invalidate the rest of what I was saying though - the stall warning worked when it was possible to make a difference and only stopped working long after anything could be done.
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Old 2nd Aug 2011, 21:33
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Doze

There is nothing in your last posts to disagree with.

The STALL occurred after the aircraft died. No argument. The mayonnaise stirring is far more important than the Stall, or even the climb, imo.

One way to recover is to fly to a heading. Oblivious of heading, apparently, and unwilling or unable to correct ROLL, plus a fixation with a dumb distraction are the reasons this crew failed?

The "Committee" approach to recovering a dangerous flight Path won't work, ever. And if in the simulator, one can "do-over".

One of the most egregious blunders was the calling back of the Captain.

A bad situation became impossible. The highly trained division of Labor took a holiday, and troubleshooting is for mechanics at the base.

What was broken about the THS? You mean mechanically, operationally, or theoretically, oh, or Philosophically? All of the above.

Nothing about what happened to 447 should be seen as being sacred. Including kit, ego, and compassion.
 
Old 2nd Aug 2011, 21:36
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Bearfoil, please tell me you're not now back to arguing that the THS screw broke during the event?
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Old 2nd Aug 2011, 21:49
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xcitation

the actual trace shows the THS pinned, with elevators deflected Nose Down, at a time when ACARS were overloaded with other unreported data, and BEA have not explained the mechanism for controls integrity.

Let alone: What was he seeing? On a PFD that was not recorded?

My mention of two identical inputs, one at the start of, and one near the end of the episode? NOSE UP, with LEFT ROLL to the stop!

That nagging and chronic descending turn to the right that cost them 270 degrees off course? You might say, well, who has time for Heading? Level wings provide a constant heading. No mention of this from BEA. Who remembers recovery from Unusual attitudes or steep banks: "Roll out on heading xxx, please"........

Doze. I have way short of enough to say anything definitively. Others might consider they are also in the same position. Look at the traces Elevs v THS on the right (later) tracks.
 
Old 2nd Aug 2011, 21:53
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Dozy said:
"It would appear that the AF447 PF was concerned about overspeed without any prompting whatsoever, but is it possible he was still focused on worrying about overspeed to the detriment of his scan and situational awareness?"
In some defense to the PF, the PNF and the Captain apparently had SA issues as well.

PNF briefing to the Captain when he returns:

"What's happening? I don't know I don't know what's happening"

Later:

PNF: What do you think ?what do you think ? what do we have to do?

Captain: I don't know we're going down

Later:

Captain: It's not possible
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