Originally Posted by
Lonewolf_50
Why is a pilot more worried about overspeed than stall? (I am going out on a limb, presuming more than a problem with body sense of speed.
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Is FOQA (worry about being written up for an overspeed) a contributor to bias in this regard?
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Think about this, and about how rules influence people: "You must not overspeed because ... (____ fill in the blanks for reasons not to overspeed)"
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Was PF predisposed to be worried about overspeed?
This is something of a conundrum - I think I might have read somewhere in the Tech Log thread that the PF was also a glider pilot. I don't think the fear of overspeed was due to fear of a write-up, so much as an overspeed can and will cause structural damage (and thus potentially render the aircraft unrecoverable) if allowed to persist, whereas with a stall you should have plenty of warning as you approach stall speed and perform the corrective actions (which at the time were effectively maintain altitude and increase thrust).
The conundrum then becomes "If he knew enough about aerodynamics that overspeed concerned him so much, why then did he then fail to realise he had stalled the aircraft based on what was being displayed in front of him (unresponsive lateral control, rapidly unwinding altitude, nose-high attitude, TOGA power, stall warning sounding)?". We're *well* into the realm of the hypothetical here, but could confirmation bias have played a part? It's generally accepted that the Birgenair PF remained fixated on overspeed because that was the first warning he got. It would appear that the AF447 PF was concerned about overspeed without any prompting whatsoever, but is it possible he was still focused on worrying about overspeed to the detriment of his scan and situational awareness?