Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
SuperTANS
I concede I'm far too old to have first hand knowledge of SuperTANS, but the question has been raised before as to what actually occurs when this switch is switched "Off" in the manner decribed by Dalek? Does TANS still accept and store input data from Doppler etc? Such a "standby" mode would explain both the "fact" data was there to be extracted post-crash and the possibility of the crew switching the unit off (a recognised technique to clear comms EMC problems in the aircraft).
Alternatively;
The Racal report is an interesting read, although of course most of it was withheld by MoD. (That is, the ROs based their verdict on information, much of which hasn't been released). What stands out to most readers is that Racal only say the inputs were working (Doppler, Air Data, GPS) but nowhere claim they were accurate. MoD clearly had better information, as they claimed both; and also that all units were serviceable.
However, in light of the conflicting evidence between AAIB and Racal over the switch, it is interesting that the released part of the report explains each function in great detail, except that of the on/off switch or the behaviour of the device when subjected to power interrupts (a common occurrence noted by Sqn Ldr Burke, but ignored by MoD). As stated before, one is struck by the single short "SuperTANS" paragraph in the AAIB - the author (Mr Cable) clearly assumed, or was told to assume, that the conflicts would reconciled elsewhere (given he was not the AAIB "lead" on TANS/Nav). One short paragraph, yet the ROs based their entire case on this area.
But what nobody menions is the Trimble 8000 GPS report, or whether its content was reconciled with that of the Racal report. This omission could be for a number of reasons. Very many assume GPS was embedded in TANS. "Learned" Lords who supported the ROs, even stated that there was no GPS at all.
But when reading both reports side by side (Windows 7, I love it) I was immediately struck by the "fact" that GPS powered down 27.6 seconds after TANS using, if I read the reports correctly, the same time baseline (i.e. that fed from TANS to the GPS internal clock upon initialisation). I suppose it is possible that TANS lost, or GPS advanced, 27.6 seconds in the 52m TANS was "fixed", but that is a lot of drift. But, from this information, it is also possible TANS was powered down some time before GPS.
The GPS wasn't entirely serviceable, carrying two known faults (actually, one fault and one defect), including one at the GPS/TANS interface. And the crew were told to ignore TANS error messages relating to GPS.
Again, I would never say this was the cause, but it is an information conflict; and conflicts must be resolved (or so it says in MoD's Safety Management regulations). Perhaps someone more up to date would care to check what I've surmised from the reports?
Alternatively;
The Racal report is an interesting read, although of course most of it was withheld by MoD. (That is, the ROs based their verdict on information, much of which hasn't been released). What stands out to most readers is that Racal only say the inputs were working (Doppler, Air Data, GPS) but nowhere claim they were accurate. MoD clearly had better information, as they claimed both; and also that all units were serviceable.
However, in light of the conflicting evidence between AAIB and Racal over the switch, it is interesting that the released part of the report explains each function in great detail, except that of the on/off switch or the behaviour of the device when subjected to power interrupts (a common occurrence noted by Sqn Ldr Burke, but ignored by MoD). As stated before, one is struck by the single short "SuperTANS" paragraph in the AAIB - the author (Mr Cable) clearly assumed, or was told to assume, that the conflicts would reconciled elsewhere (given he was not the AAIB "lead" on TANS/Nav). One short paragraph, yet the ROs based their entire case on this area.
But what nobody menions is the Trimble 8000 GPS report, or whether its content was reconciled with that of the Racal report. This omission could be for a number of reasons. Very many assume GPS was embedded in TANS. "Learned" Lords who supported the ROs, even stated that there was no GPS at all.
But when reading both reports side by side (Windows 7, I love it) I was immediately struck by the "fact" that GPS powered down 27.6 seconds after TANS using, if I read the reports correctly, the same time baseline (i.e. that fed from TANS to the GPS internal clock upon initialisation). I suppose it is possible that TANS lost, or GPS advanced, 27.6 seconds in the 52m TANS was "fixed", but that is a lot of drift. But, from this information, it is also possible TANS was powered down some time before GPS.
The GPS wasn't entirely serviceable, carrying two known faults (actually, one fault and one defect), including one at the GPS/TANS interface. And the crew were told to ignore TANS error messages relating to GPS.
Again, I would never say this was the cause, but it is an information conflict; and conflicts must be resolved (or so it says in MoD's Safety Management regulations). Perhaps someone more up to date would care to check what I've surmised from the reports?
Dalek and flip, apologies for butting in here but I asked about the TANS switch previously at post #6600 on page 330 (isn't there some auto generated mail from the PPRuNe computer if you hit that sort of combination that says, "Congratulations!! Your post means that you have just won a round the world cruise for yourself and partner!"?):
I got one response then, suggesting that it might have been switched off if there were VHF interference experienced (thanks HPT). Any other offers now, especially regarding what was off when it was "Off"?
Thanks. Oh yes, carry on please!
Ah, just noticed that you already have, tuc. Well done that man!
....the Super Tans switch which Mr Cable of course felt must have been in the Off position before the crash from the soot patterns (classic professional accident investigator observation). Two questions follow at least I would suggest:
1. Was the Super TANS itself Off therefore or merely the display?
2. Why would the switch have been selected Off?
1. Was the Super TANS itself Off therefore or merely the display?
2. Why would the switch have been selected Off?
Thanks. Oh yes, carry on please!
Ah, just noticed that you already have, tuc. Well done that man!
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Dalek,
Yes, I may be wrong.....but I might not be; hence doubt, n'est pas?
However, I would say that the WP change indicates to me that the crew had identified their turning point (or at least the area of it) and they were content that they had had navigated with sufficient confidence close to the Mull and its lighthouse and that they were intending to turn left towards their next WP (Corran) - the President of the BOI later concured with this, I think. Also, that logical technique is what I was officially taught to do at LL (a number of times) and what I have taught everyone else since. It also works! (But one had to try to get a L/R or XTE update on the next leg as soon as practicable.)
For an operator, it is very frightening to think that any radio interference on the nav kit would ever result in having to switch the kit off to correct the problem!! Sadly, that is what Chinny Mk 2 crews had to live with, or so it seems....an awfully-implemented re-design and upgrade, it should never have been allowed to fly in that state .... and certainly not with pax aboard!
flipster
Yes, I may be wrong.....but I might not be; hence doubt, n'est pas?
However, I would say that the WP change indicates to me that the crew had identified their turning point (or at least the area of it) and they were content that they had had navigated with sufficient confidence close to the Mull and its lighthouse and that they were intending to turn left towards their next WP (Corran) - the President of the BOI later concured with this, I think. Also, that logical technique is what I was officially taught to do at LL (a number of times) and what I have taught everyone else since. It also works! (But one had to try to get a L/R or XTE update on the next leg as soon as practicable.)
For an operator, it is very frightening to think that any radio interference on the nav kit would ever result in having to switch the kit off to correct the problem!! Sadly, that is what Chinny Mk 2 crews had to live with, or so it seems....an awfully-implemented re-design and upgrade, it should never have been allowed to fly in that state .... and certainly not with pax aboard!
flipster
Last edited by flipster; 13th Aug 2010 at 08:16.
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SFFP
Re your 6693
Mr Ellacott, who was the first on the scene of the crash, stated on oath that the visibility was "only about nine or ten feet maximum."
He also stated "It was difficult to say how far I was from the point of the explosion, but I don't think I could have been more than 100 yards." That is not a great distance; in fact it is the length of the garden at our main house.
100 yards equates to 91.4 metres and the AAIB assessed the impact speed as 150 kts which equates to 77 metres per second. The Pilots would, therefore, have had only a maximum of 1.187 seconds visual warning of impact to assimilate the danger and react. Incidentally, the SAR Sea Kings which were scrambled to the site of the accident reported hover-taxiing in visibility of 20 feet or less to get to the crash site.
Re your 6693
Mr Ellacott, who was the first on the scene of the crash, stated on oath that the visibility was "only about nine or ten feet maximum."
He also stated "It was difficult to say how far I was from the point of the explosion, but I don't think I could have been more than 100 yards." That is not a great distance; in fact it is the length of the garden at our main house.
100 yards equates to 91.4 metres and the AAIB assessed the impact speed as 150 kts which equates to 77 metres per second. The Pilots would, therefore, have had only a maximum of 1.187 seconds visual warning of impact to assimilate the danger and react. Incidentally, the SAR Sea Kings which were scrambled to the site of the accident reported hover-taxiing in visibility of 20 feet or less to get to the crash site.
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SFFP
Re your 6693
Mr Ellacott, who was the first on the scene of the crash, stated on oath that the visibility was "only about nine or ten feet maximum."
He also stated "It was difficult to say how far I was from the point of the explosion, but I don't think I could have been more than 100 yards." That is not a great distance; in fact it is the length of the garden at our main house.
100 yards equates to 91.4 metres and the AAIB assessed the impact speed as 150 kts which equates to 77 metres per second. The Pilots would, therefore, have had only a maximum of 1.187 seconds visual warning of impact to assimilate the danger and react. Incidentally, the SAR Sea Kings which were scrambled to the site of the accident reported hover-taxiing in visibility of 20 feet or less to get to the crash site.
Re your 6693
Mr Ellacott, who was the first on the scene of the crash, stated on oath that the visibility was "only about nine or ten feet maximum."
He also stated "It was difficult to say how far I was from the point of the explosion, but I don't think I could have been more than 100 yards." That is not a great distance; in fact it is the length of the garden at our main house.
100 yards equates to 91.4 metres and the AAIB assessed the impact speed as 150 kts which equates to 77 metres per second. The Pilots would, therefore, have had only a maximum of 1.187 seconds visual warning of impact to assimilate the danger and react. Incidentally, the SAR Sea Kings which were scrambled to the site of the accident reported hover-taxiing in visibility of 20 feet or less to get to the crash site.
You seem to be missing my point, but I expect you already know that.
Mr Ellacott may well have been the first on the scene. The weather may well have been as he described when he eventually arrived at the impact site.
But does he or anyone else know what the actual weather conditions were at the crash site at the exact time of the crash
Does anyone actually know what was seen from the flight deck windows at any time from the final turning point to the moment of impact
I would suggest that without the above factual information then it's impossible to arrive at a conclusion that fits with the verdict in this case.
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Chinook
Seldom. For heaven's sake what point are you trying to make with your repetative and boring insistance on the visibility during the last few seconds of flight? Methinks you are out of your depth.JP
For heaven's sake what point are you trying to make with your repetative and boring insistance on the visibility during the last few seconds of flight? Methinks you are out of your depth.JP
#3230
I can only repeat that emotional invective is no substitute for rational argument. Do you not agree? John Purdey
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JP,
I apologise if it bores you but I have been nothing if not consistent and my opinion has never wavered from,
No body knows for certain what the actual weather was, as seen from the cockpit at any stage from waypoint transition to the point of impact.
Nobody knows for certain what the weather was at the crash site at the time of the crash.
Nobody knows for certain if they ever went IMC.
Nobody knows for certain if the aircraft did or didn't suffer a malfunction which contributed to or caused the crash.
If what has been alluded to on here over the past few weeks is true then I can fully appreciate the angst you must be feeling with regard to the upcoming enquiry but please lets try and keep the banter on here polite.
I apologise if it bores you but I have been nothing if not consistent and my opinion has never wavered from,
No body knows for certain what the actual weather was, as seen from the cockpit at any stage from waypoint transition to the point of impact.
Nobody knows for certain what the weather was at the crash site at the time of the crash.
Nobody knows for certain if they ever went IMC.
Nobody knows for certain if the aircraft did or didn't suffer a malfunction which contributed to or caused the crash.
If what has been alluded to on here over the past few weeks is true then I can fully appreciate the angst you must be feeling with regard to the upcoming enquiry but please lets try and keep the banter on here polite.
Looking back at 3230 I came across this gem from JP:
JP, in the light of the revelations about the poor airworthiness of the HC2, how do feel about that comment?
Also, do you not agree that the visibilty from the cockpit during the last few seconds of flight, between Waypoint A and the crash site, are crucial to any decision about the performance of the crew?
But this was a simple VIP transit flight; no risk of any kind could possibly be justified.
Also, do you not agree that the visibilty from the cockpit during the last few seconds of flight, between Waypoint A and the crash site, are crucial to any decision about the performance of the crew?
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John Purdey and Cazatou,
Wratten contends that the negligence had taken place at Waypoint Change.
But since the only available witness places the aircraft in legal VFR and flying at sensible speed and height, then weather cannot be considered a factor at that point?
Any entry into cloud came after Wrattens assertion of negligence, and therefore is irrelevant to that verdict.
Wratten contends that the negligence had taken place at Waypoint Change.
But since the only available witness places the aircraft in legal VFR and flying at sensible speed and height, then weather cannot be considered a factor at that point?
Any entry into cloud came after Wrattens assertion of negligence, and therefore is irrelevant to that verdict.
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Flipster
re your post #6700
A direct line from waypoint change to B would not have cleared the Mull but would have taken them over higher ground than where they crashed (try doing some chart work).
You are suggesting that they were right to drop the only known nav reference point of any use to them (a point brought up in at least one of the inquiries) when it was still ahead and they would then have to feel their way around the Mull shoreline?
re your post #6700
A direct line from waypoint change to B would not have cleared the Mull but would have taken them over higher ground than where they crashed (try doing some chart work).
You are suggesting that they were right to drop the only known nav reference point of any use to them (a point brought up in at least one of the inquiries) when it was still ahead and they would then have to feel their way around the Mull shoreline?
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Don't be daft Walter, no-one would have gone straight on over the mull in IMC at 500ft - as I said, that would have been suicidal, I think you would agree? But the WP change is clear evidence to many that the crew were sure of their position relative to the mull (ie they could see its position) and that they were moving their attention to navigating towards the next leg and next WP. Don't forget that a WP is only a 'statement of intent'; you DONT have to overfly every one and that a nav route is only a means to an end of getting to your destination!
As for the options available to the crew, they couldn't have climbed to the required SAlt of approx 6500ft (due to the icing limitation) - even if they had, they would have carried out a LL Abort/Emergency Climb (which they had recently practiced). If they had been becoming IMC, it is more likely they would have turned back or stopped. Instead, they were, in all probability, 'VMC below' at or about WP change (Holbrook confirms this) and would have been keeping clear of the clouded (if obvious) mass of the mull by intending to turn left to follow the coast (many experienced LL and SH pilots agree - inc BOI Pres later - IIRC). They didn't or couldn't make any of those choices - but why? No-one knows for certain; neither you nor I (nor also Rotten and Day).
However, there are people around who are desparate to keep the gross negligence label on the pilots (makes you wonder why, does it not?). However, anyone with a modicum of impartiality and the ability to reason can see that there may be other possible causes - dare I say it, even your unlikely CPLS theory raises questions and doubts. But because we don't know what the pilots could see from the cockpit and because there was no CVR/ADR fitted, no-one can define anything with the level of proof required for the 'verdict' to stand
However, it can be proven - with no doubt whatsoever - that the HC2 design and its MLU did not comply with the airworthiness regulations and that it was not fit for the purpose of a passenger flight out of theatre, let alone with VVIPs aboard. Higher-level negligence and/or incompetence occured way before this flight took-off. Perhaps that is why some people like JP and his friends are slightly concerned right now?
After the crash, this incompetence was compounded by a lack of honesty and openess, if not outright obstruction by the MoD (neither was the investiagtion aided by the out-of-date and flawed BOI process). But if I am to be fair, then it may be possible that Rotten and Day did not fully know of the parlous state of the HC2 design - but someone in the higher levels of MoD (Main Bldg) and MoD PE did (and also the BOI should have found this out).
But when all is said and done and whatever the operational imperative, it is abysmal leadership to order crews to fly an unsafe ac which had been described as 'positively dangerous' without informing them and without giving them the level of detail and knowledge required to recover safely from any forseen emergency situation.
As for the options available to the crew, they couldn't have climbed to the required SAlt of approx 6500ft (due to the icing limitation) - even if they had, they would have carried out a LL Abort/Emergency Climb (which they had recently practiced). If they had been becoming IMC, it is more likely they would have turned back or stopped. Instead, they were, in all probability, 'VMC below' at or about WP change (Holbrook confirms this) and would have been keeping clear of the clouded (if obvious) mass of the mull by intending to turn left to follow the coast (many experienced LL and SH pilots agree - inc BOI Pres later - IIRC). They didn't or couldn't make any of those choices - but why? No-one knows for certain; neither you nor I (nor also Rotten and Day).
However, there are people around who are desparate to keep the gross negligence label on the pilots (makes you wonder why, does it not?). However, anyone with a modicum of impartiality and the ability to reason can see that there may be other possible causes - dare I say it, even your unlikely CPLS theory raises questions and doubts. But because we don't know what the pilots could see from the cockpit and because there was no CVR/ADR fitted, no-one can define anything with the level of proof required for the 'verdict' to stand
However, it can be proven - with no doubt whatsoever - that the HC2 design and its MLU did not comply with the airworthiness regulations and that it was not fit for the purpose of a passenger flight out of theatre, let alone with VVIPs aboard. Higher-level negligence and/or incompetence occured way before this flight took-off. Perhaps that is why some people like JP and his friends are slightly concerned right now?
After the crash, this incompetence was compounded by a lack of honesty and openess, if not outright obstruction by the MoD (neither was the investiagtion aided by the out-of-date and flawed BOI process). But if I am to be fair, then it may be possible that Rotten and Day did not fully know of the parlous state of the HC2 design - but someone in the higher levels of MoD (Main Bldg) and MoD PE did (and also the BOI should have found this out).
But when all is said and done and whatever the operational imperative, it is abysmal leadership to order crews to fly an unsafe ac which had been described as 'positively dangerous' without informing them and without giving them the level of detail and knowledge required to recover safely from any forseen emergency situation.
Last edited by flipster; 14th Aug 2010 at 07:24.
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dalek
Re your 6708.
If you are referring to the Yachtsman as the witness it is worth bearing in mind that in his sworn written evidence to the BOI in the immediate aftermath of the Crash he stated on oath that his position was "2NM SW of the Mull" and the visibility was "1 NM limited by haze." He further stated on oath that the Chinook was " proceeding towards the mass of orographic cloud that obscured the Mull."
Re your 6708.
If you are referring to the Yachtsman as the witness it is worth bearing in mind that in his sworn written evidence to the BOI in the immediate aftermath of the Crash he stated on oath that his position was "2NM SW of the Mull" and the visibility was "1 NM limited by haze." He further stated on oath that the Chinook was " proceeding towards the mass of orographic cloud that obscured the Mull."
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SFFP
Mr Ellacott was approx "100 yards" from the crash site when the Chinook overflew him and the surface visibility was " 9 or 10 ft maximum". My garden here is 100 yards long (the property precedes the French revolution and the introduction of metric measures) and a casual walk uphill from one end to the other takes less than 1 minute (including a slight detour around the swimming pool).
Furthermore, any witness at the crash site would have been at dire risk of injury or death from flying debris.
Mr Ellacott was approx "100 yards" from the crash site when the Chinook overflew him and the surface visibility was " 9 or 10 ft maximum". My garden here is 100 yards long (the property precedes the French revolution and the introduction of metric measures) and a casual walk uphill from one end to the other takes less than 1 minute (including a slight detour around the swimming pool).
Furthermore, any witness at the crash site would have been at dire risk of injury or death from flying debris.
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Caz,
You are simply splitting hairs.
Holbrooks boat was 2nms(ish) from the Mull and he could see the area just below the lighthouse. He reported the overall visibility to be 1nm(ish) in haze.
No contradiction there. As has been covered many times in this thread, visibility varies with direction. As an A1 pilot of course you know this.
He (Holbrook) saw the helicopter flying clear of cloud.
Any sane and reasonable person would average these two figures and say
"OK, vis was somewhere between one and two miles, helicopter clear of cloud, VFR."
The helicopter was flying towards a cloud covered landmass. So what.
The crew could almost certainly see the coastline, and almost certainly planned to turn before they got there.
What none of us knows is why they didn't.
So remind me again. Where was the negligence at that point?
You are simply splitting hairs.
Holbrooks boat was 2nms(ish) from the Mull and he could see the area just below the lighthouse. He reported the overall visibility to be 1nm(ish) in haze.
No contradiction there. As has been covered many times in this thread, visibility varies with direction. As an A1 pilot of course you know this.
He (Holbrook) saw the helicopter flying clear of cloud.
Any sane and reasonable person would average these two figures and say
"OK, vis was somewhere between one and two miles, helicopter clear of cloud, VFR."
The helicopter was flying towards a cloud covered landmass. So what.
The crew could almost certainly see the coastline, and almost certainly planned to turn before they got there.
What none of us knows is why they didn't.
So remind me again. Where was the negligence at that point?
Last edited by dalek; 15th Aug 2010 at 09:31.
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Caz,
Very true but just imagine how helpful an eye witness would have been. It would have cleared up the weather issue for sure. They would have been able to give us a detailed description of the last few seconds of the flight which would of probably cleared up any of the servicability issues etc.
Imagine if you will just how helpful an eye witness would have, would have stopped all the speculation for sure
Very true but just imagine how helpful an eye witness would have been. It would have cleared up the weather issue for sure. They would have been able to give us a detailed description of the last few seconds of the flight which would of probably cleared up any of the servicability issues etc.
Imagine if you will just how helpful an eye witness would have, would have stopped all the speculation for sure
I'm afraid that you are a little late with that, A2QFI. Already posted by rab-k in post #6601, page 331 here:
http://www.pprune.org/military-aircr...erged-331.html
BTW I am still intrigued as to when, according to the Beeb:
I missed that one myself. Anyone?
http://www.pprune.org/military-aircr...erged-331.html
BTW I am still intrigued as to when, according to the Beeb:
The Ministry of Defence said the helicopter was airworthy.
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dalek
Your 6701 contains 2 "almost certainly" statements - which in my book equates to one "possibly". Moreover, were they not over land when they selected the waypoint change? One could also draw attention to the non - standard Rad Alt settings which the BOI highlighted as a "contributory factor in the accident".
Your 6701 contains 2 "almost certainly" statements - which in my book equates to one "possibly". Moreover, were they not over land when they selected the waypoint change? One could also draw attention to the non - standard Rad Alt settings which the BOI highlighted as a "contributory factor in the accident".
Getting a bit desperate, aren't we caz? If we're doing pedantic now, post 6701 is yours, not dalek's. More to the point, your habit of producing alleged facts from the BoI as though they were Holy Grail rather misses the point that the BoI, like the RO's, like the then ACAS, are all part of the problem rather than being exemplars of good practice.
This accident needs to be investigated (I had a "re-" in front of that word but it would have been a contradiction in itself), this time properly and professionally. The paucity of evidence examined then needs to be culled over and all the loose ends (eg the SuperTANS found switched Off in the wreckage) looked at again. Even more vital is for all the new evidence that has since come to light to be considered (eg the lack of airworthiness of the HC2 at RTS). Then perhaps we might learn of the real Gross Negligence that pertained then.
This accident needs to be investigated (I had a "re-" in front of that word but it would have been a contradiction in itself), this time properly and professionally. The paucity of evidence examined then needs to be culled over and all the loose ends (eg the SuperTANS found switched Off in the wreckage) looked at again. Even more vital is for all the new evidence that has since come to light to be considered (eg the lack of airworthiness of the HC2 at RTS). Then perhaps we might learn of the real Gross Negligence that pertained then.