Regarding jcjeant's leak from the press:
If it's legit, I'd tend to agree with the Air France position that the stall warning system is found to be unhelpful in a particular condition.
It's a problem, and a design decision that makes me scratch my head.
Air France must face the training and operations question on why the pitch and power response to UAS didn't take place very early in the event.
Mountain Bear: the part of the team in white shirts you might want to add is those who fund and establish, and then execute, pilot training requirements.
It makes my heart ache to put myself in the position of the PNF, with the PF chasing/fighting the aircraft pitch and roll once in alternate law ... he seems never to have been in a position where PJ2's "do nothing" guidance (really, fly level and then methodically work one's way through the UAS procedures, memory then checklist) could be applied to its conclusion.
Ergonomics question: if you have flown both tapes and circle gauges, who besides me wonders if the unwinding of the altimeter, or the needle pegged down in the VSI, might have provided a different cue to the scans of PF and PNF. (OK, call me a luddite, I know that people crashed on steam gauges too ... )
When speeds went quickly bad, it appears that the pilots identified airspeed going bad, but what isn't recorded is whether or no UAS procedure was called for. For the moment, absence is evidence that they never got that far.
Training issue?