Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Cazatou,
1. I am not a conspiracy theorist. I accept that the crash may have been caused by:
a. Negligence.
b. Error of judgment.
c. Technical failure.
d. A combination of all three or something completely different.
What I know is that from the time of the last radio call until the point of impact all reconstruction of events are works of pure fiction. No reconstruction using Supertans can be relied on because unlike an ADR the equipment was never authorised to do the job.
2. If you read my earlier posts, I have always accepted that Sir John Day
(unlike Wratten and probably Craig) has some right to talk as an helicopter expert. However, if by using his past operational experience to equate his (then current) level of expertise on Chinook operations to that of Sqn Ldr Burke you are as stated by a previous entry, "having a larf."
3. I have never stated that Sir John has done anything improper, but face the facts.The decision to reverse the negligence verdict on the pilots would reflect badly on the RAF chain of command, including Wratten and Day. Allowing them to dictate the outcome of the BOI is no different than allowing an accused to sit on the jury.
4. Before you protest, I accept that not all accused are guilty. But airwothiness questions are valid and need answering in front of a truly independent and impartial judge.
1. I am not a conspiracy theorist. I accept that the crash may have been caused by:
a. Negligence.
b. Error of judgment.
c. Technical failure.
d. A combination of all three or something completely different.
What I know is that from the time of the last radio call until the point of impact all reconstruction of events are works of pure fiction. No reconstruction using Supertans can be relied on because unlike an ADR the equipment was never authorised to do the job.
2. If you read my earlier posts, I have always accepted that Sir John Day
(unlike Wratten and probably Craig) has some right to talk as an helicopter expert. However, if by using his past operational experience to equate his (then current) level of expertise on Chinook operations to that of Sqn Ldr Burke you are as stated by a previous entry, "having a larf."
3. I have never stated that Sir John has done anything improper, but face the facts.The decision to reverse the negligence verdict on the pilots would reflect badly on the RAF chain of command, including Wratten and Day. Allowing them to dictate the outcome of the BOI is no different than allowing an accused to sit on the jury.
4. Before you protest, I accept that not all accused are guilty. But airwothiness questions are valid and need answering in front of a truly independent and impartial judge.
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I too try to share dalek's open-minded approach. I see no compelling evidence as to absolutely prove why the aircraft hit the hill. Indeed, I would go as far to say that there is a reasonable probability that the crew got it wrong. However, I do not understand how this probability can be extended to an "no doubt whatsoever".
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Indeed, indeed Dalek and Cows,
You are correct but I fear that you will get no acknowlement of that and the possibility that Day and Wratten got it wrong - from either of them (or even Caz). Somehow, admitting to error is not in their make-up - it is as if they feel they would be lesser men for doing so.
Strangely, it would be the opposite; I would have much increased respect for them if they did 'see the light' and accept there is a trace of doubt.
"There is no greater joy in heaven than when a sinner repenteth" and all that.
You are correct but I fear that you will get no acknowlement of that and the possibility that Day and Wratten got it wrong - from either of them (or even Caz). Somehow, admitting to error is not in their make-up - it is as if they feel they would be lesser men for doing so.
Strangely, it would be the opposite; I would have much increased respect for them if they did 'see the light' and accept there is a trace of doubt.
"There is no greater joy in heaven than when a sinner repenteth" and all that.
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Somehow, admitting to error is not in their make-up - it is as if they feel they would be lesser men for doing so.
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dalek et al
You do seem rather uninformed in respect of the Staff structure in a Group Headquarters. At HQ 1 Gp there was a Group Captain SH, a Wg Cdr SH and a Sqn Ldr for each major Type of Helicopter in Squadron Service in the Group. Having been staffed by the SH specialists the BOI passed through SASO to the AOC. A similar structure was in use at HQSTC which reviewed the findings prior to release, finishing up with the comments of the AOCinC. In this particular case, CAS and his Air Staff also reviewed the BOI prior to release.
No changes were made to the findings.
PS Just to remind you:
BOI para 16e
"The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre."
BOI para 32c
"in the forecast conditions, the icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull-up from low level flight to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre."
You do seem rather uninformed in respect of the Staff structure in a Group Headquarters. At HQ 1 Gp there was a Group Captain SH, a Wg Cdr SH and a Sqn Ldr for each major Type of Helicopter in Squadron Service in the Group. Having been staffed by the SH specialists the BOI passed through SASO to the AOC. A similar structure was in use at HQSTC which reviewed the findings prior to release, finishing up with the comments of the AOCinC. In this particular case, CAS and his Air Staff also reviewed the BOI prior to release.
No changes were made to the findings.
PS Just to remind you:
BOI para 16e
"The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre."
BOI para 32c
"in the forecast conditions, the icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull-up from low level flight to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre."
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dalek is spot on.
All descriptions of the minutes leading up to the first impact of ZD576 with the Mull of Kintyre are based on models of what may have happened. Not records of what did!
The BOI's version of events is a hypothesis, not a fact.
The president of the BOI accepted this. He said so at the Fatal Accident Inquiry, and that is precisely why he was unable to make a finding of negligence.
Of course others seemed more keen to overlook the limitations of the 'modelling'.
All descriptions of the minutes leading up to the first impact of ZD576 with the Mull of Kintyre are based on models of what may have happened. Not records of what did!
The BOI's version of events is a hypothesis, not a fact.
The president of the BOI accepted this. He said so at the Fatal Accident Inquiry, and that is precisely why he was unable to make a finding of negligence.
Of course others seemed more keen to overlook the limitations of the 'modelling'.
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Cazatou,
Are you honestly saying that everything said by Sqn Ldr Burke is total b@@@@@ks. Remember, one of your infallible staff officers at HQSTC must at least of condoned his presence at the initial crash investigation.
If there is a scintilla of truth in any of his "theories", then doubt is cast on the verdict. If you are questioning his integrity, shame on you.
I find it incredible that a man of his experience, was not called before the BOI.
And yes I do have a theory on this one, conspiracy or otherwise.
A barrister once told me that the cardinal rule of cross examination was never to ask a question,to which you did not know, or would not like the answer.
Your Staff Officers, no doubt under pressure from on high, were well aware of Sqn Ldr Burke's opinion and chose to obey the cardinal rule.
Since you have not answered one of my questions I will do so for you.
Whenever Burke has given evidence, the body listening has found in his favour and removed the slur on the pilots. Both Wratten and Days evidence to the HOL, was found unconvincing. The defence rests.
Are you honestly saying that everything said by Sqn Ldr Burke is total b@@@@@ks. Remember, one of your infallible staff officers at HQSTC must at least of condoned his presence at the initial crash investigation.
If there is a scintilla of truth in any of his "theories", then doubt is cast on the verdict. If you are questioning his integrity, shame on you.
I find it incredible that a man of his experience, was not called before the BOI.
And yes I do have a theory on this one, conspiracy or otherwise.
A barrister once told me that the cardinal rule of cross examination was never to ask a question,to which you did not know, or would not like the answer.
Your Staff Officers, no doubt under pressure from on high, were well aware of Sqn Ldr Burke's opinion and chose to obey the cardinal rule.
Since you have not answered one of my questions I will do so for you.
Whenever Burke has given evidence, the body listening has found in his favour and removed the slur on the pilots. Both Wratten and Days evidence to the HOL, was found unconvincing. The defence rests.
Caz,
Why don't you answer the questions I asked you yesterday?
1. How does the ability to land a piston helicopter in a jungle clearing qualify you to make judgements on connector performance?
2. Would you fly in an aeroplane which required a vital connector check every 15 minutes?
The first question may seem like a frivolous attempt to score points. But there is a serious issue here which everyone who flies should be aware of.
There is a human tendency for humans to think that things they do not understand are not important. The more qualified people become, the stronger is this tendency when they consider technologies outside their knowledge. After all, we all use connectors, especially in this IT age, and I suspect that most of us have fiddled with them to get them to work. So what's the problem? Well, not much if all you're going to lose is the odd document or your sound. Fiddling with a live connector in an aircraft control system, which is not designed to make and break under load could mean that you lose your life.
Now, please answer the questions for once.
Why don't you answer the questions I asked you yesterday?
1. How does the ability to land a piston helicopter in a jungle clearing qualify you to make judgements on connector performance?
2. Would you fly in an aeroplane which required a vital connector check every 15 minutes?
The first question may seem like a frivolous attempt to score points. But there is a serious issue here which everyone who flies should be aware of.
There is a human tendency for humans to think that things they do not understand are not important. The more qualified people become, the stronger is this tendency when they consider technologies outside their knowledge. After all, we all use connectors, especially in this IT age, and I suspect that most of us have fiddled with them to get them to work. So what's the problem? Well, not much if all you're going to lose is the odd document or your sound. Fiddling with a live connector in an aircraft control system, which is not designed to make and break under load could mean that you lose your life.
Now, please answer the questions for once.
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You do seem rather uninformed in respect of the Staff structure in a Group Headquarters. At HQ 1 Gp there was a Group Captain SH, a Wg Cdr SH and a Sqn Ldr for each major Type of Helicopter in Squadron Service in the Group. Having been staffed by the SH specialists the BOI passed through SASO to the AOC. A similar structure was in use at HQSTC which reviewed the findings prior to release, finishing up with the comments of the AOCinC. In this particular case, CAS and his Air Staff also reviewed the BOI prior to release.
The AoCinC stated, “… I find the hypothetical reconstruction offered by the Board of limited usefulness.” and I consider it futile to indulge in hypothesis.”
The Tornado had ADR and CVR, yet control restrictions and medical incapacitations cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, it is deemed futile to indulge in hypothesis. Yet, in the Chinook – with no ADR or CVR, control restrictions and incapacitation can be absolutely ruled out. Plus, there is a "Degree of speculation" as to what happened to the Chinook. What the “Regardless of the circumstances” comment in respect of the Tornado means exactly, I would dearly like to know.
Some structure, Caz. Hardly a standardised approach to reporting now, is it? Especially when both BoIs were concluded within a fortnight of each other.
Perhaps, as mentioned previously, the loss of passengers left the MoD with little choice but to find the pilots guilty. In a letter to me, Adam Ingram stated, “It may, for instance, be considered that the flight crew of the Chinook owed a ‘duty of care’ to the passengers for whom they were responsible. The crew of the Tornado, with a joint responsibility for the operation of the aircraft, shared a duty of care to each other. Clearly, the burden in the former case, and the need to exercise that care, is greater, leading, perhaps to a greater need to consider whether negligence had occurred.”
The MoD were embarrassed. At the time of the accident, there were only ten Chinook airframes available for worldwide operations (and the MoD are unable to say how many of those ten were serviceable). Quite simply, due to the mid-life update schedule, the MoD had no option but to introduce into service an aircraft that was not fit for purpose – hence the ridiculous Interim Release to Service. The problems were known, yet the Chinook HC2 was still pushed to the front line.
The accident happened, the MoD were caught out in a very big way. Can’t admit problems with the fleet, because questions would be asked as to why the N.I. team were allowed to fly in a shed. Probably not an easy option, but certainly the line of least resistance – blame those unable to defend themselves. Hope the whole thing goes away. That was their second mistake.
Time and again, the Campaign has stated that Jon and Rick may well have got it wrong, but the rules in place at the time mean that there has to be absolutely no doubt whatsoever before such an allegation can be allowed to stain the reputation of a deceased pilot. The MoD’s case fails on so many levels. The Reviewing Officers could have said a long time ago, that they based their opinions on information known at the time of their decision. Since that time, so much more has been learnt about the state of the Chinook fleet. They could have walked away from this whole situation and still retained their credibility, by stating as such, yet they do not. One has to wonder why?
It is also very interesting that the MoD have still to provide me with the Chinook accident briefing notes, and correspondence to, and from, Mr Hutton since taking post. Come along now chaps, remember that the FoIA states that I should have received a reply within 20 working days.
Fifteen years ago tomorrow since this terrible accident. I am just as passionate today, as I was all those years ago, in restoring the reputations of two fine men, I had the privilege of calling friends.
My best, as always.
Brian
“Justice has no expiry date” – John Cook
Brian, as one who came to this thread only in the last couple of years may I simply say that your tenacity and drive to reverse this stain on the reputations of Jon and Rick, who I never had the privilege of knowing, means that you are a friend indeed to their memory. This thread may well drift into jargon and technicalities, inevitably, but it is fundamentally about those age old issues of what is right and what is wrong. What Messrs Wratten and Day did was wrong, no matter how illustrious their status and ranks. What those who have done in perpetuating that wrong over 15 years is doubly wrong for they have the advantages of reflection and hindsight. This is a blemish on the good name of the Royal Air Force and will remain so until it is disowned and reversed. The MOD of course has no good name.
Let Right Be Done.
Let Right Be Done.
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Quite right!
15 years ago to this day, Boscombe Down were getting ready to ground the aircraft. However, people like Day and Wratten had other ideas, possibly for some good operational reasons - like having to resupply troops under fire in NI? But then they allowed a passenger transit flight to go ahead in an aircaraft they knew to be unairworthy and over which the crew had expressed disquiet. That was an abuse of rank on behalf of the AOC and above. Unfortunately, the same people were the senior Reviewing Officers and they hid behind the 'smoke and mirrors' of their own words on the BOI report, rather than take responsibility for the inaction.
I think the world can see them now as cowards - shame on them!
15 years ago to this day, Boscombe Down were getting ready to ground the aircraft. However, people like Day and Wratten had other ideas, possibly for some good operational reasons - like having to resupply troops under fire in NI? But then they allowed a passenger transit flight to go ahead in an aircaraft they knew to be unairworthy and over which the crew had expressed disquiet. That was an abuse of rank on behalf of the AOC and above. Unfortunately, the same people were the senior Reviewing Officers and they hid behind the 'smoke and mirrors' of their own words on the BOI report, rather than take responsibility for the inaction.
I think the world can see them now as cowards - shame on them!
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Dalek wrote: <<What I know is that from the time of the last radio call until the point of impact all reconstruction of events are works of pure fiction. No reconstruction using Supertans can be relied on because unlike an ADR the equipment was never authorised to do the job. >> (My emphasis.)
What a ridiculous attitude – if something can add to the available data then it should be used – especially when it fits reasonably enough with the dist/time calcs and was reasonably consistent with the impact point.
A “work of fiction” in this regard would be the track put forward at one of the inquiries that I posted along with my version of the track some time ago – you know, where they moved the position of waypoint change so as to infer that they went straight in.
Using the higher figures of the range of wind speed according to met, you have the simple state of them flying at 135 kts TAS for the most of the flight until the position where they changed the waypoint, having held 027 mag up to that point;
they then turned 8deg to 035 (the track to the impact area) and slowed down (in TAS), which was found set as the selected course on the HP's Horizontal Situation Indicator (his main steering aid, if you like) and which just happened to be the best line for landing at that LZ I keep on about, where Chinooks had landed before, where Flt Lt Tapper had landed before, and for which the HP's baro at was set for QFE at that elevation, and a RADALT alarm was set for imminent landing;
not to mention the call sign being appropriate for an exercise;
they appear to have been surprised by their proximity to the rising ground in the last few seconds.
It seems perfectly reasonable from all of the above that they were prepared for a landing there but thought they were further out – why? That is the big question.
.
Now about the team on board as opposed to the crew who were looking after them: as individuals, for their particular jobs they were of the highest calibre and further sacrificed a normal lifestyle and security in service of their people – individuals that, because of their dedication to one type of society, would probably not have ascended to such positions of responsibility and effective authority in today's multicultural/ globalist/ internationalist/ secular humanist mess; further, the chances of them being allowed to group together let alone being put together in modern times would be highly unlikely in light of the type of ministers and policy makers who hold the reins of power in what is supposed to be Britain (eg under Thatcher, 2/3 cabinet ministers were not even notionally Christian). So it was an irreplaceable loss to a significant chunk of the UK who did not want to dissolve their community values nor surrender their traditional self reliance.
The team as a whole were planning to hit the IRA harder and did not want to make concessions at that point in time which was in direct conflict with the intent of the leaders in London who wanted to wash their hands of NI by restructuring it along the lines of the rest of the UK.
Bliar complimented Bertie (on his recent retirement) with having accomplished this in the South – genuine Irish nationalists have lost just as much as a result of the consequences this peace process as the people of Ulster in terms of the destruction of their culture – ironically, despite centuries of bloody hostility they have a lot more in common with each other than the recent immigrants and of course the old fear of the Protestants in the north, that they would become outnumbered by the Catholics in time, no longer applies as the birthrate in Ireland is now the lowest in the world – perhaps the remnants of nationalists of both sides should contemplate their own cooperation to save the Island as a whole.
Had the team got to Ft George and enabled the strategies they had been planning it would have stalled the peace process and delayed this “modernisation” for years.
After the lies regarding Iraq, is it beyond contemplation that a convenient accident could have been arranged for NI?
Do we not owe it to them to leave no stone unturned in exposing any possibility of foul play? - however unlikely? Hiding what many of you may think could have just been an embarrassing stuff up in a simple exercise would block this.
What a ridiculous attitude – if something can add to the available data then it should be used – especially when it fits reasonably enough with the dist/time calcs and was reasonably consistent with the impact point.
A “work of fiction” in this regard would be the track put forward at one of the inquiries that I posted along with my version of the track some time ago – you know, where they moved the position of waypoint change so as to infer that they went straight in.
Using the higher figures of the range of wind speed according to met, you have the simple state of them flying at 135 kts TAS for the most of the flight until the position where they changed the waypoint, having held 027 mag up to that point;
they then turned 8deg to 035 (the track to the impact area) and slowed down (in TAS), which was found set as the selected course on the HP's Horizontal Situation Indicator (his main steering aid, if you like) and which just happened to be the best line for landing at that LZ I keep on about, where Chinooks had landed before, where Flt Lt Tapper had landed before, and for which the HP's baro at was set for QFE at that elevation, and a RADALT alarm was set for imminent landing;
not to mention the call sign being appropriate for an exercise;
they appear to have been surprised by their proximity to the rising ground in the last few seconds.
It seems perfectly reasonable from all of the above that they were prepared for a landing there but thought they were further out – why? That is the big question.
.
Now about the team on board as opposed to the crew who were looking after them: as individuals, for their particular jobs they were of the highest calibre and further sacrificed a normal lifestyle and security in service of their people – individuals that, because of their dedication to one type of society, would probably not have ascended to such positions of responsibility and effective authority in today's multicultural/ globalist/ internationalist/ secular humanist mess; further, the chances of them being allowed to group together let alone being put together in modern times would be highly unlikely in light of the type of ministers and policy makers who hold the reins of power in what is supposed to be Britain (eg under Thatcher, 2/3 cabinet ministers were not even notionally Christian). So it was an irreplaceable loss to a significant chunk of the UK who did not want to dissolve their community values nor surrender their traditional self reliance.
The team as a whole were planning to hit the IRA harder and did not want to make concessions at that point in time which was in direct conflict with the intent of the leaders in London who wanted to wash their hands of NI by restructuring it along the lines of the rest of the UK.
Bliar complimented Bertie (on his recent retirement) with having accomplished this in the South – genuine Irish nationalists have lost just as much as a result of the consequences this peace process as the people of Ulster in terms of the destruction of their culture – ironically, despite centuries of bloody hostility they have a lot more in common with each other than the recent immigrants and of course the old fear of the Protestants in the north, that they would become outnumbered by the Catholics in time, no longer applies as the birthrate in Ireland is now the lowest in the world – perhaps the remnants of nationalists of both sides should contemplate their own cooperation to save the Island as a whole.
Had the team got to Ft George and enabled the strategies they had been planning it would have stalled the peace process and delayed this “modernisation” for years.
After the lies regarding Iraq, is it beyond contemplation that a convenient accident could have been arranged for NI?
Do we not owe it to them to leave no stone unturned in exposing any possibility of foul play? - however unlikely? Hiding what many of you may think could have just been an embarrassing stuff up in a simple exercise would block this.
SuperTANS
Walter
Regarding the post-crash SuperTANS “testing”, the important point is that MoD continue to claim this as evidence that the entire nav system was both serviceable and accurate. This is patently ridiculous, but symptomatic of a Department which widely regarded (and still does) system integration and demonstration of INSTALLED performance a waste of money.
In short, the Racal testing was not carried out in a representative environment, especially with regard to EMC/EMI. It is (barely) useful background information, but simply cannot be used to verify or even hypothesise what happened during the flight. Contrary to what the Chinook 2 Star and CDP thought (and placed in writing) it is rather important to progressively test systems (LRUs on bench > sub-system in rigs > system installed in aircraft etc). It is NOT acceptable to say “It worked on the bench, so it’ll work in the aircraft”, yet this is very clearly the philosophy used during Mk1 > Mk2 conversion.
Of far greater import is the human factors effect on the pilots. They had no confidence whatsoever in the SuperTANS. Yes, the system was reasonably accurate, as it got them to the vicinity of the Mull. But in the back of their minds (I imagine) was the fact that their documentation told them that the GPS didn’t have Initial Operating Capability declared yet in the US and could not be relied upon. That error codes in the TANS were now to be regarded as “meaningless”. Little gems like that, with no indication of when INSTALLED performance will actually be measured, so that meaningful limitations can be advised.
Regarding the post-crash SuperTANS “testing”, the important point is that MoD continue to claim this as evidence that the entire nav system was both serviceable and accurate. This is patently ridiculous, but symptomatic of a Department which widely regarded (and still does) system integration and demonstration of INSTALLED performance a waste of money.
In short, the Racal testing was not carried out in a representative environment, especially with regard to EMC/EMI. It is (barely) useful background information, but simply cannot be used to verify or even hypothesise what happened during the flight. Contrary to what the Chinook 2 Star and CDP thought (and placed in writing) it is rather important to progressively test systems (LRUs on bench > sub-system in rigs > system installed in aircraft etc). It is NOT acceptable to say “It worked on the bench, so it’ll work in the aircraft”, yet this is very clearly the philosophy used during Mk1 > Mk2 conversion.
Of far greater import is the human factors effect on the pilots. They had no confidence whatsoever in the SuperTANS. Yes, the system was reasonably accurate, as it got them to the vicinity of the Mull. But in the back of their minds (I imagine) was the fact that their documentation told them that the GPS didn’t have Initial Operating Capability declared yet in the US and could not be relied upon. That error codes in the TANS were now to be regarded as “meaningless”. Little gems like that, with no indication of when INSTALLED performance will actually be measured, so that meaningful limitations can be advised.
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It's fifteen years ago today that the crash happened. Perhaps, just for today, those of you who are blaming the pilots might take some time to think of them and their families.
It's great to think that after all this time there is so much to say about the crash and I applaud all those who have taken so much time to keep it in the spotlight and work to clear the pilots names.
It's great to think that after all this time there is so much to say about the crash and I applaud all those who have taken so much time to keep it in the spotlight and work to clear the pilots names.
A really irritating PPRuNer
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Not just the pilots, Pen (as you know). Everyone is just as important. Hope you are well.
In memoriam
ACC J C B Fitzsimons
Maj C Dockerty
Maj G P Sparks
Maj R Allen
Maj R Pugh
Flt Lt J P Tapper
Flt Lt R D Cook
MALM G W Forbes
Sgt K A Hardie
Mr J Deverell
Mr M Maltby
Mr J Haynes
Mr M Dalton
Ms A James
Mr S Rickard
DC Supt M M Neilly
D Supt W R Gwilliam
DC Supt D P Conroy
D Insp S Davidson
D Supt R Foster
D Supt I Phoenix
D Insp K Magee
D Supt P G Davidson
DC Insp D Bunting
Col C J Biles
Lt Col G V A Williams
Lt Col J W Tobias
Lt Col R L Gregory-Smith
Maj A R Hornby
RIP
In memoriam
ACC J C B Fitzsimons
Maj C Dockerty
Maj G P Sparks
Maj R Allen
Maj R Pugh
Flt Lt J P Tapper
Flt Lt R D Cook
MALM G W Forbes
Sgt K A Hardie
Mr J Deverell
Mr M Maltby
Mr J Haynes
Mr M Dalton
Ms A James
Mr S Rickard
DC Supt M M Neilly
D Supt W R Gwilliam
DC Supt D P Conroy
D Insp S Davidson
D Supt R Foster
D Supt I Phoenix
D Insp K Magee
D Supt P G Davidson
DC Insp D Bunting
Col C J Biles
Lt Col G V A Williams
Lt Col J W Tobias
Lt Col R L Gregory-Smith
Maj A R Hornby
RIP
Last edited by Brian Dixon; 2nd Jun 2009 at 17:23.
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Tec
<<Of far greater import is the human factors effect on the pilots. They had no confidence whatsoever in the SuperTANS. >>
I have been making this point for years – Flt Lt Tapper (acknowledged as very knowledgeable on nav systems) had warned colleagues of its potential inaccuracies – he would certainly not have relied upon it for keeping clear of a fuzzy obstacle like the Mull was that day as close in as the position of waypoint change – further, if he had another reference in which he had more confidence but which contradicted the SuperTANS by anything up to a mile, he would probably have dismissed the conflict as just the error in the SuperTANS, especially after a sea crossing which would have been expected to have made the Doppler side of the system erratic to an extent. He would most certainly not have relied upon it for the closing range in, say, a fast approach to that LZ and so it would not be surprising if he had dumped waypoint A when he considered it of no further use.
That said, who is talking about “testing” of the SuperTANS post crash? I am not drawing upon any conclusions by the MOD about its serviceability and accuracy for the whole flight – just the values stored in it, and their correspondance to the position of the crash site and velocity data (as did Mr Mitchel of Boeing in his “Analysis of Available Data”) - these suggest that the system was reasonably accurate at the time of impact and working back to the time of the waypoint change (not that long) dist/time calcs agree with the position the SuperTANS thought it was at at that time (from the range and bearing to the waypoint stored then). The crew may well have had no confidence in it but the SuperTANS retrospectively had been reasonably accurate in the critical area – which helps analysis greatly as we have a “stake in the ground” that is the position where the waypoint was changed from “A” in the SuperTANS.
A general observation I would like to make regarding not only debate on this forum but from what has transpired at the inquiries is that there appears to be a desire by many to avoid accepting the determination of any parameters that help analysis – a single fundamental example which I will use to illustrate this is the speed of the a/c:
SPEED
There has been so much emphasis on the speed being too high over the duration of the flight and particularly in the vicinity of the Mull – the impression one would get is that they were pushing the a/c beyond the recommended cruise speed (uncomfortable and not so good for the a/c) because they were in a hurry, and possibly disregarding VFR by exceeding 140 kts air speed in unsuitable conditions. Cowboys? But what are the assumptions about their speed based upon?
Let's look at Boeing's Analysis:
Their man refers to forecast wind speeds of 12-18kts at the surface and 25kt at an altitude of 2000ft and argues that “... the aircraft was likely flying at a low altitude of between 400-500ft. Consequently, the surface winds are considered to be more applicable to a calculation of average airspeed.” and so uses 15 kts as the average wind speed to get a mean airspeed of 148.8kt for the bulk of the flight up to the position of waypoint change.
Clearly, as he says, “... somewhat higher than the generally accepted operating parameters for the aircraft, where a cruise airspeed of approximately 135kts is normally used as being optimum for both aircraft range and pilot comfort.” And also, of course, above 140kts which puts more constraints on the VFR applicable to them.
But was he right to use a surface wind speed of only 15kts? If you apply some met science and use the two forecast speeds (at the surface and at 2000ft), calculations using the wind profile power law for the a/c at 500 ft give a wind speed of about 22 kts.
So reducing by 7 kts their average, we get more like 142 kts as a mean.
Further, if we consider that the forecast at the Mull was 20 kt gusting to 30 kt but the calculated wind speed from the aircraft steering calculations was 30 kts then perhaps we can understand that the actual winds that day could have been a few knots more than forecast, at least at the high end of the forecast range – after all, forecasts are not all that precise.
Perhaps you are now beginning to see a different perspective here: the MOD (and Boeing's analyst) used forecast wind speeds which implied a higher speed than was sensible – I am saying that, calculated properly for 500 ft altitude, their air speed was significantly less such that, had the wind been only a few knots more than forecast, they would have been cruising along at about the recommended 135kts air speed.
Does it not make sense that, with passengers on board and it being a nice new a/c that one would have thought they did not want to shake to bits, that they would not have exceeded the normal cruising speed? And would they not have had consideration of the 140kts barrier with respect to helo VFR?
If you really want to give these pilots the benefit of the doubt then this is one specific point that you should start with – they may not have been “speeding” at all.
<<Of far greater import is the human factors effect on the pilots. They had no confidence whatsoever in the SuperTANS. >>
I have been making this point for years – Flt Lt Tapper (acknowledged as very knowledgeable on nav systems) had warned colleagues of its potential inaccuracies – he would certainly not have relied upon it for keeping clear of a fuzzy obstacle like the Mull was that day as close in as the position of waypoint change – further, if he had another reference in which he had more confidence but which contradicted the SuperTANS by anything up to a mile, he would probably have dismissed the conflict as just the error in the SuperTANS, especially after a sea crossing which would have been expected to have made the Doppler side of the system erratic to an extent. He would most certainly not have relied upon it for the closing range in, say, a fast approach to that LZ and so it would not be surprising if he had dumped waypoint A when he considered it of no further use.
That said, who is talking about “testing” of the SuperTANS post crash? I am not drawing upon any conclusions by the MOD about its serviceability and accuracy for the whole flight – just the values stored in it, and their correspondance to the position of the crash site and velocity data (as did Mr Mitchel of Boeing in his “Analysis of Available Data”) - these suggest that the system was reasonably accurate at the time of impact and working back to the time of the waypoint change (not that long) dist/time calcs agree with the position the SuperTANS thought it was at at that time (from the range and bearing to the waypoint stored then). The crew may well have had no confidence in it but the SuperTANS retrospectively had been reasonably accurate in the critical area – which helps analysis greatly as we have a “stake in the ground” that is the position where the waypoint was changed from “A” in the SuperTANS.
A general observation I would like to make regarding not only debate on this forum but from what has transpired at the inquiries is that there appears to be a desire by many to avoid accepting the determination of any parameters that help analysis – a single fundamental example which I will use to illustrate this is the speed of the a/c:
SPEED
There has been so much emphasis on the speed being too high over the duration of the flight and particularly in the vicinity of the Mull – the impression one would get is that they were pushing the a/c beyond the recommended cruise speed (uncomfortable and not so good for the a/c) because they were in a hurry, and possibly disregarding VFR by exceeding 140 kts air speed in unsuitable conditions. Cowboys? But what are the assumptions about their speed based upon?
Let's look at Boeing's Analysis:
Their man refers to forecast wind speeds of 12-18kts at the surface and 25kt at an altitude of 2000ft and argues that “... the aircraft was likely flying at a low altitude of between 400-500ft. Consequently, the surface winds are considered to be more applicable to a calculation of average airspeed.” and so uses 15 kts as the average wind speed to get a mean airspeed of 148.8kt for the bulk of the flight up to the position of waypoint change.
Clearly, as he says, “... somewhat higher than the generally accepted operating parameters for the aircraft, where a cruise airspeed of approximately 135kts is normally used as being optimum for both aircraft range and pilot comfort.” And also, of course, above 140kts which puts more constraints on the VFR applicable to them.
But was he right to use a surface wind speed of only 15kts? If you apply some met science and use the two forecast speeds (at the surface and at 2000ft), calculations using the wind profile power law for the a/c at 500 ft give a wind speed of about 22 kts.
So reducing by 7 kts their average, we get more like 142 kts as a mean.
Further, if we consider that the forecast at the Mull was 20 kt gusting to 30 kt but the calculated wind speed from the aircraft steering calculations was 30 kts then perhaps we can understand that the actual winds that day could have been a few knots more than forecast, at least at the high end of the forecast range – after all, forecasts are not all that precise.
Perhaps you are now beginning to see a different perspective here: the MOD (and Boeing's analyst) used forecast wind speeds which implied a higher speed than was sensible – I am saying that, calculated properly for 500 ft altitude, their air speed was significantly less such that, had the wind been only a few knots more than forecast, they would have been cruising along at about the recommended 135kts air speed.
Does it not make sense that, with passengers on board and it being a nice new a/c that one would have thought they did not want to shake to bits, that they would not have exceeded the normal cruising speed? And would they not have had consideration of the 140kts barrier with respect to helo VFR?
If you really want to give these pilots the benefit of the doubt then this is one specific point that you should start with – they may not have been “speeding” at all.
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Cazatou
You have quoted the following from the BoI:
This may sound pedantic but it's important to note that no distances are used within the quote. With relation to helicopter flying (ie relatively slow and able to hover taxi if necessary) "in the vicinity of" could be, say, 100 yds.
Given the evidence of Mr Holbrook (the only witness to have given evidence as to the weather a mile or two offshore), it seems entirely feasible to me that ZD576 was likely to have been legally being flown under VFR, at least until it failed to carry out the left turn to Corran that Supertans indicates was selected. True, when the aircraft failed to turn (for whatever reason) it entered IMC and subsequently struck a cloud-shrouded hill, but that does not, in itself, indicate negligence of the crew "beyond any doubt whatsoever", "beyond reasonable doubt", or even "on the balance of probablity". I agree that they may have been negligent but no-one can ever know. Someone was, however, negligent to ignore the warnings from Boscombe Down and press the HC2 into service on, I understand, a Service Deviation. I have my own suspicion but is anyone in Ppruneland in a position to name the signatory of that Service Deviation?
You have quoted the following from the BoI:
The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre
Given the evidence of Mr Holbrook (the only witness to have given evidence as to the weather a mile or two offshore), it seems entirely feasible to me that ZD576 was likely to have been legally being flown under VFR, at least until it failed to carry out the left turn to Corran that Supertans indicates was selected. True, when the aircraft failed to turn (for whatever reason) it entered IMC and subsequently struck a cloud-shrouded hill, but that does not, in itself, indicate negligence of the crew "beyond any doubt whatsoever", "beyond reasonable doubt", or even "on the balance of probablity". I agree that they may have been negligent but no-one can ever know. Someone was, however, negligent to ignore the warnings from Boscombe Down and press the HC2 into service on, I understand, a Service Deviation. I have my own suspicion but is anyone in Ppruneland in a position to name the signatory of that Service Deviation?
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Meadowbank,
I wouldn't waste anymore time on this particular subject if I were you.
The vast majority of the rest of the world accept:
1. Fog at the lighthouse has little relevance to the actual conditions at the turning point over sea.
2. A forecast of conditions made some 6 to 8 hours before the aircraft arrived at the Mull cannot confirm whether the actual conditions were VFR or IFR.
3. The evidence of Mr Holbrook, (flawed or not), suggests VFR.
Cazatou has already stated he will not accept these facts / hypothesis / opinions, call them what you like.
I wouldn't waste anymore time on this particular subject if I were you.
The vast majority of the rest of the world accept:
1. Fog at the lighthouse has little relevance to the actual conditions at the turning point over sea.
2. A forecast of conditions made some 6 to 8 hours before the aircraft arrived at the Mull cannot confirm whether the actual conditions were VFR or IFR.
3. The evidence of Mr Holbrook, (flawed or not), suggests VFR.
Cazatou has already stated he will not accept these facts / hypothesis / opinions, call them what you like.