Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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JP, if your scenario is assumed to be correct, can you please enlighten me as to your thoughts as to why this particular crash attracted a 'gross negligence' whereas all other similar RAF crashes did not? What did Day see that gave him the 'absolutely no doubt' when he had at least one similar CFIT on his desk at the same time where he supported the BOI's 'not positively determined'?
See my conundrum?
See my conundrum?
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Chinook
Pulse1, Chugalug, Two's in, Cows etc, Please yourselves; I really do not mind, and I am only giving you my opinion as to why such an experienced crew should have carried on towards those sinister hills (and I know them) , when they should not have been anywhere near them in those conditions. With all good wishes, as always, John Purdey
Use of the phrases/words:
surely are not coherrent with
I know I have been selective but at the end of the day the accident happended. No one knows for sure why. With the rules in force at the time there should not have been any findings of gross negligence as they were based on opinion. The point of this thread, if I have understood correctly, is to right that wrong. Perhaps there should be another thread started to air all the various theories and leave this one focussed on the campaigns primary aim.
As an aside I was in HQ 1 Gp at the time Sir John briefed all his staff on his views about this sad accident (I think it was just before a magazine article (can't remember which publication) was published that called into question the gross negligence charge). I have to admit that I liked Sir John and our paths crossed on a number of occasions for the remainder of his time in the RAF and, despite our considerable rank difference, he was always very approachable and easy to talk to. Sadly I never had the balls to challenge his view face to face. A missed opportunity perhaps. However, I do hope he has the balls to one day put his hand up and say he was wrong. I can only think/hope he was pressured by the then CinCSTC to start the gross negligence ball rolling. Perhaps when Sir Bill falls off the perch the truth might out
.
Brian - I admire your tenacity to fight to clear this wrongdoing, as I also admire others who are fighting for answers elsewhere on other aircraft fleets. Perhaps with a new SofS the time has come to resubmit the evidence - he may welcome the opportunity to create a good news story!
either
generally accepted
reluctant
my opinion
absolutely no doubt whatsoever
As an aside I was in HQ 1 Gp at the time Sir John briefed all his staff on his views about this sad accident (I think it was just before a magazine article (can't remember which publication) was published that called into question the gross negligence charge). I have to admit that I liked Sir John and our paths crossed on a number of occasions for the remainder of his time in the RAF and, despite our considerable rank difference, he was always very approachable and easy to talk to. Sadly I never had the balls to challenge his view face to face. A missed opportunity perhaps. However, I do hope he has the balls to one day put his hand up and say he was wrong. I can only think/hope he was pressured by the then CinCSTC to start the gross negligence ball rolling. Perhaps when Sir Bill falls off the perch the truth might out
.Brian - I admire your tenacity to fight to clear this wrongdoing, as I also admire others who are fighting for answers elsewhere on other aircraft fleets. Perhaps with a new SofS the time has come to resubmit the evidence - he may welcome the opportunity to create a good news story!
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Flipster
You are asking some good questions – I wish those who know would respond – in the meantime, RE some of the points you raised I think I can help with:
027 mag was (with the mag var in that area of the time) a direct track from the Aldergrove VOR site to waypoint A (there are a couple of ways you can use computer applications to get this accurately);
<<Perhaps the biggest argument against Walt's idea is that the ac was still travelling over 130 kts IAS as it approached the LZ - which is not conducive to landing ...>> this has been raised before by others – the whole thrust of what I have been saying is that I believe that they were misled as to their range, that they thought that they had a bit further to go - they had begun to slow down (see Boeing's “Analysis of Available Data”) after the turn. I have asked this question before and perhaps you may consider persuing it “during a fast approach, what is the usual distance for a Chinook to slow down from cruise to final flare?”. The geometry of the track, turning point (waypoint change), LZ (at waypoint A), and position of first impact suggest they had turned towards a point just over ˝ a mile further in than the LZ – if ˝ mile was of the right order for slowing down from cruise to flare, then perhaps you may consider my view a little more deeply.
You ask about the HorizSitInd when slaved to the TANS – I wondered some time back whether the CPLS could interface with the SuperTANS such that range and bearing to a PRC112 could get to the HoSI thinking that could have explained the course selector setting. Contemporary applications in other a/c did this but I have been told on this thread that the CPLS was a separate system with its own display on the lower right of the navigator/captains console. It would be nice to have a clear description of the system as fitted to HC2 Chinooks only a matter of months after this crash. Remember that 035 mag (at the time) was the bearing from the position of waypoint change to the crash area, and that right turn (at waypoint change) was about 8 deg – not carrying straight on at all.
JP
<< … nor with a false beacon laid on the hillside by the IRA ...>> I believe that a PRC112 was in the hands of an insider who was supposed to be an the LZ, not IRA, perhaps one of the SEALs who was stationed nearby, all of whom were conversant with the equipment and had the handsets and would have been obvious candidates to help out with any such demo.
You are asking some good questions – I wish those who know would respond – in the meantime, RE some of the points you raised I think I can help with:
027 mag was (with the mag var in that area of the time) a direct track from the Aldergrove VOR site to waypoint A (there are a couple of ways you can use computer applications to get this accurately);
<<Perhaps the biggest argument against Walt's idea is that the ac was still travelling over 130 kts IAS as it approached the LZ - which is not conducive to landing ...>> this has been raised before by others – the whole thrust of what I have been saying is that I believe that they were misled as to their range, that they thought that they had a bit further to go - they had begun to slow down (see Boeing's “Analysis of Available Data”) after the turn. I have asked this question before and perhaps you may consider persuing it “during a fast approach, what is the usual distance for a Chinook to slow down from cruise to final flare?”. The geometry of the track, turning point (waypoint change), LZ (at waypoint A), and position of first impact suggest they had turned towards a point just over ˝ a mile further in than the LZ – if ˝ mile was of the right order for slowing down from cruise to flare, then perhaps you may consider my view a little more deeply.
You ask about the HorizSitInd when slaved to the TANS – I wondered some time back whether the CPLS could interface with the SuperTANS such that range and bearing to a PRC112 could get to the HoSI thinking that could have explained the course selector setting. Contemporary applications in other a/c did this but I have been told on this thread that the CPLS was a separate system with its own display on the lower right of the navigator/captains console. It would be nice to have a clear description of the system as fitted to HC2 Chinooks only a matter of months after this crash. Remember that 035 mag (at the time) was the bearing from the position of waypoint change to the crash area, and that right turn (at waypoint change) was about 8 deg – not carrying straight on at all.
JP
<< … nor with a false beacon laid on the hillside by the IRA ...>> I believe that a PRC112 was in the hands of an insider who was supposed to be an the LZ, not IRA, perhaps one of the SEALs who was stationed nearby, all of whom were conversant with the equipment and had the handsets and would have been obvious candidates to help out with any such demo.
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Walter - your 'line' does, of course, hold interest, especially for those inclined towards 'conspiracy theories', and should be considered. HOWEVER, I find it difficult to accept that these guys would have continued at highish speed towards a LZ (even if 'misplaced') WITHOUT the required VMC. Since the LZ was 'up the hill' a bit, surely surface contact would be needed to complete the approach, and therefore is it not logical to assume that they had sight of either the coast or lighthouse with which they could judge the distance to go (to a site with which I understand they were familiar)? Would you (or anyone) reasonably expect intelligent pilots to track towards known high ground at that speed without such clues, possibly even expecting to make an IMC approach to the LZ?
I am in no way familiar with SF heli ops, but is this even remotely possible as a likely option with this kit?
I am in no way familiar with SF heli ops, but is this even remotely possible as a likely option with this kit?
John Purdey:
With due respect I think you do, JP, witness your many posts over the years. I do not know why this aircraft crashed. All I do know is that it had very severe airworthiness shortcomings that were to all intents and purposes ignored by the BoI and RO's. The BoI should be reopened in that light and new evidence taken from witnesses that it never called previously. That evidence alone should affect the previous finding and hence remove the stain on the pilots' characters. It will also look bad for the reputations of Messrs W&D, as well as the RAF. Moral: don't do it again! The fallout from the QC's review of Nimrod airworthiness is liable to be widespread. Better perhaps to forestall it?
Pulse1, Chugalug, Two's in, Cows etc, Please yourselves; I really do not mind
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I am indeed reluctant to engage Walter further here and am making yet another attempt to get the mods to split off his 'theories' to another thread, BUT, for Walter:-
Would you agree that it would be essential that a 'plot' of the nature you propose would not be discovered? The political fall-out would be enormous if it were. Start, therefore, looking at 'probilities' of success for it. I would venture to suggest that anything less than 99% would not be considered?
a) You need to ensure that the weather en-route is fit for a LL transit to INS.
b) You need to ensure that the Mull weather is such that the 'normal' upslope stratus allows a LL approach to the Mull BUT covers the hill at and below the LZ elevation.
c) Likewise, there must be NO possibility that should they descend to stay in 'contact', sight of any feature such as the lighthouse, the coast or whatever would trigger doubts in the crews' minds.
d) You need to ensure that the crew carry on in those conditions toward rising ground, without sufficient visual clues and at 'high speed', towards an LZ they cannot see, do not turn around, let down over the sea and 'creep' in to the LZ, thereby blowing the lid off the whole thing.
e) You need to ensure that the ensuing impact is of sufficient violence to kill the crew and pax and render a technical investigation difficult.
f) You need to ensure that no 'survivors' know of the plan, as it appears to have been un-authorised and 'unknown'. Who tasked it? Did the crew get a phone call in the Mess the night before? Did one of the pax tap them on the shoulder on the way over and say "hey, can you have a go at this"?
At best, I arrive at around a 5-6% chance of success. Not good enough? Why would anyone take that risk? Credible? No, Walter, I'm afraid not.
Would you agree that it would be essential that a 'plot' of the nature you propose would not be discovered? The political fall-out would be enormous if it were. Start, therefore, looking at 'probilities' of success for it. I would venture to suggest that anything less than 99% would not be considered?
a) You need to ensure that the weather en-route is fit for a LL transit to INS.
b) You need to ensure that the Mull weather is such that the 'normal' upslope stratus allows a LL approach to the Mull BUT covers the hill at and below the LZ elevation.
c) Likewise, there must be NO possibility that should they descend to stay in 'contact', sight of any feature such as the lighthouse, the coast or whatever would trigger doubts in the crews' minds.
d) You need to ensure that the crew carry on in those conditions toward rising ground, without sufficient visual clues and at 'high speed', towards an LZ they cannot see, do not turn around, let down over the sea and 'creep' in to the LZ, thereby blowing the lid off the whole thing.
e) You need to ensure that the ensuing impact is of sufficient violence to kill the crew and pax and render a technical investigation difficult.
f) You need to ensure that no 'survivors' know of the plan, as it appears to have been un-authorised and 'unknown'. Who tasked it? Did the crew get a phone call in the Mess the night before? Did one of the pax tap them on the shoulder on the way over and say "hey, can you have a go at this"?
At best, I arrive at around a 5-6% chance of success. Not good enough? Why would anyone take that risk? Credible? No, Walter, I'm afraid not.
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JP:
You said:-
You are referring to the lighthouse and the "somewhat similar looking fog station site" and the fact that the ground ahead of the fog site would be some 300' higher than had they been over the lighthouse. By pointing out these details and by your use of the phrase "they mistook one for the other" can you please tell my why you believe that there are grounds for a "gross negligence" finding because according to yourself they made a mistake. Simple mistakes do not equal gross negligence, they more usually become pilot error which is a much more palatable finding.
You said:-
They mistook one for the other. Have a look at the map and at the contours of where they crashed.
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Brian
Re Post 4681; I agree that evidence given under oath to a BOI should be considered to be the truth. However, if Flt Lts Tapper and Cook were always going to fly that final sortie why did they not do the Planning? Equally, in view of the wx forecast (and the possibility of delays being incurred on their first task), why did they not seek the extension to max Crew Duty Time prior to their first sortie?
Regarding Spatial awareness, can you PM me the requisite para's - I appear to have mislaid mine.
Best wishes
Caz
PS Has anybody asked Lt K what his turning point on the Mull was - the Lighthouse or the HLS?
Re Post 4681; I agree that evidence given under oath to a BOI should be considered to be the truth. However, if Flt Lts Tapper and Cook were always going to fly that final sortie why did they not do the Planning? Equally, in view of the wx forecast (and the possibility of delays being incurred on their first task), why did they not seek the extension to max Crew Duty Time prior to their first sortie?
Regarding Spatial awareness, can you PM me the requisite para's - I appear to have mislaid mine.
Best wishes
Caz
PS Has anybody asked Lt K what his turning point on the Mull was - the Lighthouse or the HLS?
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Cazatou,
If you are late already, waiting around for authorisation to complete an additional leg will only make you later. I have dealt with 1 / 46/ 38 Gp and know just how drawn out this process can be.
I don't know all the facts. Was not the primary task not to take the pax to Inverness? What was the return task? Did it have any priority?
Had they started any planning yet for the return leg?
Considering a night stop, without prior approval may have caused them grief, but I doubt it would have been a major issue. Had they considered the nightstop already? I don't know. Can anybody else help?
Do you know for certain. I have seen nothing in the BOI ( or HOL report), which I have read, that considers this to be a major issue.
If you are late already, waiting around for authorisation to complete an additional leg will only make you later. I have dealt with 1 / 46/ 38 Gp and know just how drawn out this process can be.
I don't know all the facts. Was not the primary task not to take the pax to Inverness? What was the return task? Did it have any priority?
Had they started any planning yet for the return leg?
Considering a night stop, without prior approval may have caused them grief, but I doubt it would have been a major issue. Had they considered the nightstop already? I don't know. Can anybody else help?
Do you know for certain. I have seen nothing in the BOI ( or HOL report), which I have read, that considers this to be a major issue.
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Chinook.
Airborne Aircrew. Do try to keep up; the negligence was in fliyng towards and eventually into IMC when the hills were (according to all ten witnesses on those hills, incluing trained observers) undeniably in IMC.
Why the crew did so, as I have said several times before here, we shall never know, and I do not know either; but I have offered a reasonable explanation; and noone has refuted that possibility. But that they did indeed plough into granite, was a consequnce of this negligence. I am sorry if you are unable to follow that logic.
With all good wishes. JP
Why the crew did so, as I have said several times before here, we shall never know, and I do not know either; but I have offered a reasonable explanation; and noone has refuted that possibility. But that they did indeed plough into granite, was a consequnce of this negligence. I am sorry if you are unable to follow that logic.
With all good wishes. JP
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Can somebody please help me out, I fear I have been crossed off JP and Caz's Christmas card list.
I think that we all accept that the lighthouse was in fog. No doubt whatsoever.
The aircraft approached the Mull in (probable) VMC. Holbrook, both versions.
Why proceed from the turn to the lighthouse area?
Do try to keep up JP.
I think that we all accept that the lighthouse was in fog. No doubt whatsoever.
The aircraft approached the Mull in (probable) VMC. Holbrook, both versions.
Why proceed from the turn to the lighthouse area?
Do try to keep up JP.
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Baston
Yes, I was a little harsh on you - my apologies! Your question as to why they flew into strato-granite is, indeed, the one that puzzles us all. I sincerely doubt we will ever know for sure.
Olive,
What actually happened between WP change and impact, is not known - for certain - remember there was no CVR/ADR and it was assumed that the ac took a direct course from the WP change to the impact on the Mull. However, that is only an assumption. We really have no idea what the crew saw, heard, felt, experienced, said, decided or did! There are possible answers - distraction, disorientation, visual illusion, UFMC/restriction, transient engine faults, negligently in carrying on too close to the cliffs and climbing into cloud or even un auth'd LZs.......all possibilities.....no certainties!
Walt,
I suspect that slowing from 135 kts to zero would take a fair distance - and they would want to do so a few miles out, and not, as you suggest, less than 1 km from the WP/LZ. I think that undermines your position slightly, sorry. But you do make a valid point - what if they thought they still had some miles to go and they were not using the 'best aids' or had made an assumption as to where the transmitter was? If we knew what the CPLS/PRC receiver looked like at that time, it might help. Nonetheless, I think this unlikely for some of the reasons BOAC lists.
Caz (CGB,
The Tornado, Shackleton and Hercules in the early 1990s all hit culmulogranite and it is feasible that they all could have been dealt with in the same manner as ZD576 (ie negligence). But because the BOIs couldn't be certain, there was an element of doubt and so gross negligence could NOT be levelled against the pilots. So why not for ZD576?
Did Wratten's letter to his Air Staff in Feb 1995 set the tone for Day to do his master's bidding - ie 'we must find someone guilty of negligence to improve flying discipline'?
CHINOOK PILOTS OUT THERE - Some advice please:
1. What were the SOPs for HSI selection/slaving at LL and who said what to whom and who did what at WP changes/turning points?
2. Could S-TANS actually be slaved to the HSI?
3. If so, what did the HSI display - (eg was it mag track/true track, was there a distance to go counter and how much x-track error did each dot/full-scale deflection represent?).
4. Did the HSI track display the 'S-TANS track' automatically and did it change over when selected WPs were changed?
5. Does anyone know what the HSI beam bar x-track error was showing on impact?
6. What was significance of 035 degs?
7. Does anyone know what both the heading bugs were selected to at impact?
8. Did 1 Gp SH/SF keep a list of authorised Chinook LZs with all the relevant data - elevation, approach track, obstacles etc? If so, is/was there an entry for Mull lighthouse - either the helo pad or the other one that was bigger and previoulsy used?
9. Was it requ'd that planned LZs would be entered in the Auth Sheets and were unplanned LZs possible?
10. Could someone with accesss to a LFC please measure the track from Corran to Ft George near INV. TVM.
Yes, I was a little harsh on you - my apologies! Your question as to why they flew into strato-granite is, indeed, the one that puzzles us all. I sincerely doubt we will ever know for sure.
Olive,
What actually happened between WP change and impact, is not known - for certain - remember there was no CVR/ADR and it was assumed that the ac took a direct course from the WP change to the impact on the Mull. However, that is only an assumption. We really have no idea what the crew saw, heard, felt, experienced, said, decided or did! There are possible answers - distraction, disorientation, visual illusion, UFMC/restriction, transient engine faults, negligently in carrying on too close to the cliffs and climbing into cloud or even un auth'd LZs.......all possibilities.....no certainties!
Walt,
I suspect that slowing from 135 kts to zero would take a fair distance - and they would want to do so a few miles out, and not, as you suggest, less than 1 km from the WP/LZ. I think that undermines your position slightly, sorry. But you do make a valid point - what if they thought they still had some miles to go and they were not using the 'best aids' or had made an assumption as to where the transmitter was? If we knew what the CPLS/PRC receiver looked like at that time, it might help. Nonetheless, I think this unlikely for some of the reasons BOAC lists.
Caz (CGB,
The Tornado, Shackleton and Hercules in the early 1990s all hit culmulogranite and it is feasible that they all could have been dealt with in the same manner as ZD576 (ie negligence). But because the BOIs couldn't be certain, there was an element of doubt and so gross negligence could NOT be levelled against the pilots. So why not for ZD576?
Did Wratten's letter to his Air Staff in Feb 1995 set the tone for Day to do his master's bidding - ie 'we must find someone guilty of negligence to improve flying discipline'?
CHINOOK PILOTS OUT THERE - Some advice please:
1. What were the SOPs for HSI selection/slaving at LL and who said what to whom and who did what at WP changes/turning points?
2. Could S-TANS actually be slaved to the HSI?
3. If so, what did the HSI display - (eg was it mag track/true track, was there a distance to go counter and how much x-track error did each dot/full-scale deflection represent?).
4. Did the HSI track display the 'S-TANS track' automatically and did it change over when selected WPs were changed?
5. Does anyone know what the HSI beam bar x-track error was showing on impact?
6. What was significance of 035 degs?
7. Does anyone know what both the heading bugs were selected to at impact?
8. Did 1 Gp SH/SF keep a list of authorised Chinook LZs with all the relevant data - elevation, approach track, obstacles etc? If so, is/was there an entry for Mull lighthouse - either the helo pad or the other one that was bigger and previoulsy used?
9. Was it requ'd that planned LZs would be entered in the Auth Sheets and were unplanned LZs possible?
10. Could someone with accesss to a LFC please measure the track from Corran to Ft George near INV. TVM.
Last edited by flipster; 7th Jun 2009 at 17:45.
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JP:
Rude little devil aren't we?
You said:-
Let's not forget what you previously wrote but then lets look at another fact. Someone said that in a period of about 50 years some 40 aircraft have flown into hills in this region. There's a reason for that. The possible reasons are either some Bermuda Triangle effect that has aircraft pranging in left and right which while not necessarily absolutely absolving the pilots of all wrongdoing would, I think you would agree, warrant the removal of the Gross Negligence finding. The only other reason for the number of crashes would be meteorological conditions that consistently create situations that are misread by numerous pilots of many skill levels.
Now, I also seem to remember there being multiple references to an optical illusion caused by "odd" met. conditions that manifests itself as clear sky ahead when, in fact it is IMC shrouding a hill. This, in and of itself, migh not necessarily be grounds for the reversal of the findings because one could argue that the pilots should have known where they were since they were VMC by all accounts when approaching the Waypoint.
But what happens if we combine the two scenarios. The pilots approach the waypoint. The lighthouse is in fog but the "somewhat similar looking fog station site" is visible and they make the mistake of identifying it as the lighthouse. Now, the land ahead is 300' higher than it would have been but, that day, the optical illusion shrouded the actual higher ground and cloud to the left would appear to be shrouding what would be the higher ground... The picture "fits" so the two pilots fly on into what appears to be clear, though grey, sky ahead with Strato-Granite to their left under the cloud - the picture both pilots are "expecting" to see.
Can you say, without a shadow of a doubt that this did not occur?
I'd like to add that I have no particular axe to grind here. I knew no-one on that aircraft to my knowledge. I have read, on and off, this thread and am only involved in it because I find it irksome that a section of the military that I was very proud to have served in is seemingly deliberately ignoring their own regulations regarding a finding of Gross Negligence. One can only speculate as to the reason why but said speculation is irrelevant. There are simply too many unanswered questions to be able to apply the Gross Negligence label.
Rude little devil aren't we?
You said:-
the negligence was in fliyng towards and eventually into IMC when the hills were (according to all ten witnesses on those hills, incluing trained observers) undeniably in IMC.
Now, I also seem to remember there being multiple references to an optical illusion caused by "odd" met. conditions that manifests itself as clear sky ahead when, in fact it is IMC shrouding a hill. This, in and of itself, migh not necessarily be grounds for the reversal of the findings because one could argue that the pilots should have known where they were since they were VMC by all accounts when approaching the Waypoint.
But what happens if we combine the two scenarios. The pilots approach the waypoint. The lighthouse is in fog but the "somewhat similar looking fog station site" is visible and they make the mistake of identifying it as the lighthouse. Now, the land ahead is 300' higher than it would have been but, that day, the optical illusion shrouded the actual higher ground and cloud to the left would appear to be shrouding what would be the higher ground... The picture "fits" so the two pilots fly on into what appears to be clear, though grey, sky ahead with Strato-Granite to their left under the cloud - the picture both pilots are "expecting" to see.
Can you say, without a shadow of a doubt that this did not occur?
I'd like to add that I have no particular axe to grind here. I knew no-one on that aircraft to my knowledge. I have read, on and off, this thread and am only involved in it because I find it irksome that a section of the military that I was very proud to have served in is seemingly deliberately ignoring their own regulations regarding a finding of Gross Negligence. One can only speculate as to the reason why but said speculation is irrelevant. There are simply too many unanswered questions to be able to apply the Gross Negligence label.
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Caz, apologies for the tardy response; i've just got in from work.
Yes, I was originally referring to the Tornado but, as flipster points out, the Shackleton of 1990 is far more relevant example. Unlike many here, I personally think the probability is that the Chinook crew got it wrong (Rick was a close friend). My personal problem is balancing the weight of evidence to support a gross negligence verdict for the Chinook crash whereas the same amount of evidence was available for the Shackleton (another close friend from IOT, Colin Burns) and a far greater level of technical evidence was available for the Tornado; both these did not conclude with gross negligence.
So, on the face of it, we have varying standards of proof or, more likely, a degree of subjective assessment by the various air ranking officers. Fortunately, the MOD has moved on and no longer apportions blame. Maybe they should look back at previous judgements and adjust accordingly?
Regards
CGB
Yes, I was originally referring to the Tornado but, as flipster points out, the Shackleton of 1990 is far more relevant example. Unlike many here, I personally think the probability is that the Chinook crew got it wrong (Rick was a close friend). My personal problem is balancing the weight of evidence to support a gross negligence verdict for the Chinook crash whereas the same amount of evidence was available for the Shackleton (another close friend from IOT, Colin Burns) and a far greater level of technical evidence was available for the Tornado; both these did not conclude with gross negligence.
So, on the face of it, we have varying standards of proof or, more likely, a degree of subjective assessment by the various air ranking officers. Fortunately, the MOD has moved on and no longer apportions blame. Maybe they should look back at previous judgements and adjust accordingly?
Regards
CGB
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What finding would you have it replaced with?
As an ex Puma crewman, I always found significantly more than 50% of my pilots to be very responsible (even when working with the SAS - but we probably don't need to go there). This case asks me to believe that two pilots that had been qualified SF where not only irresponsible but were put together on the same aircraft at the same time with probably the most valuable cargo they ever had to carry... and then they decided it would be a good time to screw up...
Sorry, it doesn't make sense... and if it doesn't make sense it probably isn't the truth.
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AA,
He's not rude, he's just a little presumptuous, but if you really want to frustrate him then simply edit his posts. He simply cannot argue with the logic which frustrates him to the point where, like dalek and I, you end up on his ignore list which is quite satisfying.
He's not rude, he's just a little presumptuous, but if you really want to frustrate him then simply edit his posts. He simply cannot argue with the logic which frustrates him to the point where, like dalek and I, you end up on his ignore list which is quite satisfying.
Airborne Aircrew. Do try to keep up; the supposed negligence was in fliyng towards and possibly into IMC when the hills were (according to all ten witnesses on those hills close to the accident site but not actually at the point of impact, including trained observers) undeniably in IMC where they were stood but at the crash site there is no concrete evidence.
Why the crew did so, as I have said several times before here, we shall never know, and I do not know either which is why this verdict is so unjust; but I have offered a reasonable explanation; which is pure supposition and because I simply ignore everyone else's thoughts, noone has refuted that possibility. But that they did indeed plough into granite, was a consequence of something no one alive will ever really know for sure. I am sure you will be able to follow that logic.
With all good wishes. JP
Why the crew did so, as I have said several times before here, we shall never know, and I do not know either which is why this verdict is so unjust; but I have offered a reasonable explanation; which is pure supposition and because I simply ignore everyone else's thoughts, noone has refuted that possibility. But that they did indeed plough into granite, was a consequence of something no one alive will ever really know for sure. I am sure you will be able to follow that logic.
With all good wishes. JP