I think it is over simplification to say it is the engineers fault.
Yes, that is what I said in my post #2404. I understand quite clearly that this is complicated matter with many different players involved. My post was primarily directed at the specific person I quoted who seemed to imply that the best solution was simply to have pilots practice more in their own free time, a simplistic solution itself.
I think we all agree that turning off a stall warning as the stall gets worse is not really a good thing. But was it a main factor? Wasn't the bigger problem probably not that the stall warning stopped, but that there had been no proper reaction to it for nearly a minute before?
I'm sorry I missed this comment in my first read through of recent posts because I think it is an excellent question.
In order to understand the importance of the stall warning logic in this case we need to understand the way human beings responded to accidents. When faced with changing circumstances the mind forms a mental picture or mental model of what is happening to it. This mental model is
predictive in the sense that it takes not only the data it knows but fills in the gaps with guesses about data it doesn't know. The mind's response is also a
process in the sense that the mind is constantly taking in new data and, if necessary, changing its mental model of events as it gets new data.
In this situation there are two separate and distinct questions. The first question is why did the pilots form a wrong mental model of events to begin with. To answer this question it's wise to look at things like training, CRM, etc. The second question in this case is why did the crew maintain that wrong mental model right up until the plane went into the ocean. It is possible that the stall warning logic was a key factor in why the crew maintained the wrong mental model for so long.
I hope the distinction between a person making a mistake and a person continuing to make a mistake is clear. I don't think that the stall warning logic had anything to do with the initial mistake the crew made; I think it's possible it had something to do with why they persisted in their error for so long.
Now some people will take the position that the real focus should be on the initial mistake but I think that a robust system cannot be predicated on the fact that a human being is going to be perfect every time. There has to be more than one line of defense.
Other people will claim that even if the stall warning had operated differently it still would not have made any difference in this specific situation. That's no defense either because (a) that's hindsight bias (b) whose to say it won't make a difference in some future accident.
So do I think that the stall warning logic was "the main factor"? No. But that doesn't mean it's not a real area of concern.