Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
Cazatou:
Are you saying that there were no airworthiness concerns of the Chinook HC2 at the time? It is my understanding that there were serious concerns known and shared by most concerned with its operation, not least by the TPs at Boscombe Down. As to such concerns being recorded officially by the Flight Crew, just how would you suggest they do that, given that they held them? The only entries possible in the Tech Log are factual ones, ie the recording of defects. Can we nail this dichotomy for once and for all? An aircraft can be fully serviceable and yet unairworthy. The first is the province of the air and groundcrews, the second of the Airworthiness Authority. In the case of UK Military Aircraft that remains the MOD, ie the very authority holding hostage the reputations of these pilots.
the Crew had flown the aircraft for several hours already that day and had not raised any concerns regarding airworthiness or handling qualities of the aircraft
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antenna
"Extension to flight hours was a red herring then and is now. They were flying within permissable hours." ----- "SF can handle long days --its what they do."
It was because of people with views just like yours that Crew Duty Limitations were imposed. It does seem to be that some people interpret it as a slur that limits should be imposed when they "know better". I remember the Flt Cdr who explained to the Sqn Cdr (in the presence of 1Gp EU) that these "Crew Duty limits" did not apply to him because he was fitter than everyone else. He did not remain a Flt Cdr very long.
Yes, they were flying within permissable hours when they crashed; that is not the point. What is the point is whether they could complete the task and return to base within the remaining already doubly extended Crew Duty time; something which was exceedingly doubtful after their delayed departure from Aldergrove. Did this affect the way the flight was conducted? Did the possibility of having to telephone SRAFONI to request a further exceptional extension to crew duty time or permission to nightstop out of Theatre affect the decision making process and/or the conduct of the flight?
Just remember that this was a routine passenger flight carrying Service and Civilian personnel. Those passengers had the right to expect the same level of care as you would expect AT crews to extend to your Family. The excuse that Detatchment crews preferred to operate on a "day on -day off" basis does not justify playing the rules on Crew Duty time to achieve that end.
"Extension to flight hours was a red herring then and is now. They were flying within permissable hours." ----- "SF can handle long days --its what they do."
It was because of people with views just like yours that Crew Duty Limitations were imposed. It does seem to be that some people interpret it as a slur that limits should be imposed when they "know better". I remember the Flt Cdr who explained to the Sqn Cdr (in the presence of 1Gp EU) that these "Crew Duty limits" did not apply to him because he was fitter than everyone else. He did not remain a Flt Cdr very long.
Yes, they were flying within permissable hours when they crashed; that is not the point. What is the point is whether they could complete the task and return to base within the remaining already doubly extended Crew Duty time; something which was exceedingly doubtful after their delayed departure from Aldergrove. Did this affect the way the flight was conducted? Did the possibility of having to telephone SRAFONI to request a further exceptional extension to crew duty time or permission to nightstop out of Theatre affect the decision making process and/or the conduct of the flight?
Just remember that this was a routine passenger flight carrying Service and Civilian personnel. Those passengers had the right to expect the same level of care as you would expect AT crews to extend to your Family. The excuse that Detatchment crews preferred to operate on a "day on -day off" basis does not justify playing the rules on Crew Duty time to achieve that end.
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Chugalug 2
What was the fault that caused the crash?
As there has been no repetition of this tragedy - what was the modification that cured the fault?
When you talk about airworthiness are you including the crew? Remember that the BOI were quite specific that the Detatchment Crews preferred to work on a "day on - day off" basis and that the Crew had been on duty for 9-10 hrs when they took off on the fatal flight. Moreover, they were quite specific that it was unlikely that the crew had anything to eat in that time other than a few biscuits.
PS I think we have been here before.
What was the fault that caused the crash?
As there has been no repetition of this tragedy - what was the modification that cured the fault?
When you talk about airworthiness are you including the crew? Remember that the BOI were quite specific that the Detatchment Crews preferred to work on a "day on - day off" basis and that the Crew had been on duty for 9-10 hrs when they took off on the fatal flight. Moreover, they were quite specific that it was unlikely that the crew had anything to eat in that time other than a few biscuits.
PS I think we have been here before.
Airworthiness is defined in JSP553 Military Airworthiness Regulations (2006) Edition 1 Change 5 as:
The ability of an aircraft or other airborne equipment or system to operate without significant hazard to aircrew, ground crew, passengers (where relevant) or to the general public over which such airborne systems are flown
The ability of an aircraft or other airborne equipment or system to operate without significant hazard to aircrew, ground crew, passengers (where relevant) or to the general public over which such airborne systems are flown
What was the fault that caused the crash?
When you talk about airworthiness are you including the crew?
As to their Crew Duty Limitations, what exactly is your point? We have all been subject to delays that effect our ability to complete a duty within them. The procedures to follow then are clearly laid down, whether civilian or military. Is your case that though you would have accepted the possibility of an enforced night stop away from base, they would have not? Why?
If your case, re airworthiness, is that the aircraft must have been airworthy as no subsequent airworthiness action was introduced for the remainder of the fleet by the MOD I can only refer you to the Hercules and Nimrod threads. To say they were reluctant to do anything meaningful in that regard until goaded into it by public outrage, coroners, even PPRuNe threads, would be to understate the appalling situation that still exists in UK Military Airworthiness Enforcement by the MOD.
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I have thought long and hard as to whether to join in on this thread, well here goes!
I am close to this subject. I knew Rick Cook well. I also knew, and had worked with, many of the pax. When the RAF BOI was released, I was one of those who had to knock on a grieving widow's door to explain, as best I could, why her husband had died.
Having read the BOI from cover to cover, it is my opinion that we will never know, with absolute certainty, the precise cause of the accident. There is no, and never has been any, evidence to suggest that there was anything wrong with the ac. If it hasn't been found by now, it never will be. In my opinion, all of the emotive discussions on this (FADEC, STF equipment etc) is futile.
In my humble opinion, the only debate is about whether the charge of gross negligence should have been levied on the pilots. That question remains valid.
Retreating below the parapet.....
I am close to this subject. I knew Rick Cook well. I also knew, and had worked with, many of the pax. When the RAF BOI was released, I was one of those who had to knock on a grieving widow's door to explain, as best I could, why her husband had died.
Having read the BOI from cover to cover, it is my opinion that we will never know, with absolute certainty, the precise cause of the accident. There is no, and never has been any, evidence to suggest that there was anything wrong with the ac. If it hasn't been found by now, it never will be. In my opinion, all of the emotive discussions on this (FADEC, STF equipment etc) is futile.
In my humble opinion, the only debate is about whether the charge of gross negligence should have been levied on the pilots. That question remains valid.
Retreating below the parapet.....
cazatou, you asked:
You have made this point before so I will ask the same question I asked last time which you ignored.
I understand that, at the time of the accident, there was an instruction to check the DECU connector every 15 minutes because vibration had been causing intermittent contact problems with very serious consequences. I imagine that this is no longer current practice in the Chinook fleet so something must have been done to improve the connector design. Please explain.
Perhaps the question you should be asking is "what was the Fleetwide Modification Programme that resulted from this accident to prevent it happening again?"
I understand that, at the time of the accident, there was an instruction to check the DECU connector every 15 minutes because vibration had been causing intermittent contact problems with very serious consequences. I imagine that this is no longer current practice in the Chinook fleet so something must have been done to improve the connector design. Please explain.
If it is not too presumptuous of me, KG86, welcome to the thread and, as it's your second post only, to PPRuNe! Given your closeness to the sad subject of the thread you are surely more fitted to post here than most, certainly than I. Like you I have had the sad duty of being the ‘face’ of the Service for a newly bereaved wife, though mercifully she had already learned of that from others. I have never felt so inadequately fit for a task, nor so in awe at such raw courage as that young mother displayed to the world. You are right to remind us of the human cost of this tragedy, that will go on still, whether we succeed here or no. I would however demure from your conclusion that the only debate is whether the finding of Gross Negligence should stand or be put aside (sorry, I’ve rephrased your words as they were of course never charged, and the outcome of the ACMs’ review was a finding, not a verdict). I would suggest that the appropriate finding should be that the cause is unknown. Unsatisfactory of course, but realistic. That would then leave open the possibility of being able to revise the finding in the light of later evidence. Accident Investigation is much like Police work, and cases can be reopened years later if new evidence comes to light, often with the aid of new techniques and new technology. Why is that so important? It is because the raison d’etre of BOIs and Accident Investigations is to prevent future accidents rather than to lay blame. If Flight Safety were granted a motto it would surely be; “Never Say Never”! So there is a point to such discussion. It does not, and should not, have to be emotive but it should not been written off as futile either. There is a reason why this crash happened and it has yet to be determined. It should be the hope of every professional aviator that posts here that one day it will be.
Now if you could just move over a little perhaps I could squeeze in next to you below your parapet?
Now if you could just move over a little perhaps I could squeeze in next to you below your parapet?
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Outwith the primary quest to squash the finding of gross negligence, this is another very big reason why Chinook crash is still highly relevant today.
No prizes for guessing, continued failure to implement airworthiness regulations;
Today's Independent,
A memo sent last month from the head of the MoD's supply department reveals that the organisation is struggling to process urgent orders for land and surveillance equipment to be sent to troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. The memo calls for staff to be co-opted from other departments for 12 months to plug the gap, a move it admits is a "sticking plaster" solution.
A second memo, from the MoD's Aircraft Maintenance Policy Board, circulated widely in the MoD in May, warns that years of privatisation and staff cuts have left the ministry without the expertise to maintain its own aircraft.
"This paper argues that recent and future changes in the employment of crown servant engineers will soon leave the MoD unable to fulfil its intelligent customer remit and hence jeopardize airworthiness," it says. "[Engineering teams] are punch drunk with additional requirements... and there is evidence that they do not have the capacity to comply with existing regulations...."
Several crashes have been attributed by insiders to either a lack of know-how or loss of experience, most significantly the Nimrod aircraft which blew up in Kandahar, Afghanistan, after a fuel leak in September 2006, killing all 14 men aboard.
In a meeting with the victims' families earlier this year, the Defence Minister Bob Ainsworth admitted that a lack of trained engineers was responsible for the delay in bringing the remaining Nimrod fleet up to minimum standards.
MoD struggling to maintain aircraft and supplies to troops - UK Politics, UK - The Independent
No prizes for guessing, continued failure to implement airworthiness regulations;
Today's Independent,
A memo sent last month from the head of the MoD's supply department reveals that the organisation is struggling to process urgent orders for land and surveillance equipment to be sent to troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. The memo calls for staff to be co-opted from other departments for 12 months to plug the gap, a move it admits is a "sticking plaster" solution.
A second memo, from the MoD's Aircraft Maintenance Policy Board, circulated widely in the MoD in May, warns that years of privatisation and staff cuts have left the ministry without the expertise to maintain its own aircraft.
"This paper argues that recent and future changes in the employment of crown servant engineers will soon leave the MoD unable to fulfil its intelligent customer remit and hence jeopardize airworthiness," it says. "[Engineering teams] are punch drunk with additional requirements... and there is evidence that they do not have the capacity to comply with existing regulations...."
Several crashes have been attributed by insiders to either a lack of know-how or loss of experience, most significantly the Nimrod aircraft which blew up in Kandahar, Afghanistan, after a fuel leak in September 2006, killing all 14 men aboard.
In a meeting with the victims' families earlier this year, the Defence Minister Bob Ainsworth admitted that a lack of trained engineers was responsible for the delay in bringing the remaining Nimrod fleet up to minimum standards.
MoD struggling to maintain aircraft and supplies to troops - UK Politics, UK - The Independent
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Chugalug 2
You said "If Flight safety were granted a motto it would surely be Never say Never ".
As a former Flight Safety Officer I would disagree - the motto would be:-
" Nothing is Foolproof - Fools are too ingenious!!!"
You said "If Flight safety were granted a motto it would surely be Never say Never ".
As a former Flight Safety Officer I would disagree - the motto would be:-
" Nothing is Foolproof - Fools are too ingenious!!!"
Last edited by cazatou; 1st Sep 2008 at 13:54.
Cazatou, then let us adopt both! I would be the first to agree with you that "human error" is the likeliest cause of any accident, be they fool or otherwise. Pilots may well be the first on the scene of such an accident, but that does not mean that the "human error" was necessarily "pilot error". So someone probably screwed up bigtime prior to this tragedy, but who and where? As a former SFSO I want to know the answer to that question, as I'm sure that you do too.
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Shytorque
<<Cazatou cannot answer with any certainty because he has never been a helicopter pilot and has no experience of the appropriate SH SOPs, rules or limits.>>
Well he brought it up and you seem to be trying to get him off the hook – one RADALT alarm was found set at 69 feet (somewhere I had it referred to as the “minimum” setting but cannot locate that ref just now) - you don't need to know what SOPs were to realise that a RADALT alarm setting of 69 feet would have been about right for setting a helo of that size down on ferns and grass in the absence of clearer ground markings and in marginal weather that spoilt visual cues from objects any distance ahead.
The investigators ascribed the highest degree of confidence that the setting was as pre impact and I recall two references wherein it was suggested that their last moment evasive manouevre was initiated when that alarm went off (check the ground profile against track in the last few seconds) – one an AVM at an inquiry and the other in Boeing's “Analysis of Available Data” (the only decent effort at analysis I have come across from an authority) – so I think it is relevant.
<<For an approach, 50 feet was an appropriate setting.>>
So 69 was of the right order for approaching that landing area?
<<... certainly not the high speed at which this aircraft impacted.>>
They had started to slow down and their airspeed had reduced by about 15 kts (Boeing analysis) and had they not been so close to the ground they would not have had such a strong tail wind - if I am correct in saying that they thought they had ½ mile or so to go, it would be about right, wouldn't it?
.
Anyway, it just goes on – every parameter which could point to a landing or close pass is challenged – the problem is that none of “you” (plural) want to contemplate a scenario wherein they could have been set up.
Fair enough, even with an obvious motive for a section of the intelligence services it would have required collusion at the highest levels to execute and cover up – very high levels – you would have to have been a mountain climber to top them.
<<Cazatou cannot answer with any certainty because he has never been a helicopter pilot and has no experience of the appropriate SH SOPs, rules or limits.>>
Well he brought it up and you seem to be trying to get him off the hook – one RADALT alarm was found set at 69 feet (somewhere I had it referred to as the “minimum” setting but cannot locate that ref just now) - you don't need to know what SOPs were to realise that a RADALT alarm setting of 69 feet would have been about right for setting a helo of that size down on ferns and grass in the absence of clearer ground markings and in marginal weather that spoilt visual cues from objects any distance ahead.
The investigators ascribed the highest degree of confidence that the setting was as pre impact and I recall two references wherein it was suggested that their last moment evasive manouevre was initiated when that alarm went off (check the ground profile against track in the last few seconds) – one an AVM at an inquiry and the other in Boeing's “Analysis of Available Data” (the only decent effort at analysis I have come across from an authority) – so I think it is relevant.
<<For an approach, 50 feet was an appropriate setting.>>
So 69 was of the right order for approaching that landing area?
<<... certainly not the high speed at which this aircraft impacted.>>
They had started to slow down and their airspeed had reduced by about 15 kts (Boeing analysis) and had they not been so close to the ground they would not have had such a strong tail wind - if I am correct in saying that they thought they had ½ mile or so to go, it would be about right, wouldn't it?
.
Anyway, it just goes on – every parameter which could point to a landing or close pass is challenged – the problem is that none of “you” (plural) want to contemplate a scenario wherein they could have been set up.
Fair enough, even with an obvious motive for a section of the intelligence services it would have required collusion at the highest levels to execute and cover up – very high levels – you would have to have been a mountain climber to top them.
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W K
I am one of those few who has "Exceptional" in their Logbook.
I have never (except for a few minutes under the supervision of Buck Rowland) flown a helicopter.
I will therefore accept any correction made to my posts in respect of technical matters by those who have spent their lives in SH and are still there today putting themselves "in harms way".
I agree that I set very High Standards in regard of the standard that I am prepared to accept from those whose job it is to fly VIP's on a daily basis.
What you are unequivocably stating is that, by default, the Pilots are guilty of negligence.
PUT UP
OR
SHUT UP
I am one of those few who has "Exceptional" in their Logbook.
I have never (except for a few minutes under the supervision of Buck Rowland) flown a helicopter.
I will therefore accept any correction made to my posts in respect of technical matters by those who have spent their lives in SH and are still there today putting themselves "in harms way".
I agree that I set very High Standards in regard of the standard that I am prepared to accept from those whose job it is to fly VIP's on a daily basis.
What you are unequivocably stating is that, by default, the Pilots are guilty of negligence.
PUT UP
OR
SHUT UP
Avoid imitations
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Walter, read back over the previous posts, your questions have been answered before.
(Re Cazatou)
I've come to realise that everything written here is likely to be twisted in your strange mind to fit in with your this huge conspiracy theory of yours. Ask Cazatou himself if he thinks I, of all people, would ever try to "get him off the hook". I answered your question because I was concerned that anything Cazatou wrote would be taken in the wrong context by yourself, if it had fitted in with what you needed to read.
I say again, trying to slow any helicopter from 160 kts from half a mile range in bad weather to a landing site is simply not a normal flight manoeuvre, especially where a crew had (going on the evidence of the yachtsman), already slowed down some short distance previously. This is in simple terms, the equivalent of a driver of a truck driving at maximum speed when searching for a parking space in poor weather.
One other thing you have also failed to take into account. The captain of the Chinook didn't want to fly this particular aircraft at all, it is well documented that he wanted to use a Mk1 for the mission, asked for a Mk1 and was refused.
How in your mind would he have been able to complete "your" secondary and most secret mission using his preferred Mk 1 if this (allegedly) fitted new homing equipment was only fitted to this particular Mk2, as you claim? Or will you simply claim it was fitted to all aircraft and the conspiracy is wider than you initially thought?
Brian Dixon, I'm now very sorry to say, this will be my last contribution to your thread while Walter Kennedy outrageously continues to insult. For some time he has inferred that I am part of some MOD or RAF cover up against him, which I most definitely NOT, as you well know. Sorry, my patience with Walter has run out, it's been coming a long time.
Good luck with the cause, Brian.
(Re Cazatou)
Well he brought it up and you seem to be trying to get him off the hook
I say again, trying to slow any helicopter from 160 kts from half a mile range in bad weather to a landing site is simply not a normal flight manoeuvre, especially where a crew had (going on the evidence of the yachtsman), already slowed down some short distance previously. This is in simple terms, the equivalent of a driver of a truck driving at maximum speed when searching for a parking space in poor weather.
One other thing you have also failed to take into account. The captain of the Chinook didn't want to fly this particular aircraft at all, it is well documented that he wanted to use a Mk1 for the mission, asked for a Mk1 and was refused.
How in your mind would he have been able to complete "your" secondary and most secret mission using his preferred Mk 1 if this (allegedly) fitted new homing equipment was only fitted to this particular Mk2, as you claim? Or will you simply claim it was fitted to all aircraft and the conspiracy is wider than you initially thought?
Brian Dixon, I'm now very sorry to say, this will be my last contribution to your thread while Walter Kennedy outrageously continues to insult. For some time he has inferred that I am part of some MOD or RAF cover up against him, which I most definitely NOT, as you well know. Sorry, my patience with Walter has run out, it's been coming a long time.
Good luck with the cause, Brian.
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Walter Kennedy
Yet again you have managed to alienate somebody who was doing their level best to provide you with accurate information based on their own experience and expertise.
You have spent an inordinate amount of time trying to prove your theory but have totally ignored your duty as a resident of the United Kingdom.
If you sincerely believe that you have evidence that the crash was the result of a deliberate act by a person or persons unknown, it is your duty to present said evidence to the appropriate Police Authority.
Yet again you have managed to alienate somebody who was doing their level best to provide you with accurate information based on their own experience and expertise.
You have spent an inordinate amount of time trying to prove your theory but have totally ignored your duty as a resident of the United Kingdom.
If you sincerely believe that you have evidence that the crash was the result of a deliberate act by a person or persons unknown, it is your duty to present said evidence to the appropriate Police Authority.
Unfortunately (or possibly fortunately from his past behaviour), WK is NOT a resident of the UK .. but of Australia ... so your comments don't apply to him legally.
Morally they do, but somehow I sense that will cut no ice here.
Morally they do, but somehow I sense that will cut no ice here.
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"If you sincerely believe that you have evidence that the crash was the result of a deliberate act by a person or persons unknown, it is your duty to present said evidence to the appropriate Police Authority."
He never has had one single shred of concrete evidence so therefore any submission would be total bollocks.....................
But whats most annoying is that Shy, someone I have flown with and have the utmost respect for now feels that because of WK's meanderings he should no longer contribute to this forum.................sad
He never has had one single shred of concrete evidence so therefore any submission would be total bollocks.....................
But whats most annoying is that Shy, someone I have flown with and have the utmost respect for now feels that because of WK's meanderings he should no longer contribute to this forum.................sad
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OmegaV6
Walter's profile states his residence - what proof do you have of where he lives or that I live in France?
Actually I do - and if you PM me your telephone number I will call you and you can check the phone number.
But then you would not know if it was me or Walter - would you?
PS
Walter's Nationality is that of a Country in Central Africa - or maybe it is not.
Walter's profile states his residence - what proof do you have of where he lives or that I live in France?
Actually I do - and if you PM me your telephone number I will call you and you can check the phone number.
But then you would not know if it was me or Walter - would you?
PS
Walter's Nationality is that of a Country in Central Africa - or maybe it is not.
Last edited by cazatou; 6th Sep 2008 at 10:04.
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ShyTorque
I hope that you are still reading this thread. You may wish to follow a suggestion that I followed some months ago and that is to filter out Walter's inputs thus:
At the top of the page, click on 'User CP' then, from the resultant menu, click on 'Buddy/Ignore Lists'. Here you are able to ignore specific contributors and
all you see when they have posted is:
. . . . . . a highly satisfactory method to avoid being wound up by Walter's tedious posts! 
I hope that you are still reading this thread. You may wish to follow a suggestion that I followed some months ago and that is to filter out Walter's inputs thus:
At the top of the page, click on 'User CP' then, from the resultant menu, click on 'Buddy/Ignore Lists'. Here you are able to ignore specific contributors and
all you see when they have posted is:
This message is hidden because walter kennedy is on your ignore list.
Last edited by meadowbank; 7th Sep 2008 at 06:52. Reason: To include wording of ignored posting message.
No doubt meadowbank’s advice re Walter will equally apply to my posts now, for I fear I am going to be an even more “irritating PPRuNer” than Brian by suggesting that by sitting here dormant (well as near as) this thread is doing the work of those in the MOD (including the SoS?) whose philosophy is “out of sight, out of mind”. Nigegilb points us (at #3653) to the issue of airworthiness again. Why does this theme keep recurring? Because here and on other threads, principally the “Nimrod crash in Afghanistan (not condolences)” one, there have been posts showing that from the very beginning of the 1990s the RAF Flight Safety system was deliberately subverted by the MOD to achieve immediate financial savings. The result was that the MOD’s own Airworthiness Regulations were no longer adhered to. In particular the Build Standards could no longer be maintained, creating an immediate and deadly effect on airworthiness, not only of the Nimrod, Hercules and Chinook fleets discussed on different threads on this forum, but of every single military aircraft type in service since then! With the introduction of Safety Cases and the loss of Crown Immunity occurring at or about that time, one has to wonder at what was going through the minds of Senior Officers implementing this meltdown of Military Flight Safety. Their methods though could be quite brutal, witness tucumseh’s post #1432 here:
http://www.pprune.org/military-aircr...lences-72.html
Now it might be the feeling of this thread that there is one issue and one issue alone that matters, ie putting aside Messrs Wratten and Day's finding of Gross Negligence against two experienced Chinook pilots, the subject of review by the SoS. Given that has been the situation now for the last 9 months or so, by my understanding, am I alone in suspecting that process to be one of prevarication rather than review? If the situation in the MOD is anything like as terminally chaotic as would appear from the threads and posts elsewhere on this forum that I have described, is it likely that the “Red Herring” landed by Wratten & Day is going to be obligingly thrown back into the waters by the SoS, inviting others to immediately cast for the real causes of this tragedy? It seems to me that this thread must grasp the nettle and accept that a gentlemanly solution to this injustice just isn’t going to happen. The only gentlemen involved in this injustice are sadly deceased, those that seek to perpetuate it have, I would suggest, a vested interest in doing so. It is now for others with a far more intimate knowledge of this terrible accident than I to do what has been done on the Hercules and Nimrod threads, that is to broaden out discussion on what was going on, not on the Mull that day, but in the corridors of power at Main Building and elsewhere. It is my belief that there will be found the likely cause of this accident. Then and only then will the MOD be forced to set aside this unjust slur. It is my belief that nothing less will succeed than shining a light into the dark crevasses of MOD enforcement (or lack of) of UK Military Airworthiness Regulations over the past two decades and in particular its effect on the introduction of the HC2 to RAF service. It has already been admitted to being a cause of Nimrod XV230’s accident by ACM Loader (see tuc’s post) and an audit report in 1996 stated that loss of experience meant that maintaining specifications had been utterly compromised following savage cuts to engineering project staff. All this adds up to a de facto sabotaging of the airworthiness of the UK Military Air Fleets to my mind. The cuts meant build standards were not maintained, thus Safety Cases were invalid, and thus the Airworthiness Audit Trail was broken. That is where real Gross Negligence is to be found, and wilful Gross Negligence at that!
http://www.pprune.org/military-aircr...lences-72.html
Now it might be the feeling of this thread that there is one issue and one issue alone that matters, ie putting aside Messrs Wratten and Day's finding of Gross Negligence against two experienced Chinook pilots, the subject of review by the SoS. Given that has been the situation now for the last 9 months or so, by my understanding, am I alone in suspecting that process to be one of prevarication rather than review? If the situation in the MOD is anything like as terminally chaotic as would appear from the threads and posts elsewhere on this forum that I have described, is it likely that the “Red Herring” landed by Wratten & Day is going to be obligingly thrown back into the waters by the SoS, inviting others to immediately cast for the real causes of this tragedy? It seems to me that this thread must grasp the nettle and accept that a gentlemanly solution to this injustice just isn’t going to happen. The only gentlemen involved in this injustice are sadly deceased, those that seek to perpetuate it have, I would suggest, a vested interest in doing so. It is now for others with a far more intimate knowledge of this terrible accident than I to do what has been done on the Hercules and Nimrod threads, that is to broaden out discussion on what was going on, not on the Mull that day, but in the corridors of power at Main Building and elsewhere. It is my belief that there will be found the likely cause of this accident. Then and only then will the MOD be forced to set aside this unjust slur. It is my belief that nothing less will succeed than shining a light into the dark crevasses of MOD enforcement (or lack of) of UK Military Airworthiness Regulations over the past two decades and in particular its effect on the introduction of the HC2 to RAF service. It has already been admitted to being a cause of Nimrod XV230’s accident by ACM Loader (see tuc’s post) and an audit report in 1996 stated that loss of experience meant that maintaining specifications had been utterly compromised following savage cuts to engineering project staff. All this adds up to a de facto sabotaging of the airworthiness of the UK Military Air Fleets to my mind. The cuts meant build standards were not maintained, thus Safety Cases were invalid, and thus the Airworthiness Audit Trail was broken. That is where real Gross Negligence is to be found, and wilful Gross Negligence at that!
Last edited by PPRuNe Pop; 3rd Oct 2008 at 11:48.
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Business Secretary John Hutton will replace Des Browne at Defence
Bad news for the review, but predicted widely. (3 days out on my estimate).
Time to concentrate on airworthiness issues a little more perhaps?
Let's see what happens at trowbridge.
Time to concentrate on airworthiness issues a little more perhaps?
Let's see what happens at trowbridge.