'Falklands' Most Daring Raid'
Suspicion breeds confidence
Thank you PN. The issue was always one of demonstrating "reach". The fact that we had a navy that could travel 8k miles and the RAF that could do the same which was a much harder achievement IMHO would have seriously upset their command. Creating uncertainty goes a long way to winning a war.
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PN,
I agree that it was a statement of intent - I am not so keen to call it capability.
I believe it was a great effort and anything that could have been thrown at the enemy should have been.
That being said I don't think it demonstrated an ability to strike the mainland in strength.
So for me the jury remains out on the effect. Were the Argentinians so scared of our ability to get a single bomber that far that they significantly changed the game plan?
I agree that it was a statement of intent - I am not so keen to call it capability.
I believe it was a great effort and anything that could have been thrown at the enemy should have been.
That being said I don't think it demonstrated an ability to strike the mainland in strength.
So for me the jury remains out on the effect. Were the Argentinians so scared of our ability to get a single bomber that far that they significantly changed the game plan?
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Why weren't the Vulcans for the later Black Buck Shrike raids fitted with the bomb bay fuel tanks from 27 Squadron's MRR Vulcans?
They must have been available as they were later used in the tanker conversion.
If a couple of airframes had been fitted with them, presumably things would have been rather easier
They must have been available as they were later used in the tanker conversion.
If a couple of airframes had been fitted with them, presumably things would have been rather easier
Suspicion breeds confidence
The Grupo 8 Mirages if my memory still serves me were based at Trelew in Northern Argentina they were subsequently moved to Rio Gallegos. The main problem was their Matra 530 missile which was not effective against small fast moving targets (think Phoenix) the other problem was that they had a very simple monopulse radar which when overland in a look down position could deliver nothing. Once they came down to play they were toast to the AIM-9L.
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I can find documentation saying the Grupo 8 Mirage III EA were based in two locations, Comodoro Rivadavia and Rio Gallegos, both to the south of BA by quite a way. That's not to discount the earlier post saying three were based in BA itself - or your memory Navaleye. I think Rivadavia was actually their C2 node for the FAS so to defend it would make sense.
As far as I can work out there were 17 Mirage III EA originally but 2 were twin seaters. Of the 15 war goers 2 were splashed on day one. (One by Sea Jet the other damaged and then splashed by friendly AAA) So as of May 1 the FAA would be down to 13 total, does anyone have an idea as to their availability rate?
The other tactical consideration is that of OCA sweep when attacking ships. Ships have a MEZ around them, OCA has to sweep around or over the MEZ if it has no SEAD. Medium level sweep into a Sea Dart MEZ would be an incredibly silly idea (as demonstrated later by Learjet). Prior to the landings it made sense to try to attrit Sea Harriers outside the RN MEZ. This wasn't possible for the FAA chaps over San Carlos as their strikers had to penetrate the MEZ to deliver the weapons. Low level sweep through San Carlos would have been incredibly high risk.
The only platform it might have been worth sweeping for would be the Super-E, but that would have given away the element of surprise.
It seems to me that some Mirage III EA were fragged for DCA duties, I wonder if any Argentinian readers could expand on whether this was due to there being no point sweeping for the strikers, Blackbuck, attrition or fuel load?
As far as I can work out there were 17 Mirage III EA originally but 2 were twin seaters. Of the 15 war goers 2 were splashed on day one. (One by Sea Jet the other damaged and then splashed by friendly AAA) So as of May 1 the FAA would be down to 13 total, does anyone have an idea as to their availability rate?
The other tactical consideration is that of OCA sweep when attacking ships. Ships have a MEZ around them, OCA has to sweep around or over the MEZ if it has no SEAD. Medium level sweep into a Sea Dart MEZ would be an incredibly silly idea (as demonstrated later by Learjet). Prior to the landings it made sense to try to attrit Sea Harriers outside the RN MEZ. This wasn't possible for the FAA chaps over San Carlos as their strikers had to penetrate the MEZ to deliver the weapons. Low level sweep through San Carlos would have been incredibly high risk.
The only platform it might have been worth sweeping for would be the Super-E, but that would have given away the element of surprise.
It seems to me that some Mirage III EA were fragged for DCA duties, I wonder if any Argentinian readers could expand on whether this was due to there being no point sweeping for the strikers, Blackbuck, attrition or fuel load?
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'Capability' did exactly what Navaleye said, it demonstrated 'reach'.
That being said I don't think it demonstrated an ability to strike the mainland in strength.
There was a similar issue in 1964-65 in Confrontation. Admittedly this was only 19 years after first use and by 1982 the world had moved on a little when it came to sabre rattling.
There is some evidence to believe that Indonesia did not discount the threat from nuclear armed V-bombers. Who would pit just 4 Vulcans against an archipeligo of some 3000 miles in extent.
Similarly could Argentina discount a tactical nuke? You cannot apply our logic and thought processes to another culture. Remember also that they were not privvy to the AAR Plan. Even in 1982 I suspect that many people would have credited the Vulcan with a far greater range capability than it actually possessed.
Regarding the hole on the edge of the runway, I read somewhere that the Arg 'removed' the bomb crater spoil at night and replaced it come the dawn thus preserving an appearance of a crippled runway.
I have just ordered a copy of Air War South Atlantic Price and Ethell specialise in presenting a balanced opponents view although I suspect they may not throw any light on this matter.
due to there being no point sweeping for the strikers, Blackbuck, attrition or fuel load?
The only way to have engaged subsequent BB sorties successfully would have been either costly CAP or timely intelligence and some form of radar controlled intercept. The low and practically random sortie rate would have presented a very low chance of a successful engagement.
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The real value of the BLACKBUCK raids was that it added another problem to the many the ARgie defenders had -
Keeping a load of people up all night, every night, looking for vulcans is probably as valuable as actually hitting the runway - and you have to keep the radar switched on - which makes identifying it for Harrier strikes all that much easier
Keeping a load of people up all night, every night, looking for vulcans is probably as valuable as actually hitting the runway - and you have to keep the radar switched on - which makes identifying it for Harrier strikes all that much easier
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I still maintain that they were fully aware of the aircraft we had on the ground at Ascension and feel it might be wishful thinking to assume there were lots of sleepless nights worrying about an alleged long range bomber attack.
If all the tanker force were observed lifting off then an estimated time of arrival could be assumed and would we then assume a suitable defensive action be taken. We might have contained their warships in their home ports but that does not stop them from using all their electronic equipment to help detect aircraft entering their airspace although some equipment might have got the local residents complaining!
If only they did, then would the Shrike missions have been more successful?
If all the tanker force were observed lifting off then an estimated time of arrival could be assumed and would we then assume a suitable defensive action be taken. We might have contained their warships in their home ports but that does not stop them from using all their electronic equipment to help detect aircraft entering their airspace although some equipment might have got the local residents complaining!
and you have to keep the radar switched on - which makes identifying it for Harrier strikes all that much easier
The Mirage IIIEA were bought in two batches, the first one in 1971 and the second in 1978.
The first batch (10 aircraft) was capable of lunching the Matra 530 missile only.
The second batch (7 aircraft single seater) was also capable of lunching the Matra 550 Magic I, but those missiles were deliver just before the war in March 1982.
So the MIIIEA pilots didn't have any training in operating those missiles and only 7 aircraft were capable of lunching it.
The Argentine Air Force deployed its MIIIEA in two bases, Comodoro Rivadavia AFB and Rio Gallegos AFB.
But only the Rio Gallegos AFB was lunching MIIIEA missions to Malvinas.
Very few missions were flown armed with the MATRA 530 located in the center pylon.
The first mission on the May 1st, both MIIIEA were armed using a single MATRA 530, 2 MATRA 550 Magic I and the 2 DEFA 30 mm.
Both MIIIEA were radar vectored to a pair of SHR but the Cyrano IIbis couldn't lock any target flying below...so it was useless.
That's why the Argentine Air Force decided to retired the MATRA 530 because was causing drag and more fuel consuption without any real chance of hitting anything.
The first batch (10 aircraft) was capable of lunching the Matra 530 missile only.
The second batch (7 aircraft single seater) was also capable of lunching the Matra 550 Magic I, but those missiles were deliver just before the war in March 1982.
So the MIIIEA pilots didn't have any training in operating those missiles and only 7 aircraft were capable of lunching it.
The Argentine Air Force deployed its MIIIEA in two bases, Comodoro Rivadavia AFB and Rio Gallegos AFB.
But only the Rio Gallegos AFB was lunching MIIIEA missions to Malvinas.
Very few missions were flown armed with the MATRA 530 located in the center pylon.
The first mission on the May 1st, both MIIIEA were armed using a single MATRA 530, 2 MATRA 550 Magic I and the 2 DEFA 30 mm.
Both MIIIEA were radar vectored to a pair of SHR but the Cyrano IIbis couldn't lock any target flying below...so it was useless.
That's why the Argentine Air Force decided to retired the MATRA 530 because was causing drag and more fuel consuption without any real chance of hitting anything.
Regarding how to name the islands (about Lighting Mate post), the UN suggests that could be named Falklands/Malvinas if were named in an english language context and Malvinas/Falklands in spanish.
Moving forward from that (I think arguments regarding that are elsewhere here), Blackbuck raids (specially the first one) were more important than delivering bombs to the target.
With Vulcan capabilities on mind, Argentine defenses were re-deployed and time and resource consuming measures were taken to minimize the effects of a bombing mission in the mainland: From darkening cities to redeploying radars, to rehearsing scattering planes (and actually happening those some times due to false alarms) and, the more important thing, to maintain alert planes on the runway (the few Mirage IIIEAs)
In my humble opinion, Blackbuck missions had a very limited military value, but a tremendous effect on the strategic planning from the Argentine side.
On a side note, Argentine had timely intelligence about planes departing from Ascension Island and its payload (specially the Shrikes mission) I don´t know how it was obtained, but war diaries of the Argentine radar on island and defense positions in the mainlad reflects that.
Regards,
Moving forward from that (I think arguments regarding that are elsewhere here), Blackbuck raids (specially the first one) were more important than delivering bombs to the target.
With Vulcan capabilities on mind, Argentine defenses were re-deployed and time and resource consuming measures were taken to minimize the effects of a bombing mission in the mainland: From darkening cities to redeploying radars, to rehearsing scattering planes (and actually happening those some times due to false alarms) and, the more important thing, to maintain alert planes on the runway (the few Mirage IIIEAs)
In my humble opinion, Blackbuck missions had a very limited military value, but a tremendous effect on the strategic planning from the Argentine side.
On a side note, Argentine had timely intelligence about planes departing from Ascension Island and its payload (specially the Shrikes mission) I don´t know how it was obtained, but war diaries of the Argentine radar on island and defense positions in the mainlad reflects that.
Regards,
The Black Buck raids may have had little physical impact on the runway at Stanley which was rapidly repaired but they had a substantial impact on the morale of the Argentine troops based there.
As for the name of the place, they are the Falkland Islands!
As for the name of the place, they are the Falkland Islands!
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PN,
No you completely misunderstand me. The point is that for Blackbuck to have had an effect we would have to demonstrate the fact that FAA jets supposed to be doing one thing were stopped and made to do another.
i.e. Fighters fragged for OCA sweep in support of the strikers would be re-tasked with DCA. The point is that if the fighters couldn't mount an effective sweep (looking for FRS 1 - nor Vulcan!) then there was no point sending them to do it. Thus they could be put on DCA. This is convenient - but it might not have been Blackbuck which forced their hand.
Another point raised is important. No-one should have been looking for Vulcans. They would have been looking for Vulcan. Very important distinction in my mind. Reach I will grant you, but with a single bomber? I am not as convinced as some that we were demonstrating much. (My opinion is irrelevant, as is that of all British people. If the Argentinians thought we were demonstrating reach then BB was a success.)
Next genuine question. By 'forcing' the Argentinians to keep their radar switched on - how exactly was it made vulnerable to attack from VSTOL aircraft?
And lastly - the interesting bit.
Marcantile, this is exactly what I was hoping for. How many fighters were dispersed and kept on high readiness? Why were there blackouts but the jets seem to have been kept well to the south of Buenos Aires? Did the Argetinians think that more than one Vulcan would come? What targets did the Argentinians think it could hit? Which were actually defended? Were the Mirage III thought unsuitable to go to the islands after 1 May because they lost to the FRS1?
As I have said before it is the Argentinian point of view that matters - the British view of capability, reach, non-kinetic effect etc is purely supposition without proof of what actually changed in the Argentinian plan.
Thanks everyone, very interesting thread.
VP-F and Dan Winterland, both of you mention the impact on morale. What is your source? Being bombed is horrendous (if 107mm fire is anyting to go by) but BB only put two sticks of bombs into a limited amount of real estate. Are you speaking for all troops on the island or just those at the airport? I have read some accounts of the infantry fighting that would suggest the morale in some Argentinian units was very good. This is also very interesting - thank you.
No you completely misunderstand me. The point is that for Blackbuck to have had an effect we would have to demonstrate the fact that FAA jets supposed to be doing one thing were stopped and made to do another.
i.e. Fighters fragged for OCA sweep in support of the strikers would be re-tasked with DCA. The point is that if the fighters couldn't mount an effective sweep (looking for FRS 1 - nor Vulcan!) then there was no point sending them to do it. Thus they could be put on DCA. This is convenient - but it might not have been Blackbuck which forced their hand.
Another point raised is important. No-one should have been looking for Vulcans. They would have been looking for Vulcan. Very important distinction in my mind. Reach I will grant you, but with a single bomber? I am not as convinced as some that we were demonstrating much. (My opinion is irrelevant, as is that of all British people. If the Argentinians thought we were demonstrating reach then BB was a success.)
Next genuine question. By 'forcing' the Argentinians to keep their radar switched on - how exactly was it made vulnerable to attack from VSTOL aircraft?
And lastly - the interesting bit.
Marcantile, this is exactly what I was hoping for. How many fighters were dispersed and kept on high readiness? Why were there blackouts but the jets seem to have been kept well to the south of Buenos Aires? Did the Argetinians think that more than one Vulcan would come? What targets did the Argentinians think it could hit? Which were actually defended? Were the Mirage III thought unsuitable to go to the islands after 1 May because they lost to the FRS1?
As I have said before it is the Argentinian point of view that matters - the British view of capability, reach, non-kinetic effect etc is purely supposition without proof of what actually changed in the Argentinian plan.
Thanks everyone, very interesting thread.
VP-F and Dan Winterland, both of you mention the impact on morale. What is your source? Being bombed is horrendous (if 107mm fire is anyting to go by) but BB only put two sticks of bombs into a limited amount of real estate. Are you speaking for all troops on the island or just those at the airport? I have read some accounts of the infantry fighting that would suggest the morale in some Argentinian units was very good. This is also very interesting - thank you.
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Impact on morale......what is more likely to affect morale - a) an occasional bomb dropped from mega height which will probably miss or b) nightly pin-point air-burst 4.5" shells right over the tented camps, gun and radar positions etc???
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No you completely misunderstand me. The point is that for Blackbuck to have had an effect we would have to demonstrate the fact that FAA jets supposed to be doing one thing were stopped and made to do another.
i.e. Fighters fragged for OCA sweep in support of the strikers would be re-tasked with DCA. The point is that if the fighters couldn't mount an effective sweep (looking for FRS 1 - nor Vulcan!) then there was no point sending them to do it. Thus they could be put on DCA. This is convenient - but it might not have been Blackbuck which forced their hand..
i.e. Fighters fragged for OCA sweep in support of the strikers would be re-tasked with DCA. The point is that if the fighters couldn't mount an effective sweep (looking for FRS 1 - nor Vulcan!) then there was no point sending them to do it. Thus they could be put on DCA. This is convenient - but it might not have been Blackbuck which forced their hand..
I assume OCA to be the sweep as you say looking to take the air battle to the Navy who would have to deal with both sweep and strike. Am I right in assuming you mean DCA being tasked to cover the mainland?
I would agree that OCA, as an independent mission, would probably have had a low probability of success unless the SHAR went up to play. As escort/sweep then the OCA mission would have had a high probability of contact and probably essential for successful attack by the strikers.
I can now see where you are coming from if you consider AD assets over FI as exclusively OCA whereas I had considered AD assets over the FI to have a DCA mission.
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The morale aspect is interesting, however may I proffer the following?
The British strategy for re-taking the Falklands was that of unopposed amphibious landing followed by advance to contact and infantry battle.
I have read that the Argetinians suspected (as a result of USMC thinking) that the Brits would mount an opposed landing ivo Stanley itself.
But I tend to think that the infantry battles fought mainly at night were the crux of the conflict. Whoever won those won the war. It is possible that the Argentinians could have stopped them by disrupting the British supply chain or by sinking the amphibious shipping prior to disembarkation. So to me Stanley becomes a bit of a side show. It would not have been a side show had we managed to close it (through bombing, NGS etc) but we didn't and our strategy was not that of 'laying seige' because we had a time pressure from the South Atlantic winter. Thus the Argentinians had to win the air-sea battle at San Carlos or the battles in the mountains. The British had to win both.
From what I have seen of the battlefields the Argentinian infantry had decent kit, were fed (although accounts vary as to how well) and certainly never ran out of ammunition.
Maybe our Argentinian sources could reflect on the effect the bombing of Stanley had on those in defensive positions elsewhere? Other than the C-130 kill by FRS 1 were any re-supply flights cancelled or turned back due to CAP, NGS or bombing?
The British strategy for re-taking the Falklands was that of unopposed amphibious landing followed by advance to contact and infantry battle.
I have read that the Argetinians suspected (as a result of USMC thinking) that the Brits would mount an opposed landing ivo Stanley itself.
But I tend to think that the infantry battles fought mainly at night were the crux of the conflict. Whoever won those won the war. It is possible that the Argentinians could have stopped them by disrupting the British supply chain or by sinking the amphibious shipping prior to disembarkation. So to me Stanley becomes a bit of a side show. It would not have been a side show had we managed to close it (through bombing, NGS etc) but we didn't and our strategy was not that of 'laying seige' because we had a time pressure from the South Atlantic winter. Thus the Argentinians had to win the air-sea battle at San Carlos or the battles in the mountains. The British had to win both.
From what I have seen of the battlefields the Argentinian infantry had decent kit, were fed (although accounts vary as to how well) and certainly never ran out of ammunition.
Maybe our Argentinian sources could reflect on the effect the bombing of Stanley had on those in defensive positions elsewhere? Other than the C-130 kill by FRS 1 were any re-supply flights cancelled or turned back due to CAP, NGS or bombing?
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This forum has rather lost its way and become a deep discussion on the point of the raid rather than the ‘daring’ of the raid and its execution. For the Vulcan , Martin Withers and his crew achieved all that was expected of them, or rather that which was expected from a Vulcan crew since they were only the secondary team, thrown in the hot spot after a failure. The night refuels, which were as new to them as to the Victors and the complex formation procedures required high concentration in the cirrus of the South Atlantic. Some of the crews had to navigate using upside down North Atlantic charts as there were not enough South Atlantic charts. The refuels had to be on time and with correct transfers in spite of some equipment unserviceability. Fuel consumption turned out to be greater than predicted in the Vulcan causing rapid replanning of the recovery phase. Overall nothing like this operation had ever been planned let alone executed before and 75 aircrew had to get it right first time. Truly a Most Daring Raid.
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PN,
Sorry old chap, I was thinking of Mirage III in the OCA role sweeping for their strikers by taking on FRS 1 flying the DCA role over San Carlos.
The pickle for the OCA in this case is that they couldn't go in at medium level against the Sea Dart threat which would force them low, into the AAA and Sea Wolf MEZ, that those brave strikers were having such a hard time with.
Sorry old chap, I was thinking of Mirage III in the OCA role sweeping for their strikers by taking on FRS 1 flying the DCA role over San Carlos.
The pickle for the OCA in this case is that they couldn't go in at medium level against the Sea Dart threat which would force them low, into the AAA and Sea Wolf MEZ, that those brave strikers were having such a hard time with.
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There is also a difference as the 1000lb ers were, I believe, forged rather than cast and thus less effective as anti-personnel weapons. The potential for a random damage swathe over a mile long and a quarter wide, delivered in 6 seconds is. I suggest, a different order of magnitude from a number of accurately laid 4.5s.
The Sea Slug OTOH in an anti-personnel role was not designed to sooth them to sleep either.