'Falklands' Most Daring Raid'
500N wrote
Because he is still thinks that none of the Vulcan bombs did any damage to the runway.
RAF News, April 26th 2002, has a piece from retired Air Commodore John Davis. Davis was the first commander of the operations wing at RAF Stanley. In relation to the runway crater from the first Black Buck mission Davis wrote "This rogue crater required a succession of repairs amid what soon became high intensity air operations."
Not too sure why Thomas said the following.....
RAF News, April 26th 2002, has a piece from retired Air Commodore John Davis. Davis was the first commander of the operations wing at RAF Stanley. In relation to the runway crater from the first Black Buck mission Davis wrote "This rogue crater required a succession of repairs amid what soon became high intensity air operations."
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TEEJ
Thanks, that's interesting.
I can still remember the highs and lows of the conflict from a civilian perspective
as the BBC News came on each night and the papers in the morning.
Thanks, that's interesting.
I can still remember the highs and lows of the conflict from a civilian perspective
as the BBC News came on each night and the papers in the morning.
Considering the Vulcan was a Cold War Nuclear bomber, if it had been carrying its 'normal' cargo of instant sunshine, I don't think that not hitting the runway with 2 iron bombs would have made much difference to the destruction caused.
However, it was 1940's analogue driven technology, and even if it made no difference to the Argentine war effort, it certainly gave the British a lift.
And a bloody good beer call on the airfield when '607 returned.
ZH875 (see off crew for XM598 Black Buck 1)
However, it was 1940's analogue driven technology, and even if it made no difference to the Argentine war effort, it certainly gave the British a lift.
And a bloody good beer call on the airfield when '607 returned.
ZH875 (see off crew for XM598 Black Buck 1)
Well, I think the bombs of BB1 were less important than the message (we could hit the mainland...)
On the other hand why, if the Harriers could do better, the best anti-runway mission of the whole war was carried on May 1st? What happened with all the subsequent SHARs and Gr3 antirunway missions?
On the other hand why, if the Harriers could do better, the best anti-runway mission of the whole war was carried on May 1st? What happened with all the subsequent SHARs and Gr3 antirunway missions?
No problem, 500N.
Some additional info.
From
Letters to The Daily Telegraph - Telegraph
Some additional info.
RAF hit the target
Sir - Ewen Southby-Tailyour (Letters, May 5) is wrong in his description of the damage to the Stanley runway.
As Commander, Royal Engineers, I was responsible for its repair immediately after the surrender. There was one large crater caused by a 1,000lb bomb from the RAF Vulcan raid, and four smaller craters resulting from earlier Harrier attacks. (The Argentines had also created dummy craters to confuse our aerial reconnaissance.) Repairing the large crater and the large area of runway took about two weeks and 1,000 square metres of captured Argentine runway matting.
Lt Col Southby-Tailyour is, however, correct in stating that Argentine aircraft were able to continue to use the runway, despite the bombing raids, by temporarily backfilling the craters. This, perhaps, is why his "recce" did not spot the true extent of the damage.
Maj Gen G.W. Field (retd), Sedlescombe, East Sussex
Sir - Ewen Southby-Tailyour (Letters, May 5) is wrong in his description of the damage to the Stanley runway.
As Commander, Royal Engineers, I was responsible for its repair immediately after the surrender. There was one large crater caused by a 1,000lb bomb from the RAF Vulcan raid, and four smaller craters resulting from earlier Harrier attacks. (The Argentines had also created dummy craters to confuse our aerial reconnaissance.) Repairing the large crater and the large area of runway took about two weeks and 1,000 square metres of captured Argentine runway matting.
Lt Col Southby-Tailyour is, however, correct in stating that Argentine aircraft were able to continue to use the runway, despite the bombing raids, by temporarily backfilling the craters. This, perhaps, is why his "recce" did not spot the true extent of the damage.
Maj Gen G.W. Field (retd), Sedlescombe, East Sussex
Letters to The Daily Telegraph - Telegraph
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I think I differ only slightly from the above post.
The plan.
1. What the BB crews did was remarkable.
2. The plan, I believe was sound, why not demonstrate reach? It might show the enemy that his homeland was under threat. It might trick the enemy into thinking we actually planned to target the mainland.
3. The plan, I believe was sound, Woodward thought Stanley might operate jets - any way of denying the enemy this freedom of manoeuvre should be exploited.
3A. As part of a concerted Joint venture the bombs could deny the use of the airfield to slow movers and Tac AT. Good plan.
4. The plan, I believe was sound, no-one else really needed the gas or bombs.
5. The plan, I believe was sound, no-one likes being bombed and the raid was likely to result in a lowering of the morale of some Argentinian troops.
6. It would at least give the junta something to worry about and the Sun something to shout about.
Execution.
What the guys did was remarkable, be it co-ord, tanking or actually employing weapons.
Debrief.
Here's where I differ from some. I have been fed the effects of the raid for 30 years. My hobby is military history. I want to find out the truth. The truth simply cannot contain phrases like 'It must have.' what i have heard for 30 years has largely been supposition based on how we'd have felt if someone had done it to us. I am free to research and debate bomber command, Singapore, the many Afghan experiences the Uk has had. Why not cast an eye over BB in the cold light of day? How else do we learn?
So to take the points in order:
1. The crew did a magnificent job. Indisputable.
2. We definitely demonstrated reach to ourselves and there is evidence that a small number of AAF jets* were re-tasked to AD of the homeland vice attacking our chaps. This was a close run encounter, single sorties were important.
3. Evidence suggests that the enemy never did intend to use the runway for fast air. Oh well, how were we to know.
3A. We can claim a 'disrupt' here but no more. Oh well...thems the breaks.
4. Good plan, no-one ran out of gas or bombs.
5. In all probability it did lower the Argentine morale but maybe not amongst the frontline elements. We have no way of knowing because we are working off assumptions based on the observation of troops around Stanley.
6. I cannot speak for the junta as I can find no record of their discussions. The Sun definitely did shout.
* If we rule out the twin seaters, that couldn't get to the FI due fuel load, and the jets based at Tandil which is 200 nm south of BA (so suspect they were simply left there when Grupo 8 deployed) we have evidence to suggest 2/3 Dagger were based in BA that could have supported the war effort in the south. Probably enough to man a QRA pair. This is significant - every little helps - but not a game changer.
Summary. BB was a sound plan. To some it appears a poor investment, others have spent a long time claiming effects that don't necessarily stand up to scrutiny. No-one needed the assets it used and it did have some effect on the enemy. From an aircrew point of view (perhaps demonstrated by future aborts and low sortie rate) it is remarkable that the guys achieved what they did.
The plan.
1. What the BB crews did was remarkable.
2. The plan, I believe was sound, why not demonstrate reach? It might show the enemy that his homeland was under threat. It might trick the enemy into thinking we actually planned to target the mainland.
3. The plan, I believe was sound, Woodward thought Stanley might operate jets - any way of denying the enemy this freedom of manoeuvre should be exploited.
3A. As part of a concerted Joint venture the bombs could deny the use of the airfield to slow movers and Tac AT. Good plan.
4. The plan, I believe was sound, no-one else really needed the gas or bombs.
5. The plan, I believe was sound, no-one likes being bombed and the raid was likely to result in a lowering of the morale of some Argentinian troops.
6. It would at least give the junta something to worry about and the Sun something to shout about.
Execution.
What the guys did was remarkable, be it co-ord, tanking or actually employing weapons.
Debrief.
Here's where I differ from some. I have been fed the effects of the raid for 30 years. My hobby is military history. I want to find out the truth. The truth simply cannot contain phrases like 'It must have.' what i have heard for 30 years has largely been supposition based on how we'd have felt if someone had done it to us. I am free to research and debate bomber command, Singapore, the many Afghan experiences the Uk has had. Why not cast an eye over BB in the cold light of day? How else do we learn?
So to take the points in order:
1. The crew did a magnificent job. Indisputable.
2. We definitely demonstrated reach to ourselves and there is evidence that a small number of AAF jets* were re-tasked to AD of the homeland vice attacking our chaps. This was a close run encounter, single sorties were important.
3. Evidence suggests that the enemy never did intend to use the runway for fast air. Oh well, how were we to know.
3A. We can claim a 'disrupt' here but no more. Oh well...thems the breaks.
4. Good plan, no-one ran out of gas or bombs.
5. In all probability it did lower the Argentine morale but maybe not amongst the frontline elements. We have no way of knowing because we are working off assumptions based on the observation of troops around Stanley.
6. I cannot speak for the junta as I can find no record of their discussions. The Sun definitely did shout.
* If we rule out the twin seaters, that couldn't get to the FI due fuel load, and the jets based at Tandil which is 200 nm south of BA (so suspect they were simply left there when Grupo 8 deployed) we have evidence to suggest 2/3 Dagger were based in BA that could have supported the war effort in the south. Probably enough to man a QRA pair. This is significant - every little helps - but not a game changer.
Summary. BB was a sound plan. To some it appears a poor investment, others have spent a long time claiming effects that don't necessarily stand up to scrutiny. No-one needed the assets it used and it did have some effect on the enemy. From an aircrew point of view (perhaps demonstrated by future aborts and low sortie rate) it is remarkable that the guys achieved what they did.
Marcantilan wrote
The points were highlighted in David Morgan's book 'Dangerous Skies'
Also see post by 'Edmund Spencer'.
Post #357
http://www.pprune.org/aviation-histo...ml#post4929686
On the other hand why, if the Harriers could do better,....
Also see post by 'Edmund Spencer'.
Post #357
http://www.pprune.org/aviation-histo...ml#post4929686
Actually, we did try it! For a period of several days, may even have been a couple of weeks, we all carried a single 1000lb centreline bomb with a DA fuze of sorts on the way outbound from the carrier to the CAP station. The idea was to drop it over Stanley airfield at high level during the transit.
You can read about it in Sharkey's book and how it led to the greatest 'switch pigs' of the conflict. One of the difficulties in the Sea Harrier cockpit was that the 'pickle' button had several functions amongst which were missile firing, bomb release, camera run, acceptance of loft attack etc.
In the case of a bombs attack it was crucial to deselect the missiles, something Sharkey forgot during one of these bomb passes!! It also explains why John Leeming couldn't fire his missiles when behind an A4 (forgot to select) and ended up closing to one of the most spectacular guns kills of the conflict.
The Sea Harrier had absolutely no high level bomb aiming sight or capability whatsoever so the release point was ridiculously inaccurate. I have no idea where any of my bombs landed.One of the reasons Gordy Batt ended up dropping his free fall 1000lb bomb on the Narwhal was that he was carrying it after having passed over Stanley in bad weather and had been unable to sight the airfield. (Bloody good job it didn't go off!!!)'
You can read about it in Sharkey's book and how it led to the greatest 'switch pigs' of the conflict. One of the difficulties in the Sea Harrier cockpit was that the 'pickle' button had several functions amongst which were missile firing, bomb release, camera run, acceptance of loft attack etc.
In the case of a bombs attack it was crucial to deselect the missiles, something Sharkey forgot during one of these bomb passes!! It also explains why John Leeming couldn't fire his missiles when behind an A4 (forgot to select) and ended up closing to one of the most spectacular guns kills of the conflict.
The Sea Harrier had absolutely no high level bomb aiming sight or capability whatsoever so the release point was ridiculously inaccurate. I have no idea where any of my bombs landed.One of the reasons Gordy Batt ended up dropping his free fall 1000lb bomb on the Narwhal was that he was carrying it after having passed over Stanley in bad weather and had been unable to sight the airfield. (Bloody good job it didn't go off!!!)'
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Irrespective of the rights/wrongs success/failure debate as to whether the raids achieved anything, what everyone forgets is that we scored a spectacular own-goal with the first raid
Within days the UK press was full of detail as to how many tankers were required to mount the raid, thus making it clear to all that an attempt at anything more than a one-aircraft token (and probably suicidal) attack on the Argentine mainland was impossible
If their lordships had kept their mouths shut over the technicalities I'm sure the Argentines would have felt more restricted in their actions.
Within days the UK press was full of detail as to how many tankers were required to mount the raid, thus making it clear to all that an attempt at anything more than a one-aircraft token (and probably suicidal) attack on the Argentine mainland was impossible
If their lordships had kept their mouths shut over the technicalities I'm sure the Argentines would have felt more restricted in their actions.
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Interesting post there, TEEEJ. The button that sat under the right thumb did pretty much all those things in lots of jets. Sorry to hear of so many switch pigs from the guys that claim to have won the war.
[Written with QWI hat on]
[Written with QWI hat on]
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CM, nothing new there. Several years before at a fire power demo one F4 should have salvoed 6x1000lb HE. The other two aircraft dropped but he didn't.
As they didn't want to risk landing with 6 live 1000lb bombs and an unknown reason for a hangup they elected a safe jettison and cleared 3 dummy Sparrow, a strike camera, a SU pod (fully loaded), and 4 training SW.
It was not possible to determine the reason for the failure to drop but . . .
Then of course where the switches were indeed all in the correct positions - splash one Jag.
Or more recently when a Jag dropped all his practice bombs neatly package in the CBLS.
Happened all the time. Of course I never made a switch pigs much.
As they didn't want to risk landing with 6 live 1000lb bombs and an unknown reason for a hangup they elected a safe jettison and cleared 3 dummy Sparrow, a strike camera, a SU pod (fully loaded), and 4 training SW.
It was not possible to determine the reason for the failure to drop but . . .
Then of course where the switches were indeed all in the correct positions - splash one Jag.
Or more recently when a Jag dropped all his practice bombs neatly package in the CBLS.
Happened all the time. Of course I never made a switch pigs much.
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I've always considered Ward's Sidewinder shot a little odd as there should have been a 9L growling away shouldn't there? I understand the thinking of getting your bomb pylon live and then having a winder up just in case, but from there on the excuse matrix is bare.
I believe I am right in saying that Leeming didn't know you had to select the missile master panel (low behind the stick) on to fire the 9L. I think he was new to the aeroplane.
Morgan's book also tells of Gordie Batt having a loft brief prior to launch at night IIRC.
(Respect and RIP to both of the above)
When did the camera on/off move from pickle button to the nose wheel steering paddle switch? Anyone know?
I believe I am right in saying that Leeming didn't know you had to select the missile master panel (low behind the stick) on to fire the 9L. I think he was new to the aeroplane.
Morgan's book also tells of Gordie Batt having a loft brief prior to launch at night IIRC.
(Respect and RIP to both of the above)
When did the camera on/off move from pickle button to the nose wheel steering paddle switch? Anyone know?
Suspicion breeds confidence
The min/max ranges of an AIM-9 at 300ft are very close. I suspect this was the issue. All the more reason for ASRAAM with a much longer range.
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Navaleye - sorry, I was talking about the 'negligent discharge' one. Having thought a bit longer about it I think I'm right in saying that the 9L used to growl on selection but then cooled to a hiss and growled again at target acquisition.
Suspicion breeds confidence
Suspect what you are talking about is Finger Pigs due to fatigue. Happens a lot in combat conditions. Interesting that AIM-9 only got 28% in GW1. Suspect it was used wrong. Got 80%+ plus down south.
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Back to the Vulkan, thought this might be of interest, Roy Ewans obituary in the Telegraph.
Roy Ewans - Telegraph
Roy Ewans - Telegraph
21x 1000Lb HE bombs going rapidly one after the other in the dead of night must have done wonders for the moral and nerves of a mostly conscript army living in cold & damp conditions.
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LT, quite. It was quite spooky from 3 miles away in day time when we were expecting it. Worse than 8 or 9 salvoed IMHO.