'Falklands' Most Daring Raid'
I am gonna agree about the bravery of the Avro Vulcan flying all the way to Malvinas and back.
I am also agree about Argentine Military Commanders after the first Black Buck were very aware of the British capability of bombing any target at the continent.
But those rides did not make too much damage, the bomb crater was fix after one or two days.
In fact, the Vulcan, SHR and GR3 couldn't hit the runway strip after May 1st.
The Argentine Air Force C-130H and Argentine Navy L-188 Electra and Fokker F-28 kept supplying the Argentinian forces until the very end of the war.
The last C-130H supply mission was on the 13th.
For your information, the Avro Vulcan was targeted in its first ride by the Roland and the Oerlikon Contraves 35 mm radars, but the rules of engagement at that moment were ask to the Command post for shooting clearence before pressing the trigger. When they got the clearence the Avro Vulcan already dropped the bombs and it was out of range for firing or lunching.
That rule changed right after that bombing.
I am also agree about Argentine Military Commanders after the first Black Buck were very aware of the British capability of bombing any target at the continent.
But those rides did not make too much damage, the bomb crater was fix after one or two days.
In fact, the Vulcan, SHR and GR3 couldn't hit the runway strip after May 1st.
The Argentine Air Force C-130H and Argentine Navy L-188 Electra and Fokker F-28 kept supplying the Argentinian forces until the very end of the war.
The last C-130H supply mission was on the 13th.
For your information, the Avro Vulcan was targeted in its first ride by the Roland and the Oerlikon Contraves 35 mm radars, but the rules of engagement at that moment were ask to the Command post for shooting clearence before pressing the trigger. When they got the clearence the Avro Vulcan already dropped the bombs and it was out of range for firing or lunching.
That rule changed right after that bombing.
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Archimedes,
I don't understand your first point. I don't care who asked for or supported Blackbuck. I know what the UK view was. I have been reading about what Woodward et al wanted for 30 years. The point (as you put it) that we could bomb their soil is a British point. They may well have looked at the raids and dismissed the threat as minimal, they might have been scared witless. The point is I don't know what they thought and I am trying to find out!
My question was 'What was the Argentine view?' (which in fairness you go on to mention) without it you cannot begin to understand the raids' effect. I am very interested by what you say about the Mirage DCA and OCA, exactly what I was after - thank you. I understand it was actually a UK statement about not attacking the mainland which helped the FAA allot its fighters.
The Argentine C2 is interesting though. I read a USAF paper about it. Were the 8 Grupo Mirage allotted to FAS (southern air force - the formation tasked with striking the FI, newly formed as I understand) and then denied to it? Or were they allotted to FAS but apportioned to DCA vice OCA? The importance of course being whether or not they were anything to do with hostilities prior to Blackbuck. The FAA had to maintain its posture towards Chile of course, so not all assets were allotted to FAS.
You assume that it was Black Buck which led to the Argentines not extending the runway at Stanley. Based on what? The fact is they didn’t. I want to know why not, not hear a guess as to why not.
All very interesting.
Courtney,
I know what the guys did. We have all known for decades - helped along by the excellent Vulcan 607 book. They flew an amazingly long way, with an amazingly complex texaco plan, in some pretty unpleasant weather and did so pretty much from a standing start at the drop of a hat. Their skill, dedication and heroism is beyond doubt. But I for one have only ever been fed sweeping statements about the effect of the raids. I have never discovered sortie rates for OCA that drop dramatically post Blackbuck for example.
I have sometimes infuriated people with this - but one of my pathological hatreds is people who simply trot out perceived wisdom or regurgitate other people's opinions as fact. I only listen to people if they have accrued knowledge, subjected it to their own conscious thought and arrived at an opinion of their own. I would be an incredible hypocrite if I didn't do the same myself.
If you interpret my search for facts as criticism of the crews you are a long way off the mark. But I do understand the 'I was there, you weren't' school of thought at the tactical level at least.
I don't understand your first point. I don't care who asked for or supported Blackbuck. I know what the UK view was. I have been reading about what Woodward et al wanted for 30 years. The point (as you put it) that we could bomb their soil is a British point. They may well have looked at the raids and dismissed the threat as minimal, they might have been scared witless. The point is I don't know what they thought and I am trying to find out!
My question was 'What was the Argentine view?' (which in fairness you go on to mention) without it you cannot begin to understand the raids' effect. I am very interested by what you say about the Mirage DCA and OCA, exactly what I was after - thank you. I understand it was actually a UK statement about not attacking the mainland which helped the FAA allot its fighters.
The Argentine C2 is interesting though. I read a USAF paper about it. Were the 8 Grupo Mirage allotted to FAS (southern air force - the formation tasked with striking the FI, newly formed as I understand) and then denied to it? Or were they allotted to FAS but apportioned to DCA vice OCA? The importance of course being whether or not they were anything to do with hostilities prior to Blackbuck. The FAA had to maintain its posture towards Chile of course, so not all assets were allotted to FAS.
You assume that it was Black Buck which led to the Argentines not extending the runway at Stanley. Based on what? The fact is they didn’t. I want to know why not, not hear a guess as to why not.
All very interesting.
Courtney,
I know what the guys did. We have all known for decades - helped along by the excellent Vulcan 607 book. They flew an amazingly long way, with an amazingly complex texaco plan, in some pretty unpleasant weather and did so pretty much from a standing start at the drop of a hat. Their skill, dedication and heroism is beyond doubt. But I for one have only ever been fed sweeping statements about the effect of the raids. I have never discovered sortie rates for OCA that drop dramatically post Blackbuck for example.
I have sometimes infuriated people with this - but one of my pathological hatreds is people who simply trot out perceived wisdom or regurgitate other people's opinions as fact. I only listen to people if they have accrued knowledge, subjected it to their own conscious thought and arrived at an opinion of their own. I would be an incredible hypocrite if I didn't do the same myself.
If you interpret my search for facts as criticism of the crews you are a long way off the mark. But I do understand the 'I was there, you weren't' school of thought at the tactical level at least.
Suspicion breeds confidence
The Vulcan's bomb was not on the centre line of the runway, it just clipped the edge. Militarily it was was a pointless waste of resources and it stopped precisely nothing. The Argentinians had no plan to use that airfield as a military base because as it was unsuitable and could be shelled by British ships at night when their aircraft could not fly. They still used the airfield right up to the last night night for transport flights, so any claim that it made any difference to the local situation is complete crud. I seem to remember "one bomb Beetham" and even that missed. Great effort by all involved though. I'm not sure 30 years on it was worth it.
Last edited by Navaleye; 11th Mar 2012 at 01:03.
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Concur to a degree, but there may well be truth in the (oft peddled - rarely backed up) line that it diverted OCA assets to a DCA role on the main land.
This would be easy to quantify if we knew which units were reassigned to protect the main land vice sweep the Falkland Islands, where they were reassigned from, how much they flew and what they protected.
There may be other reasons for OCA being limited over the Falklands (other than distance and no AAR for Mirage and Dagger) but I'd like to know what they were - not just surmise what they might have been.
For example: It is plausible that the Argentinians didn't lengthen the runway at Stanley because they had no tractors and diggers, because they didn't use sea lift, because of the SSN threat - nothing to do with Blackbuck...but that would just be a uninformed guess. It might be that Blackbuck was the reason. But without talking to the Argentine airfield manager it's hard to find out.
This would be easy to quantify if we knew which units were reassigned to protect the main land vice sweep the Falkland Islands, where they were reassigned from, how much they flew and what they protected.
There may be other reasons for OCA being limited over the Falklands (other than distance and no AAR for Mirage and Dagger) but I'd like to know what they were - not just surmise what they might have been.
For example: It is plausible that the Argentinians didn't lengthen the runway at Stanley because they had no tractors and diggers, because they didn't use sea lift, because of the SSN threat - nothing to do with Blackbuck...but that would just be a uninformed guess. It might be that Blackbuck was the reason. But without talking to the Argentine airfield manager it's hard to find out.
Suspicion breeds confidence
If I may suggest an answer. They could not use Stanley airfield as a military airfield because they would have had to accept 500 50lb 4.5" dustbins landing on it every night. They knew that and would not take the risk. They were not daft. You would not put the best of your air force in un-protected positions exposed to enemy shelling. That's why they never tried it and they knew it.
Last edited by Navaleye; 11th Mar 2012 at 01:36.
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They couldn't have used it for fast air anyway, as far as I understand, due to the runway being so short. So they had the choice of either extending it, using it only for Pucara, C-130, Macchi and Turbomentor ops or not at all.
The pertinent fact is that they hadn't extended it prior to May 1, which they could have done had they really wanted to. From this I draw the conclusion that they didn't plan to use Stanley as a base for fast air. You may be right as to the reason why not.
I have read an interesting USMC analysis which points out that the deployment of the 'COIN aircraft' was questionable due to the high threat environment, but apparently their CAS skills were quite good, so possibly worth the risk.
The pertinent fact is that they hadn't extended it prior to May 1, which they could have done had they really wanted to. From this I draw the conclusion that they didn't plan to use Stanley as a base for fast air. You may be right as to the reason why not.
I have read an interesting USMC analysis which points out that the deployment of the 'COIN aircraft' was questionable due to the high threat environment, but apparently their CAS skills were quite good, so possibly worth the risk.
My first point, Orca, was to place the raid into some sort of wider context. Experience shows that if you don't do that, this sort of thread rapidly turns into a 'Bah! Bloody crabs! The RN had all the answers and the light blue were simply recerting to type' discussion, so making clear that it was a joint decision needs to be got in there early, othewise you get references to 'one bomb Beetham' which, with respect to NE, are unfair since Beetham is on record as telling the war cabinet that the limitations of the Vulcan's kit meant that he'd want at least 25 sorties to guarantee to them that the runway would be shut - because of the difficulty of getting enough bombs onto the runway. Also, I wanted to make clear that the view from the UK was that it didn't matter whether the Argentines realised that it might be only one bomber - one bomber was enough as far as their Lordships and 'Airships' were concerned.
We do not, as yet, have direct documentary evidence that the Argentine junta thought of permanent forward basing for their aircraft; nor has the supposition put to me by an Argentine officer of 1982 vintage that he thought the point was that Stanley might be used as a FOL for rearming and refuelling, plus for emergency landing (although the one Dagger which tried that was blown out of the sky in a blue on blue [or should that be 'Orange on Orange?]) with aircraft returning to the mainland at the end of the day been fully confirmed by written material.
We know the unit which had its DCA task increased at the expense of their OCA tasking - 8 Grupo. The unit's pilots say so in Middlebrook's book! Yes, their ability to conduct OCA was constrained by other factors, but the evidence is there, even if it is not from the Argentine archives. It may be that the chaps Middlebrook interviewed were entirely wrong, but that's all we have to go on so far, and there does not appear to have been a countervailing view provided to date. I would have to check, but I am fairly sure that any intimation that there would not be a raid on the mainland came some time later in the war. Again, as far as the Mirage pilots were concerned, they ended up placing greater emphasis on DCA post 1 May 1982.
We do not, as yet, have direct documentary evidence that the Argentine junta thought of permanent forward basing for their aircraft; nor has the supposition put to me by an Argentine officer of 1982 vintage that he thought the point was that Stanley might be used as a FOL for rearming and refuelling, plus for emergency landing (although the one Dagger which tried that was blown out of the sky in a blue on blue [or should that be 'Orange on Orange?]) with aircraft returning to the mainland at the end of the day been fully confirmed by written material.
We know the unit which had its DCA task increased at the expense of their OCA tasking - 8 Grupo. The unit's pilots say so in Middlebrook's book! Yes, their ability to conduct OCA was constrained by other factors, but the evidence is there, even if it is not from the Argentine archives. It may be that the chaps Middlebrook interviewed were entirely wrong, but that's all we have to go on so far, and there does not appear to have been a countervailing view provided to date. I would have to check, but I am fairly sure that any intimation that there would not be a raid on the mainland came some time later in the war. Again, as far as the Mirage pilots were concerned, they ended up placing greater emphasis on DCA post 1 May 1982.
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I've to say that I'm Argentinian and if you dont mind I'd like to offer some input on the subject.
I had a meeting with engineers recently who were based at FAA Rio Grande Base during the war, supporting the Daggers, and they told me that they performed some touch and gos with the Mirages to seize the possibility of using Stanley as an emergency runway for them. They never planned to operate from Stanley for the resons already posted.
As for the Vulcan mission, yes, it was there, did that but every argentinian book about the war emphatizes more in the labor of the Harriers in their bombing duties and the job of the battleships constantly aiming the runway. I honestly don't know what the junta was thinking on the matter, but to my knowledge there were 3 MIII in BA to protect the city even before the war started per se.
We're actually more intrigued by the SAS chopper mission to Rio Grande which ended in Chile and written off. There're lots of stories about that night but nothing concrete. Better not talk about it I guess.
Of course nothing can be 100% spot on, but I wanted to give my view on the matter.
I had a meeting with engineers recently who were based at FAA Rio Grande Base during the war, supporting the Daggers, and they told me that they performed some touch and gos with the Mirages to seize the possibility of using Stanley as an emergency runway for them. They never planned to operate from Stanley for the resons already posted.
As for the Vulcan mission, yes, it was there, did that but every argentinian book about the war emphatizes more in the labor of the Harriers in their bombing duties and the job of the battleships constantly aiming the runway. I honestly don't know what the junta was thinking on the matter, but to my knowledge there were 3 MIII in BA to protect the city even before the war started per se.
We're actually more intrigued by the SAS chopper mission to Rio Grande which ended in Chile and written off. There're lots of stories about that night but nothing concrete. Better not talk about it I guess.
Of course nothing can be 100% spot on, but I wanted to give my view on the matter.
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Archimedes,
Mate, we are arguing different points. You again address points that are well made but not anything to do with what the Argentines thought about the raids and therefore their effect. I understand your thinking but consider the British planners' opinion irrelevant.
I have read another source which deals with Grupo 8, although it refers to it as a brigade. It mentions that the Mirage III they used had less internal fuel than other aircraft so was used for medium to high ingress initially. It goes on to recount the early engagements where Grupo 8 lost a Mirage to a Sea Harrier and a damaged one to friendly AAA. They started out with 17 and lost 2 apparently - no where near the attrition suffered by other types. Do you concur or am I muddling brigades and grupos?
Which base did they fly from? I can find Mirage III at two locations.
So we have two plausible reasons for Grupo 8s re-task. The first being that the Argentinians genuinely wanted it to defend against Vulcan attack, the other that early encounters with DCA (flown by RN and RAF pilots), distance to the islands and (possibly) tank jettison making it un-employable as anything else.
Either, both or neither may be correct. Thanks for your input.
I have just read the post above, hence the edit. The presence of Mirage III in BA prior to Blackbuck is very interesting. One could either draw the conclusion that the FAA were mindful of the threat from the start or alternatively that the FAA didn't change anything due to the raids.
This is fascinating, thank you.
Mate, we are arguing different points. You again address points that are well made but not anything to do with what the Argentines thought about the raids and therefore their effect. I understand your thinking but consider the British planners' opinion irrelevant.
I have read another source which deals with Grupo 8, although it refers to it as a brigade. It mentions that the Mirage III they used had less internal fuel than other aircraft so was used for medium to high ingress initially. It goes on to recount the early engagements where Grupo 8 lost a Mirage to a Sea Harrier and a damaged one to friendly AAA. They started out with 17 and lost 2 apparently - no where near the attrition suffered by other types. Do you concur or am I muddling brigades and grupos?
Which base did they fly from? I can find Mirage III at two locations.
So we have two plausible reasons for Grupo 8s re-task. The first being that the Argentinians genuinely wanted it to defend against Vulcan attack, the other that early encounters with DCA (flown by RN and RAF pilots), distance to the islands and (possibly) tank jettison making it un-employable as anything else.
Either, both or neither may be correct. Thanks for your input.
I have just read the post above, hence the edit. The presence of Mirage III in BA prior to Blackbuck is very interesting. One could either draw the conclusion that the FAA were mindful of the threat from the start or alternatively that the FAA didn't change anything due to the raids.
This is fascinating, thank you.
Last edited by orca; 11th Mar 2012 at 03:41. Reason: Last post and this written simultaneously!
Orca,
Re your post #22, you are completely right. I may not have made myself completely clear, for which I applolgise. I didn't mean to use the "I was there, you weren't" argument. I meant to make it clear that I was in Ascension, but no associated with the raid. I simply saw a LOT of aircraft getting airborne, and recovering as singletons later. In some cases, much later.
And you are right, I do need to research more.
Re your post #22, you are completely right. I may not have made myself completely clear, for which I applolgise. I didn't mean to use the "I was there, you weren't" argument. I meant to make it clear that I was in Ascension, but no associated with the raid. I simply saw a LOT of aircraft getting airborne, and recovering as singletons later. In some cases, much later.
And you are right, I do need to research more.
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Courtney,
I am very envious. My favourite part in Vulcan 607 (I am deployed so cannot remember the names and pages exactly) is when it dawns on the head shed that all available gas has to go south as soon as possible. Which you must have seen.
The sinking 'I thought there was a tanker around here somewhere' feeling is a familiar one....as is the rush when one hoves into view...but to be trogging north over the Atlantic knowing that the texaco plan hasn't quite worked out and not knowing if your comms are getting through must have been awful.
I can't remember the name of the Victor captain I am thinking of but what a leadership situation to be in!
I am very envious. My favourite part in Vulcan 607 (I am deployed so cannot remember the names and pages exactly) is when it dawns on the head shed that all available gas has to go south as soon as possible. Which you must have seen.
The sinking 'I thought there was a tanker around here somewhere' feeling is a familiar one....as is the rush when one hoves into view...but to be trogging north over the Atlantic knowing that the texaco plan hasn't quite worked out and not knowing if your comms are getting through must have been awful.
I can't remember the name of the Victor captain I am thinking of but what a leadership situation to be in!
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What I take issue with is the title of the thread, it is just plain wrong for so many reasons and this is where I put my head right into the lion’s mouth… Did it have a significant influence, did it have any influence?
As a lay person looking at the planning behind this operation, it looks mind blowingly complex although to someone that does this day in, day out it might not be that bigger task??
Seventeen tankers to support one bomber appears to be a first in the history of the RAF and much respect for those involved but what we have to take into consideration is the enormous amount of fuel required, plus the huge requirements for admin, support, parking and no doubt a hundred and one other issues.
In other words it was eventually down to Admiral Woodhouse to decide between spare parts, extra equipment, Nimrod surveillance OR BLACK BUCK.
I include this quote to highlight the amazing efforts required to keep all aircraft replenished with fuel, fuel that was NOT readily available and not something we could supply. Our country owes a huge debt to our allies who, without hesitation gave us whatever we wanted although at times fuel became a huge problem and each BLACKBUCK mission used in excess of 244,000 Imperial gallons of fuel (1,955,000IB) Five BLACKBUCK plus two Shrike missions equates to an awful lot of that scarce commodity. Was it the best use of that fuel which at times was so low we were looking at just 24 hours of operational use before the tanker ran dry?
He then goes on to describe in great detail the harm that was done to aircraft by the very abrasive volcanic ash plus other debris that was being blasted into not just parked aircraft but also aircraft that were taxying behind other aircraft. Space at Wideawake was at a premium and no way could they afford to have aircraft parked up sitting on that parking apron for long periods of time.
Two points from that quote… Firstly I am positive that the Admiral was all in favour of BLACKBUCK as during the hours of darkness we were sneaking our warships as close in to Stanley as possible for a variety of missions. Any diversion would be greatly appreciated.
If it were a choice between much needed spares, or additional mission necessary equipment then I am guessing BLACK BUCK would be kicked in the ‘buck’ and NO senior Royal navy officer is EVER going to criticise operations carried out by our comrades in arms especially when we all needed to work as a well oiled team. Those islands would have been lost if we professionals had behaved in anything less than the way we did during that conflict... We showed the World just what we were capable of.
My thoughts on this so called ‘Most Daring Raid’ is that the planning, and mounting of this operation is worthy of commendation. Not so much for the aircrews (they were doing a job they were paid for) my pat on the back goes to the back room staff that might not have used the back of a cigarette packet, but none the less they never had today’s modern computers that would work out the complex issues that were involved. Okay, I accept they did use a pocket calculator purchased from Swaffenham Market for £4.95p
If we are talking about long range missions then straight away we should be looking at that trusty old steed the Hercules and what that aircraft managed to achieve under similar ‘war-time’ conditions. That aircraft was responsible for the carrying of spares, equipment, replacement or much needed personnel and the speeds that aircraft could manage meant a VERY long day at the office. Now correct me if I am wrong but during this period the only aircraft capable of refuelling this slow old bus was the much faster flying Victor! The only way the Hercules could match speeds was going downhill with a following wind!! Perhaps the following wind was not needed, but to achieve a fast enough speed to match the slowest possible speed of the Victor then yes both aircraft could NOT fly straight and level. Unlike the short Vulcan trip of maybe ‘just’ 16 hours, the Hercules crew were in that aircraft for a backside numbing TWENTY EIGHT HOURS!! Longest trip I believe was actually 28hrs and 3 minutes. Is that more ‘daring’ or more spectacular than the raids by the Vulcan? The Vulcan at least had a degree of speed on its side, the Hercules just had size!! No I object in so many ways to that title of most daring… My own nomination would be the ‘White Out’ rescue by the Wessex crew of HMS Antrim but I am positive there are other operations that were just as impressive.
Number 1 Squadron of the RAF really impressed members of the Parachute Regiment when the Harriers gave a whole new meaning to the word CLOSE air support. If those aircraft were not trimming the camouflage webbing off the helmets of those soldiers then they were not ‘close’ enough.
Even if the Argentine military decided to withdraw a few aircraft to protect the mainland then so what? During the conflict Sea Harriers destroyed (or partly destroyed) 28 enemy aircraft with no air combat losses. I do not want to make light of thatg statistic and it might have been taht if those few aircraft had stayed it MIGHT have made a difference but my personal thoughts are that the Sea Harriers were commanding the air and MUCH respect to all those pilots who we know wore both light and dark blue uniforms.
Are we pretending that our enemy did not have merchant ships off Ascension or that they were not aware of when aircraft were leaving that island and flying south? Are we forgetting how they also had there own Intelligence Gathering Boeng that was continually monitoring the SLOCS? My thoughts are that they may well have been counting them out and counting them back in! Theyh had ample time to take whatever precuations they deemed necessary to meet any possible threat to their mainland although I would NOT have recommended they sneak out any of their warships to deal with the possible threat of the incoming aircraft.
Seven missions in total and one iron bomb hitting the runway!! This long post is just asking the question was BLACK BUCK really necessary to help win that conflict or was it a demonstration of what could be done? In my opinion it most certainly could not be contemplated without the possibility of air cover and contrary to what is sometimes suggested the occupying force had detected the first in bound Vulcan but thankfully there was no enemy fighters in the vicinity that could pop along to exchange names and addresses .
All information quotes etc are in the public domain.
As a lay person looking at the planning behind this operation, it looks mind blowingly complex although to someone that does this day in, day out it might not be that bigger task??
Seventeen tankers to support one bomber appears to be a first in the history of the RAF and much respect for those involved but what we have to take into consideration is the enormous amount of fuel required, plus the huge requirements for admin, support, parking and no doubt a hundred and one other issues.
Originally Posted by Air Vice Marshal George Chesworth
Because of a shortage of parking space at Wideawake it was necessary to limit aircraft numbers based there. This dictated that aircraft not required for the immediate ORBAT had to leave the island for Gibralter, Dakar, or even on occasions the UK. Tasking priorities had to be established by the CinC two or three days in advance to allow time to reposition aircraft to fly the required sortie. Admiral Fieldhouse had to decide if he wanted long range Naval surveillance , Vulcan operations or Hercules drops to ships.
Originally Posted by Air Vice Marshal Ron Dick
Fuel storage at Wideawake had been designed to allow for little more than a weekly C-141 or two to service the US Tracking Station
Originally Posted by Group Captain Jeremy Price
I have already mentioned the existence of the 10000ft runway and the aircraft parking apron sufficient for twenty four large fixed wing aircraft. However the geography of the airfield and its facilities had a significant impact on the mounting of air operations. In particular the access to the runway, the nature of the surrounding areas, the supply of aviation fuel
Originally Posted by Air Marshal Sir John Curtis
Bearing in mind the Vulcan’s very dated systems and its iron bombs, weapon employment experts will tell you that in order to render a runway like the one at Port Stanley ‘unusable’ would have required some twenty five to thirty sorties so despite what critics may think, that single bomb was a pretty fair result. I spent the evening of the first BLACK BUCK operation with Admiral Fieldhouse, incidentally I can assure you that he was entirely in favour of the operation. Unfortunately our ability to replay the Vulcan card was limited by three crucial factors; the availability of flight refuelling tankers, the relative priority that had to be juggled between demands of Vulcan, Nimrod and Hercules operations; and the physical limitations imposed by fuel stocks and parking space at Wideawake Airfield ……………………………………….We therefore had to balance the need for seven tankers to support long range Nimrod reconnaissance against a Hercules spares run to the fleet which required rather less, and the 100% tanking effort demanded by a bombing sortie
If it were a choice between much needed spares, or additional mission necessary equipment then I am guessing BLACK BUCK would be kicked in the ‘buck’ and NO senior Royal navy officer is EVER going to criticise operations carried out by our comrades in arms especially when we all needed to work as a well oiled team. Those islands would have been lost if we professionals had behaved in anything less than the way we did during that conflict... We showed the World just what we were capable of.
My thoughts on this so called ‘Most Daring Raid’ is that the planning, and mounting of this operation is worthy of commendation. Not so much for the aircrews (they were doing a job they were paid for) my pat on the back goes to the back room staff that might not have used the back of a cigarette packet, but none the less they never had today’s modern computers that would work out the complex issues that were involved. Okay, I accept they did use a pocket calculator purchased from Swaffenham Market for £4.95p
If we are talking about long range missions then straight away we should be looking at that trusty old steed the Hercules and what that aircraft managed to achieve under similar ‘war-time’ conditions. That aircraft was responsible for the carrying of spares, equipment, replacement or much needed personnel and the speeds that aircraft could manage meant a VERY long day at the office. Now correct me if I am wrong but during this period the only aircraft capable of refuelling this slow old bus was the much faster flying Victor! The only way the Hercules could match speeds was going downhill with a following wind!! Perhaps the following wind was not needed, but to achieve a fast enough speed to match the slowest possible speed of the Victor then yes both aircraft could NOT fly straight and level. Unlike the short Vulcan trip of maybe ‘just’ 16 hours, the Hercules crew were in that aircraft for a backside numbing TWENTY EIGHT HOURS!! Longest trip I believe was actually 28hrs and 3 minutes. Is that more ‘daring’ or more spectacular than the raids by the Vulcan? The Vulcan at least had a degree of speed on its side, the Hercules just had size!! No I object in so many ways to that title of most daring… My own nomination would be the ‘White Out’ rescue by the Wessex crew of HMS Antrim but I am positive there are other operations that were just as impressive.
Number 1 Squadron of the RAF really impressed members of the Parachute Regiment when the Harriers gave a whole new meaning to the word CLOSE air support. If those aircraft were not trimming the camouflage webbing off the helmets of those soldiers then they were not ‘close’ enough.
Even if the Argentine military decided to withdraw a few aircraft to protect the mainland then so what? During the conflict Sea Harriers destroyed (or partly destroyed) 28 enemy aircraft with no air combat losses. I do not want to make light of thatg statistic and it might have been taht if those few aircraft had stayed it MIGHT have made a difference but my personal thoughts are that the Sea Harriers were commanding the air and MUCH respect to all those pilots who we know wore both light and dark blue uniforms.
Are we pretending that our enemy did not have merchant ships off Ascension or that they were not aware of when aircraft were leaving that island and flying south? Are we forgetting how they also had there own Intelligence Gathering Boeng that was continually monitoring the SLOCS? My thoughts are that they may well have been counting them out and counting them back in! Theyh had ample time to take whatever precuations they deemed necessary to meet any possible threat to their mainland although I would NOT have recommended they sneak out any of their warships to deal with the possible threat of the incoming aircraft.
Seven missions in total and one iron bomb hitting the runway!! This long post is just asking the question was BLACK BUCK really necessary to help win that conflict or was it a demonstration of what could be done? In my opinion it most certainly could not be contemplated without the possibility of air cover and contrary to what is sometimes suggested the occupying force had detected the first in bound Vulcan but thankfully there was no enemy fighters in the vicinity that could pop along to exchange names and addresses .
All information quotes etc are in the public domain.
The most daring raid? This must be close, if not at the top, in terms of effectiveness and efficiency........
The SAS Raid on Pebble Island | Defense Media Network
The SAS Raid on Pebble Island | Defense Media Network
Suspicion breeds confidence
This a very interesting thread and I have a question to pose. Rather than fly 21 bombs 4000 miles, could the same or better results have been achieved by Harriers flying in daylight west to east at 20,000 ft along the length of the runway? I believe that HEMC bombs wete used in Blackbuck which is what the carriers carried and several Harrier vets have stated that it was possible, so why was it not done?
Good post, Glojo. That is one of my favourite diagrams when trying to explain to people how a tanker plan works. You clearly know a lot more about the raid than I, so I'm very interested to read what you say. I think the only point we may differ on (on which we may differ, sorry) is what they thought they were going to acheive by doing it. Similarly, to Navaleye. I still thaink that the hope was to demonstrate a frightening capability and divert forces back home. I had read somewhere that this was what happened; I just don't know how much difference it made.
Orca, it was a sight to behold. I knew a lot of the tanker guys quite well and they kept me up to speed on the appauling state of the Victors there. They had exploding HDUs, engines that wouldn't produce full power, avionics red lines that sounded positively dangerous , gens that didn't work, dozens of leaks, etc. But they kept flying them. Hats off to them. Oh, and Harry-the-Ace and his amazing C-130 guys - some of the best visual turning and burning I ever did.
Courtney
) is what they thought they were going to acheive by doing it. Similarly, to Navaleye. I still thaink that the hope was to demonstrate a frightening capability and divert forces back home. I had read somewhere that this was what happened; I just don't know how much difference it made.Orca, it was a sight to behold. I knew a lot of the tanker guys quite well and they kept me up to speed on the appauling state of the Victors there. They had exploding HDUs, engines that wouldn't produce full power, avionics red lines that sounded positively dangerous , gens that didn't work, dozens of leaks, etc. But they kept flying them. Hats off to them. Oh, and Harry-the-Ace and his amazing C-130 guys - some of the best visual turning and burning I ever did.
Courtney
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Navaleye,
My personal opinion is that the fuel used by the Vulcans couldn't possibly have been used to support Harrier or Sea Harrier missions because it was in totally the wrong place. Someone correct me if I am wrong but no carrier missions were ever cancelled due to lack of avgas or of 1000lb weapons, were they? Was avgas was held at Ascension for Vulcan that should have been shipped south?
I think we all accept that the FRS 1 and GR3 crews were rushed off their feet down south, so to have attempted to 'black' Stanley would have required them to be apportioned away from their other roles.
Having read RAF Harrier Ground Attack Falklands (possible one for the grammar thread) I was very surprised to hear that the GR3 QWIs didn't know what a high angle dive site picture was, but the upshot would mean that runway cratering was unlikely by GR3. (Corporate LGB knowledge was understandably non-existent it would appear as well from the use of the GR3 laser for guidance). Cratering was also unlikely by FRS 1 using Navhars which would at best have given a 0.1nm accuracy at pickle, or loft which would give about a 30 degree impact.
That being said, there is more to the effect of reducing the enemies supply capacity than disabling an airhead. In turn there's more to disabling an airhead than targeting the runway - and any munition falling may well have contributed to the overall aim.
For me the key point is that the Argentinians appear to have never seriously considered using the field for fast air, but kept it open as a logistics hub throughout the war with what sounds like incredible efficiency.
If we had cratered Stanley - could they repair it and could a C-130 have used Goose Green or Pebble Island? Were we primed to sink any sea lift they attempted?
(No doubt someone will remember what we fuelled the early Pegasus with and what it was then called, if it wasn't avgas I do apologise - but you get the point)
My personal opinion is that the fuel used by the Vulcans couldn't possibly have been used to support Harrier or Sea Harrier missions because it was in totally the wrong place. Someone correct me if I am wrong but no carrier missions were ever cancelled due to lack of avgas or of 1000lb weapons, were they? Was avgas was held at Ascension for Vulcan that should have been shipped south?
I think we all accept that the FRS 1 and GR3 crews were rushed off their feet down south, so to have attempted to 'black' Stanley would have required them to be apportioned away from their other roles.
Having read RAF Harrier Ground Attack Falklands (possible one for the grammar thread) I was very surprised to hear that the GR3 QWIs didn't know what a high angle dive site picture was, but the upshot would mean that runway cratering was unlikely by GR3. (Corporate LGB knowledge was understandably non-existent it would appear as well from the use of the GR3 laser for guidance). Cratering was also unlikely by FRS 1 using Navhars which would at best have given a 0.1nm accuracy at pickle, or loft which would give about a 30 degree impact.
That being said, there is more to the effect of reducing the enemies supply capacity than disabling an airhead. In turn there's more to disabling an airhead than targeting the runway - and any munition falling may well have contributed to the overall aim.
For me the key point is that the Argentinians appear to have never seriously considered using the field for fast air, but kept it open as a logistics hub throughout the war with what sounds like incredible efficiency.
If we had cratered Stanley - could they repair it and could a C-130 have used Goose Green or Pebble Island? Were we primed to sink any sea lift they attempted?
(No doubt someone will remember what we fuelled the early Pegasus with and what it was then called, if it wasn't avgas I do apologise - but you get the point)
Last edited by orca; 11th Mar 2012 at 19:34. Reason: Correction
No, 'normal' jet fuel is AVTUR (JP4 or Jet A-1). AVGAS is petrol and not for jet engines (except in the Shackleton Mk3 and those Vipers only lasted about 25 hours). AVCAT (JP5) is a less flammable form of parafin (more or less) carried on ships in place of AVTUR. Works almost as well, but slightly more smoke and slightly less thrust. You can still run a Zippo on it, though. There is also AVTAG, which is like AVTUR, but stores better.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Navaleye's question about using Harrier rather than Vulcan is well asked and the Harriers could most likely have had more bombs on target for far less effort. That being the case we return to the question of why use the Vulcan.
Archimedes has stated (IIRC) that it was a demonstration of capability rather than an overriding requirement.
The other supposition of how the Arg saw and responded is of course the question. We had a similar question regarding deployment of the Vulcan during Confrontation. It is very much a parallel history question.