AF447 wreckage found
Join Date: Mar 2009
Location: Malaysia
Posts: 112
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Going to draw some flak here I know, but I have a couple of questions for you guys.
FYI, I am a just a lesser human being (a concerned SLF) but I believe I have a right to expect that aircraft manufacturers and airline operators ensure that I can travel from A to B safely and with confidence.
So here we go:
1.If the AP/AT systems on an A330 are designed to disengage when they encounter a situation which they cannot handle, and immediately hand over control to the pilots in the 'driving' seats, why are the pilots not provided with a clear reason, or at least a good indication, as to why the AP/AT disengaged in the first place?
2.Are the automated systems on this aircraft, or on any other commercial passenger aircraft, capable of detecting a potentially dangerous TS storm system, and of warning the pilots of their aircraft's proximity to the same?
If not, why not?
3.Has the logic of initiating automated multiple audio/visual alarms simultaneously in the cockpit of an aircraft in flight and in a critical situation, and the phsycological effect of this on the pilots in that situation, ever been thoroughly studied and investigated?
If not, why not?
Despite the recovery of the CVR/FDR, the fact is that nobody will ever really know the cause of this accident. CVR/FDR will provide clues but, as with so many serious aircraft accidents, nobody will ever know for sure what really happened here.
But I would suggest that the interface between aircraft automation and consequent human reaction to that automation, played a large part in this particular tragedy.
'Nuff said...
FYI, I am a just a lesser human being (a concerned SLF) but I believe I have a right to expect that aircraft manufacturers and airline operators ensure that I can travel from A to B safely and with confidence.
So here we go:
1.If the AP/AT systems on an A330 are designed to disengage when they encounter a situation which they cannot handle, and immediately hand over control to the pilots in the 'driving' seats, why are the pilots not provided with a clear reason, or at least a good indication, as to why the AP/AT disengaged in the first place?
2.Are the automated systems on this aircraft, or on any other commercial passenger aircraft, capable of detecting a potentially dangerous TS storm system, and of warning the pilots of their aircraft's proximity to the same?
If not, why not?
3.Has the logic of initiating automated multiple audio/visual alarms simultaneously in the cockpit of an aircraft in flight and in a critical situation, and the phsycological effect of this on the pilots in that situation, ever been thoroughly studied and investigated?
If not, why not?
Despite the recovery of the CVR/FDR, the fact is that nobody will ever really know the cause of this accident. CVR/FDR will provide clues but, as with so many serious aircraft accidents, nobody will ever know for sure what really happened here.
But I would suggest that the interface between aircraft automation and consequent human reaction to that automation, played a large part in this particular tragedy.
'Nuff said...
Join Date: Jul 2009
Location: Not far from a big Lake
Age: 81
Posts: 1,454
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
With reference to old-style instruments, flat-panel displays are getting bigger and bigger. No reason the same style cannot be used digitally to mimic the sacred six.
With regard to the standby instruments, why would we want to do that?
Diversity of instrument types can have benefits.
We have already put the 'sacred six' on the PFD, haven't we?
Join Date: Jul 2009
Location: Not far from a big Lake
Age: 81
Posts: 1,454
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Despite the recovery of the CVR/FDR, the fact is that nobody will ever really know the cause of this accident. CVR/FDR will provide clues but, as with so many serious aircraft accidents, nobody will ever know for sure what really happened here.
If you want absolute certainty, then you are living in the wrong world.
Pegase Driver
Join Date: May 1997
Location: Europe
Age: 74
Posts: 3,681
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The full CVR will be made avail to the general public sooner or later unfortunately( or fortunately depending on which side you're on ). In the days of I-phones which can record anonymously anything 10m around you and given the media attention this perticular accidents has, it is only a matter of time I would say.
In anycase, since there will be a trial, the defence lawyers in France will have access to it and will reveal it, as they did in the Quiberon, Brest and Pau accidents, and then it will be including all the" sterile cockpit" discussions. Trial of the crew by Media. The New Zealand and Canadian approach is far superior.
In anycase, since there will be a trial, the defence lawyers in France will have access to it and will reveal it, as they did in the Quiberon, Brest and Pau accidents, and then it will be including all the" sterile cockpit" discussions. Trial of the crew by Media. The New Zealand and Canadian approach is far superior.
Join Date: Mar 2009
Location: Norway
Posts: 10
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
X-plane stall recovery
My problem was after the stall the ACFT reached a stable position with 20-30 degrees AoA what i not could not terminate. After many crashes I decided to fly the stall what mean not try to recover early by pressing the yoke forward. I pulled gently until the rear stop was reached, power idle, engine secured by igniter, while gamble to keep wings leveled, checked the horizontal trim settings (I found best was take off trimm working). When reached that carefully move the yoke forward to reach more than 30 degrees downwards but not more than 60 degrees. While dive let the speed increase, just a little below maneuver speed bring pitch to the horizon. Reset power.
I'm not sure if I got it right - What was the THS-trim at stable stalled configuration - Was auto trim working?\ - how slow was trim reduced - what was elevator position during trim-reducing. What was trim when recovered? What about Center of gravity - and the posterior trim tank?
Those procedures should be tried in an full-scale simulator (actually I'm kind of shocked that there seems to be no developed procedure to recover from fully developed semi-flat stalls - and even little practice in simulator) - -
Join Date: May 2010
Location: -
Posts: 66
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I will bet they will know for sure to the level that you can bet your life on the result.
If you want absolute certainty, then you are living in the wrong world.
6th Jun 2011 15:33
If you want absolute certainty, then you are living in the wrong world.
6th Jun 2011 15:33
Join Date: Oct 2003
Location: Hampshire, UK
Posts: 207
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally Posted by machinbird
I believe we just pointed out that a digital display does not have the same attention getting power of the actual instrument.
Some of the bizjet & GA panels are doing a pretty impressive job with this these days. I'm sure it's an area that will continue to be refined.
Not sure what this has to do with standby instruments. They will still be there.
Join Date: May 2002
Location: dubai
Posts: 942
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
ATC
" The New Zealand and Canadian approach is far superior."
You sure about that sport??
The NZ police are pretty damned quick to subpoena the CVR to assist them in prosecuting crews if there is an accident. The is not what the CVR is designed for IMHO.
" The New Zealand and Canadian approach is far superior."
You sure about that sport??
The NZ police are pretty damned quick to subpoena the CVR to assist them in prosecuting crews if there is an accident. The is not what the CVR is designed for IMHO.
Join Date: Mar 2009
Location: Malaysia
Posts: 112
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
will bet they will know for sure to the level that you can bet your life on the result.
If you want absolute certainty, then you are living in the wrong world
If you want absolute certainty, then you are living in the wrong world
Are you 100% certain in your statements?
Join Date: Mar 2009
Location: Malaysia
Posts: 112
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
in accidents like these, there is a lot of contributing factors, neither of which could have caused the crash by itself. However, when they are working together, there is a synergy between them which leads to disaster. Even if you had all the data, you might not be able to tell if the crash really happened because of flying into thunderstorms, or pitot tube design, or lacking AoA indication, or excessive unmanageable automation, or lack of high speed, high altitude stall training/awareness, or something else. You can pick one reason and call it THE reason, but others will disagree with you, and the argument will just go on endlessly.
To an extent, are we training pilots too much?
Yes, of course, we need SOPs and structures, not to mention stall/upset training, in order to ensure safe flight but my perception is that rigid adherence to procedures is causing a mind set which sometimes doesn't perceive what is really going on.
The first step in solving any problem is the acquisition of the correct information - like, hey guys, something is happening here but what?
Yes, of course, we need SOPs and structures, not to mention stall/upset training, in order to ensure safe flight but my perception is that rigid adherence to procedures is causing a mind set which sometimes doesn't perceive what is really going on.
The first step in solving any problem is the acquisition of the correct information - like, hey guys, something is happening here but what?
Join Date: Mar 2009
Location: Malaysia
Posts: 112
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
100% certain doesn't relate to this world. Quantum mechanics and Schroedinger's Cat experiment tell us that.
So would you consider your earlier statement:
I will bet they will know for sure to the level that you can bet your life on the result.
If you want absolute certainty, then you are living in the wrong world.
If you want absolute certainty, then you are living in the wrong world.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Some offshoots of the interminable discussion (guilty) are worthy to discuss in the absence of anything new. For instance, a question.
The "Yoke" is a LIE. No, it int. It may be a totem, but it is critical to team management. With the advent of the Sidestick, two questions became legend.
"What's it doing?" and, more critically, "What's HE doing". Neither is totally without basis, obviously.
A basic format poser. What is the Airbus Philosophy? How does it differ from other flight deck formats?
At a very basic level, the a/c is sold as single pilot, imo. Hence the lack of criticality of the PNF. Including the commander, who needs to supervise?
The Airbus cockpit has two managers, the others a manager and a manager/ Leader. In the case of 447, with Captain on deck, there were three managers.
A leader tells his men what he wants; a manager does also, but then he explains how to do it. The QRH, coms, and checklist can be done auto, either audio visual, or audio.
What's lost is the Command, and imaginative leadership.
With the a/c as a priori commander, there is no chain.
Training, Experience, Confidence, Imagination.
The PF needs to be able, Life or Death, to understand immediately what's happening. Not consult, scan, or be patient, waiting to be told, or worse, to guess.
Bonehead decision making is all around us, and any philosophy that does not support "ahead of the aircraft" 'gots', for whatever reason, will kill people.
Pilot on board or no.......
The "Yoke" is a LIE. No, it int. It may be a totem, but it is critical to team management. With the advent of the Sidestick, two questions became legend.
"What's it doing?" and, more critically, "What's HE doing". Neither is totally without basis, obviously.
A basic format poser. What is the Airbus Philosophy? How does it differ from other flight deck formats?
At a very basic level, the a/c is sold as single pilot, imo. Hence the lack of criticality of the PNF. Including the commander, who needs to supervise?
The Airbus cockpit has two managers, the others a manager and a manager/ Leader. In the case of 447, with Captain on deck, there were three managers.
A leader tells his men what he wants; a manager does also, but then he explains how to do it. The QRH, coms, and checklist can be done auto, either audio visual, or audio.
What's lost is the Command, and imaginative leadership.
With the a/c as a priori commander, there is no chain.
Training, Experience, Confidence, Imagination.
The PF needs to be able, Life or Death, to understand immediately what's happening. Not consult, scan, or be patient, waiting to be told, or worse, to guess.
Bonehead decision making is all around us, and any philosophy that does not support "ahead of the aircraft" 'gots', for whatever reason, will kill people.
Pilot on board or no.......
Join Date: Jul 2009
Location: Not far from a big Lake
Age: 81
Posts: 1,454
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Quote:
100% certain doesn't relate to this world. Quantum mechanics and Schroedinger's Cat experiment tell us that.
Carjockey, you aren't showing your best side.
Good enough to bet your life on is not 100%. That doesn't exist in the real world.
When I drive to work, I know there is a real possibility of some other driver doing something that might kill me, but I don't stop driving to work.
100% certain doesn't relate to this world. Quantum mechanics and Schroedinger's Cat experiment tell us that.
I see...
So would you consider your earlier statement:
Quote:
I will bet they will know for sure to the level that you can bet your life on the result.
If you want absolute certainty, then you are living in the wrong world.
as 100% certain?
So would you consider your earlier statement:
Quote:
I will bet they will know for sure to the level that you can bet your life on the result.
If you want absolute certainty, then you are living in the wrong world.
as 100% certain?
Good enough to bet your life on is not 100%. That doesn't exist in the real world.
When I drive to work, I know there is a real possibility of some other driver doing something that might kill me, but I don't stop driving to work.
Join Date: Jun 2011
Location: Sweden
Posts: 1
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Reversed elevator effect?
I'm not a pilot but in my work I get in contact with different aspects of flying.
There are so many posts in this thread that I can't read them all. If what I'm going to suggest is mentioned in an earlier post I apologize.
Although I have never heard of it I wonder if in a stall situation like this there could be a phenomenon that could be characterized as a reversed elevator effect?
In this stall COP is obviously forward of COG and the horizontal tail must then produce a high lift (upwards) to rotate the nose downwards.
Hypothesis goes as follows. At this aoa plus the extra 13 degrees of the HT, the HT is probably stalled too. Pushing the sidestick forwards in order to gain more lift on the HT will move the trailing edge flap (elevator) of the HT downwards thereby giving the chord line of the HT a higher aoa resulting in deeper stall of the HT and less lift generated by it.
Pulling the sidestick backwards moves the trailing edge flap of HT upwards giving the chord line less aoa, a milder stall, more lift on the HT and a lower pitch angle.
If this hypothesis holds it could explain why the PF pulled on the sidestick
There are so many posts in this thread that I can't read them all. If what I'm going to suggest is mentioned in an earlier post I apologize.
Although I have never heard of it I wonder if in a stall situation like this there could be a phenomenon that could be characterized as a reversed elevator effect?
In this stall COP is obviously forward of COG and the horizontal tail must then produce a high lift (upwards) to rotate the nose downwards.
Hypothesis goes as follows. At this aoa plus the extra 13 degrees of the HT, the HT is probably stalled too. Pushing the sidestick forwards in order to gain more lift on the HT will move the trailing edge flap (elevator) of the HT downwards thereby giving the chord line of the HT a higher aoa resulting in deeper stall of the HT and less lift generated by it.
Pulling the sidestick backwards moves the trailing edge flap of HT upwards giving the chord line less aoa, a milder stall, more lift on the HT and a lower pitch angle.
If this hypothesis holds it could explain why the PF pulled on the sidestick
THS and elevator position
@Gorry:
You are homing in on a theory several of us have expoused.
The Airbus stabilizer and elevators are "conventional". i.e. no all moving stabilizer as all military fighters have had since early 1950's. So your question is a good one.
Besides that, nobody here has yet to explain how the THS moves with respect to stick commands. I am waiting.
respectfully, from an old dinosaur FBW pilot
You are homing in on a theory several of us have expoused.
The Airbus stabilizer and elevators are "conventional". i.e. no all moving stabilizer as all military fighters have had since early 1950's. So your question is a good one.
Besides that, nobody here has yet to explain how the THS moves with respect to stick commands. I am waiting.
respectfully, from an old dinosaur FBW pilot
Guest
Posts: n/a
Here's more old fashioned stuff. When the conventional a/c (Airbus) is flying, it gets to change what is effectively the Angle of Incidence of the HS, but when the a/c gives it back to the pilot, he has to control Pitch with what amount essentially to "Trim Tabs" (elevators). Manually "trimming" the big slabs back to a neutral AOI, is an extra task to get the a/c back to "neutral".
No?
No?