Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Seldom
Answer the question please. If you threatened this man
I think the moderators should have a word in your ear.
JP - try again or use the email link. D
PS - Who is the man from Provence?
I guarantee my response will have you, as it did for the man from provence
JP - try again or use the email link. D
bastOn:
So to sum up; guilty men at MOD rumbled and banged to rights but RAF CoC proved to be "Good Men, those Men" who have succinctly got the essence of the thing and come out with the right finding. Is that a fair resume, bastOn? I can see the attraction there for the RAF, but not for the NoK or for that matter, as if it mattered, me. Chocks Wahay directed us to this link. I would commend it to all:
House of Lords - Chinook ZD 576 - Report
Therein the very foundation of the RAF case is swept away with precise and polite ease. In particular Sir John Day's "facts" are shown to be merely assumptions, some of which don't bear scrutiny anyway. The same link covers the evidence of the much maligned Sqn Ldr Burke. The hound who didn't bark, well not to the BoI anyway. The combination of evidence by both witnesses points up the dysfunctional nature of the RAF's Accident Investigation by both BoI and RO's. Read what Sqn Ldr Burke has to say about 1,2 and 3 axis loss of control as well as uncommanded power from the FADEC's all of which he experienced on a number of occasions. Then let your imagination dwell on those last few minutes of flight that concern you. This accident started in the MOD and finished with the RAF. They both failed the 29 people who died on the Mull. The former by forcing an unairworthy aircraft into service, the latter for covering that up. RAF Officers of Air Rank were involved in both decisions.
The wider problems of the MOD and those who failed in their duty of care and so on and so on are very well put and I hope that they will be embarrassed into improving their performance - but don't hold your breath.
The other side of this is why did two pilots fly into a rock - and that is the morbidly fascinating problem that I wrestle with over and over again. It has happened before and will happen again. The last few minutes of flight hold the key to the accident to my mind.
The other side of this is why did two pilots fly into a rock - and that is the morbidly fascinating problem that I wrestle with over and over again. It has happened before and will happen again. The last few minutes of flight hold the key to the accident to my mind.
House of Lords - Chinook ZD 576 - Report
Therein the very foundation of the RAF case is swept away with precise and polite ease. In particular Sir John Day's "facts" are shown to be merely assumptions, some of which don't bear scrutiny anyway. The same link covers the evidence of the much maligned Sqn Ldr Burke. The hound who didn't bark, well not to the BoI anyway. The combination of evidence by both witnesses points up the dysfunctional nature of the RAF's Accident Investigation by both BoI and RO's. Read what Sqn Ldr Burke has to say about 1,2 and 3 axis loss of control as well as uncommanded power from the FADEC's all of which he experienced on a number of occasions. Then let your imagination dwell on those last few minutes of flight that concern you. This accident started in the MOD and finished with the RAF. They both failed the 29 people who died on the Mull. The former by forcing an unairworthy aircraft into service, the latter for covering that up. RAF Officers of Air Rank were involved in both decisions.
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Caz, Hello again. Hope you are well.
At 4665 I am glad to see that you align yourself with the majority of Lordships who voted against the HOL committee.
Would that be the small number of lordships who sat through all the evidence and made a judgement based on reason, or those fairly large numbers of Lordships who were bussed in at the last minute, listened to no evidence and voted to a man with the Government. The more intelligent of those would tell you that "Chinook" is a North American wind and "Mull of Kintyre", a song by Paul McCartney.
"How many flying hours did the HOL committee have?" That old chesnut.
They rule on:
Medical matters. But they are not doctors.
Financial matters. But they are not economists or accountants.
Structural matters. But they are not civil engineers.
Need I go on.
So why should we as Military Aviation be exempt from their scrutiny and judgement when everyone else in the country is not?
They come to their decisions by taking evidence from a cross section of witnesses then sorting out the "wheat from the chaff."
Among the witnesses for this particular enquiry were Pullford, Day, Wratten, Crawford, Morgan, Cable, three Fellows from the RAe, Burke, Witness A and the fathers of the two pilots. I think you will find this list covers the required expertise in all aspects of the investigation. An awful lot of flying experience here also. Far more than that at the BOI.
I watched a fair ammount of the enquiry on TV, for a bunch of "dumb civilians" they asked some pretty searching questions.
What probably vexes you, is that they spotted that the majority of the AM's "facts", were "in fact" hypothesis based on the simulation.They ruled that five "facts", were not "facts".
To be fair to Sir John, he stuck to his guns on four of them, but had to concede that the "failure to select emergency power", was unproven.
Why am I telling you all this. Well you couldn't possibly know about it. If you did, you would be well aware of the evidence given by Sqn Ldr Burke. Only two days ago you said you were not.
Also, if you have not read the full HOL committee report, how come you are so critical of its findings.
At 4665 I am glad to see that you align yourself with the majority of Lordships who voted against the HOL committee.
Would that be the small number of lordships who sat through all the evidence and made a judgement based on reason, or those fairly large numbers of Lordships who were bussed in at the last minute, listened to no evidence and voted to a man with the Government. The more intelligent of those would tell you that "Chinook" is a North American wind and "Mull of Kintyre", a song by Paul McCartney.
"How many flying hours did the HOL committee have?" That old chesnut.
They rule on:
Medical matters. But they are not doctors.
Financial matters. But they are not economists or accountants.
Structural matters. But they are not civil engineers.
Need I go on.
So why should we as Military Aviation be exempt from their scrutiny and judgement when everyone else in the country is not?
They come to their decisions by taking evidence from a cross section of witnesses then sorting out the "wheat from the chaff."
Among the witnesses for this particular enquiry were Pullford, Day, Wratten, Crawford, Morgan, Cable, three Fellows from the RAe, Burke, Witness A and the fathers of the two pilots. I think you will find this list covers the required expertise in all aspects of the investigation. An awful lot of flying experience here also. Far more than that at the BOI.
I watched a fair ammount of the enquiry on TV, for a bunch of "dumb civilians" they asked some pretty searching questions.
What probably vexes you, is that they spotted that the majority of the AM's "facts", were "in fact" hypothesis based on the simulation.They ruled that five "facts", were not "facts".
To be fair to Sir John, he stuck to his guns on four of them, but had to concede that the "failure to select emergency power", was unproven.
Why am I telling you all this. Well you couldn't possibly know about it. If you did, you would be well aware of the evidence given by Sqn Ldr Burke. Only two days ago you said you were not.
Also, if you have not read the full HOL committee report, how come you are so critical of its findings.
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baston
I think you are losing your control now.
Calm down, calm down (in apprpriate scouse accent)!
I presume the 'man from provence' is caz, as he seems to be in France. However, I think Dep 46 is more pyrenees ie near Toulouse...n'est pas? So perhaps SFFP has lost his bearings - but I'm not sure and not "with no doubt whatsoever", one could say, ahem!
I think SFFP's post reads as if caz has bombarded him facts not pertinent to the questions asked (as seen by SFFP) and now, SFFP has became so frustrated that caz is presently on his 'ignore list'.
I have a little sympathy with SFFP but this is hardly anything to bother the mods with; they have better things to be doing, I would think?
Now, back to thread.....
The BOI talks about the co-ords entered in S-Tans for the lighthouse (WP A) as being '280m in error' Does anyone know in which direction was the error? (please don't start on LZs Walt!)
I think you are losing your control now.
Calm down, calm down (in apprpriate scouse accent)!
I presume the 'man from provence' is caz, as he seems to be in France. However, I think Dep 46 is more pyrenees ie near Toulouse...n'est pas? So perhaps SFFP has lost his bearings - but I'm not sure and not "with no doubt whatsoever", one could say, ahem!
I think SFFP's post reads as if caz has bombarded him facts not pertinent to the questions asked (as seen by SFFP) and now, SFFP has became so frustrated that caz is presently on his 'ignore list'.
I have a little sympathy with SFFP but this is hardly anything to bother the mods with; they have better things to be doing, I would think?
Now, back to thread.....
The BOI talks about the co-ords entered in S-Tans for the lighthouse (WP A) as being '280m in error' Does anyone know in which direction was the error? (please don't start on LZs Walt!)
Avoid imitations
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I have read his post and very good it is too. Most of his are. Are you going to aspire to greater things in yours?
How do you know the aircraft was serviceable? No-one else does.
As an fairly experienced SH pilot, then recently retired and recently out of the NI theatre, I first wrote to Flight International in 1995. They thought my letter worthy of publication and as far as I know I was the first to publicly call foul; my protest certainly pre-dates this campaign.
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Shytorque
Your post -
My post 4687
and some of us get politely a little tired of people not reading our posts and assimilating the content.
Good evening.
Your post -
How do you know the aircraft was serviceable? No-one else does.
No I did not say that it was or was not serviceable. I was just getting down to the basic fact that the aircraft - in fog - flew into a rock. As in all things in life there is no absolute certainty. There are however very strong probabilities. The probability that I was espousing was that had basic DR nav been followed, what ever happened/did not happen in the aircraft in those last few minutes it would not have been so close to the Mull for it to have struck it. It may have fallen in the sea, it may have recovered to controlled flight - any one of dozens of possibilities.
Dear old SH fellow - if you read my posts I never postulated that the aircraft was serviceable or unserviceable. It may have been either/or. Whatever its serviceability state it still was flown by someone into a rock.
Dear old SH fellow - if you read my posts I never postulated that the aircraft was serviceable or unserviceable. It may have been either/or. Whatever its serviceability state it still was flown by someone into a rock.
I grow tired of folks turning up thinking they have all the answers
Good evening.
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Whatever its serviceability state it still was flown by someone into a rock.
It is not known for certain if the aircraft was under the pilots' control, or not. There are a number of previous references about the issue of the detached control pallet found after the accident. There had been previous problems with the same, on this airframe and others elsewhere. Thankyou.
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Thanks Walt,
I didn't have time to trawl the responses to that old post of yours but did anyone come up with why the PF had 035 deg selected on his HSI? It could be important, it might not - Chinook operators please could you tell us what were the SOPs for a VFR LL leg - was it to select the inbound track to the WP on the HSI. Then, what was the sequence of events at a WP change - who said what to whom to set up the HSI for the next leg - or did TANS do it automatically for you? In which case, where DOES 035 deg come from? (was it the track onward from WP B (Corran) to C (Fort George) - indicating an inadvertent error prior to WP change at WP A to select the incorrect leg's QDM or a mis-selection of the QDM to Corran? I am almost sure it wasn't for an LZ - sorry Walt!
I suspect that Walt's old post about unauth'd LZs created a certain amount of 'gnashing of teeth' from all corners but while I disagree with his hypothesis, I don't think he can be proved wrong - not for certain. Certainly, I think it is less likely than either of the negligence or UFCM/Engine fault/distraction theories (that is all they are). Perhaps the biggest argument against Walt's idea is that the ac was still travelling over 130 kts IAS as it approached the LZ - which is not conducive to landing, I should think?
However, he may have highlighted that perhaps the lighthouse was not 'misplotted' 200m SE but that the 'previously used' LZ co-ords were 'commonly' used as a WP (did 1 Gp SH/SF have a list of approved LZs with LZ recces/co-ords/elevations/obstacles etc etc -if so, was there one for Mull lighthouse?). This slight 'misplotting' could have contributed to the visual illusions below cloud, approaching the land - adding further to the debate as to why didn't they turn left.
Nonetheless, using the slightly incorrect co-ords for the lighthouse (WP A) is not a major factor for navigation either way (BOI agrees), However, this might have slightly mislead the crew!
If they thought they were 'on track' (027deg) from BFS to the lighthouse, then actually, they would have been tracking slightly to the right of the lighthouse in still air. Now add in the fact the the TANS computed position was in error by 280m SW, it is likely that the HSI was showing very slightly left of track (Chinook operators - how was the HSI calibrated when slaved to TANS?).
From the crew's perspective, this slight 'left of track' might have given them the idea that they were slightly further away from the lighthouse than they were and slightly to the left. In effect, that may have added to any visual illusion and /or confusion as they approcahed WP A - exacerbated by a 20 kt southerly wind (pointing the nose of the ac further right) . A little confusion at this point may have taken up some extra brain power for the crew to orientate themselves - maybe enough to delay the sighting of the lighthouse area, change WP and start the turn to the left. I can't find reference to it but does anyone know what hdgs were selected on the HDG bugs? The geometry indicates they had approx 20 secs to impact from where we presume the ac actually was at WP change and a max of 10 secs to start a turn left to avoid overflying the coast. Actually, that is quite a long time at Low level. So it begs the question - why didn't they turn towards the north - the one-million-dollar question?
If the crew were not visual with the land at this time and they carried on, then they probably did get it wrong by delaying the turn longer than 10 secs after WP change or by climbing too late/too low ROC. This is as postulated by the ROs, caz etc - but this is somewhat negated by the fact the crew changed waypoints, indicating they were visual with WP or its area.
However, it is also perfectly feasible, based on the testimony of the yachtsman (who was in a better position to see what the crew could see than those who were on land and above the base of the upslope stratus), that the ac was remaining 'VFR below' . If you can accept that, then the crew were not negligent at, or even before, the WP change. If only a ADR/CVR had been fitted - what a poor decision that was!
But what happened after the WP change is definitely UNKNOWN. Perhaps the delayed turn was because of the visual illusions and disorientation caused by the small nav kit errors? Of course, control restrictions/UCFMs and spurious Eng Fail captions/Runaways up 'cannot be discounted' either.
What is certain is that, because there was no ADR/CVR, the final minutes of ZD576 are a mystery to us all. With that as foundation, perhaps someone could explain how the burden of proof relating to Gross Negligence is met?
I don't suppose caz or baston will agree, alas!
In fact' they will probably either 'diss' everything I have said with no rational discussion or just put their fingers in their ears and go lalalalalala (figuratively speaking)!
Could any Chinny drivers please attempt to answer my questions in italics
TVM
flipster
I didn't have time to trawl the responses to that old post of yours but did anyone come up with why the PF had 035 deg selected on his HSI? It could be important, it might not - Chinook operators please could you tell us what were the SOPs for a VFR LL leg - was it to select the inbound track to the WP on the HSI. Then, what was the sequence of events at a WP change - who said what to whom to set up the HSI for the next leg - or did TANS do it automatically for you? In which case, where DOES 035 deg come from? (was it the track onward from WP B (Corran) to C (Fort George) - indicating an inadvertent error prior to WP change at WP A to select the incorrect leg's QDM or a mis-selection of the QDM to Corran? I am almost sure it wasn't for an LZ - sorry Walt!
I suspect that Walt's old post about unauth'd LZs created a certain amount of 'gnashing of teeth' from all corners but while I disagree with his hypothesis, I don't think he can be proved wrong - not for certain. Certainly, I think it is less likely than either of the negligence or UFCM/Engine fault/distraction theories (that is all they are). Perhaps the biggest argument against Walt's idea is that the ac was still travelling over 130 kts IAS as it approached the LZ - which is not conducive to landing, I should think?
However, he may have highlighted that perhaps the lighthouse was not 'misplotted' 200m SE but that the 'previously used' LZ co-ords were 'commonly' used as a WP (did 1 Gp SH/SF have a list of approved LZs with LZ recces/co-ords/elevations/obstacles etc etc -if so, was there one for Mull lighthouse?). This slight 'misplotting' could have contributed to the visual illusions below cloud, approaching the land - adding further to the debate as to why didn't they turn left.
Nonetheless, using the slightly incorrect co-ords for the lighthouse (WP A) is not a major factor for navigation either way (BOI agrees), However, this might have slightly mislead the crew!
If they thought they were 'on track' (027deg) from BFS to the lighthouse, then actually, they would have been tracking slightly to the right of the lighthouse in still air. Now add in the fact the the TANS computed position was in error by 280m SW, it is likely that the HSI was showing very slightly left of track (Chinook operators - how was the HSI calibrated when slaved to TANS?).
From the crew's perspective, this slight 'left of track' might have given them the idea that they were slightly further away from the lighthouse than they were and slightly to the left. In effect, that may have added to any visual illusion and /or confusion as they approcahed WP A - exacerbated by a 20 kt southerly wind (pointing the nose of the ac further right) . A little confusion at this point may have taken up some extra brain power for the crew to orientate themselves - maybe enough to delay the sighting of the lighthouse area, change WP and start the turn to the left. I can't find reference to it but does anyone know what hdgs were selected on the HDG bugs? The geometry indicates they had approx 20 secs to impact from where we presume the ac actually was at WP change and a max of 10 secs to start a turn left to avoid overflying the coast. Actually, that is quite a long time at Low level. So it begs the question - why didn't they turn towards the north - the one-million-dollar question?
If the crew were not visual with the land at this time and they carried on, then they probably did get it wrong by delaying the turn longer than 10 secs after WP change or by climbing too late/too low ROC. This is as postulated by the ROs, caz etc - but this is somewhat negated by the fact the crew changed waypoints, indicating they were visual with WP or its area.
However, it is also perfectly feasible, based on the testimony of the yachtsman (who was in a better position to see what the crew could see than those who were on land and above the base of the upslope stratus), that the ac was remaining 'VFR below' . If you can accept that, then the crew were not negligent at, or even before, the WP change. If only a ADR/CVR had been fitted - what a poor decision that was!
But what happened after the WP change is definitely UNKNOWN. Perhaps the delayed turn was because of the visual illusions and disorientation caused by the small nav kit errors? Of course, control restrictions/UCFMs and spurious Eng Fail captions/Runaways up 'cannot be discounted' either.
What is certain is that, because there was no ADR/CVR, the final minutes of ZD576 are a mystery to us all. With that as foundation, perhaps someone could explain how the burden of proof relating to Gross Negligence is met?
I don't suppose caz or baston will agree, alas!
In fact' they will probably either 'diss' everything I have said with no rational discussion or just put their fingers in their ears and go lalalalalala (figuratively speaking)!
Could any Chinny drivers please attempt to answer my questions in italics
TVM
flipster
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Flipster - t
That's a bit unfair!! I think your appraisal is fine, good even! You may have noticed in my posts I have never stated that the ROs findings were correct. However I am, as I posted recently, fascinated to know why they flew into the rock. There are just so many red herrings thrown into the pot as to what may or may not have distracted them in those final moments - but to me it looks like they got it wrong in spades for several of those points you raise above. Spatial disorentation in the tricky visual conditions at the time being a major factor.
All the best.
I don't suppose caz or baston will agree, alas!
In fact' they will probably either 'diss' everything I have said with no rational discussion or just put their fingers in their ears and go lalalalalala (figuratively speaking)!
In fact' they will probably either 'diss' everything I have said with no rational discussion or just put their fingers in their ears and go lalalalalala (figuratively speaking)!
All the best.
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Chinook
Flipster & Co. No-one will ever know why they pressed on instead of turning up the coast. But the fact is that they should not have been there, close to the coast, in those conditions at all.
The most likely explanation of why they entered IMC over those notorious and very dangerous hills is that they were about 500 meters to the right of the track that would have taken them over the lighthouse and thus over the hill-top with around 300 feet to spare; but those 500 yards to the right of track and thus over the (somewhat similar looking) fog station site meant that the hill-top in front of them was 300 feet or more higher than they expected. They mistook one for the other. Have a look at the map and at the contours of where they crashed.
But in the end it does not matter why they did not turn away, they did not; and it had nothing to do with being distracted by a fly in the cockpit(both pilots!!!) - as has been seriously suggested, nor with a false beacon laid on the hillside by the IRA - as has also been seriously suggested in this thread.
And, just by the way, in order to deflect any further insults from those who oppose the final findings, I am nothing to do with MOD, nor with Day- I do not recall ever meeting him, nor WRatten - who I happen to have met a couple of times, nor with with the numerous Air, Flight Safety, Legal and other staff officers who supported their views at Group, Command and MOD levels. So may we please have less of the personal attack mode, and a little more objective examination of what happened. Regars to all those of goodwill. JP
The most likely explanation of why they entered IMC over those notorious and very dangerous hills is that they were about 500 meters to the right of the track that would have taken them over the lighthouse and thus over the hill-top with around 300 feet to spare; but those 500 yards to the right of track and thus over the (somewhat similar looking) fog station site meant that the hill-top in front of them was 300 feet or more higher than they expected. They mistook one for the other. Have a look at the map and at the contours of where they crashed.
But in the end it does not matter why they did not turn away, they did not; and it had nothing to do with being distracted by a fly in the cockpit(both pilots!!!) - as has been seriously suggested, nor with a false beacon laid on the hillside by the IRA - as has also been seriously suggested in this thread.
And, just by the way, in order to deflect any further insults from those who oppose the final findings, I am nothing to do with MOD, nor with Day- I do not recall ever meeting him, nor WRatten - who I happen to have met a couple of times, nor with with the numerous Air, Flight Safety, Legal and other staff officers who supported their views at Group, Command and MOD levels. So may we please have less of the personal attack mode, and a little more objective examination of what happened. Regars to all those of goodwill. JP
JP,
You have been entirely consistent in this view but I cannot remember you ever giving a satisfactory answer, when asked, exactly what those conditions were, as seen from the cockpit. All you have done is quoted the mantra of the witnesses on the Mull and, as far as I recall, tried to discredit the testimony of the only other witness, Mr Holbrook, because of apparent inconsistencies between his evidence given to the BOI and the HoL.
Here we go, around the buoys again, but I guess we always will until you can tell us what the view from the cockpit was, or at least, be able to remove any doubt whatsoever from your version of the events.
As far as I can see, the only solid (i.e. no doubt whatsoever) evidence we have is that they flew within 1 - 2 Km of a patch of fog. Everything else is speculation, surely a long way from the required conditions for the finding of gross negligence?
in those conditions at all.
Here we go, around the buoys again, but I guess we always will until you can tell us what the view from the cockpit was, or at least, be able to remove any doubt whatsoever from your version of the events.
As far as I can see, the only solid (i.e. no doubt whatsoever) evidence we have is that they flew within 1 - 2 Km of a patch of fog. Everything else is speculation, surely a long way from the required conditions for the finding of gross negligence?
JP, I too would like to comment on the scenario that you paint. For that is all it is, a picture, a vision, a mirage even of what might have happened. It merely joins Walter's wacky radios, my doomed unairworthy aircraft, Messrs Wratten & Day's reckless and crazed pilots bent on Gross Negligence and no doubt half a dozen other theories. Why? Because there is no proof positive for any of them. If the MOD played by anything approaching the rules the finding of Gross Negligence would never have been allowed let alone sustained. But they don't and as Brian points out, they daren't, for that would then invite focus on what could be the real culprit; themselves. That is a shameful position to adopt but one only too typical of a shameful and Grossly Negligent institution. Unfortunately the RAF has also been tainted with that shame in aiding and abetting the deceit by conducting an Accident Investigation that was a charade. So it too feels compelled to prolong this injustice to the memory of two of its junior officers. That is a shame brought down on a Service with a proud history of honourable duty done to this nation. I for one bitterly resent that stain on its character, let alone on Jon and Rick's. High time for it to do the right thing.
Let Right Be Done!
Let Right Be Done!
Below the Glidepath - not correcting
I for one bitterly resent that stain on its character, let alone on Jon and Rick's. High time for it to do the right thing.
Let Right Be Done!
Let Right Be Done!
My only comment from your post (a sentiment shared by the majority here I think) is that the BOI findings and the subsequent outcry have now driven the situation to its polar extremes.
On one hand friends, family, and Service professionals want to see the BOI finding overturned and denounced for the sham it was; on the other hand, the MoD know that the chances of anyone establishing any more pertinient facts to establish the true cause are slim to none.
The net result is there are effectively two separate initiatives here, (1) Overturn the BOI findings, and (2) establish the true cause of the accident. Unfortunately the strength of feeling and emotional capital invested here (by both sides) are causing these 2 aims to be decoupled and divergent instead of viewed as a common goal, thus making any resolution harder to find.
Point taken, Two's in. But both outcomes are a necessity. Once you decide that finding the cause of an accident, and hence avoiding future ones, is merely an option rather than a vital part of aircraft operations you slide down an ever steepening slope to aeronautical doom. It seems that with this BoI and others that is exactly the path that the RAF has adopted. That is why it cannot be entrusted with that responsibility any longer and why that must be moved to a separate and independent MAAIB, so that future avoidable accidents can again be avoided. If the only outcome to this campaign is the reversal of W&D's finding then the reason for it having been made in the first place will never emerge and the ambivalent attitude of the RAF to Accident Investigation will prevail. That would mean future lives being lost needlessly IMHO. That is what is at stake here, and why we must have an independent MAA and MAAIB.