Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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The consenus seems to be serviceable but not airworthy due to failings higher up the food chain. I repeat that someone flew this aircraft into a rock, and that this would not have happened if basic airmanship/navigation et all had been followed. That is fact. Not being airworthy or even if it was unserviceable does not alter those facts above.
Avoid imitations
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That is fact. Not being airworthy or even if it was unserviceable does not alter those facts above.
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Cazatou wrote:
I was there, and I can confirm that Sq Ldr Burke's evidence to the HoL is contained within the official report of the committee. The document is linked from the campaign's website, or if you prefer this link will take directly to the relevant section.
In respect of your question regarding Sqn Ldr Burke, I was not there. I was, therefore, unable to observe him giving evidence. I have seen various posts that give various accounts as to what he is supposed to have said - I have not seen an official transcript of his evidence.
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The consenus seems to be serviceable but not airworthy due to failings higher up the food chain. I repeat that someone flew this aircraft into a rock, and that this would not have happened if basic airmanship/navigation et all had been followed. That is fact. Not being airworthy or even if it was unserviceable does not alter those facts above.
If we leave the airworthy issue out of this it's nice to see you agree that the crew may very well have flown an unservicable aircraft into a rock, any thoughts on what that unservicability may have been?
JP
This has been debated before.
The definitions are known to you. If you need reminding, read the MoD’s own literature, as you don’t seem to believe anything I say. (Which is your right).
You insist on muddying waters and avoiding the real issues. You do not give others the courtesy of response. Just like MoD.
As Pulse1 says, the anti-airworthiness brigade is again adopting the MoD’s tactic of deliberately confusing serviceability, airworthiness and fitness for purpose. The only possible reason for doing so is to protect the tarnished name of those mindless sycophants who, for 20 years, have deliberately compromised all 3 for their own ends.
May I suggest you read JSP553 and Def Stan 00-970; and then the CA Release and Release to Service. Then tell us how you can reconcile the requirements of the first two with the last. It’s impossible. If you refuse to do this, and make no attempt to understand the issues, then with respect any post you make on the subject is meaningless.
Do you not see how ridiculous it looks for ANYONE on this forum to be arguing against someone whose main concern is that their aircraft are safe? You are openly aligning yourself with people who have contributed to the deaths of so many of your fellow Servicemen.
But, one by one their crimes are being exposed. Nimrod. Hercules. They’re all the same – just different paragraphs of the same regs that were ignored. But if Mr Haddon-Cave’s forthcoming report on the subject contradicts anything I say, I’ll profusely apologise to you.
I did ask Tuc some weeks ago to give us the definitions of 'airworthy' and 'serviceable' as they were 14 or 15 years back, but I cannot trace his reply.
This has been debated before.
The definitions are known to you. If you need reminding, read the MoD’s own literature, as you don’t seem to believe anything I say. (Which is your right).
You insist on muddying waters and avoiding the real issues. You do not give others the courtesy of response. Just like MoD.
As Pulse1 says, the anti-airworthiness brigade is again adopting the MoD’s tactic of deliberately confusing serviceability, airworthiness and fitness for purpose. The only possible reason for doing so is to protect the tarnished name of those mindless sycophants who, for 20 years, have deliberately compromised all 3 for their own ends.
May I suggest you read JSP553 and Def Stan 00-970; and then the CA Release and Release to Service. Then tell us how you can reconcile the requirements of the first two with the last. It’s impossible. If you refuse to do this, and make no attempt to understand the issues, then with respect any post you make on the subject is meaningless.
Do you not see how ridiculous it looks for ANYONE on this forum to be arguing against someone whose main concern is that their aircraft are safe? You are openly aligning yourself with people who have contributed to the deaths of so many of your fellow Servicemen.
But, one by one their crimes are being exposed. Nimrod. Hercules. They’re all the same – just different paragraphs of the same regs that were ignored. But if Mr Haddon-Cave’s forthcoming report on the subject contradicts anything I say, I’ll profusely apologise to you.
bastOn:
I'm afraid that unairworthy aircraft have a nasty predilection for self destruction no matter how impeccable is the "basic airmanship/navigation" displayed before they decide to bite without warning. That is why they are a very bad idea. That is why a responsible Airworthiness Authority sees it as its prime function to provide and maintain airworthiness. On the other hand you have the MOD....
The consenus seems to be serviceable but not airworthy due to failings higher up the food chain. I repeat that someone flew this aircraft into a rock, and that this would not have happened if basic airmanship/navigation et all had been followed.
Cazatou:
You raise a very good point, caz...where to start? Given that self regulation is finally seen to be an illusion (aided by the row over Parliamentary Allowances) and a separate MAA and MAAIB is established, then the priority for it would surely be to prevent future accidents and to properly investigate those that it fails to prevent. As far as the latter is concerned it will need professional inspectors in charge of, rather than advising, investigations and access to all evidence and witnesses rather than those that the CoC deems fit. Quite revolutionary concepts I'll admit but they seem to work well enough in Civilian Aviation. As to your 764 BoI's etc caz, have you some reason to believe that any of them in particular need sorting, or is it simply all of them? When you have a situation where an Air Force needs an 800 year old civilian institution to tell them why their aircraft have crashed for reasons contrary to its own findings I take your point!
Chugalug 2
In my time in the RAF, until I went on Terminal Leave, there were 764 Accidents (Cat 3 or Higher)…. Are you going to sort through all 764 of them?
In my time in the RAF, until I went on Terminal Leave, there were 764 Accidents (Cat 3 or Higher)…. Are you going to sort through all 764 of them?
You raise a very good point, caz...where to start? Given that self regulation is finally seen to be an illusion (aided by the row over Parliamentary Allowances) and a separate MAA and MAAIB is established, then the priority for it would surely be to prevent future accidents and to properly investigate those that it fails to prevent. As far as the latter is concerned it will need professional inspectors in charge of, rather than advising, investigations and access to all evidence and witnesses rather than those that the CoC deems fit. Quite revolutionary concepts I'll admit but they seem to work well enough in Civilian Aviation. As to your 764 BoI's etc caz, have you some reason to believe that any of them in particular need sorting, or is it simply all of them? When you have a situation where an Air Force needs an 800 year old civilian institution to tell them why their aircraft have crashed for reasons contrary to its own findings I take your point!
Chinook crash: critical internal memo on software flaws | 4 Jun 2009 | ComputerWeekly.com
Now Computer Weekly is publishing the internal MoD letter in full, because it is evidence that the unreliability of the Fadec system made the helicopter unsafe to fly. A year before the crash, services supplier EDS had abandoned an assessment of the Fadec software because it had hundreds of anomalies and bugs.
To: Project Manager, Chinook, Procurement Executive, Ministry of Defence Aeroplace and Armament Experimental Establishment Boscombe Down, Salisbury
Date: 2 June 1994
CURRENT SAFETY OF CONTINUED HC2 TRIALS FLYING
References:
A. [reference number] dated 18 August 1993
B. [reference number] dated 27 August 1993
C. Letter report, Chinook HC Mk2 Interim CA [Controller Aircraft] Release Recommendations dated October 1993
D. [reference number] 24 February 1994
E. RAF Odiham March 1994 [incident report]
F. RAF Odiham April 1994 [incident report]
G. RAF Laarbruch May 1994 [incident report]
H. RAF Odiham May 1994 [incident report]
1. As CA [controller aircraft - the RAF's equivalent of a civil safety certificate] release trials were about to start on the Chinook HC2 helicopter in late summer 1993, interested parties at Boscombe Down raised questions as to the integrity of the engine control system, particularly the Full Authority Digital Electronic Control [FADEC]. Long considered a desirable upgrade to the engine controls, the design of the FADEC software had been suspect for a considerable period preceding the commencement of flight trials. A summary of references A and B, correspondence from the Superintendent of Engineering Systems Division, indicates that the major concerns were:
a. It was impossible to independently verify the software
b. The software contained illegal code, the effects of which were unknown even in safety-critical areas.
c. That the risks associated with operating the FADEC were essentially unquantifiable.
It was assumed that the FADEC would act unpredictably at some point in the future. Reference C failed to recommend CA Release of the FADEC for the reasons previously stated and considered a re-write of the software essential.
2. Since the Chinook HC2 has been phased into service, a large number of engine related incident signals [reports] have been generated by a comparatively small fleet of aircraft flying a limited number of hours. Some of these incidents, detailed at references B through G, have been serious. Reference H was one of two incidents which reported single engine flameout upon selection of FADEC Reversionary control and was sufficiently serious to cause A&AEE [Aeroplane and Armaments Experimental Establishment - now Qinetiq] to temporarily halt flying operations until the engine could be evaluated. These incidents were compared to a fault found in the HMA [hydro-mechanical assembly controlled by the FADEC's software] of a US Army MH-47E [a special forces helicopter fitted with a better-tested FADEC than the UK's Mk2 version], which experienced an engine Rundown, and while no defects in either British HMA were detected, the HMA was presumed to be the cause and provided sufficient reason for A&AEE to resume trials flying. No explanation for the variation between rundown (HMA attributable) and Shutdown (FADEC Reversionary mode attributable) was given and the incidents remain under the category 'No Faults Found'. Following the decision to continue trials flying, the second flameout (reference F) and a serious runaway up [unexpected acceleration of the engine(s)] (Reference G) have occurred. The runaway up has prompted Engineering and Performance Divisions to reassess trials sortie profiles, electing not to conduct trials flying using the Reversionary control.
3. Rotary Wing Test Squadron [RWTS] has now received reference H, yet another incident signal [report] relating to a Chinook HC2 suffering a serious engine malfunction. While previously all incidents have manifested themselves on the ground, primarily during reversionary checks, this one occurred in flight in a benign handling scenario and resulted in at least three overtemps [over-temperatures] of the engine. The power turbine section of the engine sustained significant damage and had to be replaced. Summarily, the weight of the incident signals, both their frequency of occurrence and their increasing variability, causes RTWS to believe that the previous forecast of system unpredictability is now a reality. Further, while RWTS concede that, since there have been no changes to the Engine control system, the actual risks associated with operating the Mk2 have not changed since trials first commenced, the previously unquantifiable risk is now much more clearly defined and is, at present, unacceptable. Even limiting the potential to a single engine problem, it would be impossible for the aircraft to conduct its role if it were required to remain in single engine flight condition during every sortie. This precludes a reasonable assurance of safety of any flight let alone relatable trials flying.
4. During trials flying conducted since the autumn of 1993, two other problems associated with the FADEC controlled engines have been discovered:
a. A spurious engine failure warning.
b. A 2.5 Hertz engine drive train oscillation.
The former was dismissed by the manufacturer as not being a safety-critical problem. Considering the Operational Role of the aircraft this is most definitely a view not shared by RWTS. The consequences of the latter problem have not been resolved fully as more sensitive instrumentation is required to investigate it further. In the interim, Boeing Helicopters has stated that they are not concerned about the short term fatigue implications of the 2.5 Hertz oscillation on the fuel metering valve of the HMA, a concern expressed by [deleted] at reference D.
5. While RWTS appreciate the effect that any delay in the programme [withdrawing Chinook MK2 from operational service] will have on current theatres of operation and the associated political pressures thus imposed, we consider that Boscombe Down is failing in its primary role of providing the front line with equipment which can not only efficiently carry out this task but do this safely.
6. RWTS has carefully monitored the progress of this trial and has put tremendous effort into ensuring that it progresses safety to provide timely CA [Controller Aircraft] Release recommendations. These recommendations with respect to FADEC have, to date, been ignored. Until RWTS is provided with a clear, unequivocal and realistic explanation of the faults described at references B through H, with corrective action, further Chinook HC2 flying shall not be authorized. A statement of 'No Fault Found' will no longer satisfy this requirement.
7. As a trials organisation, A&AEE has always been keenly aware of the risks associated with operating the Chinook HC2 and has tailored sortie profiles accordingly. Crews of the RAF have no such luxury and are likely at higher risk than A&AEE crews. As such, RWTS deem it imperative that, in the strongest possible terms, the RAF should be provided with a recommendation to cease Chinook HC2 operations until the conditions established in paragraph 6 are satisfied.
For Officer Commanding RWTS
Action:
Superintendent of Flying Division
Superintendent of Engineering
Superintendent of Aircraft Dynamics Division
Now Computer Weekly is publishing the internal MoD letter in full, because it is evidence that the unreliability of the Fadec system made the helicopter unsafe to fly. A year before the crash, services supplier EDS had abandoned an assessment of the Fadec software because it had hundreds of anomalies and bugs.
To: Project Manager, Chinook, Procurement Executive, Ministry of Defence Aeroplace and Armament Experimental Establishment Boscombe Down, Salisbury
Date: 2 June 1994
CURRENT SAFETY OF CONTINUED HC2 TRIALS FLYING
References:
A. [reference number] dated 18 August 1993
B. [reference number] dated 27 August 1993
C. Letter report, Chinook HC Mk2 Interim CA [Controller Aircraft] Release Recommendations dated October 1993
D. [reference number] 24 February 1994
E. RAF Odiham March 1994 [incident report]
F. RAF Odiham April 1994 [incident report]
G. RAF Laarbruch May 1994 [incident report]
H. RAF Odiham May 1994 [incident report]
1. As CA [controller aircraft - the RAF's equivalent of a civil safety certificate] release trials were about to start on the Chinook HC2 helicopter in late summer 1993, interested parties at Boscombe Down raised questions as to the integrity of the engine control system, particularly the Full Authority Digital Electronic Control [FADEC]. Long considered a desirable upgrade to the engine controls, the design of the FADEC software had been suspect for a considerable period preceding the commencement of flight trials. A summary of references A and B, correspondence from the Superintendent of Engineering Systems Division, indicates that the major concerns were:
a. It was impossible to independently verify the software
b. The software contained illegal code, the effects of which were unknown even in safety-critical areas.
c. That the risks associated with operating the FADEC were essentially unquantifiable.
It was assumed that the FADEC would act unpredictably at some point in the future. Reference C failed to recommend CA Release of the FADEC for the reasons previously stated and considered a re-write of the software essential.
2. Since the Chinook HC2 has been phased into service, a large number of engine related incident signals [reports] have been generated by a comparatively small fleet of aircraft flying a limited number of hours. Some of these incidents, detailed at references B through G, have been serious. Reference H was one of two incidents which reported single engine flameout upon selection of FADEC Reversionary control and was sufficiently serious to cause A&AEE [Aeroplane and Armaments Experimental Establishment - now Qinetiq] to temporarily halt flying operations until the engine could be evaluated. These incidents were compared to a fault found in the HMA [hydro-mechanical assembly controlled by the FADEC's software] of a US Army MH-47E [a special forces helicopter fitted with a better-tested FADEC than the UK's Mk2 version], which experienced an engine Rundown, and while no defects in either British HMA were detected, the HMA was presumed to be the cause and provided sufficient reason for A&AEE to resume trials flying. No explanation for the variation between rundown (HMA attributable) and Shutdown (FADEC Reversionary mode attributable) was given and the incidents remain under the category 'No Faults Found'. Following the decision to continue trials flying, the second flameout (reference F) and a serious runaway up [unexpected acceleration of the engine(s)] (Reference G) have occurred. The runaway up has prompted Engineering and Performance Divisions to reassess trials sortie profiles, electing not to conduct trials flying using the Reversionary control.
3. Rotary Wing Test Squadron [RWTS] has now received reference H, yet another incident signal [report] relating to a Chinook HC2 suffering a serious engine malfunction. While previously all incidents have manifested themselves on the ground, primarily during reversionary checks, this one occurred in flight in a benign handling scenario and resulted in at least three overtemps [over-temperatures] of the engine. The power turbine section of the engine sustained significant damage and had to be replaced. Summarily, the weight of the incident signals, both their frequency of occurrence and their increasing variability, causes RTWS to believe that the previous forecast of system unpredictability is now a reality. Further, while RWTS concede that, since there have been no changes to the Engine control system, the actual risks associated with operating the Mk2 have not changed since trials first commenced, the previously unquantifiable risk is now much more clearly defined and is, at present, unacceptable. Even limiting the potential to a single engine problem, it would be impossible for the aircraft to conduct its role if it were required to remain in single engine flight condition during every sortie. This precludes a reasonable assurance of safety of any flight let alone relatable trials flying.
4. During trials flying conducted since the autumn of 1993, two other problems associated with the FADEC controlled engines have been discovered:
a. A spurious engine failure warning.
b. A 2.5 Hertz engine drive train oscillation.
The former was dismissed by the manufacturer as not being a safety-critical problem. Considering the Operational Role of the aircraft this is most definitely a view not shared by RWTS. The consequences of the latter problem have not been resolved fully as more sensitive instrumentation is required to investigate it further. In the interim, Boeing Helicopters has stated that they are not concerned about the short term fatigue implications of the 2.5 Hertz oscillation on the fuel metering valve of the HMA, a concern expressed by [deleted] at reference D.
5. While RWTS appreciate the effect that any delay in the programme [withdrawing Chinook MK2 from operational service] will have on current theatres of operation and the associated political pressures thus imposed, we consider that Boscombe Down is failing in its primary role of providing the front line with equipment which can not only efficiently carry out this task but do this safely.
6. RWTS has carefully monitored the progress of this trial and has put tremendous effort into ensuring that it progresses safety to provide timely CA [Controller Aircraft] Release recommendations. These recommendations with respect to FADEC have, to date, been ignored. Until RWTS is provided with a clear, unequivocal and realistic explanation of the faults described at references B through H, with corrective action, further Chinook HC2 flying shall not be authorized. A statement of 'No Fault Found' will no longer satisfy this requirement.
7. As a trials organisation, A&AEE has always been keenly aware of the risks associated with operating the Chinook HC2 and has tailored sortie profiles accordingly. Crews of the RAF have no such luxury and are likely at higher risk than A&AEE crews. As such, RWTS deem it imperative that, in the strongest possible terms, the RAF should be provided with a recommendation to cease Chinook HC2 operations until the conditions established in paragraph 6 are satisfied.
For Officer Commanding RWTS
Action:
Superintendent of Flying Division
Superintendent of Engineering
Superintendent of Aircraft Dynamics Division
A really irritating PPRuNer
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The consenus seems to be serviceable but not airworthy due to failings higher up the food chain. I repeat that someone flew this aircraft into a rock, and that this would not have happened if basic airmanship/navigation et all had been followed. That is fact. Not being airworthy or even if it was unserviceable does not alter those facts above.
No evidence to suggest a control jam was found, although such a possibility could not be excluded, given the level of system damage.
and
It was noted that during ZD576’s service since MLU the thrust balance spring attachmen bracket had detached from the thrust/yaw control pallet (Ref 27) as a result of the release of two threaded attachment inserts bonded into the pallet. Each of the two control pallets comprised a 7.5x24 inch, 1.1 inch thick, aluminium honeycomb panel with a 0.02 inch thick aluminium skin bonded to each face and contained respectively 23 and 26 threaded inserts for component attachment. Each insert was bonded into a blind hole bored through the outer skin and part way into the honeycomb, to approximately half the thickness; its integrity appeared to rely on adhesion between the exterior of the insert and the damaged honeycomb around the hole, together with some keying effect between the adhesive and the rim of the skin hole by virtue of the boring producing a marginally larger diameter hole in the honeycomb than in the skin. Inspection of the pallet remains after the accident showed that both inserts for the thrust balance spring attachment bracket had detached, together with most of the similar inserts on both pallets. This was unsurprising in view of the attachment method and, as an insert could apparently pull out of the pallet without appreciable distress to the components necessarily resulting, the possibility that insert(s) had detached prior to the accident could not be dismissed. Few signs were apparent of extensive strong bonding of the adhesive to some inserts or to the panel.
Now, I'm not saying that these issues actually happened, or were responsible for the accident, only that there is a possibility that they could have occurred. As such, the absolutley no doubt whatsoever test fails.
Caz,
you continue to push for a definitive answer as to crew rotas, then go on to point out that the evidence under oath to the BoI suggested a day on - day off pattern, whereas the evidence given on this thread suggested a change of crew due to weather issues. I would suggest that evidence given to a BoI as opposed to a comment on a forum bulletin-board would be the more accurate.
May I ask, again, about your views on the difference of opinion in relation to the spatial awareness comments made by the BoI and John Day?
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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Chinook
Tucumseh. Many thanks for the lengthy reply, but meanwhile, and just to clear up many misunderstandings that have, as you say, been caused by confusion between airworthy and serviceable, will you be good enough to post both definitions here and now? Is that so difficult? Regards. JP
JP / MoD
Your arrogance is breathtaking. The same arrogance I saw in the Chinook 2 Star when he looked me in the eye and told me my insistence on meeting my Duty of Care obligation was a disciplinary offence. The only thing I can say is that, if you are in Bath, you are not he. But you clearly agree with him, and his seniors who supported him.
If you do not want to read the definitions for yourself, please move on. Read the RWTS letter copied in my last post and tell us what you would have done if you had airworthiness delegation. I've told you what I would have done.
Your arrogance is breathtaking. The same arrogance I saw in the Chinook 2 Star when he looked me in the eye and told me my insistence on meeting my Duty of Care obligation was a disciplinary offence. The only thing I can say is that, if you are in Bath, you are not he. But you clearly agree with him, and his seniors who supported him.
If you do not want to read the definitions for yourself, please move on. Read the RWTS letter copied in my last post and tell us what you would have done if you had airworthiness delegation. I've told you what I would have done.
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Chugalug 2
How silly of me, I never realised that their Lordships conducting the Inquiry were skilled Aviators; in fact I was quite surprised at the time that they did not include any of their Lordships who had an Aviation Background. One, I seem to remember, made a very telling speech in the House of Lords regarding their Lordships findings. Of course, that particular Lord had a long and distinguished background of both Military and Civil Helicopter operations and thus was unlikely to suit their purpose.
So, just set me straight. What exactly was the fault that caused the crash; and what exactly was the Mod that cured the fault? I assume that there must have been a Mod as there has been no repeat of such a tragedy.
PS Regarding Crew Duty Time:- if they had got to their destination they still had to off load the Pax and luggage; transit to Kinloss to refuel and then return to Aldergrove. In my experience refuelling at Kinloss outside normal working hours could involve a very lengthy wait for the Bowser (2hrs +). The alternative was to request permission to nightstop away from base; something that could only be approved by SRAFONI.
PPS. I, like the majority of Their Lordships House, do not support the findings of the HOL Committee.
How silly of me, I never realised that their Lordships conducting the Inquiry were skilled Aviators; in fact I was quite surprised at the time that they did not include any of their Lordships who had an Aviation Background. One, I seem to remember, made a very telling speech in the House of Lords regarding their Lordships findings. Of course, that particular Lord had a long and distinguished background of both Military and Civil Helicopter operations and thus was unlikely to suit their purpose.
So, just set me straight. What exactly was the fault that caused the crash; and what exactly was the Mod that cured the fault? I assume that there must have been a Mod as there has been no repeat of such a tragedy.
PS Regarding Crew Duty Time:- if they had got to their destination they still had to off load the Pax and luggage; transit to Kinloss to refuel and then return to Aldergrove. In my experience refuelling at Kinloss outside normal working hours could involve a very lengthy wait for the Bowser (2hrs +). The alternative was to request permission to nightstop away from base; something that could only be approved by SRAFONI.
PPS. I, like the majority of Their Lordships House, do not support the findings of the HOL Committee.
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Chinook
Tuc. I do not see how insults can advance matters; the fact is that down here in the West we do not have to hand the documents that you quote. But since, as I recall, it was you who started this airworthyness hare running, will you now be kind enough to quote the definitions for us; failing that, a few unkind folk might think you are merely laying smoke. With all good wishes, JP
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Brian
No I did not say that it was or was not serviceable. I was just getting down to the basic fact that the aircraft - in fog - flew into a rock. As in all things in life there is no absolute certainty. There are however very strong probabilities. The probability that I was espousing was that had basic DR nav been followed, what ever happened/did not happen in the aircraft in those last few minutes it would not have been so close to the Mull for it to have struck it. It may have fallen in the sea, it may have recovered to controlled flight - any one of dozens of possibilities. I like your reasoned replies and I wish you all the best.
I regret, Bast0n, that it is not fact. You cannot say with absolutely no doubt whatsoever, that the Chinook was serviceable prior to impact.
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Brian
I agree that evidence given on oath to a BOI should be considered to be more accurate than anything posted on PPrune. It was the evidence given on oath that led to the findings of the Reviewing Officers and the agreement of CAS who also reviewed the BOI prior to Release.
I agree that evidence given on oath to a BOI should be considered to be more accurate than anything posted on PPrune. It was the evidence given on oath that led to the findings of the Reviewing Officers and the agreement of CAS who also reviewed the BOI prior to Release.
I repeat that someone flew this aircraft into a rock...
It hit the Mull. Precisely why has not been established to the degree of proof required to support Wratten and Day's flawed verdict.
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But Beagle, we can prove that they didn't have breakfast in the mess and that they would have been outside crew duty hours sometime after the crash. 
Being less flippant, there are two discussion points running here. On the one hand there is Caz's perfectly valid stance on crew duty, breakfast etc. However, I'm struggling to see the direct relevance these lines of discussion have with the aircraft hitting the Mull. It may contribute towards painting a picture of flagrant disregard of rules but all this does is offer doubt as to the professionalism of the crew.
Looking at the whole airworthiness issue, there is stronger evidence but again it is difficult to apportion direct relevance to the crash. The FADEC issue brings an element of doubt, nothing more.
So we have two lines of thought that both offer doubt; one doubting the professionalism of the crew, the other doubting the airworthiness of the aircraft. Either way, each argument brings doubt to the other hypothesis.
This leaves us with the VFR/IFR/VMC/IMC argument. There is little doubt that the aircraft was IMC when it hit the Mull, the question is when did it enter IMC? Furthermore, the argument about safety altitude is disingenuous. If they had entered IMC and then climbed to the 'immediate' SA then they would have been safe. But, from this point onwards they could not have completed the task as this would have required a further climb the the en-route SA - above the icing level and outside of the aircraft's RTS. So, why didn't they climb to SA? I don't know but John Day tells us he does.
Being less flippant, there are two discussion points running here. On the one hand there is Caz's perfectly valid stance on crew duty, breakfast etc. However, I'm struggling to see the direct relevance these lines of discussion have with the aircraft hitting the Mull. It may contribute towards painting a picture of flagrant disregard of rules but all this does is offer doubt as to the professionalism of the crew.
Looking at the whole airworthiness issue, there is stronger evidence but again it is difficult to apportion direct relevance to the crash. The FADEC issue brings an element of doubt, nothing more.
So we have two lines of thought that both offer doubt; one doubting the professionalism of the crew, the other doubting the airworthiness of the aircraft. Either way, each argument brings doubt to the other hypothesis.
This leaves us with the VFR/IFR/VMC/IMC argument. There is little doubt that the aircraft was IMC when it hit the Mull, the question is when did it enter IMC? Furthermore, the argument about safety altitude is disingenuous. If they had entered IMC and then climbed to the 'immediate' SA then they would have been safe. But, from this point onwards they could not have completed the task as this would have required a further climb the the en-route SA - above the icing level and outside of the aircraft's RTS. So, why didn't they climb to SA? I don't know but John Day tells us he does.
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Brian
No I did not say that it was or was not serviceable. I was just getting down to the basic fact that the aircraft - in fog - flew into a rock. As in all things in life there is no absolute certainty. There are however very strong probabilities. The probability that I was espousing was that had basic DR nav been followed, I don't know basic DR Nav wasn't followed but it's my hypothesis that it wasn't, what ever happened/did not happen in the aircraft in those last few minutes it would not have been so close to the Mull for it to have struck it. It may have fallen in the sea, it may have recovered to controlled flight - any one of dozens of possibilities. I like your reasoned replies and I wish you all the best.
No I did not say that it was or was not serviceable. I was just getting down to the basic fact that the aircraft - in fog - flew into a rock. As in all things in life there is no absolute certainty. There are however very strong probabilities. The probability that I was espousing was that had basic DR nav been followed, I don't know basic DR Nav wasn't followed but it's my hypothesis that it wasn't, what ever happened/did not happen in the aircraft in those last few minutes it would not have been so close to the Mull for it to have struck it. It may have fallen in the sea, it may have recovered to controlled flight - any one of dozens of possibilities. I like your reasoned replies and I wish you all the best.
It's a great shame you cannot persuade JP or Caz with regards to your creditable and very sensible supposition.............I hope you dont mind but I added the green bits as I thought the words gave a little more clarity to your theory.
cazatou:
Nor is Coroner Mr Andrew Walker, as far as I know, caz. Like their Lordships though his skill is asking skilled Aviators and others questions that seek out the facts in order to arrive at the truth as to why an Aircraft Accident happened. That is the facility one needs in accident investigation, caz, the ability and desire to find out the facts in order to arrive at the truth of what happened. Facts and Truth caz, that's the nub of it. A nub that seems to repeatedly evade the RAF's attempts at Accident Investigation. Investigations carried out by, and at the command of, skilled Aviators. I don't think that Mr Hadden-Cave QC is a skilled Aviator, but I doubt if that will have detered him from seeking out the facts and the truth, do you?
As to your questions regarding:
What fault caused the crash: I don't know.
What exact mod cured the fault, that I don't know: I don't know.
I'd better add here that I don't know if it was a fault that caused the crash or you'll be onto that like a dog at a bone.
Could I also add that you do not seem to be on the Authorised List of people to whom I have to give immediate and full account when they ask a question. Indeed on inspection I see that only Mrs C is on that list. Unless and until you persuade her that you too should be included I regret to inform you that in future questions may indeed be ignored and go unanswered. A policy only too well known to you of course.
Chugalug 2
How silly of me, I never realised that their Lordships conducting the Inquiry were skilled Aviators;
How silly of me, I never realised that their Lordships conducting the Inquiry were skilled Aviators;
As to your questions regarding:
What fault caused the crash: I don't know.
What exact mod cured the fault, that I don't know: I don't know.
I'd better add here that I don't know if it was a fault that caused the crash or you'll be onto that like a dog at a bone.
Could I also add that you do not seem to be on the Authorised List of people to whom I have to give immediate and full account when they ask a question. Indeed on inspection I see that only Mrs C is on that list. Unless and until you persuade her that you too should be included I regret to inform you that in future questions may indeed be ignored and go unanswered. A policy only too well known to you of course.