Originally Posted by
glojo
As I keep saying, if the RAF were happy with this and no valuable supplies or equipment were delayed getting down south then fine but I will tactfully suggest that the issue of resupplying the battle group may well have been an operational game stopper and perhaps a quiet word 'might' have been whispered in the higher corridors of that concrete frigate HMS Warrior.
glojo, I think you answered your own question both here and in your earlier posting.
Admiral Fieldhouse had to decide if he wanted long range Naval surveillance , Vulcan operations or Hercules drops to ships.
The Admiral had to decide - not the RAF.
the relative priority that had to be juggled between demands of Vulcan, Nimrod and Hercules operations; and the physical limitations imposed by fuel stocks and parking space at Wideawake Airfield ……………………………………….We therefore had to balance the need for seven tankers to support long range Nimrod reconnaissance against a Hercules spares run to the fleet which required rather less, and the 100% tanking effort demanded by a bombing sortie
You would have to show that spares were delayed reaching the task force or that essential Nimrod reconnaissance missions were missed. Even if spares were delayed or sorties missed I think we can assume that the BB missions were accorded the proper priority
at the time.
Just to refresh, actual BB missions were flown on 30 Apr, 3 May, 31 May 3 Jun and 12 Jun. Two others were planned with one scrubbed and one recalled. Hardly intensive operations that could interfere with the Task Force. The first two raids predated the Pebble Island raid by at least 10 days and the 3rd was after Goose Green. The 5th was on Stanley just before the surrender and "bombs were supposed to detonate in mid-air, not to explode at impact" which would have exerted even more pressure as the land forces pressed in on Stanley - certainly combined ops.