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AF 447 Thread No. 5

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Old 31st Jul 2011, 19:15
  #1141 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by grity
the stick move of first 10 sec. after AP disconect 2:10:07 --- 2:10:18
the moves are more or less horizontal so I think he did not realise that he pulled, just fight with the rolling ship....left right left right left right.... realising that he had no longer correct speed at this time
Graph by grity


Initial grip to the SS was with the intention to counter the roll to the right. Thereby he overcontrolled or he chased the roll like in an PIO. During each reversal from left to right or vv PF induced a pitch change as well.

The initial grip had also a big NU input, which brought the plane of the later left / right movements considerably in the NU region, with only two considerable ND inputs but only enough to reach the neutral SS pitch position.

The assumption, that those NU inputs where associated with the aim to climb to a higher FL is IMHO obsolete (i didn´t believe in it anyway). PF might have intended to counter a sinking tendency as described by hazelnuts39, but i meanwhile doubt that.

The whole mess might as well have started with
- not being prepared for the situation
- being surprised by the dropout of AP + ATHR,
- PF gripping SS in a hastily and unsuitable mannor
- and thereby implementing unwanted and anneccessary steering inputs
- chasing the roll and missing the pitch (PNF might have noticed it)
- and loosing instrument cross check and SA all together
- and PNF on the LH seat not seeing the need to take over
- or not willing due to expierience in LH seat LH SS
- stall warning triggered the TOGA initiation in PF´s intinctive reaction
- and pitch control stayed as bad as before.

Was the seat position not suitable for the correct operation of SS?
Training issues had been mentioned month before already.

Unfortunately the graphs in the report are not good quality, i hope they show up some time in a higher resolution. There i a lot of info in them, and we will have lots of discussions about them.

In Phase 3, there are a few points where vertical speed goes close to zero, in one time at 02:14:15 (page 113 of the report) and also some 17 sec. before that it even shows positive climb.
Other times descent rate is more than 15.000 fpm.

Do we know, that those values are valid indications or are those values wrong?

It will be much enlighting to understand the behaviour of the crew in phase 3, because most probably their reactions based on things they saw. If those above mentioned VV values are correct, then they saw a drastic increase of descent rate when pitching down and a reduction of descent rate when pitching up with TOGA, with the expectation to get the ship flying again. We know that they had been stalled completely and that this increase in descent rate was a necessary tradeoff to achieve recovery, they probably didn´t.
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Old 31st Jul 2011, 19:25
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Originally Posted by CONF iture
THS trace is absent from page 31 and 32 graphics ... Why is that ?
ELEVATORS traces are also absent from those graphics ... Why is that ?
Because that part of the document is dealing with control responses to instrument displays as opposed to flight surface responses to commands, it would appear.

I'm therefore presuming it can be inferred from the statement that the aircraft performed as designed that the control surfaces responded to the commands given in the correct manner, for which you'd need to get your Airbus manuals out to correlate. Remember that this is an interim rather than a final report, and that hopefully the FDR traces you would like to see will be included in that document.

Last edited by DozyWannabe; 31st Jul 2011 at 21:14.
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Old 31st Jul 2011, 19:36
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Operations Attitude a Causal Factor

vanHorck

Whilst you are essentially correct, you are at risk of being side-lined as an old-school pilot who refuses to see the advantages of modern technology....

To further enhance your argument: There are now automatic messages for pilots exceeding the narrowest of tolerances during hand flying, resulting in gentle phone calls from ops to the PF and/or the captain urging them at the very lest caution if not nudging them to use the automation rather than flying by hand. This clearly results in less hand flying than would otherwise be the case.
If anyone from Ops has made such a call then they should consider themselves a causal factor in this type of incident.

If they are so insistent that automation should always be used then perhaps the airlines should order fully automated aircraft. Then they can dispense with the expensive instrument monitors that they appear to want in the cockpit.
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Old 31st Jul 2011, 19:57
  #1144 (permalink)  
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Longitudinal sidestick deflection (left/right), elevators, THS 2:09:00 - 2:14:30 (page 114).

 
Old 31st Jul 2011, 20:02
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Old Carthusian,

Let's not fight, read my last sentence.

Many lives have been saved through automation so I am all for it and a bus fan as well, but I dislike the (in my view insufficient hand-fly) training and I dislike even more the reluctance of (some) carriers to allow their pilots to hand fly both in the cruise as well as in the approach in varying circumstances.

Ian W

It's easily checked.... Ask the FO's in your fleet what percentage of captains allows them to hand fly in anything but the smoothest CAVOK weather (better even is a captain who asks his FO to hand fly), although I suspect it varies from airline to airline
(and I am certainly not implying AF have such a policy as I don't know)
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Old 31st Jul 2011, 20:06
  #1146 (permalink)  
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What's that smell?

Evidently OZONE. Noted by the crew, one is allowed to associate OZONE with WRG.....? That would explain the dire need to recover the avionics bay.

Can anyone devise a way to recover an a/c via Inertial Cues? Those boys from the Segway scooter should give it a go.

Last edited by bearfoil; 31st Jul 2011 at 20:19.
 
Old 31st Jul 2011, 20:22
  #1147 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by bearfoil
What's that smell?
Evidently OZONE. Noted by the crew, one is allowed to associate OZONE with WRG.....?
You can associate anything with anything to demonstrate your ignorance.
Real avionics faults stink, but not of ozone.....
Since ther was a mention of St.Elmo's fire, that sounds as a more plausible explanation.....
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Old 31st Jul 2011, 20:29
  #1148 (permalink)  
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Going back to link 959 and subsequent discussions:

Now, I understand also why the BEA would like to have the whole scene with all pannels filmed as many things said all along are related to instruments and very hard to guess what it was exactly.
The desire to capture cockpit video has been around for a long time. Now that we have glass cockpits, the ability to capture these now exists as well. One point missed in discussing all of this is that it does not need to be captured in "real time," which would in fact require large amounts of memory. If there were two image streams, one of the cockpit, and one composite of all of the glass displays (direct content), these could be captured with quite high resolution, but only at a rate of one capture per second. Nothing will change so rapidly that 1PPS will miss much of significance, and with a modest (in today's terms) amount of memory, one or two hours (or perhaps even an entire flight) could be captured for future reference if needed. The technology now exists. It should be done.

Thoughts.
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Old 31st Jul 2011, 20:38
  #1149 (permalink)  
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Citing a "more plausible" explanation than another somehow gives one the right to be insulting?

Electric motors produce OZONE, as does welding, Heating, Lightning, etc.

Sparking of any kind produces OZONE. Dismissing causes other than Saint Elmo's Fire strikes me as more consistent with, erm.....ignorance.

Can you please refrain from personal insult?
 
Old 31st Jul 2011, 20:43
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Bear, I don't think CJ was trying to be insulting, but I can understand his frustration. Hanging on to every last thing you can trying to prove a hardware/software fault is one thing, but spamming two threads with the same post smacks of desperation.
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Old 31st Jul 2011, 20:46
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"...demonstrate your ignorance....."

What is it with this thread?

The whole series on the search for the truth about AF447 was one of the highest standing ones EVER with magnificent contributions from many mm43 just to name one.

So please let's have respect, and continue the good work with debate not insults.

I am sure I speak on behalf of many.
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Old 31st Jul 2011, 20:50
  #1152 (permalink)  
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I tried to accommodate the different fora with a question I thought more consistent with the foundation.

I am not desperate to prove anything. On the contrary, I am trying to unstick some narrow thinking that seems to be herding itself into the corral being built by partisans.

The BOEING 787 recently had a serious inflight electrical Malfunction/Fire.
The a/c was nearly lost.

Do you know what those on board were breathing? You talk of frustration? Tedium is listening to the same old suspects gather around the 'B'anner and sing the 'A'nthem.

take care friend
 
Old 31st Jul 2011, 20:53
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Originally Posted by vanHorck
The whole series on the search for the truth about AF447 was one of the highest standing ones EVER
Sure, if you ignore the 90% of it that wasn't.
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Old 31st Jul 2011, 20:54
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Originally Posted by bearfoil
Can you please refrain from personal insult?
By all means, on condition you refrain from polluting what is supposed to be a serious discussion about a real aircraft accident with fatuous nonsense and 'theories' without any factual and argued base.
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Old 31st Jul 2011, 20:59
  #1155 (permalink)  
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Christiaan

You are not moderator, and have no business 'judging' the relative 'purity' of anyone's input.

You have control issues, my friend. 'I' is for ignore.......
 
Old 31st Jul 2011, 21:01
  #1156 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by bearfoil
The BOEING 787 recently had a serious inflight electrical Malfunction/Fire.
So if you can explain to me what the correlation between an early production B787 on flight tests experiencing a fire in the electronics bay that was clearly visible and a production A330 that suffered a crash due to excursion from controlled flight following a UAS that has shown no evidence whatsoever of in-flight fire actually *is*, then I'm sure we'd see the relevance.

PS. CJ is a former Concorde engineer, so I'd think *very* carefully before tangling with him.

[EDIT : Misunderstood KBPsen's post - my apologies, sir.]
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Old 31st Jul 2011, 21:15
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Thanks, DW !

Oh, and, bearfoil, if it wasn't for your pollution showing up in other peoples posts, I'd have pushed the "I" button long ago.
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Old 31st Jul 2011, 21:24
  #1158 (permalink)  
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CJ

Now it's alliances and feudal warfare?

Again, it is not for you to 'judge'. How about principles, rather than personalities?

You are indeed a valued resource here, and my goal is not to annoy.

Doze, B787 has neglected a serious flaw in their certification program, and no one notices. Airbus clearly has ignored some critical flaws in their product's performance relative to operator proficiency.

That's called an opinion, and is neither desperate, not personal.
 
Old 31st Jul 2011, 21:27
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unofficial CVR transcript translation - plus VS

Based on Lemurian's post #958, in turn based on spagiola's #940:

I've added the synthetic voice (VS) announcements and stall warnings, from pages 91-104 of the report in French.

I wanted to see where the stall warnings occurred in relation to the pilots' conversation, but it adds some other info as well -- eg, warnings about dual inputs toward the end, and the final "pull up"s.

And there's a puzzling (to me anyway) VS announcement at 2 h 12 min 17: « Priority right »
Just before that, the column of notes about FDR parameters has:

2 h 12 min 16
Le pilote en place OPL prend la priorité.
The pilot in place OPL takes precedence.

According to the key on page 89, "OPL" is the PF:
Copilote en place droite (PF) pilotant avec le manche OPL

Was the "PF" (sitting in place OPL) not actually the one with "la priorité" up until that moment??

Anyway, on with the unofficial transcript translation:

=====

gpc62: Added synthetic voice (VS) announcements. A few other minor additions/trivial corrections.

Lemurian: To spagiola
I took the liberty to proof-read your very good translation and this is how it is :

spagiola:
I'm a native French speaker and have a PPL, but have no further relevant qualifications, so caveat emptor.

=====

2 h 10 min 05
Cavalry charge (Alarme de déconnexion du pilote automatique)
Cavalry charge (Autopilot disconnect alarm)

2 h 10 min 06
PF: J’ai les commandes
I have control

2 h 10 min 09
PF: Ignition start
Ignition start

02 h 10 min 10.4 :
VS : « Stall, stall » (sans cricket)
VS: "Stall, stall" (without cricket)

2 h 10 min 11
PNF: Qu’est ce que c’est que ça ?
What's that ?

2 h 10 min 13
VS : « Stall, S »
VS: "Stall, S"

2 h 10 min 14
PF: On n’a pas une bonne… On n’a pas une bonne annonce de…
We don't have a good... we don't have a good indication of ...

2 h 10 min 17
PNF: On a perdu les les les vitesses alors… engine thrust A T H R engine lever thrust
We've lost the the the speeds so ... engine thrust A T H R (off) engine lever thrust

2 h 10 min 18
PF: … de vitesse
... of speed

2 h 10 min 22
PNF: Alternate law protections
Alternate law protections

2 h 10 min 24
PNF: Attends on est en train de perdre…
Wait we're losing...

2 h 10 min 25
PNF: Wing anti-ice
Wing anti-ice

2 h 10 min 27 to 2 h 10 min 31
PNF: Fais attention à ta vitesse Fais attention à ta vitesse
Watch your speed Watch your speed

PF: Okay, okay okay je redescends
ok ok ok I'm going back down

PNF: Tu stabilises
stabilize (“stay there”)

PF: Ouais
Yeah

PNF: Tu redescends
You're going back down

2 h 10 min 33
PNF: Selon les trois tu montes donc tu redescends
According to the three you're going up, so you go back down (meaning the three vertical speed indicators... )

2 h 10 min 35
PF: D’accord
Agreed

2 h 10 min 36
PNF: T’es à ... Redescends
You're at ... go back down !

PF: C’est parti on (re)descend
On our way we're going (back) down

2 h 10 min 39 to 2 h 10 min 46
PNF: Je te mets en en A T T
I'm putting you in in A T T

2 h 10 min 42
PF: On est en ouais on est en climb
We're in yeah we're in climb

2 h 10 min 49
PNF: (…) il est où euh ?
Uh, where is he?

2 h 10 min 51
VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket en continu
Stall alarm starts [continues until 2 h 11 min 45]

2 h 10 min 56
PF: (TOGA)
(TOGA)

2 h 11
PNF: Surtout essaie de toucher le moins possible les commandes en en latéral hein
Above all, try to touch the controls as little as possible in in lateral, hey ?!

2 h 11 min 03
PF: Je suis en TOGA hein ?
I'm in TOGA, no ?

2 h 11 min 06
PNF: (…) il vient ou pas
Is he coming or not ?

2 h 11 min 21
PF: On a pourtant les moteurs qu’est-ce qui se passe (…) ?
We've got the engines yet (nothing is happening...),. what's going on (...)?

2 h 11 min 32
PF: (…) je n’ai plus le contrôle de l’avion là J’ai plus du tout le contrôle de l’avion
I no longer have control of the plane; I no longer have any control at all of the plane

2 h 11 min 38
PNF: Commande à gauche
Controls to the left

2 h 11 min 41
PF: J’ai l’impression (qu’on a de) la vitesse
I have the impression (that we have) some speed

2 h 11 min 43
[Bruit d’ouverture de la porte du cockpit]
[Sound of the cockpit door opening]

CAP: Eh qu’est-ce que vous (faites) ?
Hey what are you doing?

PNF: Qu’est-ce qui se passe ? Je ne sais pas je sais pas ce qui se passe
What's happening? I don't know I don't know what's happening

2 h 11 min 45
Fin de l’alarme « Stall, stall » + cricket
Stall alarm stops

2 h 11 min 52
CAP: Alors tiens prends prends ça
So here take take that

2 h 11 min 53
VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket incomplet
VS: "Stall, stall" + cricket, incomplete

2 h 11 min 55
VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket incomplet
VS: "Stall, stall" + cricket, incomplete

2 h 11 min 58
PF: J’ai un problème c’est que j’ai plus de vario là
I have a problem it's that I no longer have vertical speed
CAP: D’accord
OK

PF: J’ai plus aucune indication
I no longer have any indication

2 h 12 min 04 to 2 h 12 min 07
PF: J’ai l’impression qu’on a une vitesse de fou non qu’est-ce que vous en pensez ?
I have the impression that we have some crazy speed, don’t we ?.. what do you think ?


2 h 12 min 07
PNF: Non surtout ne ne (les) sors pas
No, in any case, don't don't extend them

VS : « Stall, stall »

2 h 12 min 10
VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket incomplet

2 h 12 min 13
PNF: Qu’est-ce que tu en penses qu’est-ce que tu en penses, qu’est-ce qu’il faut faire ?
What do you think ?what do you think ? what do we have to do?

2 h 12 min 15 to 2 h 12 min 19
CAP: Là je sais pas là ça descend
I don't know we're going down


2 h 12 min 17
VS : « Priority right »

2 h 12 min 19 to 2 h 12 min 45
PF: Là c’est bon là on serait revenu les ailes à plat, non il veut (pas)
there ! that's good ! we'd be back to wings level, no he (doesn't) wan't to

CAP: Les ailes à plat ... l’horizon l’horizon de secours
Wings level ... the horizon the backup horizon

PNF: L’horizon
The horizon

2 h 12 min 26
PNF: La vitesse ?
The speed?

2 h 12 min 27
PNF: Tu montes ...
You're going up ...

VS : « Stall, stall »

PNF: Tu descends descends descends descends
go down go down go down go down

2 h 12 min 30
PF: Je suis en train de descendre là ?
Am I going down?

PNF: Descend !
Go down

2 h 12 min 32
CAP: Non tu montes là
No you're going up, now

2 h 12 min 33
PF: Là je monte okay alors on descend
There I'm going up ok so let's go down

2 h 12 min 34
VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket incomplet

2 h 12 min 39
PF: Okay on est en TOGA
ok, we're in TOGA

2 h 12 min 40
VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket en continu
Stall alarm starts [continues until 2 h 12 min 46]

2 h 12 min 42
PF: En alti on a quoi là ?
In alti[tude] we're at what, here?

2 h 12 min 44
CAP: (…) C’est pas possible
It's not possible

2 h 12 min 45
PF: En alti on a quoi ?
In alti[tude] we're at what ?

[*** during the following 19 seconds of speech, the stall alarm stops for 3 seconds, and then restarts for another 8 seconds. The transcript does not indicate the exact times for the pilots' speech, or where these stops and starts occur in relation to the speech: ***]

2 h 12 min 46
Fin de l’alarme « Stall, stall » + cricket
Stall alarm stops

2 h 12 min 49
VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket en continu
Stall alarm starts

2 h 12 min 57
Fin de l’alarme « Stall, stall » + cricket
Stall alarm stops

[*** now here's the pilots' speech for that time interval: ***]

2 h 12 min 45 to 2 h 13 min 04
PNF: Comment ça en altitude ?
What do you mean in altitude?

PF: Ouais ouais ouais j’descends là non ?
yeah yeah yeah i'm going down now, no?

PNF: Là tu descends oui
You're going down now, yes

CAP: Hé tu ... tu es en… Mets mets les ailes horizontales
hey you ... you're in ... put put the wings level

PNF: Mets les ailes horizontales
Put the wings level

C’est ce que je cherche à faire
That's what I'm trying to do

CAP: Mets les ailes horizontales
Put the wings level

2 h 12 min 59
PF: Je suis à fond à… avec du gauchissement
I'm at the limit of the stick... to the left

CAP: Le palonnier
Rudder pedals

2 h 13 min 23 :
VS : « Dual input »

2 h 13 min 25
PF: Qu’est-ce qu’y… comment ça se fait qu’on continue à descendre à fond là?
What is... how come we're continuing to descend so fast?

2 h 13 min 28
PNF: Essaye de trouver ce que tu peux faire avec tes commandes là-haut Les primaires et cetera
Try to see what you can do with your controls up there. The primaries etc

2 h 13 min 32
PF: au niveau cent
At level 100

2 h 13 min 36
PF: Neuf mille pieds
9000 feet

2 h 13 min 38
CAP: Doucement avec le palonnier là
Easy with the rudder

2 h 13 min 39
PNF: Remonte remonte remonte remonte
Climb climb climb climb (literally, "remonte" is "climb back up")

[*** another sequence where the transcript does not splice the VS and the pilots' speech together: ***]

2 h 13 min 41 :
VS : « Dual input »

2 h 13 min 43 :
VS : « Dual input »

2 h 13 min 45 :
VS : « Dual input »

2 h 13 min 47 :
VS : « Dual input »

2 h 13 min 40
PF: Mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l’heure
But I've been pulling to the back stop for a good while

CAP: Non non non ne remonte pas
No no no don't climb back up

PNF: Alors descend
Go down, then

2 h 13 min 45
PNF: Alors donne-moi les commandes à moi les commandes
So give the me controls. I have control

PF: Vas-y tu as les commandes on est en TOGA toujours hein
Go on, you have control. We're still in TOGA, right ?

2 h 13 min 55
VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket en continu
Stall alarm starts

2 h 14 min 03
Fin de l’alarme « Stall, stall » + cricket
Stall alarm stops

2 h 14 min 05
CAP: Attention tu cabres là
Watch it, you're pitching up

PNF: Je cabre ?
I'm pitching up?

PF: Ben il faudrait on est à quatre mille pieds
Well, we should, we're at 4000 feet

2 h 14 min 17
VS : « Sink rate »
VS : « Pull up » (3x)

2 h 14 min 18
CAP: Allez tire
Go on, pull

PF: Allez on tire on tire on tire on tire
Go on, we're pulling we're pulling we're pulling we're pulling !

2 h 14 min 21 to end
VS : « Pull up » (4x)

2 h 14 min 26 to end
CAP: (Dix) degrés d’assiette
(Ten) degrees of trim

2 h 14 min 28.4
[Fin des enregistrements]
[End of data]

=====
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Old 31st Jul 2011, 21:41
  #1160 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by bearfoil
Now it's alliances and feudal warfare?
May I answer? I assure you it's nothing of the sort, but this is the most recent of many times where you've said you were going to go away, have a break and regroup only to come bouncing back on within 24 hours with a new "lead" to throw into the mix.


You are indeed a valued resource here, and my goal is not to annoy.
You might want to think about that then.

Doze, B787 has neglected a serious flaw in their certification program, and no one notices.
I'm sure Boeing are taking it *very* seriously, which is why the 787 program has been somewhat slower than anticipated since the incident.

Airbus clearly has ignored some critical flaws in their product's performance relative to operator proficiency.

That's called an opinion, and is neither desperate, not personal.
So let me get this straight, you're trying to say that *Airbus* is responsible for the airlines' policies on training and any deficiencies within?

A note to anyone who wants to bring up Ziegler and concierges again - that was a *very long time ago* - please don't! The "race to the bottom" is a corporate disease that affects many more industries than aviation, and automation (and Airbus's role in the advances made within) is a factor, not a culprit.

Last edited by DozyWannabe; 1st Aug 2011 at 00:12. Reason: Spelin and, gramur
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