Originally Posted by
Pheasant
The question that should be asked is "Given the assets in the direct theatre of operations, why was the raid proposed in the first place, particularly given its complexity (in terms of assets required to execute)?" The raid would only ever have had a miniscule effect on the battle (due to the remote likelihood of weapon on target) and thus should have been discarded at HQ level.
Yes, but as noted earlier, it was raised at War Cabinet level and Admirals Lewin, Leach and Fieldhouse - later joined by Admiral Woodward who invited his aviators 'to shut up' (when they expressed opposition to the raid) - were in favour. Given that CDS, 1SL and CinC Fleet thought it a good thing in terms of possible psychological effect, discarding the idea at HQ level was a tad unlikely.
The problem, I fear, is that the kabourophobic argument concentrates entirely upon the hackneyed old, tactical level perspective that the raid was a massive, ineffective waste of fuel and effort because of RAF insecurity and a desire to 'play a part' (which, of course, the RAF was doing through a variety of assets).
This approach resolutely refuses to consider other factors largely because of service parochialism. Even if you rule out strategic effect, then as part of what would now be called [Buzzwords]'the Influence piece' [\Buzzwords] it makes sense. The irony is that those in dark blue who damn the raids' premise run the risk of blissfully ignoring the breadth of thought, perhaps even strategic vision, of the three admirals mentioned earlier. They didn't
care whether a bomb hit the runway or not, because CAS had told them how damned difficult that was to achieve. What they cared about was the possible effect on the junta, world opinion and possibly the tactical dispositions of the one Argentine AF fighter unit that was a dedicated air-to-air squadron.