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Vol Paris-Rio : le rapport d'enquête a été caviardé
Reportedly, a recommendation on the stall alarm of the Airbus provided for in the final report almost BEA, 48 hours before its publication, is not the official version. Air France took the European Aviation Safety.
The controversy over the crash of the AF 447 Paris-Rio is not going to go out. The shadows glide on the third progress report of the Investigation Bureau Investigation Analysis (BEA) released on Friday pointed to the responsibility of the pilot of the Airbus A330-200.
According to several sources, a recommendation on stall warning device, which was in a near-final version of the report 48 hours before its official publication, has not been published. Envisaged under the precautionary principle, this recommendation was to immediately begin a process of analysis and reassessment of the logic of operation of such alarms.
When asked by The Tribune, the BEA said "he did not comment on the steps that led to a recommendation or not." BEA internally, some did not appreciate and even threaten to resign.
According to our sources, Air France has sent a letter to the EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency) requesting that the matter be reviewed quickly. When questioned, Air France has confirmed that he took the EASA on August 1 about the failures of the stall warning.
For pilots and Air France, these problems have played a major role, since "the multiple activations and stops unwanted and misleading, contrary to the state of the aircraft, have greatly contributed to the difficulty for the crew to analyze the situation, "stated the airline in a statement released Friday in response to the report of the BEA.
Between 2:11 minutes and 45 seconds, the night of the accident on 1 June 2009, and the crash, the alarm has reactivated a dozen times with durations ranging from 2 to 8 seconds. The reactivation of the alarm the longest took place when the crew goes into action to restore the unit to a normal position. Clearly, the alarm can stop when the aircraft stalled and recur if recovery of a valid speed. Experts speak of a "case of reverse operation of the alarm."
Indeed, it stops when the speed is less than 60 knots, because it was considered that there was no reason why the aircraft can be found at this speed. But every time the driver gave the order to bite (the correct order) and ironed it on top of 60 knots (rearing, its speed had slowed considerably), the alarm goes off, making believe that his action was wrong.
They therefore had no comprehensio the actual situation of the aircraft. This explains why the actions of the pilots of flight Rio-Paris appeared incomprehensible by their colleagues.