'Falklands' Most Daring Raid'
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The most daring (or foolish?) raid nearly attempted was the one way C130 SF sortie to take out the Super Etendards on the ground. The crew and SF survivors would then attempt to make for the Chilean border where Sea King helicopters would pick them up.
The C130 got as far as engine start at ASI before the decision to call it off was made.
It turns out the airbase was heavily defended by Argentine regulars, so the mission would have been suicidal.
The C130 got as far as engine start at ASI before the decision to call it off was made.
It turns out the airbase was heavily defended by Argentine regulars, so the mission would have been suicidal.
Other than the C-130 kill by FRS 1 were any re-supply flights cancelled or turned back due to CAP, NGS or bombing?
Besides that, most of the 33 resupply flights by C-130s had two or three attemps (and that means turning back to the mainland) before landing on the islands. Most flights were diverted due to frigates nearby, CAP or NGS. Same with the 16 resupply travels by F-28 and other Navy transport aircraft.
Regards!
VP-F and Dan Winterland, both of you mention the impact on morale. What is your source? Being bombed is horrendous (if 107mm fire is anyting to go by) but BB only put two sticks of bombs into a limited amount of real estate. Are you speaking for all troops on the island or just those at the airport? I have read some accounts of the infantry fighting that would suggest the morale in some Argentinian units was very good. This is also very interesting - thank you.
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orca
Ah, this is an intelligence issue.
The strikers have to penetrate the FEZ and MEZ but OCA does not need to penetrate the MEZ in order to achieve OCA. They can achieve this by engaging the enemy air within the FEZ.
The real issue is where is the MEZ/FEZ.
Clearly the shorad with Rapier and Sea Wolf was in the SC Waters but the position of the SD MEZ would be the unknown. Therein would lie the problem for the fighters.
The pickle for the OCA in this case is that they couldn't go in at medium level against the Sea Dart threat which would force them low, into the AAA and Sea Wolf MEZ, that those brave strikers were having such a hard time with
The strikers have to penetrate the FEZ and MEZ but OCA does not need to penetrate the MEZ in order to achieve OCA. They can achieve this by engaging the enemy air within the FEZ.
The real issue is where is the MEZ/FEZ.
Clearly the shorad with Rapier and Sea Wolf was in the SC Waters but the position of the SD MEZ would be the unknown. Therein would lie the problem for the fighters.
Suspicion breeds confidence
Aside from Cdr Ward's efforts several long range pot shots were taken at C-130s with Sea Dart. The CO of Exeter was very keen to go west of the islands at night to bring a few down, although ROE applied to to flight approaching the islands not leaving them. Permission was not granted by staff.
Mirage IIIEA were not capable to hunt the Avro Vulcan due to several reasons.
The first one is the range without air refueling, those airplanes were limited to 10 min at station over Malvinas flying higher than FL260.
So when the Argentine's long range radars were detecting the bomber at around 150 NM from Puerto Argentino, the MIIIEA have to be scramble from Rio Gallegos at not less than 40 min flight time...no chance at all to get an interception.
On June 10th, the Argentine Air Force Boeing B707-320 flying long range recce detecting three airplanes flying to Malvinas.
Those airplanes were presumed as Avro Vulcan or Nimrod, so a mission of four MIIIEA were lunched for hunting them but they couldn't get any contact when arrived to the target area.
The first one is the range without air refueling, those airplanes were limited to 10 min at station over Malvinas flying higher than FL260.
So when the Argentine's long range radars were detecting the bomber at around 150 NM from Puerto Argentino, the MIIIEA have to be scramble from Rio Gallegos at not less than 40 min flight time...no chance at all to get an interception.
On June 10th, the Argentine Air Force Boeing B707-320 flying long range recce detecting three airplanes flying to Malvinas.
Those airplanes were presumed as Avro Vulcan or Nimrod, so a mission of four MIIIEA were lunched for hunting them but they couldn't get any contact when arrived to the target area.
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Following from cosmiccomet's post..
The Argentines presumably suffered as much as we did from the lack of an AEW platform
How much difference would a couple of Neptunes fitted with AN/APS-20 have made?
The Argentines presumably suffered as much as we did from the lack of an AEW platform
How much difference would a couple of Neptunes fitted with AN/APS-20 have made?
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Marcantile and cosmiscomet - many thanks indeed.
My point isn't that the Mirage III EA would be of any use against a Vulcan strike on the Falklands having scrambled from the mainland. That would be a little daft.
The standard UK line is that the Vulcan caused assets that would otherwise have been used against the task force to be used to defend the homeland. From what we think so far the only unit to receive a change in orders was Grupo 8. Our Argentine sources are saying though that the Mirage III EA of Grupo 8 could only get to the FI at medium level and even then for a very short time. They had new and untried weapons and a radar that didn't look down. They lost two of their comrades on day one.
I cannot rule out BB as a factor in the decision to re-task a part of Grupo 8. But the Mirage III EA appears to have ruled itself out of offensive ops as well.
Marcantile - do you know what fighters went to Buenos Aires? The ones from Rivadavia or Gallegos? Did they operate out of Tandil? I make it about 900 miles from Rivadavia to Buenos Ares. Of the 15 single seaters left do you knwo what split there was between the three locations?
My point isn't that the Mirage III EA would be of any use against a Vulcan strike on the Falklands having scrambled from the mainland. That would be a little daft.
The standard UK line is that the Vulcan caused assets that would otherwise have been used against the task force to be used to defend the homeland. From what we think so far the only unit to receive a change in orders was Grupo 8. Our Argentine sources are saying though that the Mirage III EA of Grupo 8 could only get to the FI at medium level and even then for a very short time. They had new and untried weapons and a radar that didn't look down. They lost two of their comrades on day one.
I cannot rule out BB as a factor in the decision to re-task a part of Grupo 8. But the Mirage III EA appears to have ruled itself out of offensive ops as well.
Marcantile - do you know what fighters went to Buenos Aires? The ones from Rivadavia or Gallegos? Did they operate out of Tandil? I make it about 900 miles from Rivadavia to Buenos Ares. Of the 15 single seaters left do you knwo what split there was between the three locations?
As far as I remembered is that the AAF left only two or three single seat MIIIEA plus the single 2 seater MIIIDA at Mariano Moreno AFB where the Grupo VIII was located at that moment in peace times.
The same happened in Tandil AFB where 3 two seats IA Dagger B and 2 or three single seat IA Dagger A remained at war time for Buenos Aires Air Defence role.
The same happened in Tandil AFB where 3 two seats IA Dagger B and 2 or three single seat IA Dagger A remained at war time for Buenos Aires Air Defence role.
I was involved at the time and I distinctly remember us all looking at each other when the news broke describing what had been organised with all the pre planning, endurance flying, number of refuels, only to be completely astounded that they.................................missed the bloody runway!
Incredible waste of time and effort. A massive PR blunder if you ask me. Time has cooled things now, but I can't see the programme doing anyone any favours, stirring it all back up again. I suppose it depends on how the director/producer bias the programme.
Incredible waste of time and effort. A massive PR blunder if you ask me. Time has cooled things now, but I can't see the programme doing anyone any favours, stirring it all back up again. I suppose it depends on how the director/producer bias the programme.
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The question that should be asked is "Given the assets in the direct theatre of operations, why was the raid proposed in the first place, particularly given its complexity (in terms of assets required to execute)?" The raid would only ever have had a miniscule effect on the battle (due to the remote likelihood of weapon on target) and thus should have been discarded at HQ level.
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I think that is the point. The Vulcans and Victors were not in the direct theatre of operations. I think it was already mentioned that an essential C130 resupply mission would have kicked the BB mission in to touch.
The long range RAF effort added an additional indirect pressure in support of the task force. Can you come up with a better opening gambit of the crack of doom just before dawn broke?
The only thing better would have been a 9x16 round broadside from the Rodney. They would have arrived at the same time, no rolling thunder
The long range RAF effort added an additional indirect pressure in support of the task force. Can you come up with a better opening gambit of the crack of doom just before dawn broke?
The only thing better would have been a 9x16 round broadside from the Rodney. They would have arrived at the same time, no rolling thunder
The question that should be asked is "Given the assets in the direct theatre of operations, why was the raid proposed in the first place, particularly given its complexity (in terms of assets required to execute)?" The raid would only ever have had a miniscule effect on the battle (due to the remote likelihood of weapon on target) and thus should have been discarded at HQ level.
The problem, I fear, is that the kabourophobic argument concentrates entirely upon the hackneyed old, tactical level perspective that the raid was a massive, ineffective waste of fuel and effort because of RAF insecurity and a desire to 'play a part' (which, of course, the RAF was doing through a variety of assets).
This approach resolutely refuses to consider other factors largely because of service parochialism. Even if you rule out strategic effect, then as part of what would now be called [Buzzwords]'the Influence piece' [\Buzzwords] it makes sense. The irony is that those in dark blue who damn the raids' premise run the risk of blissfully ignoring the breadth of thought, perhaps even strategic vision, of the three admirals mentioned earlier. They didn't care whether a bomb hit the runway or not, because CAS had told them how damned difficult that was to achieve. What they cared about was the possible effect on the junta, world opinion and possibly the tactical dispositions of the one Argentine AF fighter unit that was a dedicated air-to-air squadron.
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Archimedes,
I think we all agree that those flag officers supported those missions, do you seriously believe they would say anything other than that? This was a joint operation and NO ONE should be trying to score points at the expense of the maximum effort against the common foe.
I get very tired of those that try to drive a wedge between the different services it is uncalled for and plain wrong. We should all pull together and perhaps try to find nice things to say instead of petty bickering. Those missions were RAF missions and unless they DIRECTLY interfered with the Navy side of the operation then of course the Admirals would say what they did.
What is being suggested by some folks is that just under 14,000,000Ibs of aviation fuel might have been an expensive price for the grand total of one dumb iron bomb hitting a concrete runway! (7 x 1.94million) If the RAF were happy with that then fine, but we could not supply enough aviation fuel to Wideawake and were acquiring it from our allies. Don't forget that those operations were taking up every single tanker in theatre which meant no other long range mission could be flown from that location until those tankers and their crews became available. No important crucial spare parts or equipment, no extended Nimrod surveillance flights. All these things had to wait until all those aircraft had returned and had all the necessary servicing carried out before getting these urgent items down to the fleet.
As I keep saying, if the RAF were happy with this and no valuable supplies or equipment were delayed getting down south then fine but I will tactfully suggest that the issue of resupplying the battle group may well have been an operational game stopper and perhaps a quiet word 'might' have been whispered in the higher corridors of that concrete frigate HMS Warrior. A quiet word in private whilst publicly toeing the quite correct party line. that is the way to conduct a war and I for one will suggest this is the way to conduct business.
There were numerous 'Daring' air missions by all three services and my own thoughts are this specific one was an amazing administrative exercise but I cannot get my head around its drain on valuable resources and how anyone can rate this specific operation as being the MOST 'daring' of them all, it just seems so wrong. (In my personal opinion)
We have seen how close air support missions flown by the Harriers might have been a far far greater morale killer and who knows the effects of the naval gunfire that kept the occupying force awake at night. The locals at Stanley were allegedly just curious about the Vulcan bombs thumping into the grass... at night, with nothing to see where they were from, they could have been weaponry from air, land or sea??? There was also lots of large guns keeping the locals awake and amongst those bangs we are asked to accept that a few extra exploding dumb bombs were going to have a significant effect on morale?? How does that compare with a daylight raid by Harriers that come screaming in at a great rate of knots at low level with rockets flying through the air. The noise of those aircraft is enough to get some soldiers messing their pants, the exploding rockets will perhaps just add to their fear.
I personally would suggest the latter will have a far greater effect on those poor souls on the receiving end?
Note
I am not for one millisecond suggesting any one specific service was flying those low flying Harriers, this was a joint operation flown by some VERY brave pilots from all of our armed services.
Apologies if I am not that coherent but hopefully folks can struggle through my witterings.
I think we all agree that those flag officers supported those missions, do you seriously believe they would say anything other than that? This was a joint operation and NO ONE should be trying to score points at the expense of the maximum effort against the common foe.
I get very tired of those that try to drive a wedge between the different services it is uncalled for and plain wrong. We should all pull together and perhaps try to find nice things to say instead of petty bickering. Those missions were RAF missions and unless they DIRECTLY interfered with the Navy side of the operation then of course the Admirals would say what they did.
What is being suggested by some folks is that just under 14,000,000Ibs of aviation fuel might have been an expensive price for the grand total of one dumb iron bomb hitting a concrete runway! (7 x 1.94million) If the RAF were happy with that then fine, but we could not supply enough aviation fuel to Wideawake and were acquiring it from our allies. Don't forget that those operations were taking up every single tanker in theatre which meant no other long range mission could be flown from that location until those tankers and their crews became available. No important crucial spare parts or equipment, no extended Nimrod surveillance flights. All these things had to wait until all those aircraft had returned and had all the necessary servicing carried out before getting these urgent items down to the fleet.
As I keep saying, if the RAF were happy with this and no valuable supplies or equipment were delayed getting down south then fine but I will tactfully suggest that the issue of resupplying the battle group may well have been an operational game stopper and perhaps a quiet word 'might' have been whispered in the higher corridors of that concrete frigate HMS Warrior. A quiet word in private whilst publicly toeing the quite correct party line. that is the way to conduct a war and I for one will suggest this is the way to conduct business.
There were numerous 'Daring' air missions by all three services and my own thoughts are this specific one was an amazing administrative exercise but I cannot get my head around its drain on valuable resources and how anyone can rate this specific operation as being the MOST 'daring' of them all, it just seems so wrong. (In my personal opinion)
We have seen how close air support missions flown by the Harriers might have been a far far greater morale killer and who knows the effects of the naval gunfire that kept the occupying force awake at night. The locals at Stanley were allegedly just curious about the Vulcan bombs thumping into the grass... at night, with nothing to see where they were from, they could have been weaponry from air, land or sea??? There was also lots of large guns keeping the locals awake and amongst those bangs we are asked to accept that a few extra exploding dumb bombs were going to have a significant effect on morale?? How does that compare with a daylight raid by Harriers that come screaming in at a great rate of knots at low level with rockets flying through the air. The noise of those aircraft is enough to get some soldiers messing their pants, the exploding rockets will perhaps just add to their fear.
I personally would suggest the latter will have a far greater effect on those poor souls on the receiving end?
Note
I am not for one millisecond suggesting any one specific service was flying those low flying Harriers, this was a joint operation flown by some VERY brave pilots from all of our armed services.
Apologies if I am not that coherent but hopefully folks can struggle through my witterings.
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How does that compare with a daylight raid by Harriers that come screaming in at a great rate of knots at low level with rockets flying through the air.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
As I keep saying, if the RAF were happy with this and no valuable supplies or equipment were delayed getting down south then fine but I will tactfully suggest that the issue of resupplying the battle group may well have been an operational game stopper and perhaps a quiet word 'might' have been whispered in the higher corridors of that concrete frigate HMS Warrior.
Admiral Fieldhouse had to decide if he wanted long range Naval surveillance , Vulcan operations or Hercules drops to ships.
the relative priority that had to be juggled between demands of Vulcan, Nimrod and Hercules operations; and the physical limitations imposed by fuel stocks and parking space at Wideawake Airfield ……………………………………….We therefore had to balance the need for seven tankers to support long range Nimrod reconnaissance against a Hercules spares run to the fleet which required rather less, and the 100% tanking effort demanded by a bombing sortie
Just to refresh, actual BB missions were flown on 30 Apr, 3 May, 31 May 3 Jun and 12 Jun. Two others were planned with one scrubbed and one recalled. Hardly intensive operations that could interfere with the Task Force. The first two raids predated the Pebble Island raid by at least 10 days and the 3rd was after Goose Green. The 5th was on Stanley just before the surrender and "bombs were supposed to detonate in mid-air, not to explode at impact" which would have exerted even more pressure as the land forces pressed in on Stanley - certainly combined ops.
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Ken Scott
"that had a very positive effect on British morale, certainly at home as I remember it. The effect on Argentine public opinion would have been the opposite I'm sure."
+1
Not too sure why Thomas said the following.
"Incredible waste of time and effort. A massive PR blunder if you ask me."
.
"that had a very positive effect on British morale, certainly at home as I remember it. The effect on Argentine public opinion would have been the opposite I'm sure."
+1
Not too sure why Thomas said the following.
"Incredible waste of time and effort. A massive PR blunder if you ask me."
.
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Hi Pontious
I certainly do not disagree with any of your points, the BB raids would as we all accept take a huge degree of planning and as you rightly point out there were not many of them, but can we just say those raids took place on that one specific date and the tankers would be available for operations for all the other periods? (question NOT a statement)
Getting every single tanker asset available for a raid on the 33rd day of the month will require all those aircraft to be fully operational, fuelled up and ready to roll on that date, so how long would that take to ensure they were all on the ground, all serviceable and all ready to roll on the 33rd?? What are the ramifications for any long range missions for the preceding days of those missions?
Hopefully you can understand those questions as all tankers were required for these missions and to get them all available on the apron ready to roll on one specific date may well take time? I am just trying to get a grasp of the mechanics to organise what I personally call an amazingly complex operation. Apologies to orca for not developing his interesting part of the question and a thousand apologies to any of the crews that took part in these BB missions, I have TOTAL respect for what you did and hopefully we all accept I am NOT suggesting anything other than that these were pushing the realms of capability to the very edges of our expertise?
Apologies for being a bit slow Pontious but are you confirming what I have said or are you querying it?
That is what I said 
and fingers crossed we are all in agreement with that point.
I am NOT against these missions, never have been, never will be. They demonstrated a capability and I keep saying my only issue is with the 'Most Daring' suggestion.
Ken Scott
Yes those low fling missions did expose those brave pilots to small arms fire and and the very real risk of being shot down...., That is sadly what did happen to a few unlucky pilots. Hence you will NEVER hear me criticise the bravery, professionalism and courage of all aircrew and again I repeat that is why I query the title of this thread. I am NOT belittling the Vulcan raid, I am simply in the corner that states they feel other raids\missions may have been more daring!
Hopefully I have clarified my position and I wonder if the senior officer in command of organising these BB missions was getting Green Shield stamps for every gallon of aviation fuel or did they collect the Esso World Cup coins....
I certainly do not disagree with any of your points, the BB raids would as we all accept take a huge degree of planning and as you rightly point out there were not many of them, but can we just say those raids took place on that one specific date and the tankers would be available for operations for all the other periods? (question NOT a statement)
Getting every single tanker asset available for a raid on the 33rd day of the month will require all those aircraft to be fully operational, fuelled up and ready to roll on that date, so how long would that take to ensure they were all on the ground, all serviceable and all ready to roll on the 33rd?? What are the ramifications for any long range missions for the preceding days of those missions?
Hopefully you can understand those questions as all tankers were required for these missions and to get them all available on the apron ready to roll on one specific date may well take time? I am just trying to get a grasp of the mechanics to organise what I personally call an amazingly complex operation. Apologies to orca for not developing his interesting part of the question and a thousand apologies to any of the crews that took part in these BB missions, I have TOTAL respect for what you did and hopefully we all accept I am NOT suggesting anything other than that these were pushing the realms of capability to the very edges of our expertise?
Apologies for being a bit slow Pontious but are you confirming what I have said or are you querying it?
Originally Posted by Pontious
The Admiral had to decide - not the RAF.
and fingers crossed we are all in agreement with that point. I am NOT against these missions, never have been, never will be. They demonstrated a capability and I keep saying my only issue is with the 'Most Daring' suggestion.
Ken Scott
Yes those low fling missions did expose those brave pilots to small arms fire and and the very real risk of being shot down...., That is sadly what did happen to a few unlucky pilots. Hence you will NEVER hear me criticise the bravery, professionalism and courage of all aircrew and again I repeat that is why I query the title of this thread. I am NOT belittling the Vulcan raid, I am simply in the corner that states they feel other raids\missions may have been more daring!
Hopefully I have clarified my position and I wonder if the senior officer in command of organising these BB missions was getting Green Shield stamps for every gallon of aviation fuel or did they collect the Esso World Cup coins....
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Right I am not usually a poster on this forum but some of the attacks on the success of this raid are starting to irritate especially as they appear to be more born out of Dark Blue vs Light Blue service rivalry! All the old hackneyed reasons for why it shouldn't be seen as a success have come out:
They missed the runway (they didn't)
They only got one bomb on the runway (As planned getting NO BOMBS on the runway could still be a success)
The Harriers could of done better (it would of required all of them to fly low over the base and they didn't have the payload or fuel for the same effect)
In the context of how the raid was planned it was an utter success, people seem to think the Vulcan was somehow meant to fly down the runway and drop the whole stick along its length...that just isn't how the mission was planned! As planned the aircraft dropped the stick at a 35 degree angle to the runway the intention being to actually straddle it as close to the middle as possible (thats how no bombs hitting can still be classed as a success). The whole point is for the bombs to come in steep and bury themselves in the ground before exploding...this will then cause subsidence making the runway unsafe for fast jet operations. This is EXACTLY what happened with Black Buck 1, they came in and managed to clip the runway almost bang on the centre as planned.
In the end we can conclude after the event that the Argies didn't plan to operate jets off the runway but at the time we didn't know that. Whilst the Mirages and Daggers couldn't safely operate off the runway at Stanley the Skyhawks of the Airforce and the Navy might of, operating off the Falklands they could of been far more dangerous! Considering that unknown it was entirely reasonable having a stab at the runway and the taskforce commander was all up for if it added further confusion to the Argentine defenders! The Vulcan was the best way to effect that, all the Harriers of the task force would of had to fly directly over the airfield at lower level to drop the same tonnage of bombs and with less effect then the stick dropped at higher altitude by the Vulcan.
Black Buck got one bomb on the runway...yes but considering that falls exactly within the mission plan they should be given a bit more praise then unfair stick!
They missed the runway (they didn't)
They only got one bomb on the runway (As planned getting NO BOMBS on the runway could still be a success)
The Harriers could of done better (it would of required all of them to fly low over the base and they didn't have the payload or fuel for the same effect)
In the context of how the raid was planned it was an utter success, people seem to think the Vulcan was somehow meant to fly down the runway and drop the whole stick along its length...that just isn't how the mission was planned! As planned the aircraft dropped the stick at a 35 degree angle to the runway the intention being to actually straddle it as close to the middle as possible (thats how no bombs hitting can still be classed as a success). The whole point is for the bombs to come in steep and bury themselves in the ground before exploding...this will then cause subsidence making the runway unsafe for fast jet operations. This is EXACTLY what happened with Black Buck 1, they came in and managed to clip the runway almost bang on the centre as planned.
In the end we can conclude after the event that the Argies didn't plan to operate jets off the runway but at the time we didn't know that. Whilst the Mirages and Daggers couldn't safely operate off the runway at Stanley the Skyhawks of the Airforce and the Navy might of, operating off the Falklands they could of been far more dangerous! Considering that unknown it was entirely reasonable having a stab at the runway and the taskforce commander was all up for if it added further confusion to the Argentine defenders! The Vulcan was the best way to effect that, all the Harriers of the task force would of had to fly directly over the airfield at lower level to drop the same tonnage of bombs and with less effect then the stick dropped at higher altitude by the Vulcan.
Black Buck got one bomb on the runway...yes but considering that falls exactly within the mission plan they should be given a bit more praise then unfair stick!