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AF447 wreckage found

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AF447 wreckage found

Old 29th Jul 2011, 15:42
  #2241 (permalink)  
 
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BEA´s Safety Recommendations

Training for manual airplane handling
The first recommends that the regulatory authorities re-examine the content of training and check
programmes and in particular make mandatory the creation of regular specific exercises aimed at manual
airplane handling. Approach to and recovery from stall, including at high altitude.
As B4-LandingChkList , bubbers44 and others pointed several posts away: More stick time…
The question is who is going to pay for that? And… How is that redefinition of training going to look like?
Bubbers44 said gliding isn´t cheap; well prolly companies should pay that kind of training. Much more cheaper than a hull loss anyway.


Angle of attack measurement
This recommends that the regulatory authorities evaluate the relevance of requiring the presence of an
angle of attack indicator directly accessible to pilots on board airplanes
Well Airbus… Begin asap with it methinks...
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Old 29th Jul 2011, 15:52
  #2242 (permalink)  
 
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No conspiracy theory. The situation was mishandled by the crew leading to the aircraft departing its flight envelope.

Now the investigation will focus on the human factors involved and attempt to resolve why they did what they did.
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Old 29th Jul 2011, 16:14
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On a very quick skim-read of the French text, two key questions are:

1. Why did it start to go wrong?

2. Why was it not corrected?

As to 1: notwithstanding the difficult conditions I am afraid it does rather look like pilot error in the sense of being a combination of ill-discipline in the cockpit and bad training. If I have understood correctly, the PF and PNF had received no training in how to deal with inconsistent IAS inputs at high altitude, or in manual flight at high altitude.

However, as to 2: IMHO the full CVR transcript shows that the systems were in large part to blame. The passage from 2:12'37 to 2:12'44 is tragic and shocking in equal measure. At the start of this timeframe (i) the PF was (for once) pushing forwards (ii) the aeroplane was in a stall but (iii) the stall warning was still silent. My poor translation is that the PNF tells the PF to "descend! descend! descend!" The PF says "That's what I am doing." The Captain intercedes "No, you're climbing". The PF says "I'm climbing [meaning - "you think I'm climbing?"], okay, I'll go down".

At precisely this point, his nose-down inputs stimulated enough speed to trigger the stall warning. The captain's next remark is "This isn't possible." His bewilderment is unsurprising.

Thus the PF's correct nose-down inputs were punished by a stall warning; his wrong nose-up inputs were rewarded by the stall warning ceasing.

The instruments thus played a cruel, Pavlovian trick on the pilots which IMHO goes a consdirable distance towards exonerating them.

I don't think this is sufficiently emphasised in the report.
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Old 29th Jul 2011, 16:51
  #2244 (permalink)  
 
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Copilot´s training

Who can please shed some light on the copilot´s deficient training the BEA report states.

"The copilots had received no high altitude tr aining for the "Unreliable IAS" procedure and manual air craft handling".

I find it hard to believe this. Isn´t this training absolute standard in any simulator training of any serious airline?
Am I missing anything?

Thanks
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Old 29th Jul 2011, 17:28
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Originally Posted by levelvibes View Post
Who can please shed some light on the copilot´s deficient training the BEA report states.
"The copilots had received no high altitude tr aining for the "Unreliable IAS" procedure and manual air craft handling".
The 3rd interim report says that none of the two copilots had received a proper instruction/training for
- manual A/C piloting at high altitude (see PF's large amplitude inputs in roll and pitch above 35 000 ft)(I am also very disturbed by this !)
- UAS procedure at high altitude (one of them had received a training for UAS at low altitude, where the pitch was higher, in the order of 10°)
The CVR also shows that there was no clear attribution of the roles by the CDB when he left the cockpit, and latter, that the cooperation between the two copilots was not very good
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Old 29th Jul 2011, 17:38
  #2246 (permalink)  
 
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AF447 Interim Report In English -

http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol....let2011.en.pdf
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Old 29th Jul 2011, 17:41
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Hmmm. Claiming the a/c behaved as directed after this accident was under way is misleading, if not a direct fraud. No one to this very day knows what to expect after LOC ending in Stall, yet that is the focus of the BEA recommendations? Confusion on the flight deck? Christ, does any pilot take that as a serious critique of these guys given the circumstances?

The induction of this LOC is virtually ignored. The Public is to accept the outrageous nonchalance of this outfit, and be satisfied with a conclusion and blame prior to the finish of the investigation?

I suppose we could say that the release is intended for public and lay consumption, hence the simplistic opinion and utter lack of evidence.

But that leaves the Public with but one source of critical knowledge, a source with a financial and commercial interest in the outcome. I cannot abide "International" accords, when they are merely political, but a proper and objective source of multidisciplinary critique might be an alternative.

Who Guards the Guardians?
 
Old 29th Jul 2011, 17:45
  #2248 (permalink)  
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Hyperveloce

yes. This fact screams complacency, and negligence. If accurate, then any criticism of the pilots stops well short of the actual responsibles.

bear
 
Old 29th Jul 2011, 17:50
  #2249 (permalink)  
 
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bear, one may make some criticisms of various members of, and actions of, the flight crew without precluding criticisms of the others whose contributions to this event, via their roles, actions, and inactions were prelude to that dark and stormy night.

Let's not raise a false dichotomy.

I estimate that the key to your objection is the way that cause factors are communicated.

The vague term of "pilot error" has so much currency, and so dubious a meaning, that it can be misleading or be no more than a fig leaf.
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Old 29th Jul 2011, 17:57
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Halfnut, that's the link to the four page synthesis report.
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Old 29th Jul 2011, 17:58
  #2251 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by bearfoil View Post
Hmmm. Claiming the a/c behaved as directed after this accident was under way is misleading, if not a direct fraud. No one to this very day knows what to expect after LOC ending in Stall, yet that is the focus of the BEA recommendations? Confusion on the flight deck? Christ, does any pilot take that as a serious critique of these guys given the circumstances?

The induction of this LOC is virtually ignored. The Public is to accept the outrageous nonchalance of this outfit, and be satisfied with a conclusion and blame prior to the finish of the investigation?
Bear - look at the traces. This wasn't a LOC ending in stall, this was an aircraft *controlled into* the stall, because the guy with the stick in his hand had not been properly trained to deal with the set of circumstances with which he was faced.

After starting by insisting the vertical stabiliser must have separated, then moving on to various dark murmurings about the computer doing sometihng that the pilots didn't expect, or random actuation of flight surfaces taking them out of stable flight, your insistence that something must have been wrong with the aircraft (over and above the pitot tubes) in the face of all the evidence put forth has been puzzling. Why are you so sure they're hiding something?

But that leaves the Public with but one source of critical knowledge, a source with a financial and commercial interest in the outcome.
If there was anything nefarious going on, then you'd expect AF (which is a also a commerical interest of the French government) to have been given the whitewash treatment too - as it is they've come in for some pretty heavy stick here.
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Old 29th Jul 2011, 18:11
  #2252 (permalink)  
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Nefarious? The only thing I accuse the agency of is bias. As such, I believe it is equal to manslaughter, regardless the presence of fraud or no.

Look away from this current state of affairs. The Probes? Identified as problematic, and suspected of many episodes of intake to UAS. Rejection of AHI? BUSS? An apparent and outrageous ignorance of high altitude flight with untrained Pilots (That is the charge). This is outright negligence.

It cannot be seen another way. And yet the galling (gaulling) nonchalance: "perhaps a study of the need for AoA?"

I fear I have been crying wolf for two years; since he has not gobbled our young quite yet, "I see conspiracies." The wolf's jaw is full of blood, yet I have been overreacting?

My skin is 4 gauge dermis, and critics don't bother me. I have tried, and if I cannot convince you of shortcomings in the approach (unstable?), I have given up.
 
Old 29th Jul 2011, 18:17
  #2253 (permalink)  
 
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So three 'pilots' in the cockpit, a pull back on the stick and hold it there for....how long... until it hit the deck. OK, one may have panicked but all three?
'pilots'?
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Old 29th Jul 2011, 18:28
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If the disconnect between a/c and 3 pilots is that pronounced, why is Air France still flying?
 
Old 29th Jul 2011, 18:38
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Originally Posted by bearfoil View Post
adieu Doze
Wait - come back here- we're not finished.

Nefarious? The only thing I accuse the agency of is bias. As such, I believe it is equal to manslaughter, regardless the presence of fraud or no.
And I say again, would a biased agency be hauling AF across the coals for failing to train their pilots correctly?

Let's start with the technical issues you present:

Look away from this current state of affairs. The Probes? Identified as problematic, and suspected of many episodes of intake to UAS. Rejection of AHI? BUSS?
Airbus put out a service bulletin and AF implemented it, but did not expedite it. BUSS was a system developed to assist with the pitot problems, and was still very new at the time this accident occurred - I don't know how take-up has progressed since then.

An apparent and outrageous ignorance of high altitude flight with untrained Pilots (That is the charge). This is outright negligence.
And Air France will answer it. This is nothing to do with the aircraft at this point.

It cannot be seen another way. And yet the galling (gaulling) nonchalance: "perhaps a study of the need for AoA?"
AoA indications were available in the form of FPV display. Whether that usage was trained as such or not I don't know.

I fear I have been crying wolf for two years; since he has not gobbled our young quite yet, "I see conspiracies." The wolf's jaw is full of blood, yet I have been overreacting?

My skin is 4 gauge dermis, and critics don't bother me. I have tried, and if I cannot convince you of shortcomings in the approach (unstable?), I have given up.
Shortcomings in what approach? The Airbus control philosophy? I'm really having trouble understanding your point and I really want to.
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Old 29th Jul 2011, 18:44
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Dozy

Way back when I started commenting on these threads earlier in the year I said that unreliable instrument readings in the wee hours at night, in IMC with unsettled weather hundreds of miles from land was a nightmare situation for any pilot to confront, and that any findings of mishandling on the part of the pilots *must* take this factor into account, and this is why I got very agitated when people said that by saying software failure was unlikely to be a cause I was blaming the pilots.
Absolutely. Which is why my favourite training philosophy has always been KISS (keep it simple, stupid), to cater for the worst case/lowest common denominator scenario.

Levelvibes.


Who can please shed some light on the copilot´s deficient training the BEA report states.

"The copilots had received no high altitude training for the "Unreliable IAS" procedure and manual aircraft handling".

I find it hard to believe this. Isn´t this training absolute standard in any simulator training of any serious airline?
Am I missing anything?
Well, I thought this quote was rather surprising from the report---
"
In an interview, Eric Schramm, executive vice president for flight operations at Air France and a Boeing 777 captain, contested the need for such training. “There is not a big difference between high altitude and low altitude” in manual flight, Mr. Schramm said. “It is not a very important topic for us.” ---
Really?! Wonder how much high altitude manual flying he's done, (and I'm not talking about simply keeping the aircraft straight and level, unlike what these guys had to deal with).

In the miliitary, we had lots of practice, and I can tell you it was not as easy as it might sound. A small pitch input that would normally be of no consequence at low altitudes would quickly put you in stickshaker zone high up, especially if you had made the mistake of climbing way above your optimum (buffet margin) level.

Not that these matters concerned us at the time; (no SLF to worry about) . Different matter these days...
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Old 29th Jul 2011, 18:53
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just this once, then I'am off for vacation

Dozy, Say I develop an intricate and efficient new line in my production shop, it will streamline my production, cut cost, and widen my market. Something I can be proud of.

I pay the enormous development costs, exercise patience, have it installed, and debugged. It has problems, as do all sophisticated technologies, and it goes on line. Some of the problems have to do with training my personnel, so an expensive and sophisticated system takes care of that.

It works flawlessly. As it happens, there is a fantastically remote chance it may malfunction, which is acknowledged, and workarounds are installed. The workarounds are not modern, and involve a bypass of the new technology onto the old (left in Place) machine.

There are now two methods of avoiding this remote malfunction.

Step One. Do nothing. The machine has a good chance of self correcting.

ALTERNATE. Cycle THIS LEVER, and the line switches to the old machine which has a phenomenally good record with this remote but systemic problem.

In my business, it is called the CRITICAL PATH. Only in my business, if the Path is lost, no-one dies.
 
Old 29th Jul 2011, 19:02
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So three 'pilots' in the cockpit, a pull back on the stick and hold it there for....how long... until it hit the deck. OK, one may have panicked but all three?
'pilots'?
I agree it does fail a gut check.
I will not be satisfied unless they provide at least the same level of detail as the Colgan 3047 incident report i.e. full transcript from push back, simulated representation of flight and control inputs.
On the training issue why wait for bureaucracey. A pilot always has the option of paying themselves for extra training/sim time. Personally I would like to have basic flying experience in all the control laws including mechanical. But then I am a control freak. I detest the idea of driving an a/c and not knowing how it feels in different modes. Isn't the purpose of training to go through all the options, bells and whistles? Why hold back any training of flying characteristics from the pilots. Have we not learned from the titanic. Ships can sink and a/c can stall so we have to train for it.
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Old 29th Jul 2011, 19:39
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If you had old style fixed wing military pilots the aircraft would never have been lost. All these aircraft need a magic switch that, when it is turned on, the aircraft turns into a basic stick handling machine.
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Old 29th Jul 2011, 19:43
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xcitation : Don't get too xcited, Sir
The transcript cannot be "full from push back", as only 30' or 2h (depends which track) are recorded.

4greens: Really cannot see how this magic switch would have improved in AF447 case...
- If the crew (ex-military in your hypotesis, but any crew would do) had recognised the stall, there is no evidence that a proper recovery action (ND until the plane flies again) would have been prevented by the "system"
- If the magic switch was there in AF447, but the crew didn't recognize the stall, no difference in the end.

Last edited by AlphaZuluRomeo; 29th Jul 2011 at 20:03.
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