Nimrod MRA.4
TOFO
Perhaps you'd care to address the point in another way.
Take Chinook ZD576, Nimrod XV230, Hercules XV179, Tornado ZD576 and Sea King ASaC XV650 & XV704.
In each case, while seeking to implement the regulations, MoD staffs identified risks and/or hazards which, ultimately, the respective Boards of Inquiry cited as direct or contributory causes. In each case, the BoI came to these conclusions independently, thinking they were revelations, because they were misled by senior staffs. Similarly, Coroners/Sheriff.
Additionally, there were many generic warnings of systemic failure to maintain airworthiness.
It is this FACT, that senior staffs had prior warning and then withheld that information, in some cases for many years, that makes this whole case so appalling. By covering this up, they denied the "system" the opportunity to prevent the accident, and then prevent recurrence. This is not a "**** happens" scenario. It involved quite deliberate acts.
And yet, pprune contributors who only seek to prevent recurrence are denigrated, while those who committed serious offences are appeased. pprune is indeed MoD in microcosm.
Another question if I may. Anyone with airworthiness delegation is required by law to inform his/her superiors of any failure whatsoever. (Read your letters of delegation). How many met this obligation? In the first instance, I aim this at the MAA. It should be a pre-requisite to being posted there, because otherwise your main qualification is the ability to ignore wrongdoing. And given, on MoD's own admission, the answer is "one" (which I disagree with, I know of at least three), is that not perfect reason for an independent MAA?
Perhaps you'd care to address the point in another way.
Take Chinook ZD576, Nimrod XV230, Hercules XV179, Tornado ZD576 and Sea King ASaC XV650 & XV704.
In each case, while seeking to implement the regulations, MoD staffs identified risks and/or hazards which, ultimately, the respective Boards of Inquiry cited as direct or contributory causes. In each case, the BoI came to these conclusions independently, thinking they were revelations, because they were misled by senior staffs. Similarly, Coroners/Sheriff.
Additionally, there were many generic warnings of systemic failure to maintain airworthiness.
It is this FACT, that senior staffs had prior warning and then withheld that information, in some cases for many years, that makes this whole case so appalling. By covering this up, they denied the "system" the opportunity to prevent the accident, and then prevent recurrence. This is not a "**** happens" scenario. It involved quite deliberate acts.
And yet, pprune contributors who only seek to prevent recurrence are denigrated, while those who committed serious offences are appeased. pprune is indeed MoD in microcosm.
Another question if I may. Anyone with airworthiness delegation is required by law to inform his/her superiors of any failure whatsoever. (Read your letters of delegation). How many met this obligation? In the first instance, I aim this at the MAA. It should be a pre-requisite to being posted there, because otherwise your main qualification is the ability to ignore wrongdoing. And given, on MoD's own admission, the answer is "one" (which I disagree with, I know of at least three), is that not perfect reason for an independent MAA?
I'll take that as the Chinook, Hercules, Tornado and Sea King fleets should be grounded then.
You going to tell the PM that the RAF is closing, or shall I?
You going to tell the PM that the RAF is closing, or shall I?
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Fly hard.
In these PC days I think that some folks forget the fact that these are military aircraft and are supposed to be flown hard. Accidents will happen, pilots fly into the terrain, unforseen fatigue failures occur, software glitches only come to light when there is a system crash...........It's the nature of the game and that should be remembered. If it was all H&S then there would be no direct action to minimise a threat.
I well remember doing a couple of 'swop rides' on Nimrods out of Kinloss and sitting at an observer's window up front and watching the wingtips bouncing up and down whilst pulling 2 G at low level. I wondered even then as a baby Shack pilot what the fatigue life would be, let alone the corrosion life that low over the sea. (I was told me that the wingtip would move 3.5 feet in upwards and downwards plane, 7 feet in all - is that a fact?). Weird, being in a plastic aeroplane.
Had a ride in a Jaguar once - utterly boring once the thing finally became airborne until we hit the low level routing through the Highlands. Then it became scary.............I am sure that Fl Lt X took great delight in trying to scare me ****less. More or less succeeded.
But that's the point - when you fly aircraft hard there will be accidents. Fact. Just like racing : Cars or motorbikes. There is an element of risk and that is probably what attracts us to it in all honesty.
I well remember doing a couple of 'swop rides' on Nimrods out of Kinloss and sitting at an observer's window up front and watching the wingtips bouncing up and down whilst pulling 2 G at low level. I wondered even then as a baby Shack pilot what the fatigue life would be, let alone the corrosion life that low over the sea. (I was told me that the wingtip would move 3.5 feet in upwards and downwards plane, 7 feet in all - is that a fact?). Weird, being in a plastic aeroplane.
Had a ride in a Jaguar once - utterly boring once the thing finally became airborne until we hit the low level routing through the Highlands. Then it became scary.............I am sure that Fl Lt X took great delight in trying to scare me ****less. More or less succeeded.
But that's the point - when you fly aircraft hard there will be accidents. Fact. Just like racing : Cars or motorbikes. There is an element of risk and that is probably what attracts us to it in all honesty.
TT2,
Quite correct - and I've certainly ridden my aircraft hard when required.
But.
The assumption is that if I fly within the SOPs/RTS, and make no heinous error of judgement, I will remain safe. What Tuc et al are alluding to is, in effect, the aviation equivalent of being Geoffrey Howe being asked to 'play cricket' with a broken bat. The apparent callous nature of certain VSOs in protecting themselves and their acolytes whilst all the time preaching 'leadership' is below contempt. Don't just use the above examples, for more evidence look at JATEU C130, SF C130 and Catterick Puma and witness VSOs 'pulling up the ladder' to shaft the junior/middle management whilst protecting themselves.
With great power comes great responsibility; either we need to nail an ex-VSO pour les encouragement des les autre or one needs to stand up and take one for the team; as Patton opined, it does the enlisted man good to see a dead general on the battlefield every now and then....
Quite correct - and I've certainly ridden my aircraft hard when required.
But.
The assumption is that if I fly within the SOPs/RTS, and make no heinous error of judgement, I will remain safe. What Tuc et al are alluding to is, in effect, the aviation equivalent of being Geoffrey Howe being asked to 'play cricket' with a broken bat. The apparent callous nature of certain VSOs in protecting themselves and their acolytes whilst all the time preaching 'leadership' is below contempt. Don't just use the above examples, for more evidence look at JATEU C130, SF C130 and Catterick Puma and witness VSOs 'pulling up the ladder' to shaft the junior/middle management whilst protecting themselves.
With great power comes great responsibility; either we need to nail an ex-VSO pour les encouragement des les autre or one needs to stand up and take one for the team; as Patton opined, it does the enlisted man good to see a dead general on the battlefield every now and then....
TOFO:
It is not about what I am worth, which I agree is very little. It is what needless loss of life is worth, past, present, and future.
ATG:
Truculence isn't the answer to this crisis for the RAF. The answer is for the RAF to face up to it full square, as it has done to others in its history. It has to come out from behind the false security of the Haddon Cave Report and confront what was done to its airworthiness by its own VSOs from the late 1980s and by which it is still compromised. To avoid a recurrence it must ensure that the MAA and MAAIB are independent of the MOD and of each other, and leave them to do their work. That will be to ensure the future capability of the RAF is enhanced rather than the defeatist stance that you suggest.
TT2. Of course the point of Military Aviation is to fly hard. That is why you need aircraft capable of doing just that in a hostile environment. The aircraft involved in the fatal accidents that caused the 62 deaths mentioned by TOFO were not, because their airworthiness had not been assured by the UK Military Airworthiness Authority, aka the MOD.
BTW, TOFO you miss the point entirely. The causes of some of those accidents may well be known only unto God, if for no other reason that their BoIs were not as fully informed as we are now, about the 'ARTs, about Test Pilot reservations, be they at BD or ODH, or about interference in process from above. They all were without doubt though airworthiness related. May I remind you that the long running purpose of any Air Accident Investigator is to determine cause, be it Chinook's or whatever. That is why an investigator must be completely independent of any attempts to obstruct it in that.
Maybe because in the end that is all you are worth.
ATG:
You going to tell the PM that the RAF is closing, or shall I?
TT2. Of course the point of Military Aviation is to fly hard. That is why you need aircraft capable of doing just that in a hostile environment. The aircraft involved in the fatal accidents that caused the 62 deaths mentioned by TOFO were not, because their airworthiness had not been assured by the UK Military Airworthiness Authority, aka the MOD.
BTW, TOFO you miss the point entirely. The causes of some of those accidents may well be known only unto God, if for no other reason that their BoIs were not as fully informed as we are now, about the 'ARTs, about Test Pilot reservations, be they at BD or ODH, or about interference in process from above. They all were without doubt though airworthiness related. May I remind you that the long running purpose of any Air Accident Investigator is to determine cause, be it Chinook's or whatever. That is why an investigator must be completely independent of any attempts to obstruct it in that.
Last edited by Chugalug2; 26th Jun 2013 at 09:29.
Chug - so what happens when the MAA and MAAIB are made independent? I doubt either would be willing to allow an un-airworthy aircraft to fly, and thus would ground them. How long will it take to prove the airworthiness of each fleet, especially as we haven't been doing it for so long, and we've fired everyone who knows how to do it.
Lets say it takes 12 months to sort the paperwork out, make the necessary amendments to aircraft, etc etc. Can the RAF cope with each Fleet out of service for that long? Indeed, could the RAF produce it's output with each Fleet out of service for 1 month? Where is the point when aircrew and maintainer currency can no longer be maintained? At point does the PM say, actually, we've done without the RAF's capabilities in this area for so long, why am I paying for them to come back? You could see a point where the Merlin, Wildcat and Apache continue to fly, alongside the F-35, none of which require the RAF's input.
The other option is for the MAA to allow an un-airworthy aircraft to fly, having acknowledged it's status. I wouldn't wish to be the Chief MAA to have that happen on my books. Indeed, can you point to the CAA or FAA allowing a known un-airworthy aircraft continuing to fly?
Whilst you and tuc have been fantastic in explaining how we got here, the pair of you are pretty poor at explaining what happens next, and what the second and third order consequences are. And that, frankly, is far more pertinent to the discussion.
Beware perfect being the enemy of good enough.
Lets say it takes 12 months to sort the paperwork out, make the necessary amendments to aircraft, etc etc. Can the RAF cope with each Fleet out of service for that long? Indeed, could the RAF produce it's output with each Fleet out of service for 1 month? Where is the point when aircrew and maintainer currency can no longer be maintained? At point does the PM say, actually, we've done without the RAF's capabilities in this area for so long, why am I paying for them to come back? You could see a point where the Merlin, Wildcat and Apache continue to fly, alongside the F-35, none of which require the RAF's input.
The other option is for the MAA to allow an un-airworthy aircraft to fly, having acknowledged it's status. I wouldn't wish to be the Chief MAA to have that happen on my books. Indeed, can you point to the CAA or FAA allowing a known un-airworthy aircraft continuing to fly?
Whilst you and tuc have been fantastic in explaining how we got here, the pair of you are pretty poor at explaining what happens next, and what the second and third order consequences are. And that, frankly, is far more pertinent to the discussion.
Beware perfect being the enemy of good enough.
Whilst you and tuc have been fantastic in explaining how we got here, the pair of you are pretty poor at explaining what happens next,
Can YOU explain how we got here?
If you can be bothered to read what I think should be done, posted here often (too often for some it seems, as they want it out of sight and mind, preferring to rely on luck) then give us the benefit of your proposals. There are many ways to skin a cat, but implementing perfectly good regulations is a good starting point. In my opinion.
Beware perfect being the enemy of good enough.
We're not talking about things like accepting 300 miles range on a radar when the spec says 320. Many aspects of attaining airworthiness are absolutes. For example, on Safety Critical Software there MUST be an independent signature on the Certificate of Design before the software is allowed near a Service aircraft. In June 1994 there was no such Certificate of Design for FADEC software in Chinook. Yet a false statement was made (when signing the RTS) that this mandated regulation had been complied with. Does anyone here agree with that action?
We know what the VSOs have ruled (and what you presumably agree with, because you are arguing against me).
For example, they say one should strive for Physical Safety but it isn't mandatory; but Functional Safety can be ignored altogether without even trying.
That one philosophy applies to each and every accident mentioned above, to a greater or lesser degree. Mostly greater. That ruling remains extant to this day, and MoD is quite content stating this to Ministers.
Can we agree on our opinion of that policy? I don't agree with it. Do you? I'd rather agree with you, because seeing so many people, many of them aircrew, arguing vehemently against aviation safety is more than a bit disheartening.
ATG:-
Which is exactly what the MAA is setting out to do, I would suggest. As tuc has already said, there are degrees of unairworthiness, and the trick is to sort out the wheat from the chaff, ie spot the next "N****d" and ground it pdq, but keep the rest flying while you try to sort out their deficiencies. So why not leave them alone to do just that and stop carping on? Because the temptation will always be there to carry on covering up the past and misrepresenting the present.
As I've said before, this needs leadership, both from the RAF and the MAA. Are you telling me there is none?
Well, I'm sorry about that. We've tried to say what we think should happen next, a full public acceptance of what has happened and a sincere move to put it right. That must mean bringing those responsible for this mess and its cover up to book and ensuring that it cannot recur. Under present arrangements it could, unless and until the MAA and MAAIB be made separate and independent of the MOD and of each other. That means a civvie DG each, for a start. As to what then happens that is not up to me, you, or tuc, but up to the MAA and MAAIB. Their TORs though should be principally to maintain the fighting capability of the RAF (and FAA and AAC), and not their own backsides, ie it needs leadership.
The other option is for the MAA to allow an un-airworthy aircraft to fly, having acknowledged it's status.
...I wouldn't wish to be the Chief MAA to have that happen on my books.
the pair of you are pretty poor at explaining what happens next
Last edited by Chugalug2; 26th Jun 2013 at 13:58.
I know its hard going if you've no experience of airworthiness, which is most here, but my advice is to read the evidence to Hadden-Cave and Lord Phillip. Tuc and Chug are absolutely right. If you wanted to avoid most of these accidents and correct the system the answer is the same. The rules are not difficult to understand, just implement them. Just because an issue seems complex doesn't mean the answer isn't simple and staring us in the face. Seems to me it is something else that is upsetting a few folks. Tuc mentioned one of them, that few met their obligation to report failures. Another is the shock we feel at being let down by such senior officers. Evaluator's is one of the few posts that mentions this unmentionable.
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Not wishing to make light of Mil airworthiness but if the current CDM allows cooking of the books to continue, perhaps this chap should be hired as a consultant: Abbeywood Projects - Home
Perfect form and function - for a lifetime
Perfect form and function - for a lifetime
Last edited by GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU; 27th Jun 2013 at 08:11. Reason: Crap Spelling
What next?
Okay – Air Safety Regulation appears broken, how do we get it fixed?
I read every word of the H-C Report – and ended up none the wiser, but then I’m a simple soul. I thank those here who have explained the situation we find ourselves in.
Do we have to start by bringing (alleged) the guilty parties to court first? If so how do we go about doing this?
If not how do we get people to simply do what they are supposed to do openly and thereby expose those who are preventing them from doing it? Will this prompt an investigation at a level high enough to eventually bring about an impartial authority?
I’m sure the current engineers are doing their level best to keep our aircraft fit for use despite the apparent inadequacies of the command chain. They and those who operate the aircraft deserve better. Accidents do happen – I have seen too many. Future avoidable incidents should be prevented by the robust implementation of correct rules.
Please forgive the list of questions but simply saying “Something must be done” will not get it done – does anyone know how to go about getting this mess sorted before we all end up saying “I told you so?”
I read every word of the H-C Report – and ended up none the wiser, but then I’m a simple soul. I thank those here who have explained the situation we find ourselves in.
Do we have to start by bringing (alleged) the guilty parties to court first? If so how do we go about doing this?
If not how do we get people to simply do what they are supposed to do openly and thereby expose those who are preventing them from doing it? Will this prompt an investigation at a level high enough to eventually bring about an impartial authority?
I’m sure the current engineers are doing their level best to keep our aircraft fit for use despite the apparent inadequacies of the command chain. They and those who operate the aircraft deserve better. Accidents do happen – I have seen too many. Future avoidable incidents should be prevented by the robust implementation of correct rules.
Please forgive the list of questions but simply saying “Something must be done” will not get it done – does anyone know how to go about getting this mess sorted before we all end up saying “I told you so?”
HAS59, it rather depends on who you mean by "we". If you mean the Royal Air Force, and its High Command in particular, then the bitter truth is that "we" can't
because "we" can't be trusted to do so. The High Command still insists that an order to subvert the regulations was legal, and that anyone who disobeyed it committed an offence. That is the stance of the MOD right up to SoS level. I think that any Airworthiness Authority that operates under such strictures and steadfastly refuses to face up to what was done in the past and has been covered up ever since loses all credibility from the very start. Airworthiness Authorities should not only be independent of such pressures but be seen to be so.
The problem isn't to keep aircraft fit for use as you put it, it is that aircraft are released into service in accordance with the regulations, and remain so. The MAA is now urgently reviewing each fleet to see in what degree that is not the case, and what action it thinks should result. That can only be an interim solution, and the job of returning UK Military Airworthiness to the level attained some 30 years ago before it was so malevolently violated must be done by an Authority with real authority, ie independent of and without the MOD. Ditto all of the above with the MAAIB.
That is the something that must be done.
go about getting this mess sorted
The problem isn't to keep aircraft fit for use as you put it, it is that aircraft are released into service in accordance with the regulations, and remain so. The MAA is now urgently reviewing each fleet to see in what degree that is not the case, and what action it thinks should result. That can only be an interim solution, and the job of returning UK Military Airworthiness to the level attained some 30 years ago before it was so malevolently violated must be done by an Authority with real authority, ie independent of and without the MOD. Ditto all of the above with the MAAIB.
That is the something that must be done.
The MAA is now urgently reviewing each fleet to see in what degree that is not the case, and what action it thinks should result.
Lots of paper, lots of emotion, but no actual change.
Roger that JTO, I obviously misread a previous post, sorry! In which case the words "are not" need inserting, or perhaps "should be"? Thanks for the update. Rather underlines the urgent need for HAS59's "something"! That is the one thing that the RAF can now do by way of amends, to get that survey started and press for the re-organisation of the MAA and MAAIB to become independent bodies headed up by civilian DGs but manned by a mix of military and civilian trained personnel. Time,as they say, is of the essence.
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HEMSON, CARPENTER, RUMING AND MEDCALF
There was also this NZ produced movie (16mm Celluloid) from back in the day - Fincastle 1974. Unsure if it was ever digitised.
HEMSON, CARPENTER, RUMING AND MEDCALF - Moving Image F14224 - Online Catalogue | The New Zealand Film Archive
HEMSON, CARPENTER, RUMING AND MEDCALF - Moving Image F14224 - Online Catalogue | The New Zealand Film Archive
Last edited by RequestPidgeons; 1st Oct 2013 at 21:38.
This will sound really stupid.....
.....but how the hell do I get it to play? I remember the slomo intro as all the aircraft approach the field through the heat haze and the explanation of the a/c names. And Big Tall Eric was a great guy to fly with.
The Ancient Mariner
The Ancient Mariner
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Sorry, TAM
On looking further, seems that the film is only available to be viewed at the Archive library.
I reckon it would be worth re-publishing as a DVD; it might even turn a bit of coin for those wanting to reminisce
On looking further, seems that the film is only available to be viewed at the Archive library.
I reckon it would be worth re-publishing as a DVD; it might even turn a bit of coin for those wanting to reminisce